

15 December 2010

## INDONESIA / CENTRAL SULAWESI

# IDP return and recovery hampered by persistent tensions, land disputes and limited access to livelihoods


From the end of 1998 to 2002 there were several waves of conflict in the province of Central Sulawesi between Christians and Muslims. The cause lay in competition for land, employment and political influence at a time when post-Suharto Indonesia was in the early stages of democratic transition and decentralisation. The government was slow to respond and the arrival of Islamic militants from elsewhere in Indonesia frustrated efforts to contain the conflict. Despatch of additional military and police personnel in 2001 eventually ended most of the violence and displacement.

The three years of conflict resulted in the displacement of up to 143,000 people and intensified ethno-religious segregation. Over the past decade there have been sporadic outbreaks of violence but a significant ongoing deployment of security personnel has prevented further displacement. Some two thirds of IDPs returned to places of origin shortly after the end of the conflict. Others waited for the security situation to stabilise further before returning.

Christian IDPs have generally appeared more receptive to return to their pre-conflict homes while Muslims have generally tended to prefer local integration or resettlement. Since 2004 the process of return of internally displaced people (IDPs) has been stalled by fears of renewed violence, failure to bring to justice those responsible for orchestrated violence, failure to establish a trustworthy and transparent judicial system, lack of access to land and other forms of livelihood and inability to prove land ownership.

Government interventions to help IDPs recover property and re-establish livelihoods have been generally half-hearted, under-resourced and significantly prone to corruption. The government no longer uses the IDP label and reliable data is not available, but it is believed that between 5,000 and 20,000 displaced inhabitants of the province have been unable to return or to achieve durable solutions. Members of many formerly displaced communities, whether returnees or resettled, have been unable to enjoy rights on the same level as their fellow citizens.

### Conflict and displacement in Central Sulawesi (1998-2002)



**Number of IDPs**

It is estimated that up to 150,000 people were displaced by conflict in Central Sulawesi between December 1998 and August 2002.

Although there is no reliable data, it is believed that between 5,000 and 20,000 people may have been unable to return home or to achieve durable solutions as of 2010.

Areas with high numbers of IDPs and returnees include Poso city, North Pamona, Lage and Poso Pesisir, but also Palu and Ampana.

December 2010

**Legend**

- Main IDP movements (Dec. 1998-April 2000)
- Main IDP movements (May 2000-Dec 2001)
- Main IDP movements (Aug. 2002)
- Areas with high IDP/returnee concentrations (2010)
- Provincial capital
- Cities
- Towns
- Provincial boundaries
- Regency boundaries
- - - Sub-regency boundaries

0 100 200km

**IDMC** International Displacement Monitoring Centre

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the IDMC

Source: IDMC  
 More maps are available at [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org)

## Background and causes of displacement

### *Chronology of the conflict*

On Christmas Eve 1998, a young Christian stabbed a young Muslim in the city of Poso, the main port of the province of Central Sulawesi. A few days later, hundreds of Christian youths and Muslims were trucked into the city from elsewhere in the province (CRISE, November 2007, p.8) sparking a week of rioting which resulted in 200 people being injured, hundreds of homes and shops destroyed and thousands of people displaced (UNDP, 2005, p.14). Violence and destruction affected primarily Christians. Most people who fled the violence headed either for the Muslim-majority provincial capital of Palu or for the Christian-majority city of Manado, the capital of the province of North Sulawesi (Aragon, 2008, p.176). Other destinations within the regency (sub-province) of Poso included the Christian-majority highland city of Tentena and Ampana, a coastal town east of Poso city (HRW, 4 December 2002, p.15).

A second wave of rioting in April 2000 was triggered by another stabbing of a Muslim. Two weeks of violence resulted in the death of seven people and destruction of hundreds of houses, shops and schools, most belonging to Christians (UNDP, 2005, p.14). Police paramilitary units (Brimob) were called in from Palu to quell the violence but were withdrawn after firing on the crowd and killing three Muslims. The incident infuriated the Muslims who stepped up attacks on Christian neighbourhoods. Thousands of Christians fled into the hills above Poso and to Tentena (HRW, 4 December 2002, p.16).

