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## Indonesia: In search of durable solutions for all

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*In early 2009, sometimes ten years after being first displaced by inter-communal violence opposing different ethnic or religious groups, or by separatist struggles between rebel groups and security forces, tens of thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) in many provinces of Indonesia are still struggling to find durable solutions that would enable them to end their displacement. In Aceh, Maluku, West Timor, West and Central Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi, some former displaced groups are prevented from enjoying basic rights on the same level as other citizens as a result of economic, social and political segregation mechanisms, inadequate material and social assistance and unaddressed land and property issues. These groups often share a number of common problems including poor housing conditions, lack of access to land, lack of economic opportunities, food insecurity, limited access to basic services such as clean water, health care or education, and limited social integration with surrounding communities.*

*In Papua province, which remains Indonesia's only conflict area, counter-insurgency operations conducted in recent years by the military against rebels of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) have forced thousands of people from their homes, many seeking refuge in the jungle to escape human rights violations committed by the security forces. Although no significant displacement has been reported since 2007, military operations against OPM rebels have reportedly continued in 2009.*

*Since 2004, the government has officially considered the IDP problem solved and former IDPs considered either as "vulnerable poor" or "victims of social disasters". In regions where significant numbers of IDPs have remained, the government has however continued to provide assistance, mainly through programmes addressing the needs of both displaced and host communities. Nonetheless, corruption involving IDP funds, unreliable data on the displaced, poor coordination and limited local capacity have often hampered the response and prevented assistance from reaching IDPs. A limited number of international organisations have continued to assist conflict-induced IDPs as well as their host communities in some provinces, focusing mainly on economic and social recovery.*

## Map of Indonesia



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Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

Source: United Nations Cartographic Section  
More maps are available on <http://www.internal-displacement.org/>

## Background and causes of displacement

Large-scale population displacement has been a recurrent feature of Indonesia's recent history. There have been three broad and often interlinked causes of displacement: conflicts, political and economic policies and natural disasters. Population displacement has been used by successive governments to shape the political, demographic and economic development of the country, sometimes with dire consequences only appearing decades later; it was also a regular by-product of the many conflicts that accompanied the nation-building process and the unification of the country. Displacement reached unprecedented levels in 1998, when movements seeking increased liberty and democracy combined with the effects of the Asian financial crisis to bring down the government of President Suharto and end the "New Order" era that had started thirty years before.

Against a backdrop of economic recession, widespread discontent fuelled separatist aspirations across the country, while increased competition for political and economic resources pitted ethnic and religious groups against each other in ever-larger episodes of communal violence. The resulting unrest between 1999 and 2002 saw tens of thousands of people killed and more than 1.4 million displaced throughout the country. A further estimated 500,000 to 700,000 people were displaced by the conflict in Aceh between 1999 and 2004, while tens of thousands of people have since 2001 been forced from their homes by military operations in Papua.

The root causes of most conflicts and displacement in Indonesia can be traced back to transmigration programmes which the Suharto government undertook with the stated aim of reducing demographic disparities between regions and fostering national integration. The government-sponsored relocation of large groups of people, often from Java to less populated areas, as well as other spontaneous economic migrations, often led to new ethnic demographics and an increasing number of disputes over land and resources. Tensions flared into open conflicts when the political vacuum created by Suharto's fall triggered local power struggles. In Central Sulawesi and Maluku Province, these struggles led to conflicts along religious lines, whereas ethnic identities were the dividing streak in Central and West Kalimantan Provinces. In North Maluku province in 1999, violence between ethnic Kaos and ethnic Makian migrants quickly grew into inter-communal violence between Christians and Muslims across the province.

Separatist struggles in Aceh and in Papua were rooted in the impoverishment of the local population and their perception of being exploited by elites closely linked to the central government. However, transmigration programmes also played a role in both conflicts. In Aceh, the arrival of up to 160,000 ethnic Javanese between 1974 and 1998 generated local resentment as there was a common perception that the new migrants got the best jobs. From 1999, ethnic Javanese became the target of deliberate attacks from the rebels of the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or GAM) who viewed them as an "elemental enemy of Aceh's nationhood" (Cornell, 2008, p.135). In Papua, the transfer of an estimated

750,000 settlers with a different ethnic and religious background from Java and Sulawesi created strong resentment among the local population and contributed to discontent (WPAT, September 2007).

