

## **NIGERIA:**

# **Simmering tensions cause new displacement in the “middle belt”**

A profile of the internal displacement situation

3 December, 2010

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## OVERVIEW

### **Nigeria: Simmering tensions cause new displacement in the “middle belt”**

*In early 2010, unresolved conflicts and simmering tensions between different social and ethnic groups led to renewed displacement in the city of Jos in the heart of the “middle belt” region of Nigeria. As in the rest of the country, no clear figures on the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) were available for this latest incident of violence. Ad-hoc local registration exercises have hinted at the scale of displacement, but many people sought shelter and support from family and friends and so were not counted.*

*Displacement across the country is a common result of both communal violence and internal armed conflict. While some of the conflicts appear to be caused by religious or ethnic differences, benefits of a political, social and economic nature are generally behind the violence in a country with endemic poverty, low levels of education and a huge and alienated youth population. Nigeria also regularly experiences displacement as a consequence of natural disasters such as flooding or soil erosion.*

*The government has not yet adopted a national IDP policy, and national, international and local agencies have only assisted IDPs on an ad-hoc or selective basis. The signing of the African Union’s IDP convention in October 2009 may indicate the government’s intention to address internal displacement in a more consistent and coherent manner. As a first step, the government has realised the importance of undertaking a comprehensive profiling exercise to fully understand the scope of displacement in the country.*

### **Background and causes of displacement**

Nigeria has been affected by recurrent internal conflicts and generalised violence since the end of military rule and the return to democracy in 1999. The systematic and overlapping patterns of inequality in the country have been described as “breeding grounds” for conflict (Okpeh, 2008; CRISE, June 2007). As a result, the country is faced with the ongoing challenge of responding to a fluctuating but always sizeable internally displaced population.

Nigeria is made up of an extremely complex web of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. Conflicts have been triggered by disputes over access to land, citizenship and broader questions of identity. Identities have been particularly important in the shaping of both the political and social arena in Nigeria both during colonial and post-colonial times. Under British colonial rule, religious, ethnic and regional differences were given prominence, which eventually exacerbated divisions between Muslims and Christians, Northerners and Southerners, and Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo groups (Okpanachi, 2010). Such differences, particularly between people considered indigenous to an area and those regarded as settlers, became instrumental after independence in the manipulation of identities to political ends (Jega, 2000).

Indigenous groups have routinely prevented settlers from owning land or businesses, or accessing jobs and education; this has inevitably caused tensions. According to a strategic conflict assessment carried out by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in 2002, the return to democracy and the competition for the new political opportunities had led to increased violence. Local competition for resources has often been aggravated by “inter-elite” rivalries over privileges such as political and public service appointments, oversight of projects and admission into schools (IPCR, October 2002).

Violence before and after national and local elections has frequently led to internal displacement in Nigeria. Nigeria's national elites have tried to avert sectarian divisions since the end of military rule by nominating one southern Christian and one northern Muslim to the posts of president and vice-president on an eight-year rotational basis, in a practice known as "zoning". The death of Muslim president Umaru Yar'Adua in May 2010 and the accession of Christian vice-president Goodluck Jonathan to the highest office, however, have not followed this practice (CFR, September 2010). Presidential polls are forecast for April 2011 (Reuters, 7 October 2010), and analysts have identified two possible causes of serious post-electoral violence if the elites compete openly for the presidency: the division of the electorate along religious, ethnic and regional identities; and the inability of the Independent National Electoral Commission to ensure free and fair elections (CFR, September 2010). Months ahead of the polls, clashes between supporters of rival politicians have already broken out in some of the northern states (AFP, 27 August 2010).

In the Niger Delta region, displacement has been closely linked to oil production. Oil fields in the region are the principal source of wealth in Nigeria. The country's dependence on revenues from oil has undermined stability and governance. Huge quantities are removed from pipelines, and oil smuggling is seen as a major threat to the rule of law in the whole West African sub-region (UNODC, July 2009).

State revenues have not been shared effectively, and factional elites have taken control of state institutions, perpetuating the exclusion of other groups. The lack of a diversified economy is also held responsible for the relative absence of both a private sector and a middle class, and the consequent lack of development of independent civic institutions (NORAD, 24 August 2010), contributing to Nigeria's poor score on the 2010 Failed States Index (The Fund for Peace, 2010).

### *The Niger Delta*

Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta States, considered the core of the southern Niger Delta region, have been the scene of violent competition for land, political power and oil wealth. Following the economic decline of the 1990s, the region became vulnerable to ethnic polarisation, with different groups resorting to different means to fight for their rights (Irobi, April 2010). Recent research has suggested that in the context of increasing environmental pollution and reduced farming opportunities, government policies favoured migration of local communities to other states as the most cost-effective solution (Azam, 15 March 2009). With economic indicators worsening across the country, however, many migrants were forced back to the Niger Delta where illegality and violence constituted their most effective coping strategies. The government's failure to ensure security, limit environmental damage, deliver social development or establish effective local institutions led to an armed insurgency that escalated dramatically in early 2006 (ICG, 3 August 2006).

In 2005, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was created through the merger of different armed groups. In May 2009, thousands of people were displaced in one of the latest clashes between government forces and MEND. The Joint Task Force (JTF) charged with restoring order in the Niger Delta launched Operation Restore Hope in an effort to uproot militant groups. The JTF launched land and air strikes around the city of Warri in Delta State, and later extended its offensive to neighbouring Rivers State (Reuters, 24 May 2009). Numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) reported have varied, from 1,000 people sheltering in a school and hospital in the local capital Ogbeloh to up to 10,000 residents believed to have fled into the forest and unable to return home (IRIN, 22 May 2009; BBC, 21 May 2009; AI, 20 May 2009).

According to news reports, some 8,000 Delta State residents were still displaced at the beginning of 2010 (IRIN, 15 January 2010). In large part from Oporosa and Okerenkoko villages, the IDPs

were staying with family and friends while waiting for their houses to be rebuilt. Local authorities had promised support but reconstruction progress was slow. In April 2010, a federal high court looking into compensation claims ordered the JTF to allow experts to enter the Gbaramatu Kingdom in Warri, to establish the property destroyed by the task force (Daily Independent, 25 April 2010).

A government amnesty programme, which includes a comprehensive programme to disarm, demobilise and rehabilitate militants, has been credited for a drop in large-scale violence in the Delta in 2010 (IRIN, 23 April 2010). However, the programme has been beset by delays, in the absence of a comprehensive development strategy for the Delta (AFP, 1 November 2009; USIP, 17 September 2009; ISS, 9 September 2009). Few of the recommendations issued in November 2008 by the federal government's Niger Delta Technical Committee had been implemented by late 2010 (Vanguard, 27 October 2010). Car bombs set off by MEND in March 2010 in Warri and in October 2010 in Abuja have signalled the militant group's discontent at the current status of the amnesty programme (IRIN, 23 April 2010; Reuters, 19 October 2010).

### *The "middle belt"*

The "middle belt", which runs across Nigeria, is the area with the highest concentration of minority ethnic groups. It comprises Taraba, Adamawa, Plateau, Nassarawa, Benue Kogi States, as well as southern Bauchi, southern Zaria and southern Kaduna (ActionAid, 2008). All these areas have witnessed intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic conflicts that have spread across different states. Researchers have pointed to a "crisis of citizenship" in which "different attitudes to citizenship contribute to political conflicts" (Idowu, 1999), articulated around the "settler-native" identity, with conflicts fuelled by feelings of exclusion and struggles for recognition (ActionAid, 2008).

As in the Niger Delta, mounting poverty, low levels of education and youth alienation have also contributed to the frequent occurrence of violence (AllAfrica, 7 August 2009). High levels of inequality have aggravated the situation: in the past decade, the distribution of income between households has been extremely unequal. Northern regions, including some in the middle belt, have witnessed higher levels of poverty than those in the south (IFPRI, February 2010).

Conflicts have been triggered by a range of events including elections and disputed election results, boundary disputes, challenges to existing customary rights, political assassinations, the creation of new local government districts, land disputes, religious dissent, population movements and the impact of development projects (Reuters, 26 October 2010; The Guardian, 18 January 2009; ActionAid, 2008, p.22).

Impunity for perpetrators of sectarian violence is common. While government authorities have in some cases been under political pressure to bring perpetrators to justice (IRIN, 24 April 2009), in others government security forces have themselves been responsible for arbitrary killings (HRW, 20 July 2009). As the cyclical repetition of violence in Plateau State in 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009 and 2010 has shown, lack of accountability has prevented the sustainable resolution of sectarian conflicts. Frequent smaller-scale episodes of violence, sometimes preceding bigger events, have contributed to stand in the way of long-term democracy and peace (ACCORD, June 2010).

In December 2009, clashes in Bauchi between suspected members of an Islamic group and the Nigerian army (AFP, 31 December 2009) displaced hundreds of residents. Most of the IDPs found refuge in makeshift shelters in the bush, not far from their homes. Some 300 people sought refuge in a disused army barracks (ICRC, 18 January 2010), and around 65 people, mostly children, in the home of a Bauchi official (IRIN, 12 January 2010). Most of the people involved in or affected by the clashes were believed to be children between the age of ten and 15 (UNICEF, 30 December 2009) and more than half of those displaced were children who had lost one or both their parents in the violence. As calm returned some two days later, most of the residents

who had fled were able to go back to their homes to assess the damage (AFP, 29 December 2009). These clashes echoed those of July 2009, which involved members of the Boko Haram sect and which displaced thousands in the city of Maiduguri, in Borno State (ICRC, 31 July 2009; AP, 29 July 2009).

At least 5,000 people were displaced following renewed violence in Plateau State's capital city of Jos in January 2010 (BBC, 20 January 2010; AFP, 18 January 2010). Clashes reportedly broke out in the predominantly Christian Nassarawa Gwom district following a dispute over a Muslim resident's reconstruction of his home, which had been burned down in earlier riots in November 2008 (IRIN, 18 January 2010). IDPs sought shelter in police barracks, mosques and churches as well as with family and friends in the city. Some 4,000 people fled to neighbouring Bauchi State, where they found refuge in camps set up by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) (AFP, 24 January 2010). Some sought shelter at the site of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. With aid slow to arrive, many IDPs in camps reportedly suffered from lack of food and other basic items in the aftermath of the violence (Vanguard, 19 January 2010). As violence spread to other areas nearby, despite an initial curfew imposed by the police, more people fled their homes (VOA, 25 January 2010; AFP, 24 January 2010; Punch, 21 January 2010; Reuters, 19 January 2010). Among around 300 people arrested on suspicion of instigating the violence, many had already been taken into custody in relation to previous similar incidents in November 2008, but were never prosecuted (BBC, 25 January 2010).

The full scope of displacement is not clear. Accounts on the number of IDPs have not been consistent. Reports have referred to both 18,000 (IRIN, 27 January 2010) and 25,000 (CAFOD, 27 January 2010) people in makeshift camps in and around Jos and to at least 2,000 people in each of the 18 camps registered by NEMA (Leadership, 25 January 2010). Because of the high number of IDPs and due to a lack of coordination among relief agencies, humanitarian aid was mostly ad hoc and insufficient (IRIN, 27 January 2010 and 22 January 2010). Responding to the wish of some of the IDPs not to return to Jos, the federal and the Bauchi State governments were considering resettlement options in Bauchi (Leadership, 24 January 2010). Other IDPs were still trying to return to their villages and rebuild their homes as of October 2010 (Daily Trust, 8 October 2010). No reports were readily available on those Jos residents displaced in November 2008.

### **General numbers and patterns of displacement**

There were reportedly some 80,000 IDPs in the country at the end of 2009 (USDoS, 11 March 2010). There are, however, no reliable statistics on internal displacement in Nigeria and different numbers exist in the absence of any comprehensive survey. The figures provided by government and non-governmental agencies are generally only estimates referring to localised displacement situations. In general, estimates only include people who have sought shelter at temporary IDP camps, leaving out the many who find refuge with family and friends. In most cases, numbers are not disaggregated by age and sex. As there are no mechanisms in place to monitor durable solutions, it is also impossible to determine whether and when people have ceased to be displaced.

Nigeria also regularly experiences displacement as a consequence of natural disasters such as flooding or soil erosion (Vanguard, 26 October 2010; IFRC, 21 October 2010; Daily Trust, 15 October 2010). In conflict-affected states, natural disasters have complicated displacement and return patterns and it has in some cases been difficult to distinguish between people displaced by conflict and other causes. In 2010, recognising the need for better figures, the Nigerian government asked the help of the UN to carry out a profiling exercise that would provide a clearer picture of the number and situation of IDPs in the country (UN, 24 June 2010).

There are no official IDP camps of a long-lasting nature in the country. Temporary shelter is normally provided in army or police barracks, schools or hospitals but they serve as IDP camps only for a limited period. The vast majority of displaced people in Nigeria reportedly seek refuge with family, friends or host communities in areas where their ethnic or religious group is in the majority (Je'adayibe, 2008). Many appear to return to their homes or resettle near their home areas soon after the violence which forced them to leave has subsided, but an unknown number also resettle in other areas of the country.

In urban areas, the right of IDPs and other residents to adequate housing has suffered from persistent institutional policies of forced evictions, which have led to new patterns of intra-urban displacement. In Port Harcourt in the Niger Delta, the local government has identified hundreds of buildings in waterfront communities for demolition, both to enable urban development and to eradicate criminal activities in the city, where clashes between security forces, oil militants and other criminal groups have been common. In some cases, preparations for the demolition of buildings have been accompanied by excessive use of force by Nigerian security forces, and in no cases have the relevant authorities properly consulted affected communities or provided effective remedies or compensation mechanisms (AI, 28 October 2010). UN-HABITAT has estimated that at least 200,000 people will be affected by the demolition of the 41 waterfront communities in the city (AI, 28 August 2009).

### **National and international responses**

There is no national legislation upholding the rights of IDPs in Nigeria. A national IDP policy has been planned since the creation of the Nigerian Presidential Committee on IDPs in January 2004, but it was yet to be approved by the Federal Executive Council in November 2010. At the end of October 2009, however, Nigeria signed the African Union's Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IRIN, 26 October 2009). Its ratification could provide an opportunity for Nigeria to adopt a comprehensive approach to the continuing internal displacement situations in the country.

In the absence of specific policy and legal frameworks, the responsibility to respond to displacement lies with the local governments, and only if they are unable to cope are state governments called in. State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) exist in some states, but they have varying capacities. Only when this second level of response is ineffective does the state government appeal to the federal government for support. The President takes the final decision on whether the federal government intervenes. At the federal level, NEMA coordinates emergency relief operations and assists in the rehabilitation of victims where necessary.

For coordination purposes, NEMA has divided the country into six disaster-management areas, for each of which it has operational offices. Where SEMAs are established, NEMA collaborates and supports them. In other cases, resources are overstretched and assistance to victims is often delayed (Government of Nigeria, 30 July 2009). NEMA often supports IDPs in the emergency phase of a crisis, but it lacks the resources to assist people displaced for a longer period of time or to help returnees reintegrate, and it has no IDP-specific, age-specific or gender-specific policies.

The National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) has taken effective responsibility for post-emergency situations, and also for long-term programmes aimed at enabling durable solutions for IDPs as well as refugees. If necessary, it assists NEMA with camp management, and it has a dedicated unit working on IDP issues; but it lacks both the resources and the structure that could facilitate an effective response. Other government agencies are brought in on a case-by-case basis in an effort to overcome this lack of resources. In the 2010 Jos crisis, for example, the Federal Commissioner for Refugees sought the support of the Customs Service to provide shelter and non-food items to IDPs (Daily Trust, 22 April 2010).

Most internal displacement situations are managed on an ad-hoc basis and only in the emergency phase. The Nigerian Red Cross (NRC), the most prominent humanitarian organisation, has the structure and the personnel to respond at very short notice, and often provides immediate assistance ahead of the local governments. Although it is not in their mandate, the military has also been called on several occasions to respond to IDPs' needs especially when military barracks serve as temporary IDP camps (234NextNews, 15 March 2010). While faith-based organisations play an important role in both immediate relief and long-term support to IDPs of their religion, international organisations have also responded on a case-by case basis, most often without coordination.

The UN in Nigeria has focused on development rather than humanitarian issues, as no humanitarian agency has been willing to commit the ongoing resources necessary and as the UN community feels there is more to be gained in tackling the development failures causing the recurrent conflicts. Donor support has also reflected a similar approach favouring development assistance. Aid has mostly focused on encouraging democratic processes, rule of law and human rights, as poverty in Nigeria has been seen as a consequence not of a lack of resources, but rather of the misuse of those available (NORAD, 24 August 2010). The American USAID is the largest and most influential donor, followed by the British DFID.

## CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

### General background on displacement in Nigeria

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#### **Local power structures and social crisis nurture violence and displacement, 2004-2009**

- During transition phases from authoritarian rule to democracy, like in Nigeria, social tensions are more likely to escalate into violence because of the changes in power relations and power structures
- Additionally, the specific tripodal ethnic structure (with the Hausa, Yoruba and the Igbo constituting the three major groups) in Nigeria is particularly unstable and often conflictual
- The interplay between the tripodal structure and communal identities has been aggravated over time by systematic patterns of inequalities
- In particular, in the Niger Delta, repeated patterns of inequality has created a social crisis capable of nurturing violence and displacement

#### **CRISE, February 2008, p. 6:**

"Indonesia and Nigeria have both experienced an upsurge in violent communal conflict in certain parts of both countries, particularly in the period following the end of authoritarian rule. This is not because democracy inherently generates conflicts. On the contrary, cross-country evidence has shown that democracies are less likely to experience civil war and communal violence than authoritarian states (Hegre *et al* 2001). Rather it is in democratising countries – i.e., states in transition such as Indonesia and Nigeria – that social tensions are more likely to escalate into violence (Gurr 2000; idem 2001), because democratisation is often associated with changes in power relations and structures and democratic solutions to change are not yet fully accepted (Ake 2000). When democratisation is implemented simultaneously with decentralisation – as in Nigeria and Indonesia – the resulting changes in power relations at the local level have the potential to trigger ethnic and communal violence in the locality, but at the same time may alleviate national tensions."

#### **CRISE, June 2007, pp.3-4:**

"The numerically – and politically – majority ethnic groups are the composite Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of the southwest, and the Igbo of the southeast. The three majority ethnic groups constituted 57.8% of the national population in the 1963 census. [...] The numerical and hegemonic strength of these three ethnic groups within the Nigerian federation has meant that Nigeria has a tripodal ethnic structure, with each of the three majority ethnic groups constituting a pole in the competition for political and economic resources. The ethnic minorities are forced to form a bewildering array of alliances around each of the three dominant ethnicities. Tripodal ethnic structures are inherently unstable, especially compared to countries like Tanzania which has a fragmented ethnic structure. [...] By contrast, ethnic politics in tripodal Nigeria is often conflictual as each of the three hegemonic groups tries to build up sufficient alliances to ensure its preponderance in government, or to prevent its being marginalised by competing alliance."

The interplay between this tripodal ethnic structure on the one hand, and administrative divisions and communal identities on the other, has led to eight major cleavages in Nigerian political life (Mustapha 1986), the most important of which are: the cleavages between the three majority

groups; between the three majority ethnic groups on the one hand and the 350-odd minority ethnic groups on the other; between the north and south<sup>4</sup>; between the 36 states of the federation and the six zones – three in the north and three in the south – into which they are grouped; and finally, between different religious affiliations. Some of these cleavages overlap: for example, the southeast zone overlaps with Igbo ethnicity and Christian religious affiliation, while the northcentral overlaps with northern ethnic minorities.

The ethnic, regional, and religious cleavages in Nigerian society are made more problematic by systematic and overlapping patterns of inequalities that correspond to the cleavages. These inequalities are caused by a complex range of factors, including history, geography, cultural orientation, religious affiliation, natural resource endowments, current government policies, and past colonial policies."

#### *Social protection*

#### **AllAfrica, 7 August 2009**

"Ten years of supposed democracy have yielded mounting poverty and deprivation of every kind in Nigeria. Young people, under-educated by a collapsed educational system, may "graduate," but only into joblessness.

Lives decline, frustration grows, and angry young men are too easily persuaded to pick up readily accessible guns in protest when something sparks their rage. "

#### **ODI, August 2009, p. 3**

"Social protection plays an integral role in mitigating against the impact of poverty in an economic crisis and is, therefore, an important counter cyclical social policy. However, the social protection response to the global financial crisis has been minimal, and increases in coverage have been marginal.

[*Some countries*] have put social protection aside, and now focus on addressing macroeconomic stabilisation (Indonesia) or promote fiscal stimulus packages while controlling a widening deficit by reducing social sector expenditure (Nigeria).

[...]

Social protection coverage is low in all 10 countries. The distribution of programmes is inequitable and they help only a small percentage of the poor, offering disproportionate support to those in formal employment, particularly government employees.

[...]

The financial effects of the crisis were not recognised fully in most 2008-2009 budgets, which underestimated the likely impact on government revenue. The budgets of the 10 countries were based on more optimistic growth scenarios than those currently forecast by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), leading most budgets to indicate only modest reductions in the real value of social protection allocations. The medium-term effects on social protection allocations are more likely to be significant, and the extension of social protection to those affected by the crisis is likely to be compromised by lack of resources. Even the extension of existing programmes, planned prior to the financial crisis, will be limited by falling revenues and concerns regarding the control of budget deficits."

#### ***In particular, in the Niger Delta***

#### **Daily Trust, 6 August 2007:**

"Prior to the discovery of massive oil reserves in the 1960s, the North and SouthWest were the richest geographical zones in Nigeria. Over the years, the South-West has been able to sustain relative growth and poverty reduction through massive human capital and infrastructural development. The North has not been so fortunate. This is partly because majority of the states in

the North operate with the simple belief that resources are meant for distribution and not as a source of building economic and social capital.

This mindset has invariably cost a number of non-oil-producing states in the country the chance to grow and remove people from poverty and misery. The article aims to show (using data across the country) that reliance on the fortunes of the Niger Delta is a weak foundation for achieving development. With renewed focus and strategy, non-oil-producing states can thrive and develop amidst prevailing social and economic challenges. There is no gainsaying that spread of economic opportunities across the country remains the only chance for Nigeria to enjoy sustained development and peaceful coexistence."

**IRIN, 24 July 2007:**

"A study in 2004 commissioned by Royal Dutch Shell, the biggest oil multinational in Nigeria, estimated 1,000 people, mostly youths, were dying every year in violence between rival militia groups in the Niger Delta.

More up-to-date figures are not available but violence in the region has worsened: It is dominated by hostage-taking targeting foreign oil workers who are usually released in exchange for a ransom, but has also sparked turf wars between rival gangs.

**Worst violence since 2004 :**

At least 20 people were shot dead on 1 July as rival gunmen went on the rampage in different parts of the city's Diobu District. Many of the victims were innocent bystanders and included a 10-year-old girl who was helping her mother roast corn by a street corner, a pregnant woman hit by a stray bullet inside a church and three men shot dead while drinking at an open air bar.

This year has also seen the worst violence in the city since the first upsurge of militia violence in 2004, including two audacious attacks on police stations in which more than a dozen people were killed, including 10 policemen. In one of the attacks on the city's police headquarters, assailants freed Soboma George, head of a notorious militia known as the Outlaws, (who had been detained by the police following a traffic offence) and 124 other prisoners.

**Politicians armed gangs?**


The year 2004 had provided the tipping point for worsening violence in the region. In June that year a funeral procession led by the delta's best known militia leader, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, for the burial of his father, was attacked by a rival gang. While Dokubo-Asari escaped unhurt, more than a dozen people were killed. Scores were killed in subsequent gang violence in the city later that year.

[...]

"What we are witnessing are some of the worst manifestations of a social crisis that has been festering in the delta and the country as a whole in the past three decades," said Pius Waritimi, a sculptor and art teacher who runs a government-backed skills training scheme for youths in Port Harcourt.

With most families in the grip of abject poverty, and deep-rooted corruption and mismanagement in government frustrating social development, most youths without education and skills have become cheap recruitment targets for the militias and gangs, said Waritimi."

See also ISN Security Watch's ["New hopes for peace in Niger Delta"](#) (19 July 2007)



## **Weak rule of law cannot address the underlying causes of conflict and displacement**

- Nigeria faces difficulties to function as a federal republic as the different states are all very disparate
- With reduced sovereignty, the federal government has been unable to guarantee the security of its citizens
- Police and security forces are often accused of widespread human rights abuses and of being ensconced in patron-client relationships with politicians and criminals
- Vigilante groups have risen as an alternative to state security forces with dubious results
- Weak security forces and the inability or lack of political will to bring perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice feeds the cycle of violence

### **UNHCR, October 2008, pp. 3-4**

"Nigeria and Sierra Leone, in common with other West African states, have faced political and economic instabilities which have undermined their authority, stemming from flawed domestic policies, resource fluctuations, Euro-American foreign policy, the imposition of structural adjustment programmes, resentment against the state as a result of inequalities derived from patrimonial resource and power distribution, weaknesses and inefficiencies inherited from colonial bureaucracies, popular disenfranchisement resulting from military regimes and personalized rule, and the rise of informal markets and shadow states.

The Nigerian state faces the additional difficulty of functioning as a federal republic, uniting states which are in some ways very disparate, particularly in terms of divisions between the Muslim and Christian populations and between the 250 ethnic groups.

[...]

It is within this context of the federal government's diminished sovereignty that its ability to provide security for its citizens has reduced. The Nigeria Police Force is a federal force, and this has created tension between state and federal governments; state governors have argued that 'they had the right to their own police forces' (Meagher, 2007, p. 95). Furthermore, the police force has committed countless human rights abuses and is seen widely throughout Nigeria as being ensconced in patron-client relationships between police officers, politicians and criminals which prevent it from reliably detecting and punishing crime (Baker, 2002a) (Harnischfeger, 2003). Even the Police Affairs Minister, D.M. Jemibowon, admitted in 2000 that the police 'can't guarantee [citizens'] safety' (Harnischfeger, 2003, p. 26). Thus the federal nature of the police force, and the police force's own inadequacies (a result of low salaries, inefficient bureaucracy, and their origins as a colonial and repressive force (Jemibowon, 2003)) result in popular perception that the federal state has failed as a security guarantor.

[...]

Vigilante groups in Nigeria were created in response to this security vacuum left by the impotent state and its security forces, as the Bakassi Boys' origins amongst the crime-fighting traders of Aba suggest. Similarly, the CDF in Sierra Leone arose to protect citizens in circumstances where security was no longer the prerogative or responsibility of the state, thus necessitating provision of security from 'outside the formal security structures of the state' (Ero, 2000, p. 26).

However, though vigilante groups may thus be perceived as an alternative to failed state security provision, as Buur (2007) suggests, vigilantism as a phenomenon in fact generally aims for 'more state, not less state' (p. 77), seeking to prop up a weak state by taking on some of its functions. Indeed, Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974) suggest that vigilante action is a form of 'establishment violence' designed to defend a particular socio-political order against threats of social change."

**AllAfrica, 7 August 2009**

"Law and order deteriorate. The Nigerian police, which are federal, are called on, but they have grievances of their own. Ill-trained, ill-paid, and housed in squalid barracks, they are feared for their indiscriminate use of force. The military, though more professional, is not prepared for dealing with unrest -- and unrest has proliferated more and more."

**CIC, September 2009, p. 2**

"[T]he effectiveness and neutrality of national security services, specifically the police, military and gendarmeries, remains a substantial challenge, especially in countries where they are highly politicized. Their neutrality as defenders of the constitutional order, for example during contested elections, cannot be guaranteed. While these issues are played out at the national level, they are for the most part transnational as evidenced by the lack of effective law enforcement in Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire among others and therefore require a sub-regional response."

**IRIN, 24 April 2009**

"Following the violence in Niger state, Governor Babangida Aliyu vowed to "invoke the full wrath of the law on all those involved in the violence – [they] will not go unpunished," according to a 14 April statement.

Oguche told IRIN the police were "doing all they could", noting that on 16 April police charged 115 youths with disturbance of public peace, arson and theft.


Government spokesperson Maigari Kanna from Bauchi State, a hotbed of sectarian unrest since 1991, said government authorities are constrained from prosecuting those responsible for violence.

"Some of those involved in clashes are related to influential people...who exert pressure and ensure their relations are let off the hook. This attitude has frustrated previous attempts to prosecute the accused, which has only encouraged hoodlums to perpetrate the same crimes."

[...]

In bouts of violence in Plateau state in 2001, 2004 and 2008, repeat perpetrators have never been charged, Guttschuss said.

An investigation may follow the Niger state flare-up but Guttschuss said results usually are not made public and any recommendations rarely implemented."



*For more detailed information on the role of security forces in quelling violence, see Human Rights Watch's ["Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces"](#) (20 July 2009)*

## **Displacement related to inter-ethnic violence**

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### **Ethnic violence increased sharply since 1999, often fuelled by the emergence of militant ethnic groups**

- Nigeria accounts for one-quarter of West Africa's population and has 250 ethnic groups
- The introduction of democracy was followed by more open conflicts and the emergence of increasingly militant groups (1999)
- The Nigerian Constitution mandates proportional ethnic representation, but inter-ethnic tensions prevail

**US DOS, August 2000:**

"The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria accounts for one-quarter of West Africa's people. Although less than 25% of Nigerians are urban dwellers, at least 24 cities have populations of more than 100,000. The variety of customs, languages, and traditions among Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups gives the country a rich diversity. The dominant ethnic group in the northern two-thirds of the country is the Hausa-Fulani, most of whom are Muslim. Other major ethnic groups of the north are the Nupe, Tiv, and Kanuri. The Yoruba people are predominant in the southwest. About half of the Yorubas are Christian and half Muslim. The predominantly Catholic Igbo are the largest ethnic group in the southeast, with the Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw (the country's fourth-largest ethnic group) comprising a substantial segment of the population in that area as well. Persons of different language backgrounds most commonly communicate in English, although knowledge of two or more Nigerian languages is widespread. Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo are the most widely used."

**US DOS, February 2001, sect.5:**

"Since Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in as president in May 1999, communal conflicts have increased in Nigeria in number and intensity, causing hundreds of deaths and displacing thousands.

The most common explanation provided to IRIN by analysts in Lagos and Port Harcourt is that the introduction of democracy has acted like the release of a pressure valve, enabling people to vent their pent-up anger and express themselves more freely.