A third wave of violence took place in May-June 2000 when Christians launched revenge attacks on Muslims they held responsible for most of the two previous rounds of violence. By July, the violence had spread beyond the city of Poso and affected many villages in the regency. The situa-

tion was eventually stabilised by the intervention of 1,500 soldiers and Brimob units from Java who confiscated weapons. Between 300 and 800 people died, most of them Muslims (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.249). Tens of thousands of people fled their homes, with Muslims heading mainly for coastal towns in the province such as Palu, Donggala or Parigi and Christians taking refuge in highland towns such as Napu and Tentena or travelling to North Sulawesi. In August, after the violence had subsided, the provincial authorities made some attempts to promote reconciliation and the return of the displaced, but with limited success. Intermittent conflict persisted in the following months.

A fourth phase of conflict and displacement took place between July and December 2001. It followed the arrival in the province, mostly from Java, of members of Laskar Jihad, an extremist Muslim militia armed with more sophisticated weapons. Fighting became more deadly and caused more displacement. The government at first did little to prevent the arrival of the Muslim militants who coordinated with local Muslims to attack Christian villages, many of which were burnt to the ground. Despatch of additional security forces restored stability but not before 141 people were dead, 90 injured and close to 2,500 houses destroyed. Tens of thousands of people, mainly Christians, were displaced, the majority seeking refuge in the highlands, such as in Napu to where 11,000 people were reported to have fled (HRW, 4 December 2002, pp.20-26).

A government-brokered agreement, the Malino Declaration (MD), was signed in December 2001 and rapidly ended the large-scale fighting and destruction. However, sporadic violence in the form of bomb and attacks on villages continued. In August 2002, several thousand people fled attacks on their homes in Lage sub-district and Poso municipality and sought refuge in Tentena (OCHA, 22 August 2002).

After 2002, violence and insecurity continued to prevent many people from returning but did not lead to further large-scale displacement. In October 2003, an attack on Christian villages by remnant groups of Muslim militants resulted in the death of 13 Christians. In 2005, three Christian schoolgirls were beheaded in an incident that attracted international attention. The same year, a bomb in Tentena marketplace killed 22 people. Some of these incidents were reportedly linked to the alleged embezzlement of funds earmarked for internally displaced people (IDPs). NGOs which had denounced this corruption were among the targets of these attacks (CRISE, November 2007, p.9; McRae, March 2006). Since 2008, calm and security have been largely restored and there have been no significant incidents of violence in Poso regency, which remains heavily policed (Jakarta Post, 11 October 2010).

Between 2002 and 2004, significant improvements in the security situation in Poso and other conflict-affected parts of Central Sulawesi allowed the return of substantial numbers of IDPs. In 2003, the government estimated that nearly three-quarters of the displaced, some 107,000 people, had returned. By 2004, most of the displaced able to go home had done so and returns almost stopped as remaining IDPs decided not to return to their former homes (UNDP, July 2004, p.14). In total, between 110,000 and 143,000 people were displaced by more than three years of violence (HRW, 4 December 2002, p.39; OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.15).

#### *Causes of violence*

Although ostensibly based on religion, the conflict was rooted in underlying economic, social, political and ethnic tensions that had gradually built up towards the end of the 1990s against a backdrop of demographic changes brought about by migration movements (Bakornas & OCHA, March 2003, p. 1). Christian highlanders were favoured under Dutch colonisation, through better education opportunities and privileged ac-

cess to local government positions. They progressively lost this education advantage under the New Order, the name given to the authoritarian policies pursued during the regime of President Suharto (1965–1998), but managed, however, to retain their dominance in the local bureaucracy (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.266). As elsewhere in Indonesia, migration, both spontaneous and state-sponsored, profoundly altered the ethnic demographic balance, often creating conflicts around land, jobs and resources between migrants and the local indigenous population. A majority in Sulawesi until the late 1990s, the Christian population fell to 40 per cent in the early 2000s due to the arrival of Muslim migrants. The political transition and uncertainty that characterised the end of the New Order allowed tensions to surface and erupt into violence. Weak and corrupted state institutions proved unable to contain violence. Politicians vying for post-Suharto influence were eager to encourage and take advantage of it.