Natural disasters remain the principal cause of displacement. Indonesia is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, with millions of people affected every year. The southern and western islands face the most hazards, including droughts, earthquakes, floods, landslides, and volcanoes (CHRR, 2005). In the past years, disasters such as the 2004 tsunami or the 2006 Java earthquake have killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions. Between January 2006 and December 2008, a total of 771 disasters hit the country, resulting in the displacement of more than 3.5 million people (OCHA, December 2008, p.1).

In addition to conflicts and natural disasters, tens of thousands of people are also displaced each year as a consequence of development projects, often conducted in resource-rich areas inhabited by ethnic minorities and indigenous groups. The exploitation of natural resources throughout the country has a direct impact on the daily lives of many of these groups, often forcing them to abandon their land and way of life, and increasing tensions between communities. In the past years, the government has sponsored an increasing number of palm oil plantations in regions such as West Papua and West and Central Kalimantan, and plans to massively expand them in the future in a bid to increase biofuel production (Oxfam, June 2008, pp.23-24). As a result, communities whose livelihoods and survival depend on the forest are losing their lands

due to environmental degradation and because the government has not recognised their ownership of the land. Displaced by the destruction of their habitat, indigenous groups have viewed the arrival of outsiders hired to work on the plantations as an additional threat to the sustainability of their livelihoods, culture and identity (Friends of the Earth, LifeMosaic *and* Sawit Watch, February 2008, p.10). Tensions between indigenous groups and migrants were reportedly on the rise in 2008 in West Kalimantan and West Papua Provinces (ICG, 16 June 2008).

### **Most conflicts end but durable solutions remain elusive for some IDPs**

In most areas, following the end of conflict and the provision of significant assistance by the government and international humanitarian agencies to help them move towards durable solutions, the majority of the 1.4 million people displaced between 1999 and 2002 were able to return to their homes. By 2004, the government considered that the implementation of its 2001 IDP policy had largely ended the displacement crisis. However, while many of the displaced had indeed managed to return, resettle or integrate locally – the three options outlined in the policy – this was not the case for all and more than 500,000 people had still not been able to return or find another durable solution to end their displacement (SIDA, 7 August 2004, p.iii; NHRC, March 2005).

Some IDPs could not return because of the continued hostility of ethnic or religious groups, and others because the assistance promised never reached them,

often because of mismanagement and corruption. Some of the groups that were unable to return ended up in temporary settlements without access to basic services and with few prospects of building a livelihood. Others tried to integrate locally but were denied the same chances as other citizens because of their different origin and the lack of resources at their disposal. When they did manage to return, IDPs often found their homes destroyed and their property seized by former neighbours. Again the lack of assistance or the inability to reclaim or get compensation for their property meant that only some managed to recover.

Since 2004, there have been no reliable estimates of the number of people still displaced by conflict. The information available suggests that the combined number of those still displaced at the beginning of 2009 and those who have returned or resettled, but who continue to face barriers which prevent them from enjoying the full range of their rights, could reach 120,000. This is however a rough approximation given the absence of any systematic monitoring of return and resettlement conditions due to the government's lack of capacity and also interest, and due to difficulties in defining who is still an IDP.

Aceh provides a good example of the difficulties in identifying IDPs in a post-conflict context where no national IDP policy provides them with formal recognition and associated entitlements. The 2004 tsunami was followed eight months later by a peace agreement which put an end to a thirty-year long separatist insurgency. Most people displaced during different phases of the conflict (estimated at up to 700,000 between 1999 and 2004)

have now returned to their homes or integrated into areas of displacement, though often without any assistance. However, almost everybody has been affected by the conflict in some way, and in some areas between a third and two thirds of people reported having been displaced by force; defining who is an IDP has proved difficult for the government and humanitarian agencies, in particular after the 2005 peace agreement when many IDPs started returning (IOM, 20 June 2007, p.4).