"The Constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination by the Government. In addition the Constitution mandates that the composition of the federal, state, and local governments and their agencies, as well as the conduct of their affairs, reflect the diverse character of the country in order to promote national unity and loyalty. This provision was designed as a safeguard against domination of the Government by persons from a few states or ethnic and sectional groups. These provisions were included in response to previous domination of the Government and the armed forces by northerners and Muslims. The Government of Olusegun Obasanjo was an example of this diversity. Obasanjo is a Yoruba from the southwest, the Vice President is a northerner, and the Senate President is an Igbo. The Government also attempted to balance key positions and deputy positions among the different regions and ethnic groups. For example, the Minister of Defense is from one of the middle-belt states, while his deputy is a southwestern Yoruba. The Senate used its oversight role to reject many of Obasanjo's ambassadorial appointments and insisted on three nominees from each state for each appointment. The political parties also engaged in "zoning," the practice of rotating positions within the party among the different regions and ethnicities to ensure that each region and ethnicity is given adequate representation. Nonetheless, claims of marginalization by members of southern minority groups and Igbos continued. The ethnic groups of the Niger Delta, in particular, continued their calls for high-level representation on petroleum issues and within the security forces. Northern Muslims, who lost previously held positions within the military hierarchy, accused the Obasanjo Government of favoring southerners. Traditional linkages continued to impose considerable pressure on individual government officials to favor their own ethnic groups for important positions and patronage."

**IRIN, 5 January 2000:**

"One of the factors fuelling communal violence has been the emergence of increasingly militant groups such as the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), a pro-Yoruba organisation, Ijaw youth groups in the Niger Delta (although the Ijaw Youth Council says it espouses non-violence) and the Arewa People's Congress (APC), formed to protect the interests of the Hausa-Fulani in the north. Clashes in November 1999 between Hausas and Yoruba at a market in Ketu District in

Lagos resulted in at least 30 casualties. The disturbances were blamed on the OPC, which denied that it was involved."

### **Background on the hostility between the Yorubas of the West and the Hausa-Fulani of the Muslim North**

- O'odua People's Congress (OPC) emerged in 1994 as an organization active in the southwest of Nigeria to protect the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group
- The Yoruba allegedly perceive the civil service, the military, the diplomatic service and educational establishments dominated by Northerners
- ...while northerners see the south controls commercial activities in the economy, banking and the financial sector

### **EPCPT October 1999:**

#### **'Nigeria: The Transition to Democracy and the South-Western Opposition'**

"The British colonial administration of the 350 ethnic groups making up Nigeria comprised two separate phases. In the mid-nineteenth century the Protectorate and Colony of Southern Nigeria was established. This was followed by the Protectorate and Colony of Northern Nigeria which was declared in 1900. The British amalgamated the two regions in 1914. In 1947, a colonial constitution split Nigeria into three unequal political regions: north, west and east. The north, dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, was larger and more populous than the other two regions. There is a very significant minority population in the north. The west was, and still is, dominated by the Yoruba, while the Ibos were the largest group in the east. These three regions have now been balkanised into Nigeria's present thirty six-state federal structure. In spite of this departmentalisation, north-south divisions have remained alive in Nigerian politics [...]

The [North-South] conflict is a relatively recent development which intensified following the cancellation of the results of the June 12, 1993 elections by the Nigerian military rulers. The Yoruba saw the cancellation of the elections, which were won by a Yoruban, as the climax of a series of injustices perpetrated by the northern power elite. [...]

Since Nigeria's political independence in 1960, most of its leaders have come from the predominantly Muslim north of the country. In the early 1960s, fears of political marginalisation caused the Eastern Region to attempt to secede from the Nigerian federation. These fears were resurrected during the Sani Abacha era. The south, of which the south-west is only a part, has complained about marginalisation and the prolonged control of political power by the northern power elite. The northern ruling elite is believed to have benefited from all the regimes, military and civilian alike, to the detriment of the south. The clamour for a power-shift to the south became more insistent in June 1993, following the convincing victory of chief Moshood Abiola at the presidential polls. With Abiola's victory, the south seemed to have achieved its call for a power-shift in its favour. The nullification of these elections led to sustained and organised protest and opposition. The most articulate opposition to this prolonged northern domination came from the Yorubas of the south-west, especially after June 1993.

[...]

The north has, over the years, been accused of conniving to permanently control the nation's governance, to the exclusion of others of southern extraction. The Yoruba allege that the north dominates the civil service, the military, the diplomatic service and educational establishments.

[...]

In summary, the south-west believes that successive governments in Nigeria have only pursued one goal - primacy of the north - which serves as a generic canopy for other interests.

[...]

If the south-west feels marginalised, so does the north. There is a wide spread belief in the north that the south controls commercial activities in the economy, banking and the financial sector, education, the public service, etc. The north had held on to political power in part, to secure itself from complete marginalisation. Spokesmen for the northern power elite have repeatedly made it clear that the north is marginalised economically, educationally, and in all the facets of the public service. Northerners generally perceive leaders of the south-west and their demands as a selfish, and pursuing an ethnic agenda. Indeed, there is very little respect for the position of the south-west among the average northerners, since it is seen as an ethnic position.

[...]

The cancellation of the June 1993 election marked a turning point in the history of the face-off between the north and south. In Lagos, which is the nerve-centre of the south, the announcement was followed by rioting which led to a massive loss of life and the mass destruction of property.

Renewing their struggle, the Yoruba forged links with several organisations to help realise their aims. Affiliated ethnic organisations came to the fore in this process. Prominent among the organisations formed during the Abacha regime were NADECO, Afenifere and the Oduduwa Peoples' Congress (OPC). [...]

These organisations, led by notable Yoruba leaders, formed themselves into an opposition, supposedly to free the country from what was believed to be the clutches of the northern power elite.

[...]

This remained the situation until the deaths of general Abacha and chief Moshood Abiola. Chief Abiola's death was treated by leaders of the south-west as murder perpetrated by the state. Abiola's death re-ignited the clamour for a government of national unity, restructuring, a power-shift, and a true federal constitution fashioned through a sovereign national conference.

The renewed calls intensified, and took a violent turn with the establishment of another Yoruba platform called the Oduduwa Peoples' Congress. The congress, which is a Yoruba socio-cultural organisation led by youths, resorted to the use of direct confrontation with military and police forces. This groups which is strong in Lagos and other parts of the south-west, has clashed with the state forces on several occasions. The group benefited from recruits earlier displaced by the crisis of structural adjustment and its accompanying poverty. These clashes resulted in the destruction of lives and property. On some occasions the Oduduwa Peoples' Congress adopted violation of law and order and instigation of the civil society against the government in carrying out their activities.

[...]

In May 1999, chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military leader of Nigeria was sworn in as the elected civilian president of Nigeria. Even though he is a Yoruba from the south-west, he was not a favourite candidate of the south-west. As such, he gained his winning votes outside the region. With Obasanjo's electoral victory, a power-shift has been achieved, even if by default, meeting one of the principal demands of the Yoruba south-west.

[...]

However Obasanjo's government has encountered a number of problems in its first two months in office. Aside from numerous scandals concerning elected officials, various parts of the country have been plagued by community conflicts. One of the most dramatic is the conflict between the Hausa settlers and the indigenous Yoruba in the south-western town of Sagamu. What apparently started as a fight about a Yoruba traditional festival, expanded into interethnic violence that also spread to the northern city of Kano. In the following days hundreds of people were killed in the two towns."

### ***More background on the O'odua People's Congress (OPC)***

**HRW February 2003, pp. 20, 22**

"Nigeria has witnessed an increase in the activities of ethnic and regional militia, vigilantes, and other armed groups in the last few years. One of the better-known of these groups is the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), an organization active in the southwest of Nigeria which campaigns to protect the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group and seeks autonomy for the Yoruba people. The OPC is a complex organization, which has taken on several different roles as it has adapted to the changing political and security environment in Nigeria. One of several Yoruba self-determination groups, it was established in 1994 with the aim of overcoming what it alleged was the political marginalization of the Yoruba. It has since evolved in several different directions. Its activities have ranged from political agitation for Yoruba autonomy and promotion of Yoruba culture to violent confrontation with members of other ethnic groups, and, more recently, vigilantism and crime-fighting. In its two main spheres of activity—ethnic militancy and vigilantism—the OPC has been responsible for numerous human rights abuses and acts of violence, and its members have killed or injured hundreds of unarmed civilians. However, OPC members have been victims as well as perpetrators of human rights abuses. Hundreds of real or suspected OPC members have been killed by the police; many others have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and detained without trial for extended periods.

The most widespread killings by the OPC took place in the context of clashes between Yoruba and other ethnic groups, which reached a peak during 2000; however, violence and human rights abuses continued in 2001 and 2002. There have also been numerous individual cases in which OPC members have killed or injured people, in the course of their vigilante work and in attempts to extort money. The OPC's activities have led them into direct confrontation with the police: there have been repeated, violent clashes between the two, with casualties on both sides. OPC members have attacked police stations on many occasions, and have killed and injured several policemen."

## **Displacement related to ethno-religious conflicts**

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### **Displacement related to religious conflicts occurs mainly in the north, 1999-2003**

- Displacement is caused by religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the north, which also take on an ethnic character
- Constitutionally, there is freedom of religion, however, the government restricted this in certain respects with regard to the implementation of Shari'a law by some northern states
- In October 1999, Zamfara state instituted Islamic Shari'a law in its entirety, after which other states followed

### **IRIN, 22 November 2001, 'Nigeria: Focus on tension between communities in Kaduna State'**

"In 1804, Fulani nomads, who had migrated from the Fouta Djallon area of Guinea and had become late converts to Islam, decided to launch a 'jihad' or Islamic war to expand the religion among the Hausa states.[...]

Having defeated the Hausa, the Fulani learnt their language and intermarried with their ruling classes. Soon the two groups fused to become virtually one indistinct ethnic group under the rule of the Sokoto caliphate.[...]

But when the British arrived to colonise Nigeria, they forged an alliance with the Sokoto caliphate in pursuit of the indirect rule system. [...] It was then that the caliphate extended influence over even non-Muslim areas, to the chagrin of the ethnic minorities of northern Nigeria.

'Even with the attainment of independence, most of them have not been able to throw off the yoke of caliphate domination bequeathed by the colonialists,' Chike Ezemo, of the social sciences faculty, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, told IRIN. 'This has been a constant source of tension and suspicion between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities in much of northern Nigeria.'

The other source of conflict in Kaduna is growing pressure on land as a result of migration. The Hausa-Fulani, who are mainly migrant traders, have established sizable communities among the ethnic minority groups in the state. And in recent decades the rate of southward migration has been accelerated by the advance of the Sahara Desert. Many Hausa-Fulani farmers are therefore seeking land for agriculture."

"This type of displacement-generating conflict occurs mainly in the north of the country between Muslims and Christians. Since the north is predominantly Muslim, their Christian adversaries tend to belong to other ethnic groups, usually from the south of the country. The result is that these conflicts, though primarily religious, also take on an ethnic character. In recent times, there have been major religious conflicts in Kano, Bauchi, Yola, Kaduna and other cities in the north. Sometimes, radical Muslim sects like the Maitatsine group initiate these conflicts, targeting both Christians and more liberal Muslim sects. There is little doubt that the worsening social security situation in Nigeria is leading more and more people into revivalist and millennialist sects in both the Muslim and Christian religions. They are not only ultra conservative in approach but accept holy wars as divinely ordained." (Ibeanu 1998, p.50)

### ***Background on the application of Sharia law by some states in the north of Nigeria (1999)***

#### **US DOS, February 2001, sect.2c**

"The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, including freedom to change one's religion or belief, and freedom to manifest and propagate one's religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance; however, the Government restricted these rights in practice in certain respects. The status of respect for religious freedom deteriorated during the year due to the implementation of an expanded version of Shari'a law in several northern states, which challenged constitutional protections for religious freedom and sparked interreligious violence.

The Constitution prohibits state and local governments from adopting an official religion; however, it also provides that states may elect to use Islamic (Shari'a) customary law and courts. About half of the population is Muslim, about 40 percent Christian, and about 10 percent practice traditional indigenous religion or no religion. Since independence, the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts has been limited to family or personal law cases involving Muslims, or to civil disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims who consent to the courts' jurisdiction. However, the Constitution states that a Shari'a court of appeal may exercise "such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of the State." Some states have interpreted this language as granting them the right to expand the jurisdiction of existing Shari'a courts to include criminal matters. Several Christians have alleged that [...] Islam has been adopted as the de facto state religion of several northern states. [...]

[...]

In October 1999, the governor of Zamfara state signed into law two bills aimed at instituting Islamic Shari'a law in his state. Implementation of the law began on January 22. Zamfara's law adopted traditional Shari'a in its entirety, with the exception that apostasy was not criminalized. Following Zamfara's lead, several northern states began to implement varying forms of expanded Shari'a; by year's end 9 states had adopted variations of Shari'a law - Sokoto, Niger, Kano, Kebbi, Jigawa, Yobe, Zamfara, Katsina, and Kaduna states.

[...]

As the result of nationwide violence in February and March [2000] related to the expansion of Shari'a laws [...], several northern state governments banned open air preaching and public religious processions. [...]

On February 29 [2000], in response to the nationwide violence, President Obasanjo convened a meeting of the Nigerian Council of State [...]. The result of the meeting was an agreement that northern governors would halt initiatives to expand Shari'a laws and return to the northern Nigerian Penal Code; however, a few states continued to expand their Shari'a laws. [...]."

### **Major displacement as religious violence breaks out in Kaduna State - February 2000, July 2001 and November 2002**

- Several thousands temporary displaced by religious riots in Kaduna in November 2002
- Physical segregation of the city increased after these riots, leaving the population deeply polarised
- Conflict has made Christians originally from southern Nigeria leave Kaduna and return to their home regions in the South
- Ethnic/religious violence caused renewed displacement in July 2001
- In 2000 over 63,000 people were displaced within Kaduna and its surroundings
- Clashes followed the introduction of Sharia law in 1999, but tensions go back as far as the British rule, and have an ethnic, agricultural, and political dimension as well

#### ***Displacement in 2002***

##### **IRIN, 28 November 2002:**

"More than 30,000 people were displaced during four days of religious riots in the northern Nigerian city of Kaduna, the Nigerian Red Cross said on Thursday [28 November 2002].

Red Cross spokesman Patrick Bawa said more than 1,000 people were injured while over 200 died in the clashes between Christians and Muslims.

The violence had erupted last week after Muslim militants protested against a 16 November article in the Thisday daily dismissing their opposition to the Miss World contest which was due to be held in Nigeria. The writer, Isioma Daniel, suggested that the Prophet Mohammed would have approved of the beauty pageant and may even have chosen one of the contestants for a wife.

"More than 7,000 families were displaced in the violence, and if you multiply the number by an average of five people a family you get more than 30,000," Bawa told IRIN.

The Nigerian security forces brought the situation in Kaduna under control on Sunday, although tension was still high in the city. Bawa said some of those who had fled their homes had started going back. The Red Cross, he said, planned to conduct a fresh needs assessment in the city to determine the numbers yet to return and their current plight.

Humanitarian workers in Kaduna said many of the displaced remained in the police and military barracks where they had taken refuge, afraid of renewed violence if they went home. Thousands of residents, especially Christians from southern Nigeria, were leaving the city and returning to their home regions, they said."

##### **HRW, July 2003:**

"The 2000 violence also caused large-scale population displacement, leading to a sharp segregation of communities in some areas. By 2002, residents were describing particular areas of Kaduna town as '100 per cent Christian' or '100 per cent Muslim.' This was largely as a result of the 2000 events, and to a lesser extent the clashes of previous years. Christians and Muslims increasingly moved to areas which were dominated by people of their own faith in the hope of finding safety there; many of them did not return to their original areas of residence. Following the 2002 violence, this physical segregation of parts of the city appears to have increased — an indication of deepening polarization in what was once a genuinely mixed population. Many of the people interviewed by Human Rights Watch in December 2002 explained that they had moved homes not because they did not want to live with members of other faiths, but that it was a 'survival tactic': they expected to be safer surrounded by their own community in the event of any future resurgence of violence."

### ***Displacement in 2001***

#### **ICRC, 5 July 2001:**

"On Saturday [30 June 2001], in Kaduna (central Nigeria), yet more families were displaced by ethnic strife. The Nigerian Red Cross and the ICRC have since carried out non-food distributions for around 1,000 people with no means of subsistence."

### ***Displacement in 2000***

#### **IRIN-WA, 3 March 2000:**

"Fighting in the northern city of Kaduna began on 21 February [2000] following a march organised by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) to protest the proposed introduction of Islamic law in the state of Kaduna. The clashes in the state capital, in which at least 400 were killed, created fear between people who formerly lived as neighbours."

#### **IRIN-WA, 10 March 2000:**

"The approach of the Muslim Festival of Eid ul Kebir, to be celebrated next week, has created fears of fresh communal violence in Nigeria following clashes between Muslims and Christians in which nearly 1,000 people are reported to have died in the past two weeks.

Christians and non-indigenes have been fleeing the northern city of Kano while Muslims have been pouring out of Port Harcourt in the southeast, AFP reported.

The movement has been sparked by fears of a resumption of the incidents in the northern town of Kaduna, where Muslims killed about 400 people, mainly Christians, and the retaliatory killing of a similar number of Muslims in the southern state of Abia. The clashes were related to the proposed introduction of Islamic law in northern states."

#### **OMCT, 26 August 2002, pp. 96, 97-98:**

"When Kaduna state announced plans to implement Shari'a law, the large Christian minority in the state protested on February 21 [2000], leading to several days of violent confrontations. Estimates of the number of persons killed range from 1,000 to 1,500; many churches and mosques were burned. Many Christians in the north, fearing continued violence, returned to their historic homelands in the southeast.

On February 28, when the bodies of the victims from the Kaduna violence were returned home to the southeast, reciprocal violence erupted in Aba, Abia state, and, to a lesser extent, in the neighboring towns of Owerri, Imo state, and Onitsha, Anambra state. This violence was characterized by attacks on the minority Muslim Hausas by the majority Igbos. Estimates of the

number of persons killed range from 400 to 500. Many of the Hausas were victimized due to their ethnic identity rather than their religious beliefs." (US DOS February 2001, sect.4)

"On Wednesday 23 March 2000, the crisis spilled over to outlying LGAs, particularly Kachia and Birnin Gwari. In Kachia LGA, Muslims were attacked. Their residential houses, shops, clinics, courts, filling stations and the market were destroyed. It later spread to neighbouring villages like Sakainu, Katul, Adadgai, Slowai, and Gumel. At the end of the crisis about 350 residential houses were destroyed in Kachia LGA alone, displacing about 25,000 people. Hundreds of people were killed. Many of those displaced trooped to NASA Army Barracks for safety. In Birnin Gwari, Mararaban Jos, Gadan Gaya etc. Christians were attacked. Their properties were destroyed and many of them were either killed or displaced. Several Churches and residential houses were also destroyed.

[...]

Over 63,000 people were displaced within Kaduna and its surroundings. This excludes thousands of others that fled to their places of origin or fled to live with relatives elsewhere. It is estimated that up to 75% of those displaced were women and children. More than twenty refugee camps were opened in military barracks, Police barracks, private residences, schools and churches. Individual as well as corporate properties were destroyed."

### ***More background on the religious clashes in Kaduna State:***

#### **IRIN, 22 November 2001:**

"Reputed for decades to be the melting pot of Nigeria's cultures, the northern state of Kaduna has witnessed some of the most violent confrontations between different ethnic and religious groups since President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected in 1999.

[...]

Trouble started brewing in 1999 when a number of overwhelmingly Muslim northern states, including Kaduna, constitutionally adopted the controversial Islamic legal code or Sharia.

Under Sharia law, drinking of alcohol is punishable by flogging, stealing attracts amputation of limbs, while adulterers can be stoned to death. As Sharia rapidly caught on, it was obvious it would create trouble in Kaduna whose population, like Nigeria's, is almost half muslim and half non-Muslim. Each of the groups would seek to assert perceived rights or lay claim to demands long suppressed by military repression.

In a number of ways Kaduna is a miniature of Nigeria, a federation of 36 states. Not only is it made up of a multiplicity of ethnic groups, it also has a culturally distinct north that is predominantly Muslim and a south that is mainly Christian.

[...]

While Muslims in Kaduna embraced the religious code, counter-protests by Christians soon resulted in ethnic and religious violence, which first engulfed the state capital of Kaduna with its two million people. When the first two bouts cleared - the first in February and the second in May 2000, more than 2,000 people had been killed. Scores of houses and other property had also been destroyed.

[...]

'Sharia served as a catalyst to alert the non-Muslim ethnic minorities of the need to resist and fight perceived domination by Hausa-Fulani Muslims,' Samson Bako, a Kaduna-based human rights activist, told IRIN.

[...]

The other source of conflict in Kaduna is growing pressure on land as a result of migration. The Hausa-Fulani, who are mainly migrant traders, have established sizable communities among the ethnic minority groups in the state. And in recent decades the rate of southward migration has

been accelerated by the advance of the Sahara Desert. Many Hausa-Fulani farmers are therefore seeking land for agriculture.

According to Bako, the Hausa-Fulani - being richer and having a more advanced system of social organisation with links to the emirate system- are often appointed to head chiefdoms or districts among the people where they have settled. "Attempts to exercise this power often leads to confrontation as resentful local people resist them," he said.

[...]

Since the 2000 riots, Kaduna State governor, Ahmed Makarfi, has initiated reforms to reduce ethnic and religious tensions, including introduction of a modified version of Sharia, to try and accommodate feelings of both religious communities. Under the system which became operational on 2 November, the Muslim legal code will only apply in predominantly Muslim areas while canon or customary law will rule in areas inhabited by Christians and non-Muslims.

Makarfi has also created new chiefdoms and districts for the non-Muslim ethnic minorities of the state. He also changed the line of authority, making the chiefs answerable not to the Zaria Emirate Council, but to the state government."

### **Kano: displacement after imposition of Sharia law, June 2000, and after religious violence following US action in Afghanistan, September-October 2001**

- There was an exodus of Christians and southerners from Kano State prior to the official introduction of Sharia law in June 2000
- US air strikes against Afghanistan resulted in clashes in Kano between Muslims and Christians, which caused the displacement of thousands of people (September-October 2001)
- There were fears of reprisal attacks against northern Muslims living in southern Nigeria

#### **IRIN, 19 June 2000:**

"An exodus of Christians and southerners from the northern state of Kano prior to the official introduction of Sharia law there on Wednesday has begun, 'The Post Express' newspaper reported on Saturday.

Residents, fearing that the launching of Islamic law in the state could precipitate killings, decided to relocate to other parts of Nigeria, the daily said. However, a Kano state official denied on Sunday that Christians and southerners were leaving.

[...]

In February, hundreds of people were killed or injured, private and public buildings destroyed when Christians demonstrated against [sic!] the introduction of Sharia in the northern city of Kaduna, some 200 km southwest of Kano.

Kano and Kaduna have large Christian populations, unlike the states of Zamfara and Sokoto which adopted the Islamic code earlier this year."

### ***US air raids against Afghanistan provoked religious violence (September-October 2001)***

#### **IRIN, 15 October 2001:**

"Heavily armed troops were maintaining an uneasy calm in Nigeria's northern city of Kano on Monday after protests by Muslims against U.S. air strikes against Afghanistan resulted in two days of clashes with Christians in which scores died, residents said.

Thousands of protesters had poured onto the streets from mosques after Friday prayers in northern Nigeria's biggest city, denouncing U.S. air raids on Afghanistan and bearing portraits of Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden, suspected of being behind the 11 September terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.

The march remained peaceful until a scuffle with a group of Christians resulted in widespread violence. Burnt cars littered the streets on Monday and several burnt buildings were still smouldering. Worst hit by the violence was the Sabon Gari quarters inhabited mostly by Christians and non-Muslims.

(...)

Thousands of residents who fled their homes are taking refuge at police stations and military barracks. Many more, especially southerners, are fleeing the city in droves.

This has raised fears of imminent reprisal attacks on northern Muslims living in southern Nigeria as has been the pattern with the country's recent cycle of religious and communal violence."

### **Ethno-religious violence between Hausa-Fulanis and other ethnic groups in Plateau State displaces thousands, September 2001- 2002**

- Major displacement caused by the September 2001 clashes between the Hausa-Fulanis (mostly Muslims) and "indigenes" groups (mostly Christians) in the State capital Jos
- Tensions rooted in disputes between one side seen as "indigenes" and the other as "settlers"
- After five days of fighting the Red Cross put the total number of displaced in Plateau State at some 60,000
- Although calm returned to Jos, violence spread to other parts of Plateau State such as Langtang, Kuru and Pankshin districts
- New displacement during 2002 because of retaliatory attacks and bandit raids apparently involving Fulani herdsmen and elements from neighbouring Niger and Chad

#### **HRW, April 2003, p.23:**

"The concept of "indigene" in Nigeria refers to persons or ethnic groups that are purportedly native to a certain area; "indigene certificates" issued by a person's supposed "home" state must sometimes be presented in order to receive certain jobs or benefits through the state. The "indigene/settler" distinction has caused a great deal of hostility in Jos and other areas of Nigeria. Particularly for many Hausa/Fulanis who have been in Plateau State for generations, it is the only home they know and they resent being viewed as outsiders. At the same time, "indigenes" in Jos accuse the Hausa/Fulanis of attempting to take over areas of the city for themselves and to exclude the "indigenes" from economic or political activity. Disputes between "indigenes" and "settlers" had set off days of rioting in Jos in September 2001 that engulfed the city and killed up to a thousand people."

#### **HRW, 18 December 2001:**

"Unlike other parts of Nigeria, which have experienced inter-communal violence with tragic regularity, Jos, until September 2001, had always been viewed as a peaceful city. To many Nigerians, the Plateau State motto of 'Home of Peace and Tourism' was more than an empty slogan. Indeed, many people fleeing conflicts in their own areas had sought protection and safety in Jos; some had even settled there. Some observers believe that this regular influx of populations from neighboring states may have ended up destabilizing the tranquility of Jos. People fleeing in 2000 and 2001 from clashes in Kaduna, Bauchi, Taraba, and Nasarawa states

may have inadvertently contributed to creating an atmosphere of fear among inhabitants of Plateau State by testifying to the atrocities they had left behind, some of which were still continuing. The increase in the population in Jos, in particular, also created an increase in economic pressures, leading in turn to the scarcity of some goods and increase in prices. Resources became stretched, and tensions began to rise.

[...]

The specific incident that sparked off the violence occurred outside a mosque in the area of Jos known as Congo Russia. On Friday, September 7, a young Christian woman tried to cross the road through a congregation of Muslims outside the mosque. She was asked to wait until prayers had finished or to choose another route, but she refused and an argument developed between her and some members of the congregation. Within minutes, the argument had unleashed a violent battle between groups of Christians who appeared at the scene and Muslims who had been praying at the mosque or who happened to be in the neighborhood.

[...]

From that moment onwards, the fighting spread uncontrollably. According to testimonies from different parts of the town, the violence raged from Friday, September 7 to Monday, September 10. After a brief lull, it flared up again on Wednesday, September 12, with further killings and destruction. By Thursday, September 13, when the fighting ceased, hundreds of people had been killed, many others were missing, and thousands of homes, buildings, and other property had been destroyed."

**IRIN-WA, 12 September 2001:**

"Ethnic and religious violence spread to other parts of Plateau State in Nigeria as calm returned to the state capital, Jos, after four days of fighting between Muslims and Christians, humanitarian workers said.

'As at yesterday, the situation in Jos was getting back to normal but new crisis areas erupted again,' Patrick Bawa, spokesman of the Nigerian Red Cross, told IRIN on Tuesday. Other areas that experienced fresh fighting, he said, included Langtang, Kuru and Pankshin districts.'

[...]

The Red Cross said, also on Tuesday, that '60,000 people have been displaced so far' in Plateau State alone."

***Retaliatory attacks during 2002 continued to displace people:***

**IRIN-WA, 4 January 2002:**

"An armed attack by a militia group, during which 17 people died and several others were wounded, led this week to the displacement of some 3,000 residents of a village near Jos, capital of central Nigeria's Plateau State, state police told IRIN on Wednesday. The assailants are believed to be Muslim Hausa-Fulani who attacked Dagwom Tutu village, Vwang district, in retaliation for casualties suffered by Muslims during violent confrontations with local Christians in September 2001, Governor Joshua Dariye said. Those displaced were reported to be mainly Hausa-Fulanis who fled to Jos fearing reprisals for the attack."

**IRIN, 12 August 2002:**

"Intermittent communal clashes have rocked Plateau State since September 2001, when ethnic and religious clashes between Muslims and Christians Jos, resulting in the loss of over 1,000 lives. Since the beginning of the year several clashes have occurred in parts of the state, in which mainly local Christians have engaged Muslim Hausa-speakers whose origins are further in the north of the country. Scores of people have died and thousands have been displaced."

**Several reports after mid-2002 about bandit raids apparently involving Fulani herdsmen and elements from neighbouring Niger and Chad:**

**IRIN, 29 July 2002:**

"At least 15 people died [23 and 24 July 2002] when an armed group launched an attack on policemen deployed to trouble spots in Nigeria's central Plateau State, police sources said on Saturday.

[...]

The motive of the attackers was not immediately clear, but in recent years there have been many reports of former rebels from Niger and Chad crossing into Nigeria and Cameroon to engage in banditry.

Last week's incident adds a new dimension to intermittent communal unrest that has rocked Plateau State since September 2001, when fighting between Muslims and Christians in the capital, Jos, resulted in the loss of over 1,000 lives. Clashes that have occurred this year in parts of the state have pitted indigenous people, most of them Christian, against more recent Muslim settlers from farther north. This is the first reported incident involving foreign elements."

**IRIN, 25 October 2002:**

"Scores of people have died in central Nigeria's Plateau State in a series of raids by bandits and clashes between farmers and herders, residents and officials said.

In the latest incident, on Tuesday night, a group of gunmen identified by locals as Fulani herdsmen attacked the farming village of Maza, north of the Plateau capital, Jos. At least eight people were killed in the ensuing fighting.

Plateau State Governor Joshua Dariye confirmed the incident in a broadcast on Wednesday and appealed for calm. "I want to assure you that this situation is under control as security agents have taken total control," he told residents.

Reports from the Shendam and Langtang districts said more than 35 people were killed in raids on several villages by armed bandits thought to include Fulani herdsmen and bandits from Nigeria's northern neighbours, Niger and Chad, who have been operating in the region in recent years.

"The attacks have been persistent in the past two weeks and many people have died who remain unaccounted for," Isaac Dabup, a Langtang resident, told IRIN.

Plateau State has often experienced violent attacks on remote village communities since September last year when clashes between Muslims and Christians erupted in Jos, resulting in the death of more than 1,000 people.

While the state is predominantly Christian, large communities of Muslim Hausa-speakers, including Fulani herders, reside there. Local people said aggrieved Fulani herdsmen who lost relatives and their cattle herds in the 2001 violence had since been launching reprisal raids on isolated local communities."