The newcomers, mainly Muslim Bugis from South Sulawesi, relied on state law to determine land ownership while the local communities used customary *adat* law. In 1992, the Central Sulawesi provincial government decided that all land without certificate would become state land. As a result, land rights became unclear and land ownership previously governed by *adat* law became subject to seizure by the state to be distributed to migrants or to logging and agro-industrial companies.

State development policies encouraged entrepreneurial migrants to invest in logging and cash cropping, a contrast to the subsistence agriculture of the indigenous population. Upland rural communities became economically and politically marginalised by developmental processes beyond their control. The overlap between the migrant-indigenous and the religious cleavages helps explain why the conflict became seen as a religious one. The conflict could also be assessed "...in terms of competing territorial claims and

civil rights among those who are recent migrants and those who claim to be natives" (Aragon, 2008, p.201).

In a province where more than 40 per cent of the population is classified as poor and where the private sector and industry remain under-developed, control of public sector positions and the economic opportunities they provide is particularly important. Competition to enter the civil service intensified in the late 1990s as the end of the New Order and the nationwide roll-out of decentralisation reforms opened new possibilities for local power-holders. Interviews conducted with NGOs, leaders and ex-combatants several years after the conflict had ended showed general agreement that competition for access to the state was part of the conflict from the beginning (Diprose, 2009, p. 122). The strongest organisations able to generate mass support at this critical juncture were religious, rather than political, entities (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.p.267). Religion and ethnicity became "political vehicles for certain elite interests" (HRW, 4 December 2002, p.9).

While the initial explosion of violence in Poso in the last days of 1998 may primarily be ascribed to religious and political tensions the violence which followed was fuelled by desire to loot land and other assets and to profit from gun-selling. By the later years of the conflict revenge had become the main driver of violence (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.267). The conflict was also exacerbated by failure to establish an effective formal justice system. The weaknesses of the judicial system and inconsistent application of criminal law deepened distrust of state institutions on both sides of the conflict (HRW, 4 December 2002, p.43).

## **Most IDPs return but thousands remain displaced**

More than ten years after the initial eruption of violence, the majority of the up to 143,000 people

displaced by the conflict are thought to have returned to their homes, while others have chosen to integrate locally or resettle elsewhere. Since early 2004, the government has not considered them as IDPs but as "vulnerable poor" or ex-IDPs, a consequence of the ending of the national IDP policy that year. By then, the provincial government estimated that 18,000 families or 90,000 people remained either displaced or in need of assistance (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.15). Two years later, the Poso Office of *Community Protection and Unity of Nation (Kesbanglinmas)* estimated that 28,700 people remained displaced in the regency (Kesbanglinmas, 23 February 2006).

Although there are no reliable figures, it is estimated that as of 2010 the number of people still unable to return, or who are still waiting to receive assistance to rebuild their homes or restart their lives, may range between 5,000 and 20,000 people. Poso city, North Pamona, Lage and Poso Pesisir are believed to be some of the sub-districts with the highest concentration of IDPs and returnees. Some also remain in Palu (Sarosa et al., May 2008, p.2).