Research conducted both by the government and the World Bank during 2006 showed that an estimated 36,000 households displaced by the conflict had not returned to their homes one year after the peace agreement (GoRI & WB, March 2007, p.42). In the absence of any formal registration or assistance programme specifically targeting the displaced – the Aceh government considers IDPs as part of a broad “conflict victim” category – they have not been recognised as a separate vulnerable group and therefore not counted (ICG, 29 March 2006, p.8).

Papua remains the only province of Indonesia where conflict and violence, albeit of low intensity, has continued to regularly force people from their homes in the past years. The lack of access of international and independent observers to the conflict-affected areas, mainly located in the Central Highlands, has made it difficult to assess their number and needs. Since 2001, sweeping operations by security forces' campaigns against insurgents of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) have displaced tens of thousands of people, mainly in the Puncak Jaya region, but there have been no reliable estimates of their number (HRW, 5 July 2007,

p.32). Although no significant displacement has been reported since 2007 when military operations in Puncak Jaya displaced thousands of people, military operations often accompanied by human rights violations have reportedly continued, with unconfirmed reports of new operations in January 2009 (WPAT, February 2009). In March 2009, the government announced it would step up its military presence in Puncak Jaya following attacks by OPM rebels against military stations (Jakarta Post, 14 March 2009).

### **Out of reach of assistance, and still displaced**

Elsewhere in Indonesia, where conflicts subsided years ago, displacement is no longer considered as a major humanitarian, social or political issue, even though it has not yet ended for some of those uprooted. In 2009, up to ten years after first being displaced, there are still a number of people in almost all the former hot-spots of Indonesia who continue to suffer from the consequences of their displacement, and who still do not enjoy basic rights, often on the basis of their social, religious or ethnic identity. In Aceh, Maluku, West Timor, West and Central Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi, former displaced groups are prevented from enjoying basic rights on the same level as other citizens as a result of economic, social and political segregation mechanisms, inadequate material and social assistance and unaddressed land and property issues.

There are three broad categories of former conflict-induced IDPs whose displacement cannot be considered to have ended as they have not been able to find

durable solutions and have specific outstanding needs:

- IDPs who continue to live in camps or informal settlements with little or no access to basic services, who cannot buy the land they are living on (Central Sulawesi, West Timor);
- IDPs who have been resettled in collective sites far from urban areas, with poor access to markets, health services, education and no access to agricultural land (West Kalimantan, West Timor, Maluku and Central Sulawesi);
- IDPs who have returned to their homes but who have not been able to reclaim their property or livelihoods (Aceh, Central Sulawesi, West and Central Kalimantan and Maluku).

Despite significant differences in the situation facing each of these groups, there are a number of common problems preventing them from enjoying their rights to the same extent as the rest of the population. These include poor housing conditions, lack of access to land, lack of economic opportunities, food insecurity, limited or no access to basic services such as clean water, health care or education, and limited social integration with surrounding communities.

Many of the regional conflicts have resulted in a much more polarised society, as ethnic or religious communities have been physically segregated to avoid future clashes. While central government and provincial efforts to reconcile communities (leading for example to the Malino Declaration I and II in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku) were largely successful in putting an end to fighting and allowing situations to re-

turn to normal, these often failed to address the root causes of the violence (such as land and property issues), to foster reconciliation between former or new neighbours and eventually facilitate the reintegration of displaced communities. Reconciliation and peace building activities were largely dependent on local level-initiatives either by district authorities, host communities, NGOs or IDPs themselves. As a result, in some provinces or districts IDPs did manage to return and reintegrate into their former communities while in others they could not. The impunity of perpetrators or sponsors of violence, and the insufficiency of assistance due to the poor capacity, neglect and corruption of local authorities, have often further hampered the recovery process.

Despite significant recent progress in the reconstruction, rehabilitation and stabilisation of Central Sulawesi, society there is still segregated between Christians and Muslims and return is still problematic in mixed communities. Christians fled in large numbers to Tentena, a Christian stronghold, while Muslims consolidated their presence in Poso. Some of the villages destroyed during the conflict have not been completely rebuilt and people are still living in damaged houses with no sanitation (Useem in *Inside Indonesia* No.93, October 2008). Up to 5,000 people reportedly remained unable to return in 2007, instead staying in camps and temporary shelters in 12 locations along the Poso lake near Tentena in the North Pamona sub-district (Komnas Perempuan, November 2007, p.66). In 2008 1,162 IDP households in Poso regency were identified as still vulnerable and included in a government-sponsored relocation and reintegration programme.