**See also: [Background on the opposition between the Yoruba's of the West and the Hausa-Fulani of the Muslim North](#)**

***For an elaborate report on the background, the incidents of violence, the role of the security forces, the impact of the Jos crisis on other areas, as well as the response of the government, see the HRW report "Jos: A city torn apart", accessible through the internet link mentioned below.***

## **Renewed violence in Plateau State causes major displacement, state of emergency declared in May 2004**

- In February 2004 the Red Cross reported at least 2,500 people fled violence between Muslims and Christians in Plateau State and sought refuge in neighbouring Bauchi State
- Among the victims were 48 Christians killed by Muslim Fulanis in the town of Yelwa after they had taken refuge in a church
- In response, Christian Taroks launched a "devastating" attack on Muslim Fulanis in Yelwa at the beginning of May, killing several hundred and displacing thousands
- The conflict was essentially over land and cattle - not over religion
- President Obasanjo responded by declaring a state of emergency in Plateau

### **IRIN, 4 March 2004:**

"At least 2,500 people have fled Plateau State in central Nigeria following a fortnight of violence between Muslims and Christians that has left 62 dead and more injured, the Red Cross said on Thursday.

Patrick Bawa, a spokesman for the Red Cross in Nigeria, told IRIN that his organisation had registered 2,500 displaced people in neighbouring Bauchi State by Wednesday afternoon and more were still arriving.

[...]

Around 100 of the arrivals were injured and in need of treatment. The Red Cross provided first aid, and 16 people with severe injuries were sent to hospital, he added.

While troops and policemen have restored calm in most of the affected areas, people were continuing to flee the districts "because they're not too sure of their security," Bawa said.

Police said the latest outbreak of religious clashes in the Shendam and Langtang districts of Plateau State had claimed at least 62 lives over the past two weeks.

The victims include 48 people who were killed last week during a Muslim raid on the town of Yelwa on 24 February. Most were killed as they sought refuge in a church compound.

The bloodletting appeared to be in reprisal for a Christian attack on a nearby Muslim village in which 10 people were killed.

Four policemen have so far died in the fighting which has involved automatic rifles as well as bows and arrows."

### **HRW, 11 May 2004:**

"Armed members of the predominantly Christian Tarok ethnic group on May 2 attacked the town of Yelwa, in the southern part of Plateau State, apparently in reprisal for earlier attacks against Taroks by members of the predominantly Muslim Fulani ethnic group. Local sources described the attack on Yelwa, where the majority of the population is Fulani, as devastating.

Several hundred people were killed according to credible accounts based on the testimonies of local residents, although an accurate death toll is not yet available. The perpetrators used fire arms and machetes, and the victims were buried in several mass graves. There was also

widespread destruction in the town. Thousands of inhabitants of Yelwa have been displaced, and the area has become extremely polarized.”

**BBC, 5 May 2004:**

“Mutilated and charred corpses were still lying on the main street of the remote market town on Tuesday, reports a Reuters correspondent in the town.

Almost every house lining the main street of Yelwa was burned and some were still smouldering. A mosque was also destroyed, Reuters reports.

Thousands of Muslims lined the roadside chanting religious slogans and vowing revenge on the attackers.

‘Allah will avenge us. The pagans have killed our people,’ said one man.

In Christian villages near Yelwa, hundreds of youths were sitting on the roadside, apparently awaiting further violence, Reuters says.

[...]

**House-to-house**

Eyewitnesses told the BBC that several thousand men from four predominantly Christian ethnic groups surrounded Yelwa on Sunday.

Some of the men wore uniforms, while others were stripped to the waist and painted black.

They carried what a crowd of townspeople described as sophisticated weapons. Then they went from house to house killing whoever they could find.

**Fighting for land**

Justice Orire, secretary general of the Nigerian Muslim umbrella organisation Jama'atu Nasril Islam, asked where the Christian militia had got machine guns from, if they had not had outside backing.

He said Muslims from Yelwa reported that their cattle were being taken, or prevented from grazing, and they felt there was an attempt to get them to leave the area, even before this week's events.

In February, 48 Christians were killed by armed Muslim Fulanis in Yelwa after they had taken refuge in a church.

Muslim Fulani cattle herders and Christian Tarok farmers have been clashing in central Nigeria for more than two months.

They are fighting mainly over land and cattle. Thousands of people are reported to have fled the fighting.”

**BBC, 19 May 2004:**

“Both houses of Nigeria's parliament have approved the state of emergency in the central state of Plateau declared by President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The president ordered the measure to control continuing violence between the state's Muslims and Christians.

Several opposition politicians have already condemned the move as undemocratic.

President Obasanjo said serious action was needed to deal with a situation that he called ‘near mutual-genocide’.

Earlier the newly appointed governor of Plateau, Chris Ali, made a call for peace in the troubled state, warning that if Nigerians wanted to see where hatred and intolerance could lead, they should consider what happened in Rwanda.”

**Plateau State violence sparks revenge attacks in Kano and Adamawa States, May-June 2004**

- About 30 people are killed and 10,000 displaced in two days of violence between Muslims and Christians in the northern city of Kano in May 2004
- IDPs are mainly Christians fleeing from attackers in the predominantly Muslim city
- Thousands of IDPs find refuge at the main military and police barracks
- The violence was seen as a reprisal for the killing of several hundred Muslims in the town of Yelwa, Plateau State, about one week earlier

**IRIN, 12 May 2004:**

“Police have imposed a dawn to dusk curfew in Kano, the largest city in northern Nigeria, where about 30 people have been killed in two days of religious violence, sparked off by a Muslim protest demonstration against a massacre committed by Christians.

Kano State police commissioner Abdulganiyu Daudu told reporters on Wednesday that about 30 people had been killed in the city of eight million people.

A further 45 had been arrested and 40 had been injured after mobs of youths armed with clubs, machetes and jerry cans of petrol roamed the streets on predominantly Muslim Kano, attacking suspected Christians, burning their homes and property, he added.

[...]

State-run Radio Nigeria said an estimated 10,000 Kano residents, mostly Christians fleeing from their homes in troubled parts of the city, took refuge at the main military and police barracks on Wednesday. Grief stricken relatives of the missing tried to trace their loved ones.

[...]

The two days of violence in Kano were sparked off by a protest demonstration on Tuesday against the killing of several hundred Muslims in the small town of Yelwa in Plateau State in central Nigeria on 2 May.

The Nigerian Red Cross has estimated that more than 600 Muslims were killed in the attack by militia men of the mainly Christian Tarok tribe. Most of the dead were from the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups which dominate northern Nigeria.

Angered by the massacre, thousands of Muslims marched from Kano’s main mosque to the state governor’s office on Tuesday. But the protest, called and led by Islamic leaders, quickly degenerated into a riot as mobs launched assaults on Christians.”

**BBC, 12 June 2004:**

“Christians and Muslims clashed in Numan [Adamawa state], following a long-standing dispute over the rebuilding of a mosque which was destroyed in communal violence last year.

The latest fighting began when the local chief, a Christian, complained that the minaret overlooked his palace compound.

The Red Cross says that in two days of fighting, 41 people were killed and 145 injured.

At least 2,000 people were displaced when their homes were burned to the ground.”

**Thousands displaced by religious cartoon riots, February 2006**

- As many as 50,000 people were displaced and about 150 killed in a wave of sectarian violence across various Nigerian states at the end of February 2006, sparked by protests over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad
- The majority of deaths occurred in the mainly Christian southeast city of Onitsha, where groups of armed youths attacked Muslim Hausa-speakers from the north in revenge for Christian Igbos killed some days earlier in the north of the country
- 
- Spiralling violence spread across at least six states, with thousands of IDPs taking refuge mainly in police and army barracks or churches – although many later returned to their homes
- 

**NRCS, 22 February 2006:**

"The reprisal attacks that started in Onitsha, Anambra State in the South-Eastern Nigeria on Tuesday, February 21, 2006 continued unabated. The situation has now spread to the neighboring Enugu State. Some of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are now fleeing the South East returning to the North. The total numbers of **IDPs have increased to 50,000 people** with about **150 people reported dead**. Kotangora, Niger State has reported attack and burning of some churches and shops and over 10 people killed. Majority of the shops in Kontagora are now closed. Red Cross Team headed by the Zonal Disaster Management Officer, North Central Zone is on ground to assist and conduct Damage and Needs Assessment (DANA)."

**IRIN, 23 February 2006:**

"At least 123 people have been killed in four days of sectarian violence across Nigeria, after protests over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad fuelled underlying religious and ethnic tensions.

Two-thirds of the deaths in the past six days have occurred in the mainly Christian southeast city of Onitsha, where groups of armed youths took to the streets to seek revenge against Muslims in reprisal for deadly attacks on Christians last weekend in the predominantly Muslim north.

At least 80 people were slaughtered during two days of violence in Onitsha, leading Nigerian human rights group Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), said on Thursday. 'We counted at least 60 dead on Tuesday, and on Wednesday no less than 20,' Emeka Umeh, who heads CLO in Anambra State, told IRIN.

The violence erupted following the rumoured arrival in Onitsha on Tuesday of the corpses of Christian Igbos killed in the north. The reports sent angry crowds of armed youths onto the streets, bent on hunting down Muslim Hausa-speakers from the north.

The toll was expected to rise further following reports of attacks against Muslims in the nearby towns of Awka and Nnewi. Anambra state governor Chris Ngige late on Wednesday slapped curfews on both towns. Onitsha was already under curfew.

Killings of Muslims were also reported on Wednesday in the city of Enugu, the capital of Enugu State, about 100 kilometres north of Onitsha.

In northeast Nigeria last weekend, protests over the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad turned violent, claiming 18 lives in the city of Maiduguri. On Monday and Tuesday at least 25 people were killed in Muslim attacks on Christians in the northern city of Bauchi.

With Nigeria's population of 126 million people roughly split between a predominantly Muslim north and a Christian majority south, analysts say the cartoon controversy has simply served as a spark for this latest episode of sectarian violence."

### **Sectarian violence displaces thousands in Bauchi, 2007-2009**

- Sectarian violence is recurrent in Bauchi. Although the exact cause of the clashes is often not known violence is portrayed as the consequence of misunderstandings between Muslim and Christian communities
- Thousands of people were displaced in the city of Bauchi in both February 2009 and December 2007 following clashes between Christian and Muslim communities over access to a church and the planned construction of a mosque
- People fled their homes for fear of getting caught up in the fighting

#### **IRIN, 25 February 2009**

"Calm has returned to the northern Nigerian city of Bauchi following two days of sectarian clashes that killed 14 people, displaced 4,500 and left 100 hospitalised, according to police and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The violence erupted on 20 February, with youths burning mosques and churches, according to residents of Bauchi, the capital of Bauchi state, about 300km northeast of the capital Abuja.

The exact cause of the clashes is not known. But tension flared in Bauchi, a city of four million residents, on 13 February when members of a Pentecostal church opposite a mosque blocked a pathway being used by Muslims attending Friday prayers, residents said. A truck had broken down in the middle of the road separating the church and the mosque, blocking worshippers' passage. "

#### **IRIN, 13 December 2007:**

"At least six people have been killed and 30 critically injured since clashes between Muslim and Christian communities in the north-central Nigerian city of Bauchi broke out on 11 December, Red Cross workers and residents said.

Some 3,000 people have fled their homes in the area of the fighting, witnesses said. The government has ordered a 9pm to 6am curfew and closed the local university, which has often been the site of violent clashes.

Fighting started 11 December and continued to the next day, following a dispute over the planned construction of a mosque at a secondary school in Yelwa - a mixed Muslim and Christian neighbourhood of the city.

[...]

People have fled their homes for fear of getting caught up in the fighting, Godwin Agbara, a local journalist, told IRIN by phone from the police barracks where he and his family are staying. "I left my home because it is not safe for me to stay as tension is still high. I can't risk my life and that of my family."

Agbara said people are sleeping in the open. "The National Emergency Management Agency has brought mattresses and blankets while Red Cross provides medical supplies but we feed ourselves which is not easy."

A government official said troops have been deployed in the city, which has a population of about 1 million and is in the state of Bauchi. "Apart from the curfew military troops have been deployed from Gombe, Plateau and Adamawa states to patrol the city and ensure the return of normalcy," Muhammad Abdullahi, the governor's spokesman, told IRIN by phone from Bauchi. "

*For an account of previous ethno-religious violence affecting Bauchi state, see IRIN's "[Nigeria: IRIN focus on ethnic conflicts in the central region](#)" (18 July 2001)*

### **Clashes between security forces and Islamic group displace thousands in the north, 2009**

- Clashes between security forces and an Islamic group called Boko Haram led to death and displacement in August 2009
- Though depicted as an ethno-religious conflict, analysts read the violence as the result of weak governance and widespread poverty

#### **ISN, 7 September 2009**

"A little-known Islamist sect called Boko Haram attacked a police station in Nigeria's northern state of Bauchi on 26 July 2009. The incident led to a four-day armed struggle between state security forces and members of the militant group, spreading to three other states (Yobe, Kano and Borno) and [leaving as many as 800 dead](#), many of them members of the sect.

The militant attacks, which followed the arrest of several of its members, targeted mainly police stations, prisons, government buildings and churches in the four states.

Since the completion of a military attack that sought to break up the sect, no more violent outbreaks have occurred. Borno State and its capital city Maiduguri - the sect's stronghold - were most affected.

While there are no indications that Boko Haram is powerful enough to turn into a major threat for the country, the federal government appears to be playing it cautious. Given the extensive criticism he received over the handling of this recent crisis, Yar'Adua is clearly anxious to limit the damage.

On 30 July, police captured the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in Maiduguri. After a few hours in custody, Yusuf was shot dead in what appeared to be an extra-judicial killing, while police officials maintained that he was killed during a shootout after his attempted escape.

Several other members of Boko Haram met the same fate.

These killings, together with the high number of casualties, resulted in criticism of the way the federal government handled the crisis, not only from human rights groups but also from its own ranks.

[...]

The group is unrelated to rebel movements in the country's [Niger Delta region](#), and despite the fact that Nigeria has been prone to religious conflicts in the past - the country is relatively evenly split between Christians and Muslims - various religious sects are not organized or connected to each other.

Indeed, Boko Haram is ideologically isolated and lacks popular support from the population and Muslim leaders. The Nigerian umbrella body of Muslims, Jama'atul Nasril Islam (JNI), condemned

the sect's actions and stated that it wished to "categorically dissociate Islam from the activities" of Boko Haram.

But despite the common depiction of the conflict as being a religious one, several commentators point to its political nature. "

#### **Reuters, 6 August 2009**

"An uprising by a radical Islamic sect in northern Nigeria may ostensibly have been about religion but such bloodletting will recur unless underlying issues of poverty, unemployment and education are addressed.

West African Islam is overwhelmingly moderate and northern Nigeria home to a powerful political elite, yet militant cleric Mohammed Yusuf was able to establish a cult-like following whose members became violently anti-establishment and anti-Western.

Yusuf's sect, Boko Haram, wanted sharia (Islamic law) more widely applied across Africa's most populous nation. Its name means "Western education is sinful" and its followers are supposed to eschew the use of all Western-made goods.

But the support Yusuf drummed up -- from illiterate youths to professionals who quit jobs and families to join him -- came as much from frustration with what is seen as a corrupt and self-serving political establishment as from pure religious fervour."

*For more information on Boko Haram's objectives, see Vanguard's ["Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad"](#) (14 August 2009)*

#### **Several thousand people are displaced after clashes in and around Jos, Plateau State (March 2010)**

- In January 2010, fighting between Muslims and Christians erupted in Jos, leading to the displacement of thousands. Jos had previously seen deadly riots in 2001 and 2008. Some reports suggested violence began after an argument over the rebuilding of homes destroyed in the 2008 clashes. Violence was also fuelled by inflammatory text messages.
- In March 2010, inter-ethnic violence erupted again in Jos leading to further displacement.
- Clashes in Nigeria are often explained by sectarianism. However, poverty and access to resources such as land often lie at the root of the violence.
- The Nigerian authorities were blamed by some for failing to bring stability to a region, which has long been a religious powderkeg.

#### **IRIN, 18 January 2010**

"Several thousand residents of Jos, in central Nigeria, are displaced after their homes burned in deadly sectarian clashes, according to residents and the local Red Cross.

Local authorities have not confirmed the death toll from the 17 January violence but information IRIN obtained from hospital sources and residents put the number at 26, with 300 people injured. Violence erupted in the Dutse Uku neighbourhood of the predominantly Christian Nassarawa Gwom district. Residents told IRIN the clashes followed a dispute over a Muslim resident's reconstruction of his home that had been burned down in February 2008 riots, in which according to Human Rights Watch 133 people died.

The NRC is coordinating its response with the government's National Emergency Management Agency and has appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross for support.

Military and police are patrolling Jos city and a dusk-to-dawn curfew imposed on 17 January remains in effect, Plateau State information commissioner, Gregory Yenlong, told IRIN on 18 January.

Gregory Anting, state police commissioner, told IRIN police have arrested 35 people, five of whom were in military uniform."

#### **AFP, 18 January 2010**

"Security forces sealed off a section of the central Nigerian city of Jos after clashes at the weekend between Christians and Muslims left at least 26 dead and more than 300 wounded, according to a local imam.

The Nassarawa Gwom district was under a dusk-to-dawn curfew in the wake of the unrest that flared up when Christian youths protested at the building of a mosque in the Christian-dominated neighbourhood.

There was no immediate death toll from the authorities. But the head of Jos's central mosque, Balarabe Dawud, told AFP that 16 bodies had been brought to the mosque, adding to 10 earlier reported dead.

"Eleven of them were buried yesterday and we are conducting a funeral for the remaining five," he said. "So far we have over 300 injured people, most of them from gun shots."

More than 3,000 people were meanwhile sheltering in mosques, churches and police barracks after being displaced from their homes, the Red Cross said.

Security forces searched vehicles and individuals for weapons, as the police claimed that order was being restored.

"Security personnel have succeeded in quelling the unrest and restoring calm in the affected area of the city," Plateau State police spokesman Mohammed Lerema told AFP.

Plateau State information commissioner Gregory Yenlong said the curfew would remain in force "to ensure that no security breach happens."

He added: "The government calls on the people to go about their normal business without fear."

#### **BBC NEWS, 20 January 2010**

"The Nigerian army says it has regained control of the city of Jos, where fighting between Muslims and Christians in recent days has left scores dead.

Lt Col Shekari Galadima told the BBC the city was "very calm" as the army was enforcing a 24-hour curfew. He insisted there would be no more riots.

But a BBC reporter in the region says the violence has now spread to Pankshin town, 100km (60 miles) from Jos.

Religious officials said at least 265 people had died since Sunday.

Among the dead were said to be 65 Christians and 200 Muslims.

Muhammad Tanko Shittu, a senior mosque official organising mass burials, gave a much higher death toll - telling Reuters news agency more than 350 Muslims had died.

He said the death toll had risen as workers retrieved bodies from areas outside the city of Jos on Wednesday.

The figures could not be independently verified.

Jos has been blighted by religious violence over the past decade with deadly riots in 2001 and 2008.

The city is in Nigeria's volatile Middle Belt - between the mainly Muslim north and the south where the majority is Christian or follow traditional religions.

Violence spreading

Col Galadima told the BBC's Network Africa programme that Jos city "has been brought under control tremendously".

"Because of the 24-hour curfew imposed by the government, movement has been restricted so you cannot have any riots or any demonstrations going on," he said.

The Associated Press reported that soldiers with machine guns were patrolling in pick-up trucks and residents were stopping and raising their hands to show they were not a threat as the trucks passed.

Meanwhile, the BBC Hausa Service's Shehu Saulawa says the violence appears to have spread to the town of Pankshin.

On Wednesday morning, one resident of Pankshin told our reporter by telephone the fighting began at 2230 (2130 GMT) on Tuesday.

He said the unrest had continued into Wednesday morning but no soldiers could be seen on the streets.

Another family told the BBC they had fled the town to neighbouring Bauchi State to escape the violence.

But Plateau State spokesman Dan Manjang dismissed the accounts from Pankshin as "rumours". The Jos-based League for Human Rights said people have little faith in the security forces to restore order.

The group's Shamaki Gad told the BBC that no-one had been prosecuted for participating in previous religious and ethnic clashes.

Correspondents say such clashes in Nigeria are often blamed on sectarianism.

However, poverty and access to resources such as land often lie at the root of the violence.

It is unclear what the trigger was for the latest bout of violence, but there have been reports it started after football match.

Other reports suggested it began after an argument over the rebuilding of homes destroyed in the 2008 clashes."

#### **IRIN, 22 January 2010**

"In Kuru Karama village, 30km from Nigeria's central city of Jos, only four of some 3,000 residents remain; the rest have fled or been killed, said village chief Umar Baza. Every home has been destroyed.

[...]

Kuru Karama is a predominantly Muslim village with several Christian families, situated in a predominantly Christian part of Plateau State. Having heard of sectarian violence erupting in other parts of Jos on 17 January, religious leaders in Kuru Karama met to make a pact with the police to defend any attacks by outsiders.

But several hours later youths armed with machetes attacked the village. The Christian minority residents had cleared their homes of their possessions before the gangs arrived, suggesting they had received warning, Baza said.

Violence erupted on 17 January in the Dutse Uku neighbourhood of the predominantly Christian Nassarawa Gwom district of Jos. Though accounts vary, several residents told IRIN the clashes followed a dispute over a Muslim resident's reconstruction of his home that had been burned down in February 2008 riots.

The violence was carried out by mobs of young men armed with guns, bows and arrows and machetes, according to reports provided to Human Rights Watch (HRW).

[...]

#### **Blame**

Jos has repeatedly been hit with sectarian violence over the past decade. The latest violence comes just over a year after Christian and Muslim clashes and a crackdown by security forces left more than 700 dead in Jos.

In a statement HRW called on the government to take stronger steps to control sectarian violence. "This is not the first outbreak of deadly violence in Jos, but the government has shockingly failed to hold anyone accountable," said Corinne Dufka, West Africa researcher with the rights organization. "Enough is enough. Nigeria's leaders need to tackle the vicious cycle of violence bred by this impunity."

#### **AFP, 24 January 2010**

"Frightened residents flooded a military checkpoint to flee the Nigerian city of Jos on Sunday after Muslim-Christian clashes that killed nearly 500 people and gutted scores of buildings.

While fighting subsided in the central city and troops were deployed to end the unrest, fleeing residents said they were too frightened to stay.

At a military checkpoint on the outskirts of Jos, where long lines of cars and buses carrying residents formed, soldiers searched all vehicles, an AFP reporter saw. Several vehicles were laden with baggage.

[...]

At least 178 bodies have so far been recovered from wells and pits after the clashes, Kuru Karama village head Umar Baza said Sunday, taking the unofficial death toll compiled from various sources to 492.

Kuru Karama, a former mining village, is a Muslim enclave in a Christian region 30 kilometres (18 miles) south of Jos.

Dozens of cars, houses, churches and mosques were burnt during four days of unrest and an overnight curfew remained in effect between 5:00 pm and 10:00 am.

State officials have given no official death toll for the violence, which broke out in Jos, the capital of Plateau State, on January 17 and spread to nearby towns and villages.

Global rights watchdog Human Rights Watch (HRW) told AFP on Saturday that according to figures provided by Muslim leaders, at least 364 Muslims died in the clashes.

Although the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) has not provided a comprehensive death toll of its members in the fighting, one of its officials, Chung Dabo, earlier told AFP that 55 Christians died.

[...]

Christian and Muslim leaders in Plateau State have both said the unrest owed more to the failure of political leaders to address ethnic differences than inter-faith rivalries.

[...]

Jos has long been a hotbed of religious violence in Nigeria, whose 150 million people are divided almost equally between followers of the two faiths.

An estimated 200 people were killed in religious clashes in the city in late 2008."

#### **Al Jazeera, 26 January 2010**

"Hundreds of frightened residents are fleeing the city of Jos, the capital of Nigeria's Plateau State. They're afraid, despite increased security and a curfew aimed at stopping days of Christian-Muslim fighting, which has killed hundreds.

Reports say the presence of armed soldiers has failed to reassure the population, and people fear that violence may flare up again. Joy Simon is a reporter covering the clashes.

She says there is renewed tension in the city because of the discovery of more victims.

"There is this place in Jos where they have about 150 dead bodies buried in wells, so that brought another sporadic attack on both sides.

So both parties believe they are still killing 'our' people, so the fighting continues."

The presence of heavily armed soldiers has not improved security, says Simon, because residents believe some rogue officers are taking sides in the fighting."

#### **BBC NEWS, 27 January 2010**

"Days of deadly violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria last week was fuelled by inflammatory text messages, a religious leader has told the BBC.

Rev Joseph Hayab said hundreds of texts circulated around the city of Jos - some urging Christians not to buy food from Muslims "because it was poisoned".

Another told Muslims the state governor had ordered their water supply to be cut in an attempt to kill them.

Police say 326 people died in the riots - other estimates are much higher.

Muslim officials have told rights groups that 364 Muslims were killed.

Christian leaders have not yet confirmed a death toll - although earlier estimates said around 65 Christians had died.

More than 300 people have been arrested.

'Dump them in a pit'

Rev Hayab told the BBC's Network Africa programme that messages had been circulating among both Christians and Muslims.

"I received hundreds of these text messages - some people wanted to know whether the things they were hearing were true, some were sending them to me to alert me that there was danger," he said.

The AFP news agency quoted rights groups as saying more than 145 different messages had been sent helping to escalate the violence.

The agency quoted one message as saying: "War, war, war. Stand up... and defend yourselves. Kill before they kill you. Slaughter before they slaughter you. Dump them in a pit before they dump you."

And messages continued to circulate last weekend warning Christians that Muslims intended to attack churches.

There were no subsequent attacks on churches and religious leaders have urged people to ignore the messages.

Police are trying to find the source of the messages, AFP reports.

Violence erupted in the city early last week, rapidly spreading to nearby villages.

Several thousand people remain displaced, having abandoned their homes to escape the violence.

Jos, the capital of Plateau state, lies between Nigeria's mainly Muslim north and predominantly Christian south and has seen sectarian riots in the recent past.

But analysts say the real cause of the violence is a struggle for political superiority in the city."

#### **IRIN, 8 March 2010**

"Hundreds of people in the city of Jos, 350km northeast of Nigeria's capital, Abuja, have been buried in mass graves after machete-wielding intruders attacked residents at 3 a.m. (local time) on 7 March.

"There was a mass burial of the dead last night [7 March], organized by the state government under tight security. No resident was allowed near the mass grave during the burial, as the graveyard was cordoned off by soldiers," Fidelis Tawkek told IRIN.

"There is a heavy military presence in the area, with the deployment of three trucks of soldiers and two armoured cars to [prevent] escalation of violence," Shamaki Gad Peter, of the League for Human Rights, a local NGO, told IRIN on 8 March. He said villagers had counted 202 cadavers.

Peter said the attacks were "well-coordinated and indiscriminate, as they were launched simultaneously, and women, children and the handicapped were macheted and then burnt."

In the dead of night

[...]

#### **Why?**

A local NGO working to prevent desertification in northern Nigeria, Green Shield of Nations, said there were an estimated 15 million pastoralists in northern Nigeria.

Dwindling cultivable land, political gerrymandering and impunity have increased the risk of violence, making Plateau State vulnerable to recurring violence, according to the government and rights groups.

The perpetrators of sectarian violence are rarely prosecuted, according to Human Rights Watch. Local police said more than 300 people arrested after the January killings were still in police custody in Jos and Abuja in late February.

The government is still in the process of demarcating grazing reserves in the northern states of Katsina and Bauchi, in an effort to curb deadly clashes between nomads and farmers over shrinking cultivable pastures caused by poor seeds and soil.

When the northern state of Jigawa – long a focus of community violence – cordoned off livestock routes several years ago, conflicts dropped from an average of 20 per year to only three in 2009, the state's director of livestock services told IRIN in October 2009.

#### **Displaced again**

Relief workers are now determining the number of people displaced by the violence on 7 March."

#### **MISNA, 11 March 2010**

"Some 8000 people were driven from their homes by the inter-ethnic violence in the region of Jos, capital of Plateau, said to MISNA Robin Waudo, manager of the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) who confirms a death toll of hundreds of casualties. According to Waudo, 5000 people were forced to leave their homes in Dogo-Na-Hawa and the other villages on the southern outskirts of Jos, which witnessed unspeakable violence last Sunday. Another 3000 people, says the IRCC official left the city seeking refuge in camps based in the nearby state of Bauchi. Yesterday, the police suggested that the death toll was 109, lower than the initial estimates; however, the media and the IRCC have reiterated, today, that there were several hundred people killed. "The teams of aid workers with whom we are in contact – said Waudo – have confirmed that Monday in Dogo-Na-Hawa at least 300 people were buried". The IRCC has started to distribute water and food to the displaced persons, but it stresses that the situation remains 'tense'. The main newspapers in Nigeria said that at the heart of the violence are tensions between the farming community of the Christian and animist Berom and the Muslim shepherds of Fulani ethnicity, the two groups are fighting over access to resources. The burden of socio-economic factors in the crisis that have been witnessed on too many occasions in Jos was highlighted by representatives of the two main religions in Nigeria, Christianity and Islam."

#### **AFP, 14 March 2010**

"The latest sectarian massacre in Jos has brutally exposed the failure of the Nigerian authorities to end bloodshed and bring stability to a region which has long been a religious powderkeg.

"The security forces have failed in their primary responsibility to maintain law and order in the case of Jos killings. This is a flagrant violation of the constitution for which they have to be sanctioned," prominent rights activist Joe Okei-Odumakin told AFP.

"They cannot excuse their failure," said Okei-Odumakin, president of the Campaign for Democracy, a coalition of rights bodies in Nigeria, where Jos lies between the country's Muslim and Christian communities.

Plateau State Information Commissioner Gregory Yenlong put the casualty figure in the March 7 massacre of mostly Christian farmers in three Berom villages by ethnic Fulani herdsman at more than 500.

Other sources put the toll at between 100 and 400.

Previous violence in and around Jos has claimed several thousand lives. The town lies in central Nigeria, on the faultline between the Christian majority south and the mostly Muslim north.

There have been outbreaks of violence every few years since 2001, and some commentators attributed Sunday's slaughter to revenge for the killings of Muslims by Christians last January.

But some residents said the killings were part of a spiralling feud between the Fulani, who are nomads, and Berom, who are farmers, which had been sparked by the theft of cattle, rather than for religious motives.

[...]

Eric Guttschuss, a researcher for the New York-based Human Rights Watch, accused the security forces of neglect.

"We are deeply concerned about the failure of the security forces. There's been a slow reaction of the security forces," he told AFP.

Although military reinforcements have been deployed, Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang said security lapses had worsened the carnage.

Jang told reporters in Abuja that he had alerted the army commander about reports of hostile movement around the area and been told that troops would be heading there.

"Three hours or so later, I was woken by a call that they (armed gangs) had started burning the village and people were being hacked to death," he lamented.

The region's army commander, Major-General Salih Maina, denied receiving any hint from state authorities about the unrest, but stressed that he sent troops to crush an uprising last year where 700 people, mainly Muslims, were killed at Maiduguri.

"The public should stop seeing members of the joint task force as enemies, either compromising or being partisan," Maina told reporters in Jos.

The army headquarters berated Jang for his public outburst saying it was "inflammatory... targeted at rubbishing the army."

Analysts and critics have accused Nigerian authorities of failing to punish those arrested over previous attacks in Jos, thereby creating a feeling of impunity, rather than deterrence.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Monday called on Nigeria to find and punish those responsible for the killings.