In November 2009 the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) estimated that several thousand people remained displaced in Poso regency, often because of unresolved land and property disputes. In 2008, the Poso Social Welfare Office identified 1,607 IDP households, or roughly 8,000 individuals, located in 62 villages of 12 sub-districts in Poso. The previous year, it estimated that 4,300 families, or 20,000 individuals, were still in need of housing assistance, one third of them were located outside the province (Suara Pembaruan Daily, 16 July 2007). The same year, the National Commission on Violence Against Women estimated that some 5,000 people remained displaced in camps and temporary shelters in 12 locations along Poso Lake near Tentena in the North Pamona sub-district (Komnas Perempuan, November 2007, p.66)

Poso regency was segregated on the basis of religion before the conflict. In ten of 17 sub-districts Muslims or Christians were in a majority of over 80 per cent (UNDP, July 2004, p.12). In the late 1990s decentralisation resulted in redrawing of administrative boundaries and further strengthening of religious homogeneity (CRISE, June 2007, p.1). Displacement and post-conflict return and resettlement processes further increased ethno-religious segregation. Coastal centres, including Poso city, as well as regional government institutions became dominated by such Muslim groups as the Javanese, Bugis, Gorontalo and Arabs. The departure of most Muslims left rural areas in the mountains and towns such as Tentena almost entirely controlled by Christian groups, including the Pamona, Lore and Mori (Aragon, 2008, p.176; UNDP, July 2004, p.14). Following the removal of Morowali and Tojo Una-Una from Poso regency, Christians, formerly a minority in Poso district, have become a majority (UNDP, 2005, p.66).

It is believed that an equal number of Christians and Muslim were displaced during the conflict (HRW, 4 December 2002, p.39). Although there is no reliable ethnic or religious breakdown of the population that has failed to return or has resettled elsewhere, it appears that there is a difference in return or resettlement preferences. Christian IDPs have appeared more willing to return to their pre-conflict homes than Muslims who have tended to prefer local integration of resettlement. This is partly explained by the fact that the conflict inflicted greater loss of life and injury for Muslims while Christians lost more homes and land (Aragon, 2008, p. 182). It may therefore have been easier for Christians to overcome their displacement and to decide to return home whereas Muslims may have been more traumatised. Christian IDPs are mostly indigenous highlanders who have a deep spiritual attachment to land and a profound unwillingness to leave it. Muslim migrants, on the other hand, attach more importance to family and are less tied to specific plots of land. Making a success of migration is the primary

objective and for Muslims land is primarily a means to achieve this (Aragon, 2008, p.204).

## Durable solutions

The extent to which all the different displaced groups, in particular those who sought refuge with friends or relatives and who were often not registered as IDPs, have been able to find durable solutions remains largely undocumented. Available information suggests that a number of former displaced groups in Central Sulawesi, both returned and settled elsewhere, are prevented from enjoying basic rights on the same level as other citizens. This is due to economic, social and political segregation, poor social integration with host communities, inadequate material and social assistance and unresolved land and property issues.

According to the Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, "a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement". A number of criteria are used to determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved. The criteria relevant in the context of the Central Sulawesi displacement situation include:

- long-term safety, security and freedom of movement
- an adequate standard of living, including, at a minimum, access to adequate food, water, housing, health care and basic education;
- access to employment and livelihoods;
- access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide them with compensation; and
- participation in public affairs at all levels on an equal basis with the resident population. (IASC, April 2010, pp.27-42)

*Long-term safety, security and freedom of movement*

Most areas in the province, and particularly Poso regency, are now relatively safe and there have been no serious incidents in the past years. However, security significantly depends on the continued extensive presence of security forces. Sporadic security incidents, including targeted attacks and bombings, in the years following the MD, discouraged many from returning home, in particular in areas where their religion was in minority. IDPs living in Later camp, near Tentena, remained reluctant to return to their Christian village, isolated in a Muslim-majority area, because they had already tried to do so twice only to have their houses once again burned (UNDP, July 2004, p. 23). Most of those who did not return did so because they were too traumatised by what they had gone through during the conflict (Aragon, 2008, pp.188-191).

The conflict and displacement had a great impact on the mental health of residents of affected areas, with those forced from their homes often experiencing the highest level of violence. IDPs who suffered high levels of violence reported depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. A survey conducted by the Health Ministry found that 30 per cent of returnees were suffering from a mental disorder (Jakarta Post, 10 January 2002). Trauma and psychological stress were compounded by economic hardship which resulted in increased stress on family relationships (UNDP, 2 July 2004, p.11). The loss of income caused by the conflict has created frustration and tension between children and parents (Tol et al., February 2010, p.119). Between 2004 and 2007, Church World Service conducted psycho-social programmes for children in schools located in areas most affected by the conflict but, in general, trauma counselling and psycho-social assistance has been insufficient.

As in most conflicts, women and children were the main victims of the violence. The security forces have been accused of sexual harassment and

rape at IDP sites (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.276). Victims often remained reluctant to report the case to the police as they feared the consequences. Women who became pregnant as result of rape by soldiers had no option but to flee the IDP camp with their children (UNDP, 2 July 2004, p.18). A number of children from Kasiguncu, a village in Poso regency which was seriously affected during the conflict, were moved to an orphanage in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, where they were subjected to serious abuses including beating, starvation and sexual assaults (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, p.282).

*Standard of living, and access to food, water, housing, health care and education*

The recovery of a large number of IDPs has been hampered by lack of assistance and mismanagement of recovery and rebuilding funds. Insufficient reconstruction in villages affected by the conflict meant that conditions were often not conducive for return and people who have returned remained in need of assistance.

Recovery needs have been particularly important in the sub-districts most affected by the violence and destruction. These include Poso Pesisir, where the conflict resulted in the destruction of 6,401 houses and public buildings and Lage where, in 2008, some villages destroyed during the conflict had not yet been completely rebuilt and where people were still living in damaged houses lacking sanitation (Useem, October 2008; Diprose, 2009, p.103). In 2007, the Department of Social Affairs estimated that up to 20,000 people were still waiting for housing assistance. Some were still living in temporary barracks, others in gardens or staying with host families or friends. 65 per cent were in Poso regency while the remaining 35 per cent were in Manado (North Sulawesi) or in Makassar (South Sulawesi) (Suara Pembaruan Daily, 16 July 2007).

Assistance provided to the displaced has, in most cases, not been gender-sensitive. An assessment

in IDP camps in North Tentena subdistrict by the National Commission on Violence against Women in 2007 showed that conditions were often inadequate, in particular for women. Access to basic health services, and particularly to reproductive health care, was reported as limited (Komnas Perempuan, November 2007, p.69). In camps the specific needs of women were often not taken into consideration and women have no access to sanitary napkins or contraceptives.

For many displaced groups in camps or resettlement sites a primary impediment to recovery is lack of ownership of land or inability to prove tenure. Without access to land or title deeds the displaced are at risk of eviction. In 2008, some 200 families who had been living on land owned by a church in Tentena following their 2001 displacement were asked to move to make way for a school extension. Most IDPs refused to leave, having integrated into the neighbourhood and fearing having to start from scratch (ICG, 22 January 2008, p.9).

Conflict- and displacement-induced poverty has made it hard for many children to attend school. Many parents cannot afford uniforms and other expenses. Many children have dropped out because of the length of their displacement, destruction of schools and shortage of teachers (Tol et al., February 2010, p.119). According to 2007 statistics, drop-out rates, mainly linked to poverty, are particularly high in the province, reaching 9.4 per cent in primary school, 8.2 per cent at junior high and 2.1 per cent at high school (Jakarta Post, 6 October 2010). Lack of school premises meant that much schooling took place in churches, houses or temporary buildings (UNDP, 2 July 2004, p.11). The extreme polarisation of Poso society is reflected in high levels of suspicion between opposing religious groups, particularly between children of former combatants and IDPs.

#### *Access to mechanisms to restore housing, land and property or provide compensation*

According to a local NGO involved in mediating

land and property disputes in Poso, the inaccessibility of the formal legal system and the demise of *adat* have combined to make IDP land ownership disputes very disruptive and a trigger for ethnic or religious tensions (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, p.294). For fear of reigniting the violence, the police have often failed to take measure to ensure that seized land and property is returned to rightful original owners (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.260). In addition to land and property disputes between returnees and squatters, the judicial system has struggled, as it does elsewhere in conflict-affected regions of Indonesia, to resolve land disputes between indigenous groups who generally turn to *adat* law and migrants who make their claims on the basis of state law.