"The Nigerian government should ensure that the perpetrators of acts of violence are brought to justice under the rule of law and that human rights are respected as order is restored," the top US diplomat said."

**See also, [USIP, Is Nigeria a hotbed of Islamic Extremism?, 4 May 2010](#)**

## **Displacement related to communal conflicts over land**

### **Land disputes in Ebonyi State caused displacement in July 2001**

- Fighting between two communities in Ebonyi State displaced more than 1,000 people, many of whom took refuge in and around Afikpo town.
- Cause of the clashes was a land dispute in 2000 between the two communities

#### **IRIN, 24 July 2001:**

"Renewed fighting between two communities in southeastern Nigeria's Ebonyi State has claimed at least 27 lives, local officials and residents said on Tuesday [24 July 2001].

The fighting between the neighbouring communities of Akaeze in Iro local council and Osso Edda in Afikpo South displaced more than 1,000 people, while several homes, two schools and a community health centre were destroyed, Samson Agwuocha, a resident of Afikpo, told IRIN.

[...]

Many of the displaced people have taken refuge in Afikpo town and neighbouring communities. Residents of the affected communities trace the latest incident to lingering anger and the desire for vengeance by families whose members died in fighting over the disputed land last year, in which at least seven people were reported killed."

### **People displaced from farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe states after attacks by armed cattle herders, February 2003**

- 20 farming communities in Dumne (Adamawa State) attacked from 26-28 February 2003, temporarily displacing some 20,000 people
- More detailed assessment later found that nearly 4,000 IDPs from the Dumne attacks required urgent assistance, in May 2003 it was reported that these IDPs had returned, but that shelter remained a problem as houses had been burned
- Assumed that attackers were nomadic herdsmen from neighbouring Chad

- Similar attacks in the Gombe State during the same period affected 14 villages and over 3,700 people were displaced
- Reported in May 2003 that about 3,000 IDPs in Gombe were still sheltered at relatives and friends, while about 1,500 IDPs were still staying at a temporary school shelter

**IRIN, 4 March 2003:**

"At least 40 people were killed when a group of heavily armed men attacked the town of Dumne in northeastern Nigeria, police said on Monday [3 March 2003].

The attackers, thought to be nomadic herdsmen from neighbouring Chad, attacked the rural town on Friday. 'We have so far confirmed that 40 people were killed, including seven policemen, a soldier and 32 civilians,' police spokesman Chris Olakpe told reporters.

He said the security forces had sent reinforcements to the area to restore order and that police had begun investigating the motives of the attackers, some of whom were arrested and were being questioned.

Residents of Dumne said the attack was launched in the middle of the night. Dozens of houses were set ablaze, as was the town's market. Some people who escaped from the burning houses were shot or hacked to death with machetes. Most of the victims were women and children, they said.

According to reports from the area, some of the residents believed the attack was not unrelated to a violent dispute over grazing land in September 2002 between local people, who are mainly farmers, and nomadic herdsmen.

Parts of central and northeastern Nigeria have recorded many violent disputes between indigenous farming communities and nomads in recent years, as increasing desertification on the country's northern fringes forces grazers southward.

A year ago, a similar conflict in the Mambilla plateau, which is in the same region, resulted in dozens of deaths and forced more than 25,000 Fulani herdsmen to flee across the border to Cameroon.

The northeastern, where Nigeria meets Cameroon and Chad, has been particularly volatile in recent years, with heavily armed groups, remnants of Chad's rebel wars, often crossing the border to fight in local conflicts."

**IFRC, 16 April 2003:**

"Udawa cattle herders attacked and burned 34 farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe States in February and March 2003 resulting in 63 dead, 563 injured and 23,700 displaced. The displaced persons, mostly women and children, fled their villages to urban centers in search of safety, shelter and means of sustenance.

**1- Adamawa State**

Following an attack on 20 farming communities by armed Udawas cattle herders in Dumne, in Song Local Government Area of Adamawa State from 26-28 February, Adamawa Red Cross branch reported that that over 500 people were injured, 63 people died and over 20,000 persons displaced. Several people sought refuge in a temporary shelter at the Central School of Dumne town. Calmness has returned to Dumne town and the attacked villages. The assessment team visited Dumne town, which hosts a large number of the internally displaced persons (IDP), who

are still looking for assistance. The victims who look frail are housed in a temporary shelter without potable water and toilet facilities.

The Commissioner for Special Duties of the State informed the assessment team that the number of IDPs requiring urgent assistance was 3,820 (532 families). The team assessed three destroyed villages and observed that returnees were making efforts to rebuild their houses. It was clear that the farming communities lost most of their property and their houses were burnt down. They have been without any outside assistance except for some food provided by the local Red Cross branch. The team also observed cases of diarrhoea, malaria and infected wounds on those injured during the crisis."

**IFRC, 9 May 2003:**

"[9 May 2003:] Presently, all the 532 displaced families (3,820 persons) have moved back to their burnt villages and houses after receiving some food and non food items assistance, which lasted them for not more than 3 weeks.

The returned families have not been able to repair and restore their houses and farming due to their inability to afford basic housing repair materials. Shelter remains a critical problem as rainy season commences shortly. Food has become a more serious problem as they have to depend on the good will of their friends and relations, who provided short time assistance in line with local norm.

Farming activities is seriously affected and delayed during the rainy season since they had lost their farming implements when their communities were attacked."

**Gombe State**

**IFRC, 16 April 2003:**

"In Gombe state, 14 villages were attacked by Udawa armed cattle herders from 15-17 February injuring over 63 people. The Gombe Red Cross branch reported that over 3,700 people were displaced. Calm has returned to the area and the IDPs are sheltered at both Bambam Secondary School and Primary School. Food is in short supply as containers were destroyed together with several corn milling machines and people have to trek into the neighboring states to Taraba and Adamawa looking for milling facilities."

**IFRC, 9 May 2003:**

"The situation of the displaced persons in Dadiya and Maitukun communities, Bambam Local Government of Gombe State is far from resolved as about 3,000 IDPs have left a temporary school shelter to stay with relatives and friends around the shelter area, while about 1,500 IDPs are still staying at the school shelter. The condition of the people is very pathetic and the children are getting malnourished due to irregular and poor feeding. Children are developing fever and diarrhea at the camp."

**Plateau State: farmers killed as they flee nomad attack, February 2004**

- Nomads kill 49 townspeople in the farming town of Yelwa, Plateau State, in February 2004
- Although tensions were growing between Muslim and Christian communities in the region, the conflict was over land rather than religion per se

***See also 'Renewed violence in Plateau State causes major displacement, state of emergency declared in May 2004' in the section on displacement related to ethno-religious conflicts***

**AFP, 25 February 2004:**

"Nigerian troops and police have deployed to keep the peace in a small farming community in the country's central highlands after nomadic fighters slaughtered 49 townspeople, officers said Wednesday.

Plateau State's police commissioner, Innocent Ilozuke, said that most of the victims died after seeking shelter in a church from the raiders, thought to be members of the Fulani ethnic group, which attacked the town of Yelwa.

[...]

Nomads and farmers, who compete for grazing land, often clash in central Nigeria, where deep ethnic and religious divisions fuel tensions over control of the region's sparse natural resources.

Yelwa is a small farming community in the Shendam local government area 300 kilometres (190 miles) east of Nigeria's capital Abuja, in a part of Plateau State which has frequently been the scene of fighting since 2001.

[Plateau State's police commissioner] Ilozuke said the headquarters of the state's intelligence and criminal investigation teams had been moved to Yelwa to probe the latest clash, which is believed to be a spillover from fighting nearby earlier this month.

On February 13 trouble flared between the mainly-Christian Tarok community and the Muslim villagers of Mavo in the Wase district neighbouring Shendam, leaving 11 people from both sides dead, officials said last week.

Community tensions in Plateau have often been exacerbated by differences between the Muslim and Christian communities in the region, although religion does not appear to have been a factor in Tuesday's attack.

Most of the people of Yelwa are Muslims, like the Fulani who are said to have attacked them."

### **Further deadly clashes in Adamawa state, February 2005**

- In February 2005 dozens of people were killed in Adamawa state when Fulani herdsmen attacked 'indigenous' farming communities in a dispute over grazing land
- Clashes are part of pattern in several parts of central Nigeria, caused partly by increasing desertification and shrinking pasture land
- Allegations were made that former rebel fighters from Chad and Niger are involved in the violence

**IRIN, 8 February 2005:**

“At least 30 people have been killed in a week of clashes between farming communities and nomadic cattle herdsman in Adamawa state, near the eastern frontier with Cameroon, local officials and residents said on Tuesday.

The deadliest fighting took place last Thursday when ethnic Fulani herdsman attacked the farming village of Bali, killing 28, said Saidu Adamu, a local government official.

‘Farmers in the area have been complaining that cattle have been grazing on their land, and on Tuesday last week killed two Fulani herdsman over the dispute,’ Adamu told IRIN. ‘This latest incident was obviously a reprisal,’ he added.

One Bali resident, Kwanga Dogo, told IRIN that the attackers had been armed with assault rifles, machetes and bows and arrows and had stormed the village in the early hours of the morning.

Dogo said the dialects spoken by some of the assailants suggested they hailed from nearby Chad and Niger, but police and local officials would not confirm the claims.

Dogo said he had escaped from the village and had fled to the state capital, Yola.

Adamawa state police chief, Hafiz Ringim said police reinforcements were being sent to the affected area to stop the violence from escalating.

Over the last decade, clashes between indigenous farming communities and nomadic herdsman have increased in several parts of central Nigeria, including the country’s eastern flank.

Increasing desertification in northern Nigeria has been forcing herders further south into the central region in search of pasture, raising the ire of farmers that work the land.

Remnants of former rebel forces in Chad and Niger have moved into Nigeria during this period, engaging in banditry.

Residents and police have in the past blamed these armed gangs for some of the violence, alleging that they often hire themselves out as mercenaries.”

### **Conflict over farmland in southeastern Nigeria, April 2005**

- In a resurgence of perennial conflict over farmland, dozens of people were killed in clashes between two rival communities in Cross River and Ebonyi states in April 2005

#### **IRIN, 26 April 2005:**

“Dozens of people died in clashes last week between two rival communities in southeastern Nigeria over ownership of prized farmland, residents and officials said Tuesday.

More than 50 people were killed in the worst day of the violence last Thursday when fighters armed with machetes and rifles, believed to be from Cross River State, rampaged through a settlement of people across the border in neighbouring Ebonyi State, residents said.

John Otu, Ebonyi commissioner for information, confirmed there were many deaths but said he could not give definite figures. He said a longstanding dispute over farming land flared up again last week, with retaliatory attacks culminating in Thursday’s mayhem.

'The people are farmers and this is the farming season which often brings such conflicts,' Otu told IRIN.

Ebonyi governor, Sam Egwu, on Saturday met his Cross River counterpart, Donald Duke, in an effort to calm rising tension in the area and stop the violence from spreading.

Police officials said reinforcements had been sent to the area to prevent more fighting and Otu said no further violence has been reported between the two communities.

Thousands of people have died in Nigeria in communal, ethnic and religious clashes often triggered by land disputes since the 1999 election of President Olusegun Obasanjo ended more than 15 years of repressive military rule."

### **People flee communal fighting on border between Benue and Taraba States, 2007**

- Over 3000 people have reportedly been displaced due to communal fighting in a border town between Benue and Taraba States
- Most of the displaced come from two main villages on the border between the two States and they tend to find refuge with family and friends

#### **NRCS, August 2007:**

"Over 3,000 people have been displaced in both Takun Local Government of Taraba State and Katsina –Ala in Benue State. The crisis took place in Dogon Gawa a border town between Benue and Taraba State. The area is still very volatile due to the nature of the conflict."

#### **IRIN, 25 July 2007:**

"A growing stream of villagers are fleeing border areas between Benue and Taraba states in central Nigeria after an upsurge of deadly clashes between ethnic Tiv and Kuteb communities over a protracted land dispute, residents and officials said on 25 July.

Over 200 people have arrived in the town of Katsina-Ala – about 30km from the fighting – since the latest reported attack on 19 July in which local militia fighters opened fire on a crowded minibus, killing nine passengers, Rufus Achenge, a local government official, said.

Dozens of people have been reported killed since the resurgence of fighting in early June in the Katsina-Ala and Takum districts spanning Benue and Taraba states.

"Most of the displaced people arriving in the last week are coming from areas around Dogon Gawa and Kwaghando villages where we had the most recent fighting," said Achenge. "They generally find refuge with relations and friends." "

*Land clashes previously broke out in 2002 in Mambilla Plateau in Taraba State. For an account of those clashes and for an analysis of the causes of the conflict, see UNHCR's "[Africa Newsletter](#)" (1 March 2007) and The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution's "[Home Sweet Home: Exploring Issues Related to the Repatriation of Nigerians Affected by Land Related Conflict on the Mambilla Plateau](#)" (February 2006)*

### **Communal conflicts in southeastern Nigeria cause displacement, 2008**

- Communal clashes in Akwa Ibom state over the control of a parcel of land in August 2008 caused destruction and displacement
- In neighbouring Ebonyi state, clashes between the Ezza and the Ezzillo communities in a feud over land in July 2008 forced thousands of villagers to flee
- The military was finally called in to pacify the area in October 2008 prompting the resettlement of hundreds of families
- At the root of both conflicts lies the distinction between indigenous populations and settlers and the different type of access to land that is traditionally granted to the latter

### ***Akwa Ibom State***

#### **Vanguard, 7 September 2008:**

"COMMUNAL clash reared its ugly head, August 28, in Akwa Ibom State when the Andoni militants, from Eastern Obolo Local government Area, wreaked havoc on the quiet village of Ikot Akpan Udo where not less than 37 houses were completely brought down, the market razed and the villagers taking refuge in the neighbouring satellite villages.

[...]

The current mayhem was said to have started from a disagreement between two motor cyclists from the two communities, but the Ikot Akpan Udo community traced its remote cause to the unbridled quest by the Andonis to acquire Ibibio land in Ikot Abasi Local Government Area.

The community, which alleged that the Andonis were settlers, said the court at Ikot Abasi had in the past adjudicated in land disputes between it and the Andonis, adding that the court ruled that the Andonis were granted tenancy on condition of payment of tributes to the Ibibios. It said that even the West African Court of Appeal (WACA) ruling on the issue of tenancy of the Andonis in Ikot Abasi in 1945 and 1953 respectively, affirmed that the natural boundary of the Ibibios on the west would be the Opobo River."

### ***Ebonyi State***

#### **Reuters, 5 July 2008:**

"Nigeria has deployed troops in the remote southeastern state of Ebonyi after 14 people were killed and scores of buildings destroyed in clashes between rival groups feuding over land, police said on Saturday.

The violence between the Ezillo and Ezza of Ishielu district first erupted last month following a dispute over the land where a telephone booth was installed.

The violent clashes, which flared again this week, were not reported before because the district is remote and inaccessible.

The fighting has forced thousands of villagers to flee to the state capital, Abakaliki, witnesses said."

#### **BBC, 3 October 2008:**

"The military has been called in to help split up a town in south-east Nigeria after bloody clashes between two communities, the state government says.

A curfew has been declared for three months while hundreds of families are separated and resettled.

[...]

The Ezza are being relocated to a place called Eguachara, a few kilometres away from Ezillo town.

The clashes began when the Ezza people moved to the area in the late 1950s, state authorities said.

In Nigeria, migrant communities have limited rights to land, even years after they settle in new areas."

## **Conflict related to new administrative boundaries and political elections**

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### **Overview of link between elections and violence**

- Reducing voter intimidation contributes to reducing violence by means of increasing voter turnout and results legitimacy
- In Ekiti State, for example, local election results were delayed in April 2009 as voter intimidation led to violence in two voting wards and the local town of Oye, home to 18,000 people.

### **Improving Institutions for Pro-poor Growth (IIG), August 2009, pp.1-2**

"The CSAE [Centre for the Study of African Economies] partnered with AAIN [ActionAid International Nigeria] to undertake the first systematic empirical evaluation of a campaign to counteract the use of violence in the run up to the April 2007 elections in Nigeria. The campaign ran in January and February 2007.

[...]

Its campaign consisted of holding town meetings, street theatre productions and the distribution of leaflets. The aim was to encourage citizens to go out and vote and in so doing punish violent politicians at the polls. The campaign covered the six states of Nigeria which represent the main socio-economic regions of the country: Delta, Kaduna, Lagos, Oyo, Plateau, and Rivers.

The CSAE collected information from all locations covered by AAIN's campaign. It also ran representative household surveys, and contracted local journalists in each observed location to keep diaries of local violent events. To allow a clear attribution of the results to the AAIN campaign, comparisons were made with similar locations that were not part of the anti-violence campaign.

The key differences in areas targeted by the campaign were that relative to non-targeted areas: Less violence occurred; Violent politicians got fewer votes; Voter turnout increased by 10%.

The diaries of violent events reveal a consistent and statistically-significant reduction in actual violence. In addition, citizens' perceptions of violence originated by politicians changed by between 5 and 12%. These perceptions were measured using survey questions and directly-measured behaviour.

Surveys also indicate that the reason violent politicians received fewer votes was because more of their former supporters abstained.

Comparisons of the numbers of people who voted in campaign areas relative to other areas show a distinct 10% increase in voter turn-out in the targeted areas.

The campaign was especially effective with those people who were less locally integrated because they were poor or working outside the district. This group were less likely to benefit from local political deals and were therefore more receptive to the campaign messages.

The campaign had an effect on voters who were directly approached as well as those who lived in the campaign area but were not directly approached.

Policy conclusions:

Effective campaigns to counteract voter intimidation can be mounted. A campaign can have an effect even on people who are not directly targeted.

Providing such campaigns are appropriately designed, their effectiveness can be measured using modern statistical techniques.

Measurement is likely to make it easier to attract outside funding for such campaigns from international and governmental donors."

*An example:*

### **Reuters, 27 April 2009**

"Nigeria's electoral agency on Monday postponed publication of the results of a gubernatorial poll in southwestern Ekiti state because of security concerns and voter intimidation in some areas.

Ekiti residents over the weekend voted in a re-run of the 2007 gubernatorial election, which was annulled by an appeals court last February due to electoral law violations.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) said it was forced to delay the Ekiti election results because of violence in two voting wards and the town of Oye, home to around 18,000 voters.

"The early stages of the election on Saturday started very well and were quite impressive and smooth. Later on a serious security situation set in as politicians and their gangs moved to undermine the process," said INEC Chairman Maurice Iwu."

### **Violence linked to new administrative and national boundaries, mid-1980s-2008**

- 15 new states and 300 new local government areas created after mid-1980s
- Affected communities not properly consulted during redrawing of the boundaries and existing historical demarcations were ignored
- Location of capital of any new local administrative area (LGA) often contested, especially if communities belonging to different ethnic groups are involved
- The location of the capital of an LGA is seen by some ethnic groups as the chance to free themselves from neighbours, or to take revenge at rivals, while others see it as a denial of their right to self-determination
- Military governments have in the past sought to reward certain ethnic groups seen as their supporters, for example through the creation of new administrative areas and the location of their capitals
- In the case of the Bakassi peninsula, Nigeria handed over the disputed strip of land to Cameroon on 14 August 2008 following a 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice
- Although Bakassi residents had the option of staying in the peninsula under Cameroon as foreign residents or acquire Cameroonian nationality, thousands of them fled to the Nigerian states of Cross River and Akwa Ibom for fears of violence from Cameroonian security forces

### **OMCT, 2002, pp.12-13:**

"In the fifteen years of military rule preceding the inauguration of the present elected government, a total of additional 15 states and over 300 local government councils were arbitrarily created in

Nigeria. These creations necessitated re-adjustment of existing local boundaries. However, in the process of redrawing these boundaries the affected communities were not consulted and existing historical demarcations were ignored by state officials who carried out the exercise. A National Boundaries Commission exists in Nigeria. Apart from the tardiness of the Commission's work, its powers are limited to making recommendations on internal boundary questions, recommendations that the government is not obliged to implement. Petitions and protests by affected communities seeking redress for lost assets, including farmlands occasioned by the exercise of creation of new administrative units, were either ignored or brutally repelled. Consequently, the communities are periodically pitched in violent conflict in an effort to seek local solutions."

**Ibeanu, 1999, pp. 172-173:**

"Perhaps the most common conflicts in Nigeria today are linked to the process of transition from military to civilian rule. Not only has the state targeted many opponents as individuals, but there have been many other conflicts involving groups. The most significant, however, are numerous conflicts associated with decentralization of government, particularly the creation of new local administrative areas (LGAs). For one thing, their creation has reopened a number of old inter-communal rivalries, some dating to the colonial era. For another thing, the enormous power that people have come to associate with government, especially the tendency for people who occupy political positions at all levels of the state to amass personal wealth and influence, has made 'government', even at the very local level, a highly contested terrain. In addition, because of the tendency for governments in Nigeria to focus attention only on certain areas, urban centres and capital cities in particular, to the negligence of the vast rural areas, the location of the capital (the seat of government) of any new LGA is hotly contested. This contest is particularly fierce if communities belonging to different ethnic groups are involved. Moreover, some local communities and/or ethnic groups see in the creation of local governments an opportunity to free themselves from overbearing neighbours. Others see it as an opportunity to get back at rivals. Still others see it as a denial of their right to self-determination, especially where their request for a local government is denied. The situation is worsened by the manipulation of old inter-communal rivalries by politicians who seek office in the newly created local councils. It was therefore to be expected that the creation of 181 new LGAs in the country in late 1996, as part of the transition to democracy, would unleash a new fury of violence across the country."

*The case of the Bakassi peninsula*

**IRIN, 13 November 2007:**

"Following years of tensions between Nigeria and Cameroon which led to clashes in the 1990s, Nigeria officially accepted a 2002 decision by the International Court of Justice which awarded all of the swampy peninsula to Cameroon.

Diplomatically, the process has been touted as a huge success. Nigeria had administered the peninsula since independence from Britain in 1960, except during occasional incursions by Cameroon. The withdrawal followed a series of border agreements between the two countries covering the 2,300 km land border, from Lake Chad and to the Gulf of Guinea - where the two countries plan to share significant offshore oil reserves.

According to UN officials who are members of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission helping to monitor the agreement, Bakassians have three choices: They can take full Cameroonian citizenship, they can remain Nigerian and take resident alien status in Cameroon, or they can leave Bakassi and resettle in Nigeria."

**IFRC, 10 November 2008, p.2:**

"The Nigerian Government's formal handover of the Bakassi Region to Cameroonian authorities on 14 August 2008 resulted in a significant population movement. Thousands of Nigerians

residing in Bakassi feared for their security and fled to Nigeria's Cross River and Akwa Ibom States. Most returnees left without basic personal items or lost money and belongings due to violent attacks.

Despite enormous efforts made by Akwa Ibom's local authorities to provide makeshift camps (the majority of the returnees are concentrated in Akwa Ibom State), the support provided does not meet all of the returnees' immediate needs. In Cross River State, there are smaller numbers of returnees, and Government has been able to provide more support. Since the influx started, the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS), with support from their volunteers, has been receiving the returnees and providing limited assistance in temporary facilities or camps provided by the local authorities."

**IRIN, 25 September 2008:**

"The Nigerian government has announced it is unprepared for the tens of thousands of returnees who have fled the southern Bakassi province over the past month, and is calling on the UN to help it handle the unexpected return.

Up to 76,000 returnees have registered at 12 sites in Akwa Ibom and Cross River states, according to Victor Antai, council chairman of Mbo, one of the sites in Akwa Ibom."

**Election-related violence reportedly displace some 4,600 people in Kogi, Delta and Nasarawa States, 2007**

**NRCS, August 2007:**

"There were few violence recorded during the recently concluded 2007 General Elections. The violence occurred in Ihima Local Government Area of Kogi State, Ukwale Local Government Area of Delta State , Asakio Local Government of Nasarawa State.

There were also a few other places where minor incidents were recorded and people displaced due to the destruction of their residence but these people were absorbed by their relations.

S/NO	STATE	NO OF DISPLACED	Location
1	Ihima Communal Clash –okehi LGA , Kogi	1250 people	Ihima Primary School
2.	Ukwale Local Government Area Delta	2,000 people	
3.	Assakio Local Government Area of Nasarawa state	1,415	

"

**Post-election violence displaces thousands in Jos, December 2008**

- Following news of disputed local state elections results, violence spread throughout the city of Jos causing hundreds of deaths and the displacement of thousands of residents
- Residents of Jos north, the scene of violence, were among the majority of the IDPs
- Thousands of houses were burnt this making it impossible for IDPs to return home

**Reuters, 30 November 2008:**

"The latest clashes between gangs of Muslim Hausas and mostly Christian youths began early on Friday and were provoked by a disputed local election after news spread that the ANPP party candidate backed by Hausas had lost the race to the ruling PDP.

"The PDP provided an all-Christian ticket. They started the trouble because they couldn't win," said Samaila Abdullahi Mohammed, spokesman for the Imam at the main mosque.

He accused the security forces of heavy-handed tactics.

"As far as we are concerned, we have stopped the violence, but the police have not," he said. Official results showed the PDP candidate won the vote but his swearing in, originally due on Monday, has been postponed."

**IRIN, 1 December 2008:**

"Preliminary police figures show that some 200 people died in the violence, triggered by local election results, but the number is thought to be higher.

Health workers fear infection from dead bodies still strewn about the city, and say they can barely cope with the injured.

Up to 10,000 residents of Jos North, the scene of the violence, have sought refuge in local mosques, churches, and army and police barracks, according to Nigerian Red Cross director in Jos Dan Tom."

**IRIN, 4 December 2008:**

"Calm has been restored to the city following sectarian violence that broke out on 27 November, but thousands of residents whose houses were burned down during the three days of fighting are still sheltering in mosques, churches, army barracks and hospitals."

*See also Human Rights Watch's "[Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed in Jos](#)" (1 December 2008) for a clear account of the root causes of the violence*

## **Displacement caused by conflicts in oil-producing southern Nigeria**

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### **Oil resources makes competition for political power particularly violent in the southern Delta region, 1999-2009**

- An unequal redistribution of oil revenues has fuelled decades of resentment that has evolved into armed struggle since the early 2000
- There is a risk that inflow of money from oil companies to local communities reinforce factional violence within a community or between one village and the next
- Impunity for abuses is more likely in the Delta as lack of infrastructure limit information flows
- Violence is linked to state corruption and competition for public posts
- A solution to the Niger Delta unrest would have to involve not only political and economic issues but also social and environmental damage
- Environmental pollution has caused widespread pauperization among Delta communities thus fuelling additional tensions

**Council on Foreign Relations, September 2009, pp. 1, 5-6**

"To date, various efforts by government, by outside mediation groups, and by civil society have failed to overcome the basic antipathies and conflicting interests that fuel the conflict. In recent months the conflict has worsened. In May 2009, there was a large-scale government military attack on major militant camps, with reportedly considerable loss of life and damage to civilians. At the same time the Nigerian government offered an amnesty to militants under certain conditions. Yet neither of these initiatives, nor the two together, have overcome the tension nor addressed the under-lying causes of the crisis. The future appears as uncertain and fraught with the threat of violence as before.

This conflict has cost the Nigerian government dearly. As much as one million barrels' worth of daily oil production has been shut in due to violence. This has severely reduced government revenue, affecting the entire country. Unrest in the Niger Delta has also frequently caused the world price of oil to spike. Meanwhile, a significant amount of oil is being regularly stolen through collusion between militant groups, corrupt politicians, and other officials and the proceeds from the sale of this oil has financed a steadily increased sophistication of arms flowing to the militant groups. These groups are now capable of attacking offshore oil installations as well as onshore ones, and even attacking neighboring countries. Thus the problem has acquired a regional dimension.

[...]

The first significant use of arms in the Niger Delta occurred in 1966, when Isaac Adaka Boro formed an Ijaw group, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, and declared a republic. His uprising was crushed by the federal government within days, but his demands for greater autonomy for the people of the region inspired later activists such as Ken Saro Wiwa and "Mujahid" Dokubo-Asari.<sup>3</sup> Saro Wiwa raised awareness about the environmental pollution caused by the oil industry and highlighted the lack of representation of the Niger Delta people, especially the Ogonis. He helped found the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which in 1990 published an Ogoni Bill of Rights. The arrest and execution of Saro Wiwa and eight of his colleagues at the hands of the Abacha regime in 1995 caused outrage and drew international attention to the plight of the people of the Niger Delta for the first time.

Over the past forty years, Warri has been a frequent flashpoint for interethnic tension, with out-breaks of warfare between the Itsekiris and the Urhobos or between the Itsekiris and the Ijaws. Yet communal violence has not been confined to Delta State, however. A desire to control oil or gas facilities along disputed borders has been instrumental in causing conflict across the region. Further east, in Rivers State, clashes have broken out between the ethnically Ijaw Okrikans and the Elemes (who are related to the Ogonis). Bayelsa State has not been spared, either. The historic Nembe kingdom has been torn apart by resource-driven power struggles, as have some other neighboring communities.

While ethnic cleavages are intense in the Niger Delta, its inhabitants are united by a sense of grievance about the exploitation and neglect of their region. The federal government virtually ignored the Niger Delta during the 1990s, leaving development in the hands of the oil companies in an era when corporate social responsibility meant little. The federal government in 1979 established the oil deposits as a national asset, taking away any local ownership or control. Indeed, from the earliest discovery of oil, the delta region has been deprived the benefits from this resource, which finances much of the federal government and the state governments of the rest of the country. For decades, moreover, the oil industry exploited the area and in the process polluted the riverine environment, wiping out the traditional livelihoods of fishing and farming, but providing few jobs in return. Today, with a greater sense of social responsibility, and facing serious losses of production, the oil industry is finding it difficult to deal with the immensity and

complexity of the situation, vacillating between support of various development projects and taking narrower steps to protect its immediate facilities. In addition, the remoteness and inhospitable geography of the region have hampered the limited attempts to develop infrastructure. Roads in the Niger Delta cost four times more to build than those on dry land, leaving the canoe or motorboat as the primary form of transport. The difficulty of moving goods and people means that essential supplies—including petroleum products—cost more in the Niger Delta than in other parts of Nigeria. Thus a combination of geography, ethnic tension, economic underdevelopment, and the presence of an industry that yields many disadvantages but few direct advantages to the people of the region, have created a situation ripe for conflict.

While some groups, such as MOSOP, tried to address these environmental, political, social, and economic injustices through dialogue, others chose armed struggle. Oil installations and their employees were an obvious target. Attacks by armed groups occurred intermittently until about 2004, and were usually accompanied by demands for additional benefits from the oil companies. Since that date, the frequency and ferocity of the attacks have increased, showing more signs of planning and sophistication. Kidnapping has become endemic. "

**ISN Security Watch, 27 June 2008:**

"Militants in the southern region, which accounts for nearly all the oil that is the mainstay of Nigeria's economy, accuse the oil companies of collaborating with successive Nigerian governments to deny them access to the oil wealth pumped from their land. The leading international oil companies operate joint ventures with the Nigerian state, splitting profits with the government.