In Central Sulawesi, *adat* is particularly important in areas with large populations of Christians from the Kulawi ethnic group and Muslims from the Kaili community. Elsewhere, informal justice is sought through village leaders, sub-district officials and sometimes at the district level. Generally in Central Sulawesi, people have less trust in the formal justice system: 44 per cent of respondents in a survey trusted it but 77 per cent indicated trust in the informal system (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, pp.295-299). The police are often the first and only contact citizens have with the formal justice providers. In Poso, only 31 per cent of respondents said they trust them. The majority regard them as unaccountable, beholden to the powerful, slow to act, poor at investigation and corrupt. This helps explain why the victims of conflict prefer the informal system. Trust in the courts in Central Sulawesi is also very low among non-displaced citizens as they are regarded as too hard to get to, costly to access and ineffective (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, pp.306-309).

#### *Effective remedies for displacement-related violations and access to justice*

Compared with other conflict areas in Indonesia, in particular West and Central Kalimantan, a significant proportion of the perpetrators of violence

were arrested and received heavy sentences. Poso is thus somewhat of a paradox: the failure to enforce law and contain the initial violence was clearly a root cause of the conflict, but it was very firm and effective law enforcement that succeeded in bringing an end to the violence (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.279).

Access to justice, in particular for marginalised groups such as the displaced, remains generally limited and variable from place to place. Access to government services remains poor for many IDPs who are left with “no remedies for the injustices they suffered during the conflict” (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, p.280). IDPs surveyed in Maholo village complained that state institutions provided no assistance at all and that none of the perpetrators of violence had been arrested. In Tokorondo village, most of the 22 reported cases of abuse and violence by security forces against girls occurred in 2004, after the end of the conflict. Only one resulted in a legal inquiry (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, pp.281-285).

#### *Access to employment and livelihoods*

Houses were destroyed, belongings were lost and garden plantations were neglected or destroyed during the conflict. Most returnees have struggled to recover upon return to their homes and have had to start from scratch. Some returnees in Poso report a 50-75 per cent decline in their pre-conflict income. This is mainly because productivity was low as a result of land having remained neglected for four years (UNDP, 2 July 2004, p.10). Many returnees have had to find alternative sources of livelihoods and occupations such as motorcycle taxis, brick-making or construction. The sharp drop in family income has made returnees, especially those in women-headed households, more vulnerable to food insecurity.

Poverty due to loss of property and assets and lack of employment and nearby land is the main problem faced by IDPs in camps (Aragon, 2008, p.188). Many IDPs survive as casual agricultural la-

bourers. In areas where large number of IDPs have settled, such as Tentena and around Poso Lake, there are concerns that the limited availability of land and competition between the displaced and host communities may lead to conflict (Aragon, 2008, p.192). Many IDPs initially borrowed land from the local community. The state-provided IDP assistance package enabled many IDPs to buy this land and thereby improve their standard of living. However, the fact that land was lost to IDPs reportedly caused friction between the two groups (AMAN, 10 May 2010, p. 1). Some IDPs in Tentena were able to find supplemental employment more easily than in their home sub-district of Lage. They commuted from their camp to their home village to harvest cocoa and other cash crops (UNDP, July 2004, p.23).

The uneven distribution of funds intended for IDPs and other victims of the conflict, together with denial of access to return and rehabilitation entitlements, have created resentment between and within communities. Many IDP groups report they have never received earmarked livelihood and rebuilding assistance due to corruption at regency and local levels. In April 2004, more than two years after the end of the conflict, an estimated 4,000 IDP households had yet to receive assistance from the government (OCHA, 14 April 2004, p.2). In Maholo village, none of the 178 IDPs have received IDP compensation payments to which they were entitled. They have instead been provided to civil servants. NGOs and the media reported that half of the funds intended for IDPs have been embezzled. The displaced have been strongly discouraged from trying to seek redress. When the Tokorondo village demonstrated in front of the local parliament, the head of the village was shot (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, pp.290-292).

#### *Participation in public affairs*

The social polarisation resulting from the conflict and reinforcement of ethno-religious segregation has affected inter-religious relations and

reduced social cohesion in mixed areas (Susanty et al., January 2007, p.230). Interaction with people from other religions is now much reduced and that with people of the same religion much greater (Tol et al., February 2010, pp.123-128).

In many cases IDPs who were a minority in the village or area they fled decided not to return and preferred to integrate locally. As noted above, competition for land, jobs and resources sometimes generated tension between the IDPs and the host community. However, in most cases IDPs were able to participate in public affairs and decision-making processes in their host community. Christians from Poso who moved to Tentena, and Muslims from Tentena who moved to Muslim-majority areas and who decided not to return, could not participate in the community-based planning and budgeting process known as *musrenbang* in places of origin but were able to do so in their new places of residence (Sarosa et al., May 2008, p.11). Poverty is the major impediment to participation in *musrenbang*. Most formerly displaced people have to make a living and cannot afford to lose time attending, especially when their chances of having their views heard are so slim. Community awareness about the right to participate and access to public documents is limited. Local civil society representatives tend to dominate as they are often the only official invitees or people with knowledge of where and when events are to take place (Sarosa et al., May 2008, p.10; UNDP, 3 July 2004, p.11).

## National response

As noted, the government was initially very slow to respond to the violence and displacement that affected Poso in early 1999. The weakness and indecisiveness of the security forces' response and its perceived bias crucially allowed the conflict to escalate. It was only towards the end of 2001, or three years after the violence had begun, that the government deployed a sufficiently robust

security force able to end large-scale violence and displacement. Poso's special security status has not been lifted and it is the continued deployment of an additional 1,600 police that maintains peace and order in the province (Jakarta Post, 15 August 2009).

### *Humanitarian response*

The government responded to the humanitarian emergency mainly through the Provincial and District Coordinating Bodies for Disaster and IDP Management (*Satkorlak* and *Satlak*) and through the Social Affairs Department (*Dinas Sosial*). These agencies provided basic livelihoods support to IDPs. Each family in camps received immediate cash assistance of Rp.1.25 million (\$125) and a similar grant for resettlement. They also provided building supplies and Rp.2 million (\$200) for those who had lost a family member (UNDP, 2005, p.50). The military were also involved in the rebuilding of housing. In 2007, the government estimated that 14,000 houses had been rebuilt and that 7,000 more would follow (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.282).

However, widespread corruption hampered the recovery process and prevented many IDPs from receiving promised assistance to rebuild their homes or re-establish livelihoods (Aragon, March 2004). In September 2007, the former regency head of Poso was sentenced to two years in prison for embezzling IDP return funds in 2001 (ICG, 22 January 2008, p.10). Many other politicians and civil servants, particularly those working for the provincial and regency-level Social Affairs Office through which most IDP fund disbursements are made, are suspected of having profited from the large sums which flowed to Central Sulawesi (McRae, March 2006).

In 2007, the central government set up a Rp.58 billion (\$5.8 million) post-conflict recovery fund for Poso available to IDPs and other vulnerable people (ICG, 22 January 2008, p.7). Of this total, Rp.10 billion was to be distributed to communi-

ties in the form of direct cash assistance and Rp.48 billion was earmarked for economic empowerment projects. Access to the fund was reportedly constrained by lack of clarity on assistance entitlement criteria and by limited development proposal skills among IDPs. Many IDPs also complained that they were never supported by the civil servant tasked with reviewing the proposals and that when they submitted them they were told they had missed deadlines (Komnas Perempuan, November 2007, p.68). Allegations of corruption continue to be reported. According to a local NGO, the Poso administration has yet to account for how the Rp. 58 billion has been disbursed (Jakarta Post, 9 October 2010).