Nigeria, Africa's most populous country of 140 million people is made up of more than 250 different ethnic groups, with the biggest of them - the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo - dominating government. The impoverished inhabitants of the oil region - mostly ethnic minorities - have had little or no influence on how the oil wealth is expended while having to cope with the pollution and environmental damage that have come along with its exploration. It is a situation that has fuelled decades of resentment that evolved into armed struggle in recent years.

[...]

"The people moving with guns in boats in the delta are symptoms of a complicated problem requiring equally a complicated solution," Antony Goldman, a London-based independent analyst specializing on the Gulf of Guinea, told ISN Security Watch. "It goes beyond holding a stakeholders' conference."

[...]

Solving the oil region's problems requires a comprehensive approach that will address not only political and economic issues but also social and environmental damage, he said."

**IRIN, 12 December 2001:**

"The 70,000-sq km Niger Delta is one of the three largest wetland areas in the world, with a unique but fragile ecosystem. It produces more than 90 percent of the crude oil that is the lifeblood of the Nigerian economy. However, more than four decades of oil exploration and production by international oil companies in the area left massive environmental degradation. As a result the farming and fishing communities of the region watched their yield decline dramatically over the years.

[...]

In the past decade, neglect suffered by the region also fuelled restive feelings among impoverished locals. Violence swirled through the region as angry youths disrupted oil operations, kidnapped expatriate employees of oil multinationals for ransom or fought each other for the few benefits that came from oil companies. On the eve of Obasanjo's election in 1999, violence in the region had spiralled out of control and become a threat to Nigeria's oil production, often cutting exports by as much as a third."

**HRW, October 2002, pp.2, 3, 7:**

"When a civilian government was reinstated in Nigeria in 1999, many of those living in the Niger Delta region, the source of Nigeria's oil wealth, hoped that a "democratic dividend" would end decades of neglect they had suffered under successive military regimes. From the early 1990s a cycle of protest and repression had led to the militarization of large parts of the delta, notably in Ogoniland, a small area of Rivers State where demonstrations leading to the closure of oil production had led to a five-year deployment of a special military taskforce to the area and the 1995 execution of nine minority rights leaders, including author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. The situation has eased under the new government, and in particular Ogoniland is no longer occupied. But there is still widespread deployment of army, navy, and paramilitary Mobile Police at oil facilities across the delta. In November 1999, five months after the new government headed by President Olusegun Obasanjo took office, soldiers destroyed the town of Odi, in Bayelsa State, killing hundreds of people. Though the past three years have seen no incident of similar seriousness in the delta area, past human rights violations by the security forces have gone unpunished and new abuses related to oil production continue to be committed. Moreover, though vastly increased sums of money are flowing from the federal government to the delta region, under a new "derivation formula" that requires at least 13 percent of the oil revenue to be returned to the states where it is produced, ordinary people living in the delta see little if any benefit from these funds.

[...]

The environment of the Niger Delta, and the difficulties of transport and communication in the mangrove forest areas, where telephones are not accessible to most people, means that often information is late and unreliable. Impunity for abuses-too often the norm in Nigeria-is thus even more likely in the delta. There have not been any attempts to investigate or prosecute those who were responsible for hundreds of deaths and massive property destruction in Ogoniland and Odi.

[...]

[Oil companies]are thus targeted for protest by the communities in which they work. Responding to these protests-which range from politically motivated occupations of their facilities that close down production to essentially criminal hostage-taking for ransom-the oil companies now have quite extensive programs for community development projects in the "host communities" for oil facilities, make substantial payments for allowing oil work to be carried out both to local government authorities and to other interest groups in the areas they are working, and frequently hire youth as "ghost workers" or for "surveillance contracts" in order to satisfy a demand for employment that cannot be met in this capital- rather than labor-intensive industry. In other cases, they hand out cash payments, sometimes to legitimate representatives of the communities where they operate as compensation, for example for spills, but often to individuals or groups who have gone into hostage-taking or oil facility occupation as a means of earning a living. These payments, even the best intentioned, have themselves generated problems. The companies have in most cases taken insufficient care to monitor the use made of their money; in particular, to ensure that it does not reinforce factional violence within a community or between one village and the next. In addition, they continue to fail to monitor closely security force activity at or near their facilities or where work is being carried out on their behalf, or, in many cases, to intervene with the authorities when abuses are committed.

[...]

The presence of the oil companies in the Niger Delta exacerbates communal tensions of the type seen across Nigeria. The weakness of conflict resolution structures-whether the courts, responsible elected and appointed state officials, or the law enforcement agencies-means that many disputes in Nigeria are settled violently that could have been resolved through peaceful means. In Nigeria generally, the level of state corruption means that government positions are highly sought after and that competition for party candidacy or electoral victory often leads to violence. In the Niger Delta, the stakes are higher, even at local government level, because of the amount of money that flows to the delta, both through state structures and directly from the oil companies. Conflict related to local government, state, and federal elections that will take place during 2002-2003 has already been more bloody in the Niger Delta than elsewhere in Nigeria."

***Environmental pollution caused by the oil production is also a cause behind ongoing conflicts:***

**Ibeanu, 1998, p.49:**

"These conflicts date to the very beginnings of oil exploration in Nigeria. Most of them, however, date to the past ten years and still remain unresolved. Several oil-producing communities, especially in the Rivers, Delta and Cross-River states, have had to cope with continuing military and police 'occupation' and systematic state repression, sometimes taking the form of extra-judicial killings enacted in summary executions. The disputes usually arise over environmental pollution and material deprivation in these communities. Villages like Umuechem, Obagi, Brass, Nembe Creek and Rumuobiokani, as well as dozens in Ogoniland, all in Rivers state, have experienced extensive population displacement resulting from environmental pollution caused by crude oil mining and refining, as well as from material deprivation and state violence. The relationship between the multinational oil company Shell, the Nigerian state and the Ogoni people, which culminated in the mock trial and execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, is well-documented."

**IRIN, 12 December 2007:**

"Civil society groups in the Niger Delta region have warned that the government is destroying communities' health and Nigeria's environment by flouting laws against gas flaring, a technique used in oil production.

For decades gas flaring has been used to separate crude oil from the associated gases that are extracted with it, but Nigeria flares more gas today than any nation in the world after Russia, even though it is only the world's eighth largest oil producer.

In most other countries the excess gas has been harnessed to generate power, but about 50 communities in the oil producing Niger Delta region have had to put up with gas flares burning continuously for decades.

Bari-ara Kpalap from the Nigerian non-governmental organisation (NGO) Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, which is based in the Delta and represents a large ethnic group there, said oil and gas flaring had caused devastating pollution for the region's farming communities."

**JSDA, 2008, p. 182:**

"The twin evils of oil spills and gas flaring, in addition to seismographic and construction activities of the oil companies have undermined the local economies of Oil Producing Communities, leading to occupational disorientation and the exacerbation of poverty. The result of this is normally displacement of people."

***See also Amnesty International, 'Nigeria: Are human rights in the pipeline?' (9 November 2004)***

**Political violence in Delta region, 2003-2005**

- Warri is a base for oil operations and tension between the communities has been intensified by the competition for benefits from the oil companies.
- One root cause is the tension between the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ijaw ethnic groups linked to the number of electoral wards allocated to each community and the drawing of boundaries between wards

- More than 200 people were killed in 2003 in fighting between Ijaws and Itsekeris around Warri, mostly over claims of ownership of oil-bearing land
- In June 2004 at least 50 people were reportedly killed in a clash between government troops and Ijaw militants near the oil city of Port Harcourt
- In September 2004 at least 100 people were reported killed and more than 6,000 displaced in Port Harcourt in violence the government blamed on an Ijaw militia group led by Asari Dokubo
- A Human Rights Watch mission to Rivers State in November 2004 found that months of clashes between Asari's militia and his main rival, Ateke Tom, had caused the displacement of tens of thousands of villagers and serious human rights abuses
- In February 2005 government troops allegedly killed at least 30 people and torched houses whilst investigating an oil dispute between two communities in Bayelsa state

### ***November 2002***

#### **IRIN, 5 November 2002:**

"Tension is mounting in Nigeria's oil region Delta state over recent deployment of troops amid allegations by residents that they were subjecting several ethnic Ijaw communities to harassment.

Residents of villages including Diebiri, Batan, Ajuju, Ewerigbene and Kumusi said scores of heavily armed naval personnel have been deployed in their riverine communities since an oil spill last month, which affected their farmlands and fishing areas."

### ***January 2003***

#### **HRW, April 2003, pp.26-27:**

"Some of the most recent large-scale violence in Nigeria broke out in and around Warri, Delta State, on January 31, 2003, and again in March 2003. On January 31, the PDP attempted, for the second time, to hold party primaries for Delta South Senatorial District. There is a history of conflict between the Itsekiri, Urhobo, and other ethnic groups in the area, but the immediate tension between the Itsekiri and Urhobo was motivated by a dispute over the number of electoral wards allocated to each community and the drawing of boundaries between wards. The military also played a major role in what happened; according to reports, one of the first casualties was a soldier, and many of the initial deaths were a result of military reprisal. The exact number of people killed over several days of fighting is unclear, but it seems likely that at least dozens died. According to news reports in the first day or two of fighting, individual eyewitnesses had reported seeing twelve, eighteen, and twenty bodies; a local organization estimated that at least two hundred people were killed. The Nigerian Red Cross reported that the fighting had left more than six thousand people displaced from their homes.

The Itsekiri and Urhobo ethnic groups are two of the main groups in Warri South local government area, with Ijaw and other groups also represented. The January 2003 conflict was not the first time that ethnic groups in the area had clashed. In 1997, a dispute between the Ijaw and Itsekeris over the location of the local government headquarters led to a crisis that left scores of people dead. Again in 1999, fighting between the Itsekiri and Urhobo led to many deaths. Both clashes occasioned the intervention of the military, which was still patrolling the area when the crisis broke out in January 2003. Because Warri is a major base for multinational oil operations, tension between the communities has been intensified by the competition for benefits from the oil companies.

The delineation of wards in the local government in the lead-up to the repeat senatorial primary left Urhobos feeling disenfranchised. The specific issue was whether the number of wards controlled by the Urhobo would increase from two to four. According to news reports, officials from the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had recognized only two Urhobo wards in accrediting delegates for the primaries, despite claims from some Urhobo groups that INEC had earlier approved two additional wards.

On the afternoon of January 31, Urhobo youths from Okere, disgruntled by their inability to participate in the primary, proceeded to an Itsekiri area of Okere and began to loot and burn property. Soldiers who had been stationed there since the earlier crises intervened, and one soldier was shot and killed during the attempt to stop the rioting; it was unclear whether he was killed accidentally by other security forces or by the rioters. Meanwhile, a group of Itsekiris voting at the township stadium heard of what had happened and began to rush to Okere; on their way, they encountered an army detachment. According to one version of events, the soldiers opened fire on the Itsekiris in reprisal for the earlier killing of a soldier, apparently either not realizing that the earlier burning and looting that led to a soldier's death had been committed by Urhobos, or not knowing the people they had encountered were Itsekiris. The random shooting by soldiers reportedly led to several deaths among the Itsekiris as well as passersby. Over the next two days, as the Itsekiris attempted to avenge their losses, killing, looting, and burning of homes and other buildings spread to various surrounding neighborhoods. Although the military intervened early on, they were unable to halt the violence completely, and the fighting renewed in intensity on February 2. On February 3, the state government imposed a dusk to dawn curfew. As military reinforcements were sent to the area, most activity in the city ground to a halt, although a local organization reported that this still did not stop some attacks and counter-attacks. Fighting finally appeared to peter out on February 5 and 6.

From March 13, 2003, serious fighting broke out again, primarily in Warri Southwest LGA. In clashes between the Ijaws and the Itsekiris, and between the Ijaw and the military, scores of people were killed and dozens of villages destroyed over a period of around two weeks, according to reports from local non-governmental organizations, journalists and other sources. One of the reasons for the fighting between Ijaws and Itsekiris was a dispute over the distribution of electoral wards, which the Ijaws believed favored the Itsekiris. The majority of the victims in the fighting between the two groups were reported to be Itsekiris. After four military personnel were killed on March 13, a large contingent of Nigerian army, navy and police was deployed to the area, clashing primarily with Ijaw youths. There were reports of indiscriminate reprisal attacks by the security forces on Ijaw communities, particularly in the village of Okerenkoko; dozens of Ijaws were reported to have been killed."

### ***March 2003***

#### **IRIN, 19 March 2003:**

"Violence has escalated in southern Nigeria's Niger Delta, with militants from one community attacking villages populated by a rival ethnic group and storming an oil facility, officials and residents said on Tuesday.

At least seven people were killed on Monday [17 March 2003] when armed Ijaw militants in speed boats attacked the Itsekiri villages of Aruton and Madangho, residents said, bringing the death toll in a week of clashes to 15.

[...]

Many displaced residents of the affected communities took refuge inside ChevronTexaco's Escravos compound and arrangements were being made to transfer them to other safe locations, Omole added.

The latest violence brought to 15 the number of people who had died since Ijaw militants and naval troops exchanged gunfire at the Ijaw village of Okerenkoko on 13 March. Five civilians and two soldiers were killed in that clash.

[...]

The conflict is directly linked to a violent dispute which broke out in Warri in February between the Urhobo and the Itshekiri communities over the delineation of electoral wards ahead of general elections in April-May. The Ijaws have sided with the Urhobo, alleging that the distribution of wards favoured the Itshekiri."

**IRIN, 21 March 2003:**

"At least 60 people were killed on Thursday [20 March 2003] in Nigeria's volatile Niger Delta oil region during a pitched battle between troops and ethnic Ijaw militants fought a pitched battle, military sources and militants said.

The latest confrontation signaled a worsening of a confrontation that has disrupted the operations of oil transnationals in the area and cut Nigeria's oil exports of about two million barrels a day by more than 10 percent.

[...]

Oil giants Royal/Dutch Shell and ChevronTexaco, which have operations in the conflict-ridden area have been pulling out their staff and shutting down facilities. They have also been helping to evacuate scores of displaced people from communities affected by the fighting."

**May 2003**

**IRIN, 14 May 2003:**

"At least 25 people have been killed in a fresh outbreak of political violence in the volatile southern oil town of Warri, residents and officials said on Wednesday.

Residents said violence between supporters of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the rival Alliance for Democracy (AD) broke out on Monday in the Effurun district of Warri and continued on Tuesday. Several buildings were burned down.

"More than 25 people have been killed and some houses are still burning," Thompson Mukoro, a resident, in Warri, the capital of Nigeria's Delta state, told IRIN."

**AFP, 15 May 2003:**

"Some 12,000 people have fled fighting in the southern Nigerian oil city of Warri, the Nigerian Red Cross said Thursday [15 May 2003] as it launched a relief operation.

At least 18 people have been killed in three days of riots between armed political gangs in the Effurun district of the Niger Delta city, according to witnesses. Press reports speak of up to 25 casualties.

'As of last night, around 12,000 people have been displaced,' Red Cross president Emmanuel Ijewere told AFP.

'These are people either made homeless because their houses have been burnt or were forced to flee the conflict area,' he said."

**July 2003**

**IRIN, 29 July 2003:**

“Renewed fighting between militias from the Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic groups in Nigeria's volatile Niger Delta have killed at least 25 people in the past week and displaced hundreds, residents said on Tuesday.

And in yet another incident underlining escalating restiveness in the region, women protesters occupied an oil facility belonging to oil giant Royal/Dutch Shell to back demands for jobs and amenities for their community while an employee of Chevron-Texaco has been kidnapped by armed militants.

An attack on Abi-Gborodo, an Itsekiri village on the bank of Warri River last Thursday in which at least 15 people were killed, was followed on Friday by an apparently retaliatory attack on the nearby Ijaw village on Mangorogbene in which 10 people were killed, local officials said.

‘The information we have now is that at least 25 people have died in these attacks,’ Mike Birisibe, an official of Warri North local government, where the incidents occurred, told IRIN. He said hundreds of people had fled their homes while several others were still missing, presumed injured and likely to die in the bush.

He said attempts were made by armed attackers suspected to be Ijaw militants on Saturday and Sunday to invade the mainly Itsekiri town of Koko - still largely in ruins following attacks in April - but were repelled by troops now stationed there.”

### ***August 2003***

#### **IRIN, 22 August 2003:**

“The Nigerian Red Cross said on Friday about 100 people were killed in five days of ethnic violence that rocked the southern oil city of Warri.

The federal government meanwhile set up a task force protect oil wells in the area and crack down on the massive theft of crude oil from pipelines.

The shadowy figures behind this racket are widely believed to have flooded the Niger Delta with sophisticated weaponry that used by the tribal gangs to attack each other and the government's security forces.

Fighting erupted between rival militias of the Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic groups on 15 August, defying a night curfew declared by the Delta State government. Gangs of armed youths armed with automatic rifles engaged each other in a series of gun battles.

Calm returned to the city on 20 August as troop reinforcements arrived. The Delta State government said it had persuaded the warring groups to agree a truce.

‘With calm now returning to the city we are beginning to see the extent of the damage and have reason to believe close to 100 people died,’ Emmanuel Ijewere, president of the Red Cross told IRIN.

He said more than 1,000 people had been treated by the Red Cross, mostly for minor injuries, while more than 4,000 had been displaced from their homes.”

### ***October 2003***

#### **IRIN, 23 October 2003:**

“Fresh ethnic clashes around the Nigerian oil town of Warri have claimed several lives over the past week, threatening a fragile ceasefire secured between rival tribal militias in the troubled Niger Delta, residents said on Thursday.

More than a dozen people have been killed since Saturday in violent clashes between armed groups from the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo tribes, the main ethnic groups inhabiting the Warri area, they said.

Ijaw militant leader Bello Oboko said a boatload of Ijaws, mostly women and children were attacked on Tuesday by armed men while travelling between the riverside towns of Ogulagha and Burutu. He blamed the attack - in which he said four people died - on rival Itsekiri militants.

[...]

But Daniel Iremiji, who leads the Itsekiri Youths Council, denied it was a premeditated attack. He blamed Ijaws instead for sparking the latest clashes.

[...]

Ijaws and Urhobos have in the past been allies against the Itsekiri, who are perceived by both groups to be getting more than their fair share of benefits accruing from oil operations in the western Niger Delta.

But the alliance appears threatened by the clashes between the Urhobo village of Okwagbe and the Ijaw village of Ayakoromo in Burutu local council area over a land dispute.”

#### **IRIN, 9 December 2003:**

“More than 200 people have been killed this year in fighting between Ijaws and Itsekiris around Warri. Much of the fighting have been over claims of ownership of oil bearing land, which the poor communities in the region believe will attract to them amenities and other benefits that flow from oil production.

Following fighting in October in which more than 100 people had died, the Nigerian government had sent in a military taskforce to pacify the region and it has since imposed a fragile truce between the warring sides.”

#### ***June 2004***

#### **IRIN, 7 June 2004:**

“At least 50 people died in a clash between government troops and Ijaw militants near the oil city of Port Harcourt in southeastern Nigeria at the end of last week, witnesses and a local human rights organisation said.

However, a military spokesman denied there had been any casualties when troops raided the nearby community of Ogbakiri before dawn on Friday.

The armed forces said they shot dead 17 pirates in an unrelated incident near Warri in the west of the oil-rich Niger Delta on Saturday.

Eye witnesses, including local residents, said the security forces used gunboats, helicopters and ground troops in the attack near Port Harcourt. They said the security forces killed more than 50 people as they occupied Ogbakiri and exchanged fire with militants said to have abducted two policemen.

They accused the security forces of firing indiscriminately and burning houses in Ogbakiri and in other neighbouring communities.”

#### ***September 2004***

**IRIN, 10 September 2004:**

“At least 100 people have been killed and more than 6,000 displaced from their homes in Nigeria's oil city of Port Harcourt as a result of gang violence over the past month and attempts by the security forces to suppress it, a local human rights group said on Friday.

The Lagos-based Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR) said thousands of residents in Port Harcourt and nearby villages had been forced to flee their homes as a result of these clashes.

They involved at least two local militia groups which have political connections. The armed bands finance themselves by tapping oil illegally from pipelines in the Niger Delta and selling it to tankers waiting offshore.”

CDHR said the worsening security situation around Port Harcourt raised questions about the legitimacy of the government of Rivers State, of which it is the capital.

According to official results, Governor Peter Odili and his People's Democratic Party (PDP) each won 98 percent of the vote in last year's elections.

This is the party of President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was returned to power for a second four-year term in the April 2003 elections.

All the main opposition parties and many independent observers protested at what they said was widespread fraud.

Obasanjo's government blames the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, a group of armed Ijaw militants led by Asari Dokubo, for the recent spate of attacks on Port Harcourt.

Last week, the federal authorities sent in extra troops to start 24-hour street patrols in the city of three million people, which controls most of Nigeria's strategic oil production.”

**HRW, February 2005:**

“On September 27, 2004, the leader of a powerful armed group threatened to launch an ‘all-out war’ in the Niger Delta -- sending shock waves through the oil industry – unless the federal government ceded greater control of the region's vast oil resources to the Ijaw people, the majority tribe in the Niger Delta. The threat, made by Alhaji Dokubo Asari, leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), followed the deployment of federal government troops to quell months of intense fighting between the NDPVF and a rival armed group, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom. The threat also provoked an immediate response from multinational oil companies, global financial markets, and Nigerian government officials. Shell Petroleum Development Company, which produces about half of Nigeria's approximately 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd) production, shut down a facility that produces some 28,000 bpd because security concerns prevented the company from traveling to the area to fix a technical problem. The threat of supply disruption rattled already twitchy oil markets, and helped push global crude prices above an unprecedented U.S. \$50 a barrel.

A Human Rights Watch fact-finding mission to Rivers State in November 2004 found that months of fighting between the armed groups has led to serious human rights abuses against ordinary Nigerians. The violence between Asari's NDPVF and Tom's NDV occurred mainly in riverine villages southeast and southwest of Port Harcourt, known as the oil capital of Nigeria, and within Port Harcourt itself. Since late 2003, the running fight for control of these villages and towns has resulted in the deaths of dozens of local people and forced tens of thousands to flee their homes. Schools and businesses have closed, and homes and property worth millions of dollars has been

destroyed. Hundreds of mostly young male fighters have also been killed. The violence has created a profound climate of fear and insecurity in Rivers State, leaving local people reluctant to return to their homes or to seek justice for the crimes committed.

The recent violence in Rivers State is primarily the result of a struggle between the NDPVF and rival NDV for control over illegal oil revenues. Underlying the conflict are several key issues that fuel the violence, including: the manipulation of frustrated youth<sup>1</sup> by political leaders, traditional elites, and organized crime syndicates involved in oil theft; the impact of oil money on community politics; crushing poverty and youth unemployment; and the widespread availability of small arms and other lethal weapons. Human Rights Watch found strong evidence to suggest that senior members of the state government at one time gave financial or logistical support to Asari and Tom, laying the foundations for a later conflict that would spin out of control. Both the leaders of armed groups and their backers have been emboldened in their acts of brutal violence by the prevailing culture of impunity. Across the Niger Delta, as throughout Nigeria, impunity from prosecution for individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses has created a devastating cycle of increasing conflict and violence.”

### **February 2005**

#### **IRIN, 24 February 2005:**

“Residents in a rural town in the southern Niger Delta said government troops killed at least 30 people and torched houses during a raid carried out as part of investigations into an oil dispute between two local communities.

More than 200 soldiers in gunboats attacked the remote town of Odioma in the Nembe district of Bayelsa state on Saturday, burning houses and firing at the inhabitants as they fled in confusion, residents said.

Nimi Barigha-Amange, a clan chief in the area, said more than 30 bodies had been recovered and that many people were still missing.

Felix Tuodolo, a local minority rights activist, circulated a list compiled by the Odioma community of 33 people allegedly killed by the soldiers.

But a spokesman for the Nigerian army denied that there had been any deaths in the incident, which took place near the Atlantic coast 80 km southwest of Port Harcourt, the hub of Nigeria's vital oil industry.

[...]

Both Odioma and the neighbouring town of Obioku each lay claim to a stretch of swampland adjoining the two communities where Shell recently began drilling for oil.

Earlier this month, a boat taking local leaders mediating in the dispute to Obioku was attacked by gunmen, whom the authorities suspect came from Odioma. Four local officials were among the 12 people killed in the attack.

Army spokesman Yusuf said troops had been sent to hunt down those responsible. But he said the soldiers came under fire as they approached Odioma last Saturday and opened fire in return.

A Shell spokesman declined to comment on the violence, saying the land dispute was a matter for the Nigerian authorities to resolve. Shell has in the meantime suspended drilling activities in the disputed patch of swamp land, known as Owukubu.

Violence between communities laying competing claims to oil land and the jobs and welfare amenities associated with it, is rife in the impoverished Niger Delta, the region that produces much of Nigeria's 2.5 million barrels of daily oil exports.

In response to violence by gangs of criminals and militants who steal oil from pipelines, kidnap workers and generally disrupt oil operations, President Olusegun Obasanjo's government has deployed thousands of troops to the region in the past two years."

### **Clashes between militias and government security forces displace thousands, 2007-2009**

- Heavy fighting between militia members and government security forces in May 2009 and September 2008 led to the alleged displacement of thousands of residents
- Previously, violence had erupted on 6 August 2007 because of clashes between rival armed gangs over control of resources and criminal rackets
- Hundreds of people have reportedly fled the city for fear of further attacks and of being caught between the armed gangs and government security forces

#### **Amnesty International, 20 May 2009**

"The JTF [*Joint Task Force*] offensive began on 13 May after the JTF was reportedly attacked by armed groups in Delta State. The JTF have been conducting land and air strikes on communities across the Warri south and south-west local government areas where the Nigerian government believes the camps of the armed groups are located. Hundreds of people are feared dead.

On 15 May, using helicopters equipped with machine guns, the JTF attacked several communities of the Gbaramatu Kingdom, including Okerenkoko and Oporoza. In Oporoza, around 500 people had gathered for a yearly festival that was being celebrated in several communities of the Gbaramatu Kingdom. Exact casualty figures following the attacks are as yet unknown. According to reports received by Amnesty International, hundreds of bystanders, including women and children, are believed to have been killed and injured by the JTF, and by the armed groups, while shooting at the JTF.

The 20,000 people who live in the area of the attack are trapped there by the JTF's continuing operations. The main method of transportation for these communities is by boat; however, people attempting to travel by water are reportedly targeted by the JTF or members of the armed groups.

Thousands have fled their communities and are unable to return to their homes. Many houses in the communities have been set on fire and destroyed by the military. "

#### **IRIN, 19 September 2008:**

"Even by the usual violent standards of Nigeria's conflict-ridden, oil-rich southern Niger Delta region, it has been a bloody seven days, with dozens of civilian casualties and many more wounded or displaced, according to local observers, in [clashes in Rivers state](#) between the military and rebel fighters.

The clashes – reportedly the heaviest in two years in the region – were sparked on 13 September when government security forces allegedly razed the villages of Soku, Kula, and Tombia, in Rivers state while looking for Farah Dagogo, a member of rebel group Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Civilians caught in crossfire

"I got distress calls from the affected areas saying two of the villages had been razed to the ground, and there was an urgent need for medical teams to go there, but it was not possible for us to go." said Chika Onah with the Nigerian Red Cross (NRC) in Port Harcourt.

Ongoing insecurity has cut off access to parts of Rivers state, making it hard for disaster workers to count how many of the estimated 20,000 inhabitants in the three towns have fled, according to NRC."

**IRIN, 17 August 2007:**

"People are fleeing Nigeria's main oil city of Port Harcourt amid heavy fighting between government troops and armed gangs, residents and officials told IRIN on Friday.

"The whole thing appears to be completely out of hand," said Opuka Ibieye, a resident of Port Harcourt, a 2 million strong city in the south of the country, who said he was fleeing the city with his family.

"We have no choice but to leave this city as it is not safe any more."

Fighting broke out in the early hours of 16 August after the military launched an attack in the Makoba district of the city on what was believed to be a hideout of top militia leader, Soboma George, known often simply as George."

**AI, 22 August 2007:**

"The latest outbreak of violence in Port Harcourt started on 6 August when two rival armed gangs clashed in the streets. In the following ten days, the armed gangs attacked not only each other, but they also randomly shot ordinary civilians. At least 30 persons were killed. According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), over 70 people with gunshot wounds were treated in the first two weeks of August in Teme hospital, Port Harcourt. Seven of these patients died from their injuries. A third of these people were bystanders, including women and children, who reportedly witnessed armed gangs deliberately and indiscriminately shooting into crowds of people at a bus stop and in a market.

On 16 August, the Joint Task Force (combined troops of the army, navy, air force and the mobile police) intervened, using helicopters and machineguns. At least 32 people -- gang members, members of the security forces and bystanders -- were killed. Amnesty International has received several reports claiming that bystanders, including women and children, were killed and many more wounded as a result of the intervention of the Joint Task Force. Reports suggest that several innocent people, who had nothing to do with the gangs, were arrested.

In response to the violent clashes, the Rivers State Governor has imposed a curfew from 7 pm till 6 am. The Governor stated that the Joint Task Force will stay in Port Harcourt for six months, and described this deployment as a "temporary inconvenience aimed at restoring law and order."

[...]

The clashes of the last weeks have had a considerable impact on the local population. Hundreds of people have fled the city out of fear of more attacks. Amnesty International fears that more people will be displaced, as the Rivers State government decided to demolish houses in the Port Harcourt waterfront area and replace them with 6,000 new housing units. The Rivers State government assumed that this area served as a haven for the gangs."

## **Efforts to resolve the Niger Delta crisis, 2009**

- Hopes for an end to violence in the Niger Delta were raised after the launch of a government amnesty programme and a rebel truce
- The declaration of amnesty by president Umaru Musa Yar'Adua followed recommendations contained in the 2008 report by the Niger Delta Technical Committee
- Challenges, however, persist as the reintegration part of the programme remains particularly weak

### **AFP, 1 November 2009**

"Nigeria's hopes for an end to three years of violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta have been raised after an amnesty and a rebel truce, but a lasting peace is still uncertain, analysts say.

"It would be unrealistic to say this is the end of the Niger Delta's problems," Elizabeth Donnelly, Africa programme manager at the British institute Chatham House, told AFP.

The amnesty process is "a chance to implement some change" but there are "a lot of reasons to be sceptical," she said, warning there could be more "broken promises".

In view of persistent attacks from armed groups, responsible for Nigeria's oil output dropping from 2.6 million barrels a day in 2006 to around 1.7 million, Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua decided in June to offer an amnesty.

Thousands laid down their arms and the main rebel group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), declared an indefinite ceasefire. "

### **AFP, 23 October 2009**

"Over 15,000 militants who laid down their arms in Nigeria's restive oil region have so far been registered but the number could rise at the end of documentation, Nigerian defence minister said Sunday.

"Although our projection based on initial assessment estimated the figures of all true militants as 17,000, the number we have now is 15,260," General Godwin Abbe told reporters in Lagos.

"These figures cannot be categorical at this stage of the upsurge in the number of ex-militants since the end of the amnesty period. Some of the groups are yet to authenticate their lists," he said.

He said "contacts are ongoing" to get those yet to lay down their arms after the expiration on October 4 of the 60-day amnesty."

### **USIP, September 2009, pp. 1-2**

"A Technical Committee appointed by Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua to make recommendations for action relating to the Delta made its report nine months ago, but the government has taken no action on the report.

[...]

The general consensus of those from the Delta and those familiar with the issues is that the report of the Technical Committee, appointed by President Yar'Adua, provides the most thoughtful and sensible road to a peaceful future in the Delta. One informed observer said that if 70 percent of the report's recommendations were adopted, that would represent enormous progress toward resolving the issues and returning the Delta to peace. The report has become a rallying point for leaders in the Delta, including some of the militants. Another observer noted that the report's implementation could bring peace, increase oil production, and generate increased government revenues, which in turn would benefit all parts of Nigeria. A major virtue of the report

is that it builds on all the previous reports on the Delta commissioned by the Nigerian government over the past fifty years.

While most observers believe that the president and the vice president are committed to change, no action has been taken on the report. President Yar'Adua appointed a committee several months ago to review the report and prepare a white paper, but nothing has happened. Members of the Technical Committee have complained publicly about the government's failure to respond to its report, but the government has remained silent.

The one concrete action the federal government has taken is to introduce an amnesty for militants who turn in their weapons and commit to abandoning violence. The amnesty period will terminate in early October, unless it is extended. As part of the amnesty process, a jailed and prominent militant leader, Henry Okah, has been released from prison and granted amnesty.

Many questions surround the amnesty process. First, for "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration" (DDR) to be effective, all three components of the process must be integrated and implemented.

The existing process in the Niger Delta makes no carefully planned provision for reintegration, which should include resettlement, training, alternative employment, etc. One potential resource that has remained untapped is the preparedness of some oil companies to assist with technical training to enhance the employability of those given amnesty. Second, as with most DDR programs around the world, probably only a fraction of existing weapons are being surrendered and it is not even clear that the weapons being turned in were those used by the militants. Third, for a DDR process to be fully successful it needs to be part of a comprehensive peace process. Without addressing the grievances of the militants and others in the Delta, it is unlikely that DDR can succeed. Fourth, many militants would have greater confidence in the disarmament process if international monitors were invited as witnesses with assurance that the weapons turned in are put beyond use. But the government has resisted international observers. Fifth, some militants understand the purpose of the amnesty process to be a means of dividing the militants against each other. "

### **ISS, 9 September 2009**

"On June 24, 2009, the Nigerian Federal Government officially opened a two-month amnesty window (from 06 August to 04 October 2009) to all militants in the Niger Delta region in exchange for their demobilization and disarmament. Upon surrendering their weapons, militants would receive financial compensation from the government over a period of time. The question is whether these measures really tackle the contentious issues in the troubled Niger Delta? Will government's handouts bring sustainable peace to the region? Why are the recommendations of the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) only partially implemented? These questions raise serious doubts about the political will and determination on the part of the Nigerian Federal Government to effectively and sustainably achieve peace in this oil rich region.

The declaration of amnesty by president Umaru Musa Yar'Adua follows recommendations contained in the 2008 report by the NDTC. The Committee was initially established by the Federal Government to assess various initiatives taken for the Niger Delta region and provide for a comprehensive report and recommendations. The NDTC was comprised of high profile individuals and institutions mandated by President Yar'Adua. The Committee proposed *inter alia* three sets of reforms tackling issues of governance and the rule of law, socio-economic development and human development towards achieving sustainable peace and progress in the region.

So far Abuja has offered, as part of its amnesty deal, to gratify each militant with N65 000 (US \$841) as part of its disarmament and demobilization programme. As for reintegration, the details

of the process are still unclear, as no DDR commission has yet been established. Abuja also released Henry Okah. However, the JTF that was deployed in the region still remains in position and active. This has raised concerns from MEND, which threatened to break their unilateral ceasefire declared on 15 July 2009.

Handing out money to militants cannot be expected to solve a situation as complex and volatile as the Niger Delta. On the contrary, it only works as a symptomatic relief not a cure. The 'disease' remains and another armed group could replace MEND around the same grievances. The region, which comprises nine states, produces the bulk of Nigeria's oil and yet only receives about 13 percent share of the petroleum revenues. Militant groups such as MEND call for an upward revision of the share - consistent with NDTC recommendations - to 25 percent, therefore considerably boosting the economy of the region. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the same militants receiving grants will not remobilize and reengage to receive even greater handouts. The grants would only uncover the federal government's 'Achilles heel' that other groups could exploit over various grievances."

## POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

### Global figures

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**UN estimate of total number of IDPs is 200,000 – but reliable statistics are non-existent, November 2004**

- The 2005 Humanitarian Appeal (CAP) for West Africa puts the total number of IDPs in Nigeria at 200,000 (as of November 2004)
- According to the Nigerian government, 250,000 people remain displaced across the country (as of June 2004), and as many as 800,000 have been displaced in the last four years
- There is no independent verification of these figures, as data collection and tracking of population movements have been virtually non-existent

***The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Humanitarian Appeal 2005 for West Africa, 11 November 2004, p9, states that there are 200,000 IDPs in Nigeria***

**GIDPP, 30 June 2004:**

“The government estimates that there are currently 250,000 IDPs in Nigeria..... [but] in the case of recent attacks and displacement in general, no systematic effort has been made to objectively document population movement in Nigeria.”

**IRIN, 2 January 2004:**

“Some 800,000 people have been displaced from their homes as a result of communal and religious clashes that have rocked Nigeria over the past four years, according to the government’s National Commission for Refugees (NCR).

Ignia Gabriel, the head of the NCR, told reporters in the capital Abuja on Thursday that areas with the highest concentrations of displaced people were Plateau and Benue states in central Nigeria, Yobe State in the Northeast, Cross River State in the Southeast and the oil-rich Niger Delta.

He did not provide any breakdown of the figures by state or region.

However, Gabriel said Plateau State had the highest number of displaced people as a result of clashes between Christians and Muslim communities there. These had led to the burning down of 72 villages over the past two years, he noted.

More than 1,000 people were killed in sectarian clashes between Christians and Muslims in Jos, the Plateau State capital, in September 2001.

Subsequently a low intensity conflict spread to the surrounding countryside, where the mainly Christian farmers clashed repeatedly with the predominantly Muslim livestock herders.

Several hundred more people died in these skirmishes, which forced several thousand people to abandon their homes.

Gabriel said most of the displaced people in Nigeria were women and children who were psychologically traumatised and required counselling as well as food and other material assistance.”

## **Geographical distribution**

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### **Several thousands people displaced in Jos, Plateau State (March 2010)**

- In January 2010, several thousand residents of Jos have been displaced by fighting between Muslims and Christians
- In Kuru Karama village, only four out of the 3'000 residents remained.
- 17 makeshift camps were set up in and around Jos hosting 18'000 displaced people. In February, the National Emergency Management Agency opened 8 additional camps in Bauchi State.
- NGOs estimate that 6,900 IDPs are sheltering in makeshift camps in and around Jos, capital of Plateau state, while another 8,500 have fled to neighbouring Bauchi state, where the authorities are providing them with water and food.

#### **IRIN, 18 January 2010**

“Several thousand residents of Jos, in central Nigeria, are displaced after their homes burned in deadly sectarian clashes, according to residents and the local Red Cross.”

#### **IRIN, 22 January 2010**

“In Kuru Karama village, 30km from Nigeria’s central city of Jos, only four of some 3,000 residents remain; the rest have fled or been killed, said village chief Umar Baza. Every home has been destroyed.”

#### **Al Jazeera, 26 January 2010**

“Hundreds of frightened residents are fleeing the city of Jos, the capital of Nigeria’s Plateau State. They’re afraid, despite increased security and a curfew aimed at stopping days of Christian-Muslim fighting, which has killed hundreds.”

#### **IRIN, 27 January 2010**

“Relief agencies are struggling to help the some 18,000 displaced people in 17 makeshift camps in and around the central Nigerian city of Jos.

Most of the displaced do not have enough food and they lack access to toilet facilities and safe drinking water, Nigeria Red Cross (NRC) head Auwalu Mohammed told IRIN.”

#### **IRIN, 12 February 2010**

“Some 15,400 people who fled violence in the central Nigerian city of Jos remain displaced three weeks later and despite dire living conditions, many do not plan to return and rebuild their destroyed homes.

NGOs estimate that 6,900 displaced people (IDPs) are sheltering in makeshift camps in and around Jos, capital of Plateau state, while another 8,500 have fled to neighbouring Bauchi state, where the authorities are providing them with water and food.

#### **MISNA, 11 March 2010**

“Some 8000 people were driven from their homes by the inter-ethnic violence in the region of Jos, capital of Plateau, said to MISNA Robin Waudu, manager of the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) who confirms a death toll of hundreds of casualties.

### **Thousands of Delta residents remain displaced (January 2010)**

- An unclear number of people (up to 10,000 people) were displaced in the Niger Delta, in Gbaramatu kingdom, following attacks by the Joint Task Force
- In January 2010, some 8,000 Delta State residents remain homeless

#### **IRIN, 15 January 2010**

"Some 8,000 Delta State residents remain homeless eight months after government forces stormed militants with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Most of the displaced are residents of Oporosa and Okerenkoko villages. Their homes destroyed, they are living with friends and family in neighbouring villages with several families to a hut, Nigeria Red Cross representative in Delta State, Eghworo Ovocity, told IRIN.

Alfred Bubor, a chief in Okerenkoko, told IRIN he lost two homes in the government incursion. "Now I have nowhere to sleep. Tell me how I can go back." Many residents cannot afford to rebuild their houses, Ovocity told IRIN."

#### **Vanguard, 1 July 2009**

"WARRI—CHAIRMAN of the Rehabilitation Committee set up by Delta State government to cater for the thousands of persons that were displaced from their communities in the face off between the Joint Task Force (JTF) on the Niger-Delta and militants in Gbaramatu kingdom, Mr. Kingsley Oturo, has said that more than 100 communities were dislocated by the crisis.

Briefing newsmen yesterday in Warri on the activities of the committee since it was inaugurated by Governor Emmanuel Uduaghan, Oturo said, "the crisis caused a major dislocation of the people in more than one hundred communities that make up the Gbaramatu kingdom. Thousands of people in a twinkling of an eye became homeless, ending up as internally displaced people (IDP)."

#### **IRIN, 22 May 2009**

"Thousands of civilians have fled their villages in Nigeria's Delta state after government troops launched an offensive against militant groups in the state on 13 May.

Villagers in Delta state's Gbaramatu kingdom reported Oporosa and Okerenkoko villages being attacked with heavy machine-gun fire from low-flying helicopters on 15 May. Eyewitness accounts reported at least 100 bodies, according to Amnesty International's Nigeria campaigner Lucy Freeman.

The Nigerian Red Cross estimates that 1,000 displaced people have fled to Ogbe Ijoh – capital of Warri south government area – where they are sheltering in a primary school and hospital.

Witnesses report that about 3,000 people have fled and Amnesty International estimates that as many as 10,000 could be on the move. "

### **Between 3,500 and 4,000 people displaced in Maiduguri (Borno State), (July 2009)**

- Between 3,500 and 4,000 people were displaced in Borno State following clashes between security forces and an Islamic group in Maiduguri, capital city of Borno State

**ICRC, 31 July 2009**

"Following this week's violent clashes between the Nigerian security forces and members of the Islamic armed group Boko Haram, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Nigerian Red Cross Society are providing material and psychological assistance to an estimated 3,500 people who have fled their homes and sought shelter in barracks and police stations around Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state in northern Nigeria."

**AP, 29 July 2009**

"Soldiers in tanks and armored cars besieged the shelled compound of a radical Islamist sect and sporadic gunfire exploded as hundreds of innocents fled Wednesday, the third day of fighting in Nigeria's northern city of Maiduguri.

Relief official Apollus Jediel said about 1,000 people had abandoned their homes Wednesday, joining 3,000 displaced this week in four states caught up in the violence."

**Some 4,500 people flee clashes in Bauchi, (February 2009)**

**IRIN, 25 February 2009**

"Calm has returned to the northern Nigerian city of Bauchi following two days of sectarian clashes that killed 14 people, displaced 4,500 and left 100 hospitalised, according to police and the International Committee of the Red Cross. "

**Some 14,000 people displaced in Jos, Plateau State, (December 2008)**

**ICRC, 4 December 2008:**

"As at 1 December, the Red Cross had taken 148 injured persons to various hospitals and registered over 14,000 displaced people at 13 different camps."

**IRIN, 1 December 2008:**

"Up to 10,000 residents of Jos North, the scene of the violence, have sought refuge in local mosques, churches, and army and police barracks, according to Nigerian Red Cross director in Jos Dan Tom."

**Between 50,000 and 100,000 Bakassi residents flee to Akwa Ibom State, (September 2008)**

**IRIN, 11 September 2008:**

"Up to 100,000 Nigerians displaced from Bakassi in southern Nigeria are sheltering in makeshift camps 10 kilometres away in the state of Akwa Ibom. More keep arriving according to the Nigerian Red Cross, leading local authorities to fear an impending humanitarian crisis."

**Vanguard, 28 August 2008:**

"Akwa Ibom State has recorded the influx of no fewer than 50,000 displaced people from Bakassi, Mr. Victor Iyanem, Akwa Ibom State Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, has said.

Iyanem told the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) in Abuja that the returnees, who are indigenes of the state, were in Mbo, Oron, Okobo, Uruan, Udung Uko, Nsit Eket, Eket and Ibiono Ibom Local Government Areas."

# PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

## General

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### **Thousands displaced after clashes between Muslims and Christians in Jos, Plateau State (February 2010)**

- Some 15,400 people who fled violence in Jos remained displaced three weeks later and despite dire living conditions, many did not plan to return and rebuild their destroyed homes.
- NGOs estimate that 6,900 IDPs sought refuge in makeshift camps in and around Jos, while another 8,500 fled to Bauchi state.
- In February 2010, the National Emergency Management Agency opened eight additional camps in Bauchi State to cater for the increasing number of Jos IDPs.

#### **IRIN, 12 February 2010**

"Some 15,400 people who fled violence in the central Nigerian city of Jos remain displaced three weeks later and despite dire living conditions, many do not plan to return and rebuild their destroyed homes.

NGOs estimate that 6,900 displaced people (IDPs) are sheltering in makeshift camps in and around Jos, capital of Plateau state, while another 8,500 have fled to neighbouring Bauchi state, where the authorities are providing them with water and food.

"We don't have anywhere to go because our homes and what we possessed have been burnt. I don't think many of us want to go back and rebuild our homes because we think they will just be destroyed again," Sada Bilyaminu, who is displaced at Gangare secondary school in the Jos North neighbourhood, told IRIN.

"Even if we intend to go back to our homes we don't have the money to rebuild them," said Bilyaminu.

"We are in a dilemma. We can't go back to our homes and at the same time we can't stay here for the rest of our lives. We have to find places to stay."

IDPs are calling on the Plateau authorities to compensate them for their lost property so they can rebuild elsewhere.

[...]

School-share

Some 600 IDPs are sleeping in Farin Gada primary school in Jos North, vacating the premises in the morning so children can attend class, said Lipdo.

"Many of us sleep in the open with no mattresses, beddings or blankets despite the cold, due to the shortage of classrooms," said Halliru Musa."

#### **Leadership, 23 February 2010**

"The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), has opened additional eight camps in some communities in Bauchi State to cater for the increasing number of the internally displaced persons from the recent Jos ethno-religious crisis.

A press release signed by the North-East Zonal coordinator of the agency, Aliyu Baffle Sambo in Maiduguri and made available to LEADERSHIP said the influx of displaced persons into the neighbouring border communities of Bauchi State despite the resettling of over 4,000 persons necessitated the establishment of more camps in addition to the existing four centres.

According to the release, Sambo told some community leaders in Bauchi and Dass that the continuous increase in the migration of Internally Displaced Person (IDP) to the state could only

be addressed by providing the widows and orphans with shelter, food, water and needed security at the emerging camps in Bauchi, Dass, Toro and Alkaleri Local Governments.

His words: "With the new wave of movement of people into Bauchi State from the Jos ethno-religious crisis, the Federal and Bauchi State governments would continue to assist them by attending to their welfare and security of lives."

He appealed to the state government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the North East to quickly help by intervening in what he called "integrating the internally displaced persons into the larger society." No fewer than 75 per cent of the widows were said to have vowed not to go back to their homes in the recently troubled city of Jos .

The agency also said it has reached out to the Federal Neuro-Psychiatric Hospital, Maiduguri for collaboration and partnership in medical emergency humanitarian services in the areas of provision of socio-psycho trauma treatments to disaster victims, their relations and IDPs to overcome stress and trauma associated with the recent mayhem.

The release further disclosed that the management of the Neuro-Hospital has expressed the readiness to partner with NEMA in bringing the victims back to life.

It said while the hospital was meant to service the six states that made up the North-East geopolitical zone, it assured that the hospital was competent to handle various degrees of stress and trauma-related problem in addition to its primary functions and that the hospital is meant to serve the six states in the North-East sub-region."

### **Some 8'000 Delta State residents remain homeless and are still staying with friends and family in neighbouring villages (January 2010)**

- Approximately 8'000 Delta State residents, mostly from Oporosa and Okerenkoko villages, are still living with families and friends in neighbouring villages. They fled their villages after fighting between government forces and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).
- In July 2009 local authorities promised to rebuild houses in Okerenkoko, but in January 2010 reconstruction work had not started yet.
- Many villagers were not willing to return even if their houses were rebuilt for fear of further fighting.

#### **IRIN, 15 January 2010**

"Some 8,000 Delta State residents remain homeless eight months after government forces stormed militants with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Most of the displaced are residents of Oporosa and Okerenkoko villages. Their homes destroyed, they are living with friends and family in neighbouring villages with several families to a hut, Nigeria Red Cross representative in Delta State, Eghworo Ovocity, told IRIN.

Alfred Bubor, a chief in Okerenkoko, told IRIN he lost two homes in the government incursion. "Now I have nowhere to sleep. Tell me how I can go back." Many residents cannot afford to rebuild their houses, Ovocity told IRIN.

Paul Kirifede, displaced from Oporosa, said his family is still living in a tent.

In July 2009 local authorities promised to rebuild houses in Okerenkoko; they set up rebuilding and resettling committees and razed the village to create space for new foundations, the governor, Emmanuel Udughan, told IRIN.

But since then nothing has happened, according to Bubor. "The bulldozers left the village and it is like a ghost town...not a single foundation has been laid."

Udughan said the contractors would soon return to finish the project. "The villagers should have patience."

Another Okerenkoko chief, Clery Ibojoh, told IRIN many villagers would not return even if their houses were rebuilt, for fear of getting caught in the crossfire of another military attack on MEND,

or a MEND attack on oil installations. Ibojoh said many people fear resuming their fishing – the principal livelihood in the region.

Nigeria military Joint Task Force spokesperson Lt Col Timothy Antiga told IRIN: “The military has assured the villagers of their safety....The people can go about their legitimate business without fear of anything as the military is there to provide security for them.”

### **In the Delta, women and children find refuge in local hospitals and schools while men remain in hiding (2009)**

- Most of the people who found shelter at the hospital in Ogbe Ijaw, Delta State were women and children. Men were afraid of being arrested on suspicion of being militants and thus remained in hiding

#### **FPIF, 14 July 2009**

"At the hospital I visited, there were 200 to 300 individuals, mostly women and children, living under the outdoor, covered walkways. [...] I was also told that men are afraid to come to the IDP camps for fear of being arrested or killed."

#### **FoE-Nigeria, 19 June 2009**

"The hospital turned camp has about 3000 women and children who congregate mostly on the floor of the hospital building.

[...]

The camp was filled with women, children, young boys, and devoid of men, excepting about 4 members of the DSRC present during the visit. The team was told that the few men amongst those that arrived the camp earlier were arrested as suspected militants, and as such most of the men and elderly are in still in the bush."

### **IDPs find refuge with family and friends or shelter in public buildings (2008)**

***The vast majority of displaced people in Nigeria seek refuge with family, friends or host communities in areas where their ethnic or religious group is in the majority or they found shelter in public buildings like schools, churches, mosques and police and army barracks. Many appear to return to their homes or resettle near their home areas soon after the violence which forced them to leave has subsided, but an unknown number also resettle in other areas of the country.***

#### ***In Jos:***

##### **IRIN, 4 December 2008:**

"Calm has been restored to the city following sectarian violence that broke out on 27 November, but thousands of residents whose houses were burned down during the three days of fighting are still sheltering in mosques, churches, army barracks and hospitals.

[...]

Meanwhile families, whose homes still stand, are starting to return.

"I have returned to my house which has been partially burnt and I feel luckier than those that have completely lost their homes to fire. But having no water or food to eat, I feel like returning to the [displaced] camp where I can get some little food and water when I need it," resident Lawan Kabir told IRIN."

***In Bakassi:***

**IFRC, 10 November 2008, p. 2:**

"Returnees [Bakassi residents] are residing in camps and residential areas in both the interior and coastal areas. Some are integrated into local communities. There are four main camps in Akwa Ibom State (Esik Eket, Ibiono Ibom, Ikot Abasi and Obono). [...] In Ibiomo Ibon returnees have crowded into the classrooms of an abandoned school and collect water from a nearby stream. In Okobo, returnees have occupied empty grass huts and collect rainwater to drink. In Esit Eket returnees are encroaching upon the resources of long-term inhabitants creating a potential conflict."

# PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

## General

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### **Nigerian government and security forces accused of failing to provide security during violence in Plateau State, Kano and Bauchi, 2004-2009**

- Human Rights Watch (HRW) denounces the failure of the Nigerian government and security forces to provide security to the population of Plateau State from as early as 2001
- Local residents of Yelwa town accused police and army of assisting the attackers, according to a Nigerian newspaper
- Residents of Bauchi accused security agents of not intervening to quell the violence, according to another newspaper
- During the violence in Kano in May 2004, Nigerian police used excessive force to restore law and order, contributing to the high death toll, while in Jos in 2008 a 'shoot-on-sight' order contributed to the killing of several people in a show of disproportionate use of force, according to HRW

### **Punch, 23 February 2009**

"Some of those who fled to Jos on Sunday told our correspondent that they took the decision because the violence spread to other parts leading to more killings, injuries and burning of property.

One of them, who gave his name as Steven Daniel, said that two churches, including the Deeper Life Bible Church, were torched on Saturday despite the curfew imposed by the state government on the troubled parts.

He accused security agencies of not being decisive in dealing with the situation saying "those people (rioters) continue to kill and burn without the police or the army doing anything to them."

Another fleeing resident said the rioters swooped on areas not covered by the curfew and therefore without significant presence of security agents to unleash violence."

### **HRW, 1 December 2008**

"The violence in Jos, the capital of Plateau State in central Nigeria, began early on the morning of November 28, 2008, following a disputed local election in which supporters of the opposition All Nigeria Peoples Party accused the governing People's Democratic Party of rigging the election results. Over the next three days, clashes between rival Muslims and Christians, some of whom on both sides were armed with firearms and machetes, left several hundred people dead, according to local sources in Jos. There was also widespread destruction in the town as mobs burned down homes, mosques, and churches. Thousands of residents have been forced to flee their homes.

The Plateau State governor issued a "shoot-on-sight" order to security personnel and ordered a 24-hour curfew in the worst-affected areas. Journalists and civil society leaders reported several instances in which people were killed by members of security forces responding to the violence,

and Human Rights Watch has received credible reports of such killings from local residents and civil society leaders who witnessed them."

**HRW, 11 May 2004:**

"Plateau State has been ravaged by interethnic conflict since an unprecedented outbreak of violence in the state capital, Jos, claimed as many as one thousand lives in September 2001. The government set up a commission of inquiry into the violence in Jos, but has still not published its findings. Hundreds of people—both Taroks and Fulanis—have been killed in different parts of the state since 2002. The fighting around Yelwa has intensified since February 2004, when scores of people died, including around 50 Taroks reportedly killed by Fulanis in Yelwa at the end of February.

'In light of the pattern of violence in Plateau State over recent months, with each community seeking to avenge attacks by their opponents, the latest outbreak should have come as no surprise to federal and state authorities,' said Takirambudde. 'Yet the Nigerian government took no action to preempt the massacre.'

Human Rights Watch denounced the failure of the Nigerian government and the security forces to provide security to the population of Plateau State. In the latest incident, police and army reinforcements were only sent to Yelwa after hundreds of people had already been killed.

'The government's neglect of the situation in Plateau over the last three years has resulted in an endless cycle of revenge,' Takirambudde said. 'Not only have the police been unwilling or unable to stop the fighting, but the government has not taken responsibility for finding a lasting solution to the crisis.'

**Vanguard, 8 May 2004:**

" Some residents [of Yelwa] accused the police and army of assisting the attackers -- some of whom were armed with military-issue assault rifles -- and dark rumours are swirling around Yelwa of the kidnap and rape of young women.

Such stories could not immediately be confirmed and, for their part, the police deny any involvement in the atrocities. Officers did, however, admit that the ferocity of the attack had left them powerless to protect the innocent.

'The truth is that the policemen and soldiers were overpowered by the attackers. The various interest groups are better equipped than the security forces,' said an officer in the town, playing down the larger casualty estimates. 'It is a war situation where propaganda also plays a role.'

It's a prospect that daunts the townsfolk here. Lawal Abdullahi, a 35-year-old farmer, is pessimistic: 'When we can, we defend ourselves with bows and arrows, spears and machetes, but this time we were overpowered'.

Community elder Mohammed Babayaro echoed him: 'This time they meant to finish us all off.' "

**HRW, 17 May 2004:**

"Nigerian police deployed to quell violence between Muslims and Christians in the northern city of Kano have used excessive force and may have committed dozens of unlawful killings in the name of restoring law and order, Human Rights Watch said today.

Police fired into a crowd on May 13, killing around 40 people and wounding numerous others, according to credible local sources. These sources also reported that police used lethal force in several other incidents.

[...]

Police reinforcements were sent to Kano after two days of rioting on May 11 and 12, when scores of people were killed as Muslims attacked Christians in reprisal for an attack by Christians against Muslims in Yelwa, Plateau State, on May 2. Several hundred people were killed in the Yelwa attack.

The attackers in Kano used a range of weapons—including machetes, knives, daggers, arrows and stones—as they targeted Christian residents of the city. Witnesses reported that they did not use firearms. Yet many of the dead and injured had gunshot wounds, which local sources believe must have been inflicted by the police. In several cases, eyewitnesses confirmed that the victims had been shot by the police.

Police officials have confirmed in public statements that the police shot a number of people, but claimed that this was in self-defense.

Over the last three years, Human Rights Watch has documented a similar pattern of unlawful, arbitrary and extrajudicial killings by the police following outbreaks of intercommunal violence in Plateau, Kaduna and other states. Some of the victims were not even participating in the rioting or the violence.

In past incidents, none of the police officers responsible for unlawful or extrajudicial killings have been brought to justice.”

# SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

## General

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### Plateau State IDPs in Bauchi have wide-ranging needs (January 2010)

- After the outbreak of violence in Jos, in 2010, most of the displaced lived in poor conditions, lacking safe drinking water and toilet facilities.
- Displaced children could not attend school as their parents were not able to afford enrolment fees.
- Local aid agencies and the state authorities declared they were unprepared for the scale of destruction.

#### IRIN, 18 January 2010

"Several thousand residents of Jos, in central Nigeria, are displaced after their homes burned in deadly sectarian clashes, according to residents and the local Red Cross.

[...]

"These people don't have enough food and water," he said. "They have lost their homes...so they couldn't salvage anything from their belongings. They are in urgent need of clothing and blankets to protect them from the cold, especially children who are more vulnerable to the unfriendly harmattan [seasonal winds]."

#### IRIN, 27 January 2010

"Relief agencies are struggling to help the some 18,000 displaced people in 17 makeshift camps in and around the central Nigerian city of Jos.

Most of the displaced do not have enough food and they lack access to toilet facilities and safe drinking water, Nigeria Red Cross (NRC) head Auwalu Mohammed told IRIN.

Local aid agencies and the state authorities say they were unprepared for the scale of destruction, he said.

The capacity of the Nigeria Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and NRC is overstretched, he said, adding that a lack of coordination among local relief organizations is hampering the humanitarian effort.

"There is no synergy between the organizations providing relief. We don't have an avenue to coordinate the assistance we provide or to know what the needs of the IDPs are and which camps need what materials," he told IRIN.

"Our resources are limited but if we could all harness our resources and coordinate our activities, we would enhance the assistance we provide these desperate people."

[...]

Though previous violence in Plateau State saw higher death tolls, an "unprecedented" number of residents were displaced this time because their houses were destroyed, according to Red Cross. Local and international aid agencies, including ActionAid and Médecins Sans Frontières, are launching operations to help the displaced."

#### IRIN, 12 February 2010

"Some 15,400 people who fled violence in the central Nigerian city of Jos remain displaced three weeks later and despite dire living conditions, many do not plan to return and rebuild their destroyed homes.

[...]

### **Poor conditions**

Most of the Jos displaced are sheltering in mosques, schools, churches and military barracks. None of these facilities has adequate toilets or running water, making sanitation the biggest worry, said Awwalu Mohammed, head of Nigeria Red Cross in Jos. Water is delivered in tanks every few days, he said, but it is not sufficient.

"IDPs are left with no option but to defecate in the open which poses serious health risks to them, especially to children," Mohammed told IRIN.

The Nigerian Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, the National Emergency Management Agency and National Refugee Commission are providing relief materials to the displaced, alongside local NGOs the Stefanus Foundation and Jama'atu Nasril Islam. But the Red Cross's Mohammed said despite this help, conditions are "miserable" and there is not enough food, water or medicine to meet people's needs.

Mark Lipdo, programme coordinator of the Stefanus Foundation, told IRIN: "People are left to use whatever they can find around them for shelter and lavatories. There are no tents in the camps and some IDPs sleep in the open despite the cold weather."

### **School-share**

Some 600 IDPs are sleeping in Farin Gada primary school in Jos North, vacating the premises in the morning so children can attend class, said Lipdo.

"Many of us sleep in the open with no mattresses, beddings or blankets despite the cold, due to the shortage of classrooms," said Halliru Musa.

The displaced children sleeping in the school cannot attend classes as their parents cannot afford to enrol them, said Lipdo."