According to local NGOs and civil society representatives, the government has much to do to improve the education and health system. They also believe the government has prioritised physical reconstruction but neglected the psycho-social impact of the conflict and displacement as well as reconciliation and reintegration needs (Jakarta Post, 7 October 2010; HD, 3 March 2010, p.4). Most former IDPs have struggled to access government support programmes and the needs of women and children's needs are reported to have been particularly overlooked (Jakarta Post, 15 August 2010). Overall, there has been a lack of follow up as a result of limited financial and human resources. There have been no evaluations/reviews of peace-building and assistance programmes. It is thus neither possible to judge their effectiveness nor to document the needs of the affected population, particularly IDPs (HD, 3 March 2010, p.4).

Former displaced groups may benefit from the central government's 2010-2014 National Medium Term Development Planning. This will include a three-year property and land-titling programme that offers scope for IDPs to secure land tenure rights.

#### *Peace-building and reconciliation*

The MD proved decisive in bringing an end to the violence and creating a conducive environment

for reconciliation initiatives. It suffered, however, from a number of constraints. The working groups created by the MD and tasked with its implementation were quickly disbanded and replaced by a Communication Forum charged with disseminating the terms of the MD at sub-regency level. However, the Forum did not function as planned due to continued insecurity, lack of reliable IDP data and the slow pace of reconstruction of mosques and churches (HD, 3 March 2010, p.4).

The most effective mediation processes have been informal initiatives of religious authorities, village leaders and IDPs. While in 2002-2004 most mediation between IDPs and their home communities was government- or NGO-led, from 2005 many IDPs turned to self-initiated reconciliation, often relying on *adat* mechanisms. A number of local NGOs, in particular women's NGOs, played an important role in fostering inter-religious dialogue between villages. These interventions typically focused on practical issues of IDP return and did not dwell on the causes of or responsibility for the conflict nor involve any apology. The Central Sulawesi post-conflict context has thus been described as one of non-truth and reconciliation (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, pp.261-262).

## **International response**

The insecure environment discouraged a significant international presence in Poso during and after the conflict years (Braithwaite et al., March 2010, p.277). International NGOs providing assistance to IDPs have included CARE (with focus on shelter and livelihood, water and sanitation and economic development); the Church World Service (food security, and psychosocial mental health); the International Medical Corps (IMC); Mercy Corps (education, water and sanitation and reconciliation) and CARDI (a consortium of three international NGOs focusing on youth programming and education) (UNDP, 2005, p.77).

As of 2010, World Vision is the only international NGO directly addressing the needs of the displaced. With funding from the European Union, under its Aid to Uprooted People (AUP) programme, World Vision Austria has recently started a project which aims at supporting displaced people and host communities, in particular marginalised women and children, to integrate and develop livelihood opportunities. It is hoped that the project will strengthen communities' capacity to build social cohesion, essential to sustainable peace, and result in more effective participation in *musrenbang*. In recent years, the World Bank, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and CARE have supported *musrenbang* as an important peace-building tool.

A foundation for institutional participatory development was laid after the end of the conflict with the implementation of the World Bank-supported Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) whereby villages were given between \$60,000 and \$110,000 in grants to spend on projects identified through collective deliberations. Since 2005, the KDP programme has been complemented by the Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA), a nationwide programme implemented by the WB in a total of 40 regencies affected by conflict in Indonesia and which aims at strengthening governance, promoting growth and improve service delivery.

In 2005, UNDP started a five-year "Peace Through Development" programme of conflict-sensitive reintegration and development projects. They seek to ensure the needs of the most vulnerable, including IDPs, are included in the planning of community-level development programmes to improve livelihoods (UNDP, November 2008). Between 2001 and 2008, UNDP also funded programmes supporting legal empowerment and assistance for disadvantaged people such as IDPs. Countries supporting UNDP's programmes include the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand and Sweden (Jakarta Post, 22 May 2010).

**Note:** This is a summary of IDMC's internal displacement profile on Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The full profile is available online [here](#).

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## About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people.

In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org).

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