## **Despite high average annual growth rates poverty remains a challenge (2010)**

### **IFPRI, 2010**

"Although the Nigerian economy has recently seen relatively impressive growth with an average annual growth of 7.3 percent from 2000 to 2007, poverty is still a challenge in the country's development efforts. The national poverty rate was 54 percent, or 69 million people living below the poverty line that is about 1\$ a day, in 2004, which was reduced from its highest level in the early 1990s, but was still two times higher than the poverty rate in 1980 (NBS 2005). While economic growth is necessary for the country's development, it does not automatically impact poverty reduction. The good news is that a key driver of the recent growth in Nigeria has been agriculture. Between 1990 and 2006, the sector accounted for 47 percent of national growth. Agriculture is not only the most important non-oil economic activity in Nigeria, it is also Nigeria's largest employer, providing employment opportunities to 70 percent of the labor force in 2006 (NBS 2006). Thus, the agricultural sector is important for reducing poverty (Agenor et al. 2004)."

## **People fleeing violence in Kano require medical, food and shelter assistance, May 2004**

- Hostilities in Kano State in May 2004 displaced more than 17,000 people, many of whom sought refuge in police and military barracks
- About 500 people required emergency medical treatment
- Red Cross reported that IDPs required emergency assistance in terms of medical, food and nonfood items

### **IFRC, 17 May 2004:**

"Following the Yelwa hostilities, the conflict in Kano State began on 10 May 2004; it escalated on 12 May 2004 in the Sharada area of Kano city resulting in more deaths. The Kano State Branch of the Nigerian Red Cross Society reported that 36 persons were killed and 598 injured, with a lot property destroyed. As a result, 17,087 people fled their homes; about 8,000 are seeking refuge in various police and military barracks. The situation is tense in spite of heavy police and military presence in some parts of the city.

The Nigerian Red Cross Emergency Team reported that about 500 people with bullet, machetes and arrow wounds requiring immediate evacuation and medical assistance were attended to and evacuated nearby hospitals (Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital, Murtala Mohammed Specialist Hospital, Mohammed Wase Specialist Hospital and Mohammed Sanusi Hospital).

[...]

The first field assessment by the Red Cross showed that emergency assistance in terms of medical, food and nonfood items are required for the displaced persons. The hospitals in Kano are congested with victims; more dressing materials will be needed to treat them. The Kano Branch report indicates that IDP staying in various military and police barracks need food assistance i.e. rice, sugar, beans, salt and drinking water. Non-food items are also urgently needed i.e. mats, blankets, cooking pots, feeding utensils and toiletries."

## Health

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### **Displaced women give birth in camps in squalid conditions (January 2010)**

- More than 30 displaced women, whose homes were destroyed during the violence which erupted in Jos, in January 2010, have given birth in camps and mosques
- The head of the Nigerian Red Cross declared that many more pregnant women were still in the camps in squalid conditions without proper antenatal care and good nutrition.

#### **AFP, 28 January 2010**

"More than 30 pregnant woman, among the thousands of people displaced by deadly ethnic and religious strife in Nigeria last week, have given birth in camps and mosques, officials said on Thursday.

"We have recorded some births in the camps. We have 31 mothers who have given birth in barracks and the Bukuru central mosque in Jos South," Binta Hassan, a midwife in the central Nigerian town told AFP.

"Many pregnant women have given birth in the last week in barracks and mosques they are staying after losing their homes in the recent violence," Auwalu Mohammed, head of the Nigeria Red Cross in Jos, also said by telephone.

"These women are among the internally displaced persons whose homes were destroyed in the violence," Mohammed added.

According to the Red Cross official, the displaced people are sheltered in 17 camps in Jos, capital of central Plateau State. There are some other camps in neighbouring Bauchi State, relief officials said.

Mohammed said many more pregnant women were still in the camps in squalid conditions without proper antenatal care and good nutrition.

"These camps are unclean and unsanitary with no proper toilets and sewage disposal system. People defecate in the open which poses serious health hazard especially to the pregnant women," he said.

The displaced people in the camps are also not served with nutritious meals, he said, adding that they are mostly served with rice and palm oil.

"There are still many pregnant women on the camps without the needed antenatal care which is worrisome," Mohammed said.

A Geneva-based housing rights group on Thursday urged the authorities to provide "adequate emergency shelter" for the more than 20,000 people displaced by the violence that claimed at least 300 lives in the city of Jos and its environs last week.

Estimates from medical and aid workers and religious and community leaders have put the toll from the recent bloodshed at more than 550.

"Those displaced as a result of the recent violence ... must be provided with adequate emergency shelter while efforts begin to provide a permanent solution to their housing problems," the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) said in a statement."

### **Bakassi IDPs encounter difficulties accessing healthcare facilities (2008)**

- Serious outbreaks of various diseases have occurred among Bakassi IDPs in the makeshift camps where they have found refuge
- There are also concerns of possible increases in HIV/AIDs cases
- Financial constraints may impede access to healthcare services for IDPs as they tend to lack even basic items
- Distance to nearest healthcare facilities is also an obstacle

### **IFRC, 10 November 2008, p. 2**

"A lack of appropriate interventions to date have increased the potential for a serious outbreak of various diseases, such as cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever, worm infections, skin infections and malaria. A possible increase in the spread of HIV/AIDS is also a concern. More than thirteen people have been confirmed dead in the camps. No immunization efforts have been reported since the arrival of the returnees.

Access to health services in Nigeria is not free, and returnees must pay for health services. The distance to the nearest health facility from each of the four camps is 10 km or more. There is an urgent need to support the returnees in health and care, the provision of relief materials, and with safe drinking water. The Nigerian government has offered free health services to returnees in Okobo camp, but the cost of transportation to the health facility is unaffordable for most residents."

## **Food and nutrition**

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### **Most of the displaced people in and around Jos, Plateau State does not have enough food (January 2010)**

#### **IRIN, 27 January 2010**

"Relief agencies are struggling to help the some 18,000 displaced people in 17 makeshift camps in and around the central Nigerian city of Jos.

Most of the displaced do not have enough food and they lack access to toilet facilities and safe drinking water, Nigeria Red Cross (NRC) head Auwalu Mohammed told IRIN.

Local aid agencies and the state authorities say they were unprepared for the scale of destruction, he said."

### **Food shortages affect Jos IDPs (December 2008)**

- Jos IDPs are at risk of food shortages aggravated by the burning down of city food market
- Some food suppliers are also fearful of bringing their supplies into the city
- State government and NGOs are struggling to meet the needs of the IDPs

#### **IRIN, 4 December 2008:**

"Water, medicine and food supplies are running low for an estimated 10,000 people displaced by violence in Jos, northern Nigeria, following three days of violent clashes.

[...]

Food shortages have been heightened by the burning down of over 3,000 grain shops and warehouses in Laranto grain market, the city's only food market, which was the scene of much of the violence.

"The whole city relies on this market for food, but nothing is left of it but rubble, ashes, and mangled remains of roofing. Even we who sell [food] to the city don't have enough to eat," said trader Mohammed Sani while clearing the smouldering debris that used to be his shop.

Many other traders who have some supplies left, are too nervous to bring them to the city, he said.

According to Dan Tom, a federal lawmaker and director of non-profit organisation the Nigerian Red Cross in Jos, emergency food and medical supplies are insufficient to meet the needs of the injured and displaced. The Red Cross, the Nigeria Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Plateau state government, and other NGOs are struggling to meet people's needs, he said."

# ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

## Public Participation

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### Uncertainty about voting rights of IDPs (January 2003)

#### **ThisDay News, 24 January 2003:**

"Eligible voters displaced by inter-tribal and religious clashes in Kaduna and Plateau states are to forfeit their voting rights since they will not be registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) at the on-going make-up registration exercise.

Niger state resident electoral commissioner (REC), Alhaji Ismaila Abdulkareem disclosed this to THISDAY in Minna on Monday after a close door meeting with leaders of all the political parties in the state.

According to him, victims of ethnic or religious riots that fled from Kaduna and Plateau States to Niger State are not eligible for the make-up exercise, saying "any attempt by the victims of these riots to re-register will tantamount to multiple registration and it is illegal."

The INEC boss said all displaced eligible voters are to hold on to their temporary voters slip until the completion of the compilation and release of final voters cards.

Abdulkareem, who was particular about those who fled from Kaduna State to Muan and Tafa local government, Niger State at the wake of the last religious riot, advised such people not to present themselves for the make-up exercise.

According to him, such persons who can not say where they were initially cannot present himself or herself for re-registration, as this will be a double registration."

The commissioner, who had earlier educated the political leaders on those eligible to register said that the make-up exercise was designed primarily for those who could not be registered during last year exercise.

"These categories of Nigerians include those who were out of the country, those who were hospitalised and those genuinely left out for being below 18 years when the voters registration exercise was conducted in September 2002," Abdulkareem explained.

He then advised the affected people to hold on until the permanent voter's card is released before they can apply for transfer of card from the affected state to their new state.

Abdulkareem maintained that the interest of such victims is taken care of by the Electoral Act, which approves transfer of voter's name from one state to another. "Not until we (INEC) is about to do that victims of ethnic or religious clashes will have to wait," he concluded. "

# PROPERTY ISSUES

## General

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### **More than 1000 houses burned during Lagos clashes, February 2002**

#### **ICRC Geneva, 18 March 2002:**

"On 02.02.02 an ethnic clash broke out between a faction of the Yoruba ethnic militant troop, Oodua People's Congress (OPC) and a section of the Hausa community in Idi-Araba area of Lagos. Although there have been conflicting reports on the real cause of the crisis, it is reported to have left over 100 people dead and over 400 wounded. More than 1000 houses were burnt and a number of cars were destroyed. Residents fled their homes resulting on about 5,000 displaced persons. Some of the residents took refuge in the Lagos University Teaching Hospital in Idi-Araba while others were evacuated to a nearby army barracks. By the third day of the crisis, the ethnic disturbances spread to some other parts of Lagos creating tension in the lives of Lagos inhabitants. Soldiers were then drafted to the area to assist the police to bring the situation back to normal."

### **Communal violence in and around Jos causes major destruction, September-October 2001**

- Dilimi village on the outskirts of Jos town suffered the most intense destruction
- In the Angwan Rogo suburb of Jos houses belonging to Christians were all burnt and their property destroyed

#### **OMCT, 26 August 2002, p. 119:**

"Dilimi village on the outskirts of Jos town suffered the most intense destruction. Inhabited mostly by Muslims, virtually the entire village was razed to the ground. The only buildings left standing were those belonging to Christians and "indigenes". In all, about four thousand houses, eleven Mosques, and two schools all belonging to Muslims were systematically destroyed in Dilimi. Some residents of Dilimi are still living in a displaced person's camp in Gangare Primary School in Jos. The entire Muslim population of the village had to be relocated there. In Angwan Rogo on the other hand houses belonging to Christians were all burnt and their property destroyed. Churches in the area were also destroyed."

### **Soldiers plunder abandoned farms in Benue State, October-December 2001**

- After the October violence in Benue State, the deployed army forces allegedly were involved in extortion, harassment and looting
- Soldiers also regularly plundered farms which were abandoned by frightened farmers, harvesting the crops and selling the produce
- As a consequence of this conduct, people were displaced and fled into the bush to hide

**HRW, April 2002, p.14:**

"While the majority of rape cases reported to Human Rights Watch took place between the end of October and the end of November, other forms of abuse by the military continued into December. The most common complaints by residents were of systematic extortion and harassment, especially at roadblocks, and looting. Soldiers regularly plundered farms which had been abandoned by frightened farmers, harvesting the crops and selling the produce. A source in Makurdi reported that in mid-November, more than fifteen military trucks were seen passing through the town carrying yams and other goods, and that soldiers in Abako town were harassing farmers and preventing them from returning to their fields to harvest their crops. In mid-December, there was still a military presence at Vaase, despite the fact that the village was almost empty. Local residents complained that the soldiers were harassing the few people who were still there, harvesting their crops and stealing machinery and vehicles. Residents of Gbeji also complained of looting and extortion by soldiers. One man told Human Rights Watch that soldiers had come on four consecutive days in mid-November and asked the residents of Gbeji to give them yams or money. "They said that if we didn't give them what they wanted, they would not cooperate with us. People were afraid, so we ran into the bush to hide [...] Soldiers are still taking our yams and beating people."

**Property of IDPs destroyed by fighting in Nasarawa and Taraba States, July-August 2001**

- Many displaced believe that their homes have been destroyed by the fighting
- Destruction of crops
- No male adults in Lafia camp, since they keep vigil over their property (July 2001)

**CRS, August 2001:**

"The fighting has taken its toll on the lives of the displaced. Some have lost family and many believe that their homes have probably been destroyed by the fighting."

**NGO (anonymous), 14 August 2001:**

"Food needs are always great for IDPs in Nigeria and particularly this year when many IDPs are themselves subsistence farmers whose crops have been ruined."

**UN-OCHA, 14 August 2001:**

"No male adults are in [Lafia] camp except camp administrators. On questioning response was that some of the men are dead & others are keeping vigil in the villages/communities to ensure that what is left does not get burnt down."

**Houses of as many as 60,000 IDPs destroyed in reprisal attack on Odi in the Bayelsa State in 1999**

- Most houses destroyed and 60,000 inhabitants forced to flee
- Reported in October 2002 that at least 90% of the population still lived in temporary structures

**OMCT, 26 August 2002, pp. 71, 76, 78, 80:**

"On December 14 1999 Abdul Oroh, Executive Director of the Civil Liberties Organisation, in a press conference summed up his impression of Odi after the invasion [i.e. reprisal attack by the Nigerian army] as thus: "we saw no single livestock, poultry or domestic animals except a stray cat.

[...]

Over 95% of the Odi population were displaced by the invasion and to date at least 90% of the population live in temporary structures. Some lucky ones have been able to rebuild or live as squatters in some rooms in primary school buildings and partially completed buildings built by the Bayelsa State government to house some of the displaced individuals in Odi. Many inhabitants of Odi who managed to escape the invasion spent the fourteen days of invasion and its immediate aftermath hiding in the bush and living under the elements. Others managed to flee to neighboring towns and villages for the entire period. On their return home most of them found themselves homeless and had to live under open canopies for weeks until they were able to relocate into classrooms, uncompleted houses or makeshift shelter made of wood, roofing sheets or mud depending on the availability of the building materials."

# PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

## General

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### **Resettlement in Bauchi State of over 30'000 IDPs displaced by the violence in Jos, Plateau State (July 2010)**

- Over 30'000 Plateau State IDPs have been resettled in Bauchi State at the cost of N315 million.
- Bauchi State Governor declared efforts had been made to ensure reduction in disaster to barest minimum through reduction activities such as training for state and local stakeholder on peace building, conflict resolution contingency planning, vulnerability and capacity analysis VCA, emergency profiling and awareness creation tour to communities.

#### **Nigerian Tribune, 2 July 2010**

"Bauchi State governor, Isa Yuguda, has disclosed that over 30,000 persons, who were internally displaced from Plateau State during the January crisis, have been resettled in the state at the cost of N135 million.

Governor Yuguda stated this at the opening of a one-day interactive meeting between the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and Disaster Reaction Unit (DRU) of the military, at Zaranda Hotel, Bauchi.

The governor also said since emergency cases in Nigeria often overwhelmed the capacity of civilian authority, there was need for the military to always intervene on such occasions, saying "this necessitates the intervention of the military in controlling violence, restoring law and order or undertaking search and rescue operations."

He further said that Bauchi State had been making efforts to ensure reduction in disaster rate to the barest minimum through training for state and local stakeholders on peace building, conflict resolution, contingency planning, vulnerability and capacity analysis, emergency profiling and awareness creation tour to communities."

#### **ThisDay News, 10 July 2010**

"The Bauchi State Government has said it has initiated a resettlement programme for the over 30,000 Internally Displaced Persons [IDPs] at the cost of N135 million. The government said those affected were desirous of settling down in the state permanently.

The stated governor, Mallam Isa Yuguda, who disclosed this at a one-day interactive meeting between the National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA] and Disaster Reaction Unit [DRUs] of the military at the Zaranda Hotel, Bauchi, said his administration has also supported and provided the State Emergency Management Agency [SEMA] with the appropriate facilities, materials, equipments and vehicles that enabled it to be more responsive to disaster management.

Yuguda said since the emergency cases in Nigeria often overwhelm the capacity of civil authority there is need for military intervention "this necessitates the intervention of the military in controlling violence, restoring law and order or undertaking search and rescue operation", but however stressing that "disaster management is not the exclusive business of Government, but it is everybody's business".

He said the state has been making efforts to ensure reduction in disaster to barest minimum through reduction activities such as training for state and local stakeholder on peace building, conflict resolution contingency planning, vulnerability and capacity analysis VCA, emergency profiling and awareness creation tour to communities.

Also speaking at the occasion, the NEMA Acting Director of Dr, Charles Agbo who stressed the need for military collaboration with the Agency and other stakeholders said military should not limit itself to defence activities of the sovereignty and territorial integrity alone but as the circumstances demand should provide support and reinforcement to internal security institutions and paramilitary service as well as disaster management and humanitarian operation .

While Highlighting the various challenges hindering the smooth operation of the emergency actors to include low level of inter- Agency collaboration, inadequate capacities and turf protection syndrome, lack of synergy and collaborations between the military , NEMA and other relevant stake holders, among others, he stressed the need for full implementation of the NDRP and other related policy documents.

He called for strict adherence to International Humanitarian Law [IHL]"as a major principle that the Armed Forces need to familiarise themselves with while intervening in any emergency situation", even as he pointed out also that s making use of civil response structure which typically goes against the grain military culture and procedures also militates against successful Military-Civil relations during emergencies."

### **The majority of people displaced after violence erupted in Jos in January 2010 have started leaving the IDP camps (March 2010)**

#### **IRIN, 8 March 2010**

"Most of the estimated 20,000 people displaced during the violence in January have started leaving the nine camps set up to house them in Jos.

Auwalu Mohammed, director of the Red Cross in Jos, noted that "The number of IDPs [internally displaced persons] in those camps has significantly dwindled, as we now have not more than 6,000 people in them."

### **IDPs in Nigeria appear to return after major threats recede (2009)**

- Unknown number of IDPs apparently also resettle elsewhere or get assimilated into the communities that had given them shelter
- Return must be analyzed in the context of general movement patterns between the different Nigerian states and ethnic groups

#### **IRIN, 5 August 2009**

"Most of the 4,000 Maiduguri residents in Borno state, northeastern Nigeria who fled last week's violence to shelter in military and police barracks on the outskirts of town, have now returned home, according to the Nigerian Red Cross (NRC).

"Most of the IDPs [internally displaced people] have left the camps save for those whose homes were either burnt or looted after they had fled during the violence," Adamu Abubakar, head of the Nigerian Red Cross in neighbouring Bauchi state, told IRIN."

#### **Global IDP Project, April 2003, p.8:**

"In Nigeria it seems to be a pattern that displaced people are able to return to their homes after the violence and other dangers that forced them to flee no longer represents a major threat. However, an unknown number of IDPs apparently also resettle elsewhere or get assimilated into the communities that had given them shelter during their displacement. The latter must also be seen in the context of general movement patterns between the different Nigerian states and ethnic groups. In some cases, former neighbors have used looting and destruction of property as a tool to discourage return, while in other areas there are examples of local authorities actively

guarding property until the IDPs return. Unfortunately, several participants indicated that such solidarity is on the decline.

The discussions indicated that Guiding Principles 28-30 would be a relevant basis for a future official policy on return/resettlement of IDPs in Nigeria. Several participants underscored in particular the need to involve IDPs more actively in the return process, and to inform better both IDPs and the communities where IDPs return or resettle about the approach taken and the role of national and international humanitarian actors. Those providing assistance in the return phase should pay attention to the potential tensions that access to humanitarian assistance can create between beneficiaries and their neighbors. International actors should thus acquire a better understanding of local conditions and practices before initiating humanitarian assistance activities."

### **Ongoing violence is an obstacle to return in Delta communities (2009)**

- With destruction limited in IDPs' villages of origin, ongoing violence and fighting constitutes the main obstacle to return
- In August 2009, the local government had started relocating some 5,000 IDPs back to their communities with the guarantee that they would not be targeted by security forces

#### **Ministry of Information, Delta State, 3 August 2009**

"The Delta State Government will commence a mass relocation of some 5,000 persons displaced by recent military operation in the Niger Delta to their various communities particularly in Gbaramatu Kingdom of Warri Local Government Area of the state.

The victims were displaced by the military operation of the Joint Task Force, 'Operation Restore Hope', following the killing of six soldiers by suspected militants in the area on May 13.

Governor Emmanuel Uduaghan, however, told our correspondent at his private residence in Warri on Saturday morning, that the victims would start returning to their communities from today even as he revealed plans to resettle them.

The announcement has raised hope to return of normal economic activities to the Warri waterways and other riverside communities in the state, following spate of bloody clashes between the task force armed youths.

Speaking after a private meeting with Gbaramatu leaders at his private residence in Warri, the state Uduaghan said he had reached an agreement with the JTF to facilitate the return of the displaced persons, most of who were camped at the Ogbe-Ijoh General Hospital, back to their ravaged communities.

He said, "At last we have reached an agreement and an arrangement is fully on ground for the displaced people of Gbaramatu Kingdom to start going back to their communities, especially those from Okerenkoko, Oporoza and the other villages, where there was displacement.

"The official flag-off will be on Monday, the 3rd of August and they would start moving back. There is no doubt that some of the communities, especially Okerenkoko was really affected by the destruction and what we are doing now is to put up temporary structures for the people going back home to stay."

The Delta State Governor also revealed multibillion naira plans to rebuild the devastated communities and start new settlements for inhabitants of the Ijaw communities as well as their Itsekiri counterparts in the local government area as part of government's resettlement plans for the victims of the crisis."

#### **VOA, 31 May 2009**

"A military-sponsored tour for two aid agencies took place last week, and provided an opportunity to assess what was left of the local communities. A senior official of the Nigerian Red Cross, Augustine Egbero, who was on the trip, told VOA the degree of destruction was not as widespread as previously speculated.

"We were in Oporoza, we saw Kurte, but we did not enter Krute," said Augustine Egbero. "We were in Azama, we were in Ote Ijoh or something like that, then Kulukuluma. It was not as they are saying it. There were houses still standing there. Like in Oporoza, two visible compounds were affected, invariably Tom Polo's house and the king's palace. Krute had some houses burnt, it is much in Krute. We could not get to Okerenkoko."

This may be great news for anxious displaced residents of the Niger Delta. The implication is that they may be able to return home as soon as the fighting stops."

#### **Villagers in Plateau State have used looting and vandalism of property to deter IDP return (2004)**

- In some areas of Plateau State, vandalism, looting and burning of property took place well after the original attacks in order to discourage returning IDPs
- Government 'peace committees' and religious 'interfaith' groups were targeting these areas with reconciliation work
- According to UN OCHA, the government must do more to establish a safe and enabling environment for IDPs who want to return

#### **GIDPP, 30 June 2004:**

"Briefing the IASC on a recent mission to Nigeria, UN OCHA reported that areas of conflict visited were Shendam local government area – Yamina/ Yelwa and Kadarko in Wase local government area. Both local government areas are in Plateau state, from where the IDPs in Bauchi and Nassarawa originate.

IDPs normally return to their homes after the violence and other dangers have been removed. In the areas visited clearly much of the vandalism, burning and looting took place well after the original attacks. People in the villages and have used looting and destruction of property as a tool to discourage returning IDPs e.g. in Yelwa and Yamina. Weeks after the violence erupted, there was evidence of fresh burning of property and vandalism. Perhaps these symbols would also impact visiting authorities and others for receiving relief items.

As in the case of IDP camps visited, interlocutors in these town and villages were not very willing to attempt compromise or accommodation for those former residents who fled. However, the government has established peace committees to target these areas. In addition, reconciliation work is being undertaken by an 'Interfaith' group that includes representatives of Muslim and Christian faiths.

More effort has to be made by the Government to establish a safe and enabling environment for IDPS who want to return. Security must be assured, as well as an obligation to protect freedom of movement. IDPs will only return when these conditions are met and police and other security forces are seen to be impartial and respect laws and conventions that govern their behaviour.”

# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

## General

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### **IDPs in the creeks in the Niger Delta are out of aid workers' reach (May 2009)**

- Because of continued security operations in the creeks in the Niger Delta, humanitarian organisations had little to no access to assist thousands of people displaced by the fighting

#### **IRIN, 28 May 2009**

"The Nigeria Red Cross says conflict-hit areas it has been able to access in the Niger Delta are in better condition than anticipated, but that continued restrictions on aid workers' movement leaves many questions unanswered.

Government soldiers are controlling access in and out of the Delta, site of a military incursion launched on 13 May to crack down on Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) militants."

#### **IRIN, 25 May 2009**

"Aid agencies are unable to access an area in the Niger Delta where more than 2,000 people are believed to be hiding in the bush after a military offensive against militants [forced families to flee their homes](#).

Security forces have cordoned off the area as their operation continues.

"Our mandate is to provide relief to people in distress," Yushau Shuaib, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) spokesperson, said in a communiqué. "We have tried to get relief materials into the creeks for those trapped there, but the military say it [the aid effort] has to wait until the military operation is over."

Military officials say they entered the area to root out militant groups after the groups allegedly attacked government soldiers. The only way the JTF will stop its offensive is if militants produce military personnel they have abducted, Joint Task Force maritime commander, Commodore Azubuike Ajuonu, said in a press statement over the weekend.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is appealing to government Joint Task Force troops to allow humanitarian passage and to recognise civilians' right to access medical care. "

# NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

## National response

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### National response: overview (2009)

The national responsibility to respond to displacement lies with the local governments, and only if they are unable to cope are state governments called in. State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) exist in some states, but they have varying capacities. Only when this second level of response is ineffective does the state government appeal to the federal government for support. The President takes the final decision on whether the federal government intervenes. At the federal level, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) coordinates emergency relief operations and assists in the rehabilitation of victims where necessary.

For coordination purposes, NEMA has divided the country into six disaster-management areas, for each of which it has operational offices. Where SEMAs are established, NEMA collaborates and supports them. In other cases, resources are overstretched and assistance to victims is often delayed (Government of Nigeria, 30 July 2009). NEMA often supports IDPs in the emergency phase of a crisis, but it lacks the resources to assist people displaced for a longer period of time or to help returnees reintegrate, and it has no IDP-specific, age-specific or gender-specific policies.

The National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) has taken de facto responsibility for post-emergency situations and long-term programmes aimed at durable solutions for IDPs as well as refugees. If necessary, it assists NEMA with camp management, and it has a dedicated unit working on IDP issues but it lacks both the resources and the structure that could facilitate an effective response.

The federal government is considering whether to create a separate agency responsible for IDPs or to attach this responsibility to the mandate of existing agencies such as NCFR. A national IDP policy has been planned since the creation of the Nigerian Presidential Committee on IDPs in January 2004, but it was yet to be approved by the Federal Executive Council in November 2009. NCFR highlighted in a 2008 press statement that Nigeria was among the countries in the African Union to deliberate on a convention for the protection and assistance of IDPs in Africa (Daily Trust, 26 June 2008). Its signature at the end of October 2009 (IRIN, 26 October 2009) could provide an opportunity for Nigeria to adopt a comprehensive approach to the continuing IDP situations in the country.

Most internal displacement situations are managed on an ad hoc basis and only in the emergency phase. The Nigerian Red Cross (NRC), the most prominent humanitarian organisation, has the structure and the personnel to respond at very short notice, and often provides immediate assistance ahead of the local governments. Faith-based organisations also play an important role in both immediate relief and long-term support to IDPs of their religion. International organisations have also responded on a case-by case basis, most often in an uncoordinated fashion.

## **Absence of a comprehensive legislative and policy framework on IDPs (June 2010)**

### **CRC, 11 June 2010**

"75. The Committee notes information in the State party's written replies on measures to enhance the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs), including the amendment to the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) Act aimed at giving wider legal powers to the NCFR with respect to its presidential mandate on internal displacement and the draft amendment bill on internally displaced persons. Nevertheless, the Committee remains concerned at the absence of a comprehensive legislative and policy framework on IDPs to effectively address the situation of IDP children, especially those displaced in connection to recent political and inter-communal unrest and violence, flooding and evictions, and ensure their long-term reintegration in society. The absence of a data collection system on internally displaced persons is furthermore of concern to the Committee.

76. The Committee urges the State party to take all measures to guarantee the rights and well-being of internally displaced children. In particular, the State party is urged to: 23

- (a) Adopt a comprehensive national policy on IDPs which, inter alia, identifies the agency responsible for the registration, monitoring and protection of IDPs, including children;
- (b) Ensure that, until such policy is in place, the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) and the Nigerian Red Cross are provided with the necessary resources to effectively protect and ensure the rights of internally displaced children."

### **National Response to the crisis in Jos, Plateau State (April 2010)**

- The National Emergency Management Agency has opened 8 additional camps in Bauchi State to cater for the increasing number of IDPs from the crisis in Jos.
- Local aid agencies and authorities were not prepared to respond to a crisis of this magnitude
- A Human Rights Watch researcher accused the security forces of neglect after the failure to prevent/stop the outbreak of violence in Jos. Outbreaks of intercommunal violence are likely again unless the government takes swift action to hold perpetrators to account and address the root causes
- The Governor of Bauchi State has promised IDPs in various camps employment in the state civil service, distribution of relief materials, the provision of befitting accommodation before the rainy season begins as well as farms, grazing land and plots of land for the construction of houses.

### **IRIN, 27 January 2010**

"Relief agencies are struggling to help the some 18,000 displaced people in 17 makeshift camps in and around the central Nigerian city of Jos.

Most of the displaced do not have enough food and they lack access to toilet facilities and safe drinking water, Nigeria Red Cross (NRC) head Auwalu Mohammed told IRIN.

Local aid agencies and the state authorities say they were unprepared for the scale of destruction, he said.

The capacity of the Nigeria Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and NRC is overstretched, he said, adding that a lack of coordination among local relief organizations is hampering the humanitarian effort.

"There is no synergy between the organizations providing relief. We don't have an avenue to coordinate the assistance we provide or to know what the needs of the IDPs are and which camps need what materials," he told IRIN.

"Our resources are limited but if we could all harness our resources and coordinate our activities, we would enhance the assistance we provide these desperate people."

[...]

Though previous violence in Plateau State saw higher death tolls, an "unprecedented" number of residents were displaced this time because their houses were destroyed, according to Red Cross. Local and international aid agencies, including ActionAid and Médecins Sans Frontières, are launching operations to help the displaced."

### **Leadership, 23 February 2010**

"The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), has opened additional eight camps in some communities in Bauchi State to cater for the increasing number of the internally displaced persons from the recent Jos ethno-religious crisis.

A press release signed by the North-East Zonal coordinator of the agency, Aliyu Baffle Sambo in Maiduguri and made available to LEADERSHIP said the influx of displaced persons into the neighbouring border communities of Bauchi State despite the resettling of over 4,000 persons necessitated the establishment of more camps in addition to the existing four centres.

According to the release, Sambo told some community leaders in Bauchi and Dass that the continuous increase in the migration of Internally Displaced Person (IDP) to the state could only be addressed by providing the widows and orphans with shelter, food, water and needed security at the emerging camps in Bauchi, Dass, Toro and Alkaleri Local Governments.

His words: "With the new wave of movement of people into Bauchi State from the Jos ethno-religious crisis, the Federal and Bauchi State governments would continue to assist them by attending to their welfare and security of lives."

He appealed to the state government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the North East to quickly help by intervening in what he called "integrating the internally displaced persons into the larger society." No fewer than 75 per cent of the widows were said to have vowed not to go back to their homes in the recently troubled city of Jos .

The agency also said it has reached out to the Federal Neuro-Psychiatric Hospital, Maiduguri for collaboration and partnership in medical emergency humanitarian services in the areas of provision of socio-psycho trauma treatments to disaster victims, their relations and IDPs to overcome stress and trauma associated with the recent mayhem.

The release further disclosed that the management of the Neuro-Hospital has expressed the readiness to partner with NEMA in bringing the victims back to life.

It said while the hospital was meant to service the six states that made up the North-East geopolitical zone, it assured that the hospital was competent to handle various degrees of stress and trauma-related problem in addition to its primary functions and that the hospital is meant to serve the six states in the North-East sub-region."

### **IRIN, February 2010**

"If the Nigerian authorities fail to punish those responsible for the latest intercommunal violence, they are only paving the way for further bloodshed, say human rights advocates, historians, politicians and religious leaders.

"Outbreaks of intercommunal violence are likely again unless the government takes swift action to hold perpetrators to account and address the root causes," Human Rights Watch Nigeria researcher Eric Guttschuss told IRIN.

In the latest violence, which erupted in Plateau State on 17 January, at least 326 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced.

Guttschuss pointed out that following 2001 violence in Plateau's capital, Jos, in which some 1,000 people were killed, several hundred more died in ensuing clashes between Christian farmers and Muslim pastoralists across the state.

Dead-end investigations

Several judicial inquiry commissions have been set up to look into violence, but their findings have not been acted upon or even made public, Plateau State senator Dan Tom told IRIN.

A hearing into earlier killings in Plateau was held in late 2009 but nothing came of it, he said, adding that several suspects were arrested but later released, setting a bad precedent.

"The reports of these commissions must be [made public] and people should be punished for their involvement," Tom told IRIN.

#### Roots

If Nigeria's deadly unrest is to subside, the government must go after not only perpetrators but also causes, observers told IRIN.

Though the violence manifests along religious lines with Christians and Muslims fighting – a majority of those killed in the latest violence were Muslim; mosques and churches were burned – the unrest is driven by political tensions over power and resources, Tom said.

"It is more a question of ethnicity than religion...a struggle for political control between the indigenous Berom ethnic group, [mostly Christian], and the Hausa, [predominantly Muslim]."

Many Hausa are not considered natives of the state and cannot access state privileges – a nationwide problem that is particularly palpable in Plateau State.

The issue of natives versus settlers was exploited when tin mining developed in Jos in 1904, drawing in mainly Hausa migrants and pushing mainly Berom natives to the town's outskirts, Adam Higazi, researcher with Oxford University, told IRIN. From here Christian groups asserted exclusive rights over local and state political positions, power they have consolidated over the years, he said.

Tensions have mounted recently partly because Hausa communities in Jos North are vying for more political power in parts of Jos, Tom said.

Higazi said discrimination remains strong. "The state government is very discriminatory in its practices, notably in the exclusion of so-called settlers from state politics, and its views towards the recent violence in Jos are one-sided, defined by religious orientation and ethnic prejudices of those in power," Higazi told IRIN.

"My family has been here since 1909," Jos Imam Cheikh Ibrahim Ismael told IRIN. "But my children cannot access scholarships to further their education. They are second-class citizens."

Senator Tom said ethnic discrimination is a nationwide problem and the federal government must take the lead to resolve it.

A draft bill has been issued to bring an end to the practice of favouring indigenous groups but it has made no progress in Parliament.

The federal government must also push state authorities and civil society representatives to set up a mediation panel to help foster peaceful relations among ethnic groups, Higazi said.

An impartial investigation into the latest events must also be set up said HRW, and its recommendations be followed up and made public.

#### Hope?

HRW's Guttschuss said he is encouraged that several public officials have recently talked publicly about the need to tackle impunity, recognizing that it fuels the fighting.

Plateau senator Tom is optimistic. "I'm very hopeful things will change for the better in Plateau State because Hausas and Beroms don't have any other country but Nigeria....We can't continue killing ourselves and destroying our homes."

#### **AFP, 14 March 2010**

"The latest sectarian massacre in Jos has brutally exposed the failure of the Nigerian authorities to end bloodshed and bring stability to a region which has long been a religious powderkeg.

"The security forces have failed in their primary responsibility to maintain law and order in the case of Jos killings. This is a flagrant violation of the constitution for which they have to be sanctioned," prominent rights activist Joe Okei-Odumakin told AFP.

"They cannot excuse their failure," said Okei-Odumakin, president of the Campaign for Democracy, a coalition of rights bodies in Nigeria, where Jos lies between the country's Muslim and Christian communities.

[...]

There have been outbreaks of violence every few years since 2001, and some commentators attributed Sunday's slaughter to revenge for the killings of Muslims by Christians last January. But some residents said the killings were part of a spiralling feud between the Fulani, who are nomads, and Berom, who are farmers, which had been sparked by the theft of cattle, rather than for religious motives.

[...]

Women and children bore the brunt of the three-hour killing spree and in the week, mothers staged a series of angry demonstrations. They also called for troops to leave, saying that the army had not stopped the massacre.

The police said they have arrested 49 Fulani herdsmen for the killings and that the suspects had confessed to having acted in revenge for the January incident.

A Fulani community leader in Jos condemned the arrests, describing it as the "grossest injustice". With recriminations still flying, locals said they would pray for an end to the bloodshed as they had lost faith in the security services.

The government and security officials are trading accusations over the failure to prevent the tragedy despite having one of the country's strategic army formations based in Jos.

Eric Guttschuss, a researcher for the New York-based Human Rights Watch, accused the security forces of neglect.

"We are deeply concerned about the failure of the security forces. There's been a slow reaction of the security forces," he told AFP.

Although military reinforcements have been deployed, Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang said security lapses had worsened the carnage.

Jang told reporters in Abuja that he had alerted the army commander about reports of hostile movement around the area and been told that troops would be heading there.

"Three hours or so later, I was woken by a call that they (armed gangs) had started burning the village and people were being hacked to death," he lamented.

The region's army commander, Major-General Salih Maina, denied receiving any hint from state authorities about the unrest, but stressed that he sent troops to crush an uprising last year where 700 people, mainly Muslims, were killed at Maiduguri.

"The public should stop seeing members of the joint task force as enemies, either compromising or being partisan," Maina told reporters in Jos.

The army headquarters berated Jang for his public outburst saying it was "inflammatory... targeted at rubbishing the army."

Analysts and critics have accused Nigerian authorities of failing to punish those arrested over previous attacks in Jos, thereby creating a feeling of impunity, rather than deterrence.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Monday called on Nigeria to find and punish those responsible for the killings.

"The Nigerian government should ensure that the perpetrators of acts of violence are brought to justice under the rule of law and that human rights are respected as order is restored," the top US diplomat said."

### **Daily Champion, 9 April 2010**

"Governor Isa Yuguda of Bauchi State has promised people with requisite qualifications among the hundreds of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the crises in neighbouring Plateau State who are now taking shelter in various camps in the State of employment in the state civil service.

Governor Yuguda made the promise at Boto Camp of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of the state during a visit to distribute relief materials to the IDPs.

He also assured them that a befitting accommodation would be provided for them before the rainy season begins.

While calling on eligible people among the IDPs to submit their documents at the State Emergency Management agency (SEMA) for employment in the State's Civil Service, he said the State government was also going to provide farms and grazing land to the displaced persons.

The Governor added that already the host local government area had demarcated plots of land for the construction of houses for the displaced persons.

In his response on behalf of the IDPs, Alhaji Haladu Adamu Mai Bulawus thanked the governor for the gesture and assured him that the people were law abiding and appreciative of the support they had been receiving from the state government.

Alhaji Mai Bulawus requested that since they were going to be provided with farm lands they should also be provided with fertilizers as all of them were farmers.”

## **Government’s DDRR and amnesty programme (April 2010)**

### **IRIN, 23 April 2010**

“The government’s amnesty programme whereby militants in the Niger delta are to be disarmed and rehabilitated with a stipend, job training and a micro-credit loan, has been linked to reduced violence in the delta, but critics say it has made the same mistake as almost every other disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) campaign: too much “dd” and not enough “rr”.

“The government has not been conscientious about implementing the rehabilitation and reintegration dimensions for the amnesty,” Nnamdi Obasi, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG), told IRIN. “Part of this has been blamed on delays relating to the president’s illness, but more fundamentally, it was not well-thought-out or planned.”

An amnesty for militants in the delta region was initiated by President Umaru Yar’Adua in July 2009 following regular outbreaks of violence from 2006-2009 culminating in a May 2009 military incursion by government troops into the delta’s creeks, which left thousands displaced.

Militants’ anger has largely been fuelled by communities being left out of the region’s oil wealth.

Through the amnesty programme, militants surrender their weapons at collection centres and register to be trained in a job skill during which period they receive counselling and a monthly allowance of US\$439 prior to being reintegrated into civilian society. At the same time the authorities put in place policies to ensure more oil wealth is directed back into community development.

Violence down, development up

While criminality linked to oil theft persists, large-scale violence is down in the delta since the amnesty started, says Samuel Ayelume of the University of Llorin in Delta State, with incidents of oil bunkering, kidnappings, vandalism, oil theft and small arms proliferation all having dropped.

A greater proportion of state funding is being channelled into local development, he pointed out.

In April 2010 Delta State authorities passed their budget of US\$2.2 billion, 63 percent of which is earmarked for building up infrastructure in affected states, including rebuilding the Gbaramatu kingdom, an area made up of several villages in Delta State, which was destroyed in fighting between government troops and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in May 2009, according to Delta State Governor Emmanuel Uduaghan.

Bayelsa State Governor Timipre Sylva says its \$1.28 billion budget will include rebuilding access roads in the creeks, supporting youth centres and rehabilitating health centres.

On 21 April acting President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law a bill giving domestic firms priority in the awarding of oil blocks and requires foreign companies to hire more local workers.

Jonathan has promised to reinvigorate the amnesty process, which flagged during President Yar’Adua’s long-term illness, and in April 2010 appointed a new petroleum minister, Diezani Alison Makueke from Bayelsa State, and a new minister of Niger Delta affairs.

Shortcomings

However, lack of planning in the DDRR process meant the government underestimated the resources required for long-term, workable rehabilitation and reintegration activities, said the ICG’s Obasi. Critics have said the same of DDRR processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The authorities predicted 10,000 ex-militants would sign up for amnesty, but 17,500 - a mixture of militants, unemployed youths, criminals or militant-criminals, which he calls "milicrants" - did so. These 17,500 have high expectations, and some have told ICG a micro-credit loan and small business start-up are not good enough - they want well-paid appointments with international oil firms.

Monthly payments are irregular, ex-militant Andrew Cross, from Ughelli in Delta State, complained to IRIN, while human rights activist Oke Joseph, also from Ughelli, told IRIN: "The rehabilitation centres where these boys are supposed to be trained are lacking even basic facilities - the programme is derailing."

MEND set off two bombs in the city of Warri in Delta State, in mid-March 2010 outside meetings where the authorities were discussing the amnesty programme. "The car bombing at the venue of the post-amnesty dialogue talk is enough to tell the whole world that the post-amnesty rehabilitation programme is not working," Joseph pointed out.

Also of concern is the fact that though 17,500 have registered, between them they have handed in just 2,700 weapons, which "falls severely short of the arsenals that the militants circulate in the region," Obasi told IRIN.

These pitfalls might have been avoided had more Nigerian or international DDRR experts been consulted on the process, he said.

To make progress, the federal ministries, heads of the various implicated states, and the Niger delta Development Commission, whose relations Obasi describes as "fractured", need to stop working solo and coordinate their plans, he said. This should also lead to more realistic planning of what needs to be done to get the amnesty process back on track, he added.

The longer the process drags on, the bigger the risks, says Obasi, for militants could be co-opted into fomenting electoral violence in the upcoming 2011 local elections. "This has happened in the past... the 2011 elections will be contested just as viciously as in 2007."

And longer-term, the violence that has characterized the past few years could relapse.

Ex-militant Nicolas Dickson warned IRIN: "If the amnesty programme does not go forward, I promise that Nigeria will not know peace."

### **The National Commission for Refugees (April 2010)**

- Nigerian authorities establish the "National Commission for Refugees" as the sole agency responsible for overseeing all refugee matters in Nigeria
- Federal Commissioner for Refugees has solicited the assistance of the Nigeria Customs and the Custom Officers Wives Association in aiding the IDPs affected by the Plateau State conflicts.

#### **NCFR, 2008, paras. 1-2, 6:**

##### **"The mandate**

The Federal Government of Nigeria, further to the fulfillment of her obligations to the 1951 United Nations Convention, 1967 New York Protocol and Organisation of African Unity (African Union) Convention of 1969 on the status of refugees, domesticated some aspects of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and AU Conventions in Decree 52, now Cap 244, titled "the National Commission for Refugees", set up the commission as the sole agency responsible for overseeing all refugee matters in Nigeria.

In addition, during the inauguration of the Governing Board of the Commission in 2002, His Excellency, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo enlarged the mandate of the commission to include the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

[...]

The main objective of this Framework is Emergency Preparedness and Risk mapping activities for durable solutions as a medium long-term development project for the management of refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and other people of concern in the various conflict-affected areas in the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria. The framework is elastic and has a propensity to accommodate intervention from related agencies, donor organizations, development partners and other relevant institutions in the vanguard of poverty reduction as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) projects."

#### **Daily Trust, 22 April 2010**

"Federal Commissioner for Refugees Hajiya Hadiza Sani Kangiwa has solicited the assistance of the Nigeria Customs as well as Custom Officers Wives Association (COWA) in aiding the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) affected by the Plateau State conflicts. Hajiya Hadiza made the call when she visited the Comptroller- General of Customs Alhaji Abdullahi Dikko in his office. She said rainy season is approaching, thereby increasing vulnerability of the IDPs especially in the areas of provision of shelter, clothing and other non food items.

She said due to the gap in funding and delays in budgetary release, the Commission deems it necessary to seek intervention from organisations and agencies such as the Nigeria Custom Service so as to ameliorate the suffering of the internally displaced persons.

The commissioner was accompanied by the Head of the Internally Displaced Persons Division Mrs. Bajoga Petel as well as the Head of the Legal Unit of the Commission Barr. Garba Isimbabi. Responding, Comptroller- General of Customs Abdullahi Dikko expressed appreciation for the visit and pledged "assistance and support to this course"."

#### **Nigeria signs AU IDP Convention (October 2009)**

IRIN, 26 October 2009

"Seventeen countries signed the [African Union convention](#) on internally displaced persons (IDPs) after years of preparation culminated in a week of meetings in the Ugandan capital but a lot more hard work remains before it becomes effective, according to observers.

"The most important step now is implementation," Julia Dolly Joiner, AU commissioner for political affairs, said. "We need to move from intentions to actions."

For the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, it is crucial that implementation is carried out "in a timely fashion and in a manner that makes a real difference to the lives of persons affected by internal displacement in the region, including host communities.

"The first step forward should involve a process of national dialogue and civic education aimed at securing the Convention's ratification and implementation by the State parties," according to a statement by the project, which monitors displacement issues worldwide to promote best practice among governments and other actors.

Fifteen countries must ratify the convention before it enters into effect."

#### **Government introduces conflict-prevention measures to prevent farmer vs. nomad clashes (October 2009)**

- Clashes between farmers and nomadic herders happen frequently in Nigeria and often cause destruction and displacement

- In an effort to curb such violence, the national government has started marking out grazing reserves
- The development of grazing reserves and livestock routes would lead to a clearer use of the land by both groups

**IRIN, 12 October 2009**

"The national government has started marking out grazing reserves across Katsina and Bauchi states in northern Nigeria, as well as the capital Abuja, to curb often deadly clashes between farmers and nomads over pasture.

The three planned reserves, to serve about 15 million pastoralists, involve demarcating 175,000ha of grazing land, building veterinary service centres, and constructing settlements for nomads to use en route, at a cost of US\$247 million, director of livestock and pest control in Nigeria's Agriculture and Water Resources Ministry, Junaidu Maina, told IRIN.

The government is also demarcating a 1,400km livestock route from Sokoto state in the northwest to Oyo state in the southwest; and another 2,000km route from Adamawa state in the northeast to Calabar in the delta region, said Maina.

"The development of the grazing reserves and livestock routes has become imperative to avoid conflicts between pastoralists and farmers due to increased urbanization and rapid population growth," Maina pointed out.

As pasture shrinks, disputes have increased, particularly in the north during the May to September rainy season, when herds invade farmland and eat crops.

Two days of fighting between farmers and nomads in June left three dead and a number of pastoralists' settlements burned in Plateau state.

Maina said once built, the three grazing reserves would be managed by a team of pastoralists, conflict resolution committees and local government representatives."

**IRIN, 25 December 2007**

"At least three people have been killed and nine seriously injured in a clash between farmers and nomads over grazing land in Borno state, northern Nigeria, police and eyewitnesses said.

But some eyewitnesses put the death toll at more than 20.

Violence erupted on 24 December in Bulabulin Ngaburawa village when herdsmen from the Shuwa tribe reportedly led their herd onto lands belonging to farmers from the Kanuri tribe, destroying crops ready for harvest.

"A number of houses were also torched," Borno police spokesperson, Isa Adamu Azare, told IRIN on the phone from Maiduguri, the state capital."

**CEDAW calls on Nigeria to pay special attention to IDP women (2008)**

- The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) considered Nigeria's sixth periodic report at its 41st session from 30 June to 18 July 2008

- Among other questions, the Nigerian delegation was asked to report on the status of the national policy on internally displaced persons and on its efforts in collecting data and protecting internally displaced women
- In its concluding observations, the Committee expressed concern about the situation of internally displaced women and requested that the government pay particular attention to their needs through the adoption of a national policy on internal displacement and the formulation and implementation of gender-sensitive programmes

**CEDAW, 18 July 2008, paras. 37-38:**

"The Committee expresses concern about the situation of internally displaced women, including women with disabilities, displaced by violence and conflict, particularly in view of their precarious living conditions in camps where they are at increased risk of sexual and other forms of violence, and lack access to health care, education and economic opportunities.

The Committee requests the State party to pay particular attention to the needs of internally displaced women, including women with disabilities, through the adoption of a national policy on displacement in line with Security Council resolution 1325 and 1820, and the formulation and implementation of gender-sensitive plans and programmes for social reintegration, capacity-building and training of internally displaced persons. It also recommends that the Interministerial Task Force on Gender and Peacekeeping pay particular attention to the situation of internally displaced women. The Committee also requests the State party to ensure the protection of internally displaced women from violence and their access to immediate means of redress."

***The Committee's concluding observations were based on an exchange had with the Nigerian government over the consideration of its sixth periodic report.***

**CEDAW, 3 July 2008:**

"MARY SHANTHI DAIRIAM, expert from Malaysia, asked about the status of the national policy on internally displaced persons. Had it been drafted and when would it be adopted? How did it address specific vulnerabilities of women and girls during conflict, and what measures would it have for social reintegration of displaced women and girls? In the absence of such a policy, how was the safety of women and girls ensured? Were there any punitive measures to protect women and girls against sexual violence? Could the delegation provide examples in that regard? Was data collected on the existence of displaced women and girls? Was the Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Gender and Peacekeeping cognizant of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), which called on States to involve women in matters of peacekeeping?

[...]

*[Nigeria:]* Concerning the committee on internally displaced persons and gender violence, the previous federal administration had set up a provisional committee on internally displaced persons and, with support from the Brookings Institution, had set up a national policy on internally displaced persons. That policy had not yet been approved, but a final draft had been presented to the Presidential Council for adoption. The United Nations Secretary-General had visited Nigeria to ensure that the draft policy was fashioned in line with United Nations standards governing internally displaced persons and gender violence. The National Commission for Refugees had a desk officer on gender and violence."

## **International response**

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## **International response: overview (2009)**

The UN in Nigeria has focused on development rather than humanitarian issues, as no humanitarian agency has been willing to commit the ongoing resources necessary and as the UN community feels there is more to be gained in tackling the development failures causing the recurrent conflicts. In this context, coordination between humanitarian agencies at all levels has been limited. The UN country team will implement programmes under the second UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF II) for the period from 2009 to 2012, for the first time “delivering as one” to ensure faster and more effective operations towards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (UN, June 2008). As a first step, however, this new approach will only be implemented in six selected states, one in each of the geopolitical zones in Nigeria, while the UN country team will take collective responsibility for the achievement of outputs and progress towards the outcomes agreed under UNDAF II.

## **International Response to the crisis in Jos, Plateau State (March 2010)**

- Oxfam invited stakeholders to partner with it in an effort to support the development of a national coordinated emergency response and disaster risk reduction plan among all stakeholders and agencies through its programme: Consolidating Cooperation between Disaster Management Agencies and Vulnerable Communities for Disaster Risk Reduction in Nigeria.
- Oxfam is implementing a programme: “Strengthening Livelihoods of Small Scale Farmers in Nigeria”, co-financed by the European Commission, in Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Katsina and Kano states.
- France has donated 25,000 euros as relief fund to alleviate the suffering of victims of the 2010 crisis in Jos.
- CAFOD assists over 500 families made homeless after the crisis in Jos in March 2010.

### **ThisDay News, 3 February 2010**

“A leading Non Governmental Organisation in Nigeria, Oxfam GB, has advised Nigerian security authorities to restore normalcy to Jos, and pay urgent attention to the food and social security of the poor and vulnerable; amongst them women and children.

The Country Director, Oxfam, Lesley Agams, said given that the poor and vulnerable are mostly the cannon fodder and victims in a recurring crisis, is a testimony to government that ensuring good governance and proper disaster risk reduction initiative are necessary to overcome the challenges of poverty.

Agams said that the latest crisis, which began on January 17, with reports from government sources, media, Oxfam and their local partners, particularly West Africa Network for Peace building (WANEP), indicated that over 490 lives have been lost, thousands wounded and over 18,000 persons internally displaced.

He commended the actions of Federal and Plateau state relief agencies, the Nigerian Army, Police Forces, the Nigerian Civil Defence and Security Corps, the media and colleagues from Nigerian Red Cross, and partner WANEP who have worked tirelessly to contain and report the incident.

He urgently appealed to humanitarian aid providers to target this category of citizens negatively impacted by the crisis in the distribution of relief materials. “We ask all Nigerians to support efforts to provide relief to the victims and find a resolution to the underlying causes of the violence.”

“Even as tempers have died down, Oxfam wishes to strongly deplore the loss and disruption of life as a result of the crisis while declaring our commitment to the values of democracy, equity

and human rights. We therefore urge security agencies to prioritise the protection of the poor and vulnerable in its efforts to restore full normalcy", Agams added.

Oxfam invited stakeholders to partner with it in an effort to support the development of a national coordinated emergency response and disaster risk reduction plan among all stakeholders and agencies through its programme: Consolidating Cooperation between Disaster Management Agencies and Vulnerable Communities for Disaster Risk Reduction in Nigeria.

The organisation is implementing a N200 million programme: Strengthening Livelihoods of Small Scale Farmers in Nigeria (SLISSFAN), co-financed by the European Commission (EC), in Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Katsina and Kano states.

The project is working with 6,000 small-scale women and men farmers to improve their productivity and livelihoods; in addition to a number of programmes meant to deliver benefits to marginalised women and men that Oxfam is implementing in Nigeria.

The SLISSFAN programme is being implemented by a 7-person team led by David Allu from their field office based in Jos; in collaboration with a number of local civil society partners spread across the Plateau, Benue and Nasarawa states.

During the crisis, Oxfam disclosed that their programme office was closed and staff evacuated to safety till the situation stabilised. The office has however resumed minimal services."

### **PANA, 6 February 2010**

"France has donated 25,000 euros (about 5.25 million naira) as relief fund to alleviate the suffering of victims of the recent crisis in Jos, the capital of Nigeria's north-central Plateau State, PANA reported from here Friday.

This was disclosed at a news release jointly signed by Seyi Soremekun, Head of Communication of the Nigerian Red Cross, and Vincent Larrouze, First Secretary, Embassy of France.

The donation, which was presented by the French Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Jean-Michel Dumond, to the Secretary General of the Nigerian Red Cross, Bello Haman Diram, at the Alliance Francaise in Jos, on Thursday, was part of the French Embassy's support for the Nigerian people.

Dumond regretted the extent of destruction and the large number of internally-displaced people as a result of the crisis, noting that the donation by the French government would go a long way in supporting the victims, particularly the children.

Responding, Diram expressed appreciation to the kind gesture of the French Embassy, observing that the French government had once again demonstrated its true love for the people and government of Nigeria.

The Secretary General assured that the Nigerian Red Cross would use the fund to provide for the needs of the victims of the crisis who are currently camped in parts of Jos and three local governments in neighbouring Bauchi state.

He disclosed that the Nigerian Red Cross had been providing psychological and material supports for the victims while separated family members were being reunited through the "Restoring Family Links" programme of the society"

### **CAFOD, 12 March 2010**

"Less than two months after the January 17th 2010 violence erupted in Jos Nigeria, in which hundreds of people lost their lives, Jos once again faced the horror of mindless violence.

CAFOD has pledged £8,500 (N2 million) to assist over 500 families made homeless by the recent violence on March 7th, and who are now in desperate need of food, clean water and non-food items, such as cooking utensils, blankets, soap and mats.

Early in the morning of March 7th, the villages of Dogon Nahawa, Ratsat and Zot Foron, some 15 kilometres south of Jos city suffered a devastating attack. The villagers, who are of the Berom ethnic group and are mainly Christians, alleged that their attackers were Fulani Muslim herdsmen who swooped on them while they slept. The attack which lasted more than two hours left little chance for the victims, mainly children and women who were hacked down and burnt as they attempted to escape the massacre.

In January the aid agency pledged £12,500 to assist 2,000 people made homeless by the violence.

CAFOD's office in Jos has been working in partnership with a coalition of ten organisations, including the local office of Justice, Development and Peace/Caritas and other faith based groups including three Muslim agencies.

Jos has repeatedly suffered from sectarian violence over the last decade. In November 2008 at least 700 people were killed in just two days of fighting.

CAFOD's main focus in Nigeria is strengthening primary health care services, but the aid agency has also been working closely with Archbishop Kaigama of Jos to support his efforts to create peace and dialogue.

Archbishop of Jos Ignatius Kaigama said: "After each flare up, communities argue over who suffered the most. But the fact is that the victims are men and women, young and old, Christian and Muslim. Each death is a tragedy for the family concerned. All of the casualties are a tragedy for Jos, for Nigeria and for both Christianity and Islam."

"There must be concerted efforts by the state governors to address the problems permanently as most of the issues that lead to these crises are not about religion. Religion is a convenient tool used to press for demands.

"Our political leaders must address the real issues underlying the conflict. There is no denying the reality of poverty in Nigeria. Health, education and water supply services are inadequate for the needs of the poorest."

### **'Delivering as One' approach to be implemented for the first time under UNDAF II (2008)**

- Addressing issues of internal displacement has been mainstreamed into UNDAF II and specifically foreseen under the fourth priority, i.e. conflict prevention
- For the first time, the UN Country Team in Nigeria will implement the UN Development Assistance Framework according to the 'Delivering as One' approach
- This approach implies overall responsibility for the achievement of results and will be initially implemented in six selected states

#### **UN, June 2008, p.9:**

"The results matrix for UNDAF II is organised around four major priorities: (i) governance and accountability that supports transparent, equitable and effective use of resources; (ii) productivity and employment for wealth creation with a bias towards the poor and with the aim of contributing towards the growth of a private sector-led non-oil economy; (iii) social service delivery to invest in Nigeria's human capital and contribute towards a democratic dividend that reaches the poor even as it boosts current and future potential for equitable growth; and (iv) reduction of the risk of crisis and conflict to help address the challenge in the Niger Delta whilst assisting with crisis prevention, management and mitigation in other parts of the country. Taking a step further, these priorities have been disaggregated into specific areas of assistance to guide the formulation of results and identification of indicators.

#### Understanding 'Collective Work' and 'Collective Responsibility'

'Collective work' and its corollary 'collective responsibility':  
apply to work that will be undertaken as 'One UN', whether at the Federal level or in the 6 focus States;

require UN agencies to manage the project cycle within a common framework through Strategic Programme Frameworks/SPFs and the associated Strategic Fund/SF (described in section 4.2 and Annex 3);  
require that resource allocation, management and resource mobilization be managed within the framework of SPFs and the SF;  
embrace the full range of modalities for implementation, thus, do not automatically imply that all programmes or projects must be 'joint';  
necessitate programme planning, management and M&E arrangements and instruments that are appropriate to the close day-to-day collaboration that is envisaged; and  
imply that overall responsibility for the achievement of results (agency outcomes and outputs) lies with the collective, that is, the UNCT rather than with specific agencies.

## **References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**

### **Known references to the Guiding Principles (as of October 2007)**

- References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other references to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

### **References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation**

None

### **Other references to the Guiding Principles**

Draft National IDP Policy (not yet available). Referred to in First Regional Conference on Internal Displacement in West Africa (see below).

First Regional Conference on Internal Displacement in West Africa: Held in the Nigerian capital Abuja, the conference was hosted by the Nigerian government and co-organised by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), UNHCR, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. It brought together a wide variety of representatives of ECOWAS member states, national, regional and international organisations, policy makers and academics. It was acknowledged that while there are currently around one million conflict-induced IDPs in the sub-region, there is a high risk of increased instability and further large-scale displacement. Discussions aimed at finding ways to improve the overall response to IDPs, mainly at a national and regional level. Key recommendations included the development of national laws and policies on internal displacement based on the UN Guiding Principles, and the strengthening of ECOWAS engagement on the issue, for example by developing a regional protocol, declaration or plan of action. The Nigerian government, for its part, presented its own draft National IDP Policy, based largely on the Guiding Principles.

Date: 26-28 April 2006

Document:

Report of the First Regional Conference on Internal Displacement in West Africa, Brookings, June 2006

**Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages**

None

**Training on the Guiding Principles**

~~NRC training workshop: The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), in collaboration with the National Commission for Refugees (NCR), held a 3-day training workshop on the Guiding Principles in the city of Jos, the state capital of Plateau state. The workshop was part of a global NRC effort to disseminate and explain the Guiding Principles to representatives of governments, NGOs, the UN agencies and the displaced themselves, in order to ensure better protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. A total of 59 participants attended the workshop: 34 participants represented different state emergency agencies, the National Commission for Refugees and regional state authorities from all over Nigeria; national and international non-governmental organizations sent 22 representatives and the UN system was represented by UNICEF and UNHCR (3 participants).~~

Date: 17-19 February 2003

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