In addition to persistent localised tensions, obstacles to return in Central Sulawesi include unresolved land and property disputes and lack of assistance largely resulting from the mismanagement of assistance and recovery funds. In 2007, according to the department of social affairs an estimated 4,300 families were reportedly still waiting for housing assistance (*Suara Pembaruan Daily*, 16 July 2007). Lack of transparency and widespread corruption has fuelled distrust between the local authorities and civil society, in particular between the police and NGOs, and has been considered by community leaders as a far more serious threat than the risk of renewed violence (ICG, 22 January 2008, p.10).

The uneven distribution of funds intended both for IDPs and other victims of the conflict not only denied many IDPs of return or rehabilitation opportunities, but also created resentment between and within communities and undermined confidence in the reconciliation process (*Kompas*, 2005, p.10). While the fragile peace was reinforced by a strong military presence, the repeated bombings and attacks reported were often linked to the embezzlement of IDP funds (Brown & Dirpose, November 2007, p.9; McRae, March 2006).

While efforts were made to avoid further conflict, little was done by the government or the provincial authorities to engage in proactive peacebuilding. The thematic working groups (*Pokja Malino*) set up to follow up and help implement the peace and reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, education and spiritual welfare provisions of the Malino Declaration did not resolve the underlying causes

of the conflict and were considered a failure by all sides (CRISE, November 2007, p.10; UNDP, July 2004, p.14). Most of the reconciliation work was done at the local level without involvement of government or international institutions, but relying more on NGOs, village leaders, religious leaders and IDPs themselves, who often turned out to be the main peace builders (Braithwaite, John, January 2009, p.32).

In some cases, the recovery needs of the displaced are considerable but difficult to distinguish from those of the rest of the population, because the majority of the population has also experienced displacement at some point during the conflict, and because poverty is so widespread that those who were never displaced were only slightly better off.

Following displacement caused by the military campaign launched in May 2003, almost all IDPs in Aceh struggled to rebuild their lives after returning as most found their homes destroyed and property looted (IOM-GoRI, September 2004, pp.16-17). While all civilians living in conflict-affected areas suffered from its effects, the displaced were generally worse off, with many of them finding their houses and property destroyed and their livelihoods undermined by their inability to work on their land while displaced. Most of them have since struggled to restore their livelihoods and rebuild their homes, but with poverty levels extremely high throughout the province, their needs would now be hard to distinguish from those of the rest of the population, in particular in the districts hardest hit by the conflict (WB, January 2008, p.8). Psychosocial needs assessments conducted by IOM between 2006

and 2007 in high conflict areas showed that the majority of people had experienced extremely high levels of violence resulting in severe mental health consequences such as depression, anxiety or post-traumatic stress disorder (IOM, 20 June 2007, p.76). The overwhelming majority of people surveyed reported difficulties providing for their families, finding work or restarting livelihood activities (IOM, September 2006, p.3).

### **Social segregation and unresolved property issues hamper reintegration**

While the government made genuine efforts to foster reconciliation and peace in some of the conflict-affected regions such as Maluku or Central Sulawesi, in others it left the initiative to provincial or district-level governments, often to the detriment of displaced minorities. Many IDPs who were willing to return had to do so on their own. Many struggled to reclaim their land and property, in particular when they represented an ethnic minority in the province or the local area.

In Central Kalimantan, the majority of the up to 180,000 ethnic Madurese expelled from the province in 2001 were allowed to return in the following years, but severe restrictions were placed on their freedom of movement and other fundamental rights as they had to accept the conditions imposed by the ethnic Dayaks who had won the conflict. The failure of the central government to adopt a clear return and reconciliation policy meant that local governments were left free to impose their own case-by-case approach to returns according to what they considered “natural” (or *alami*). The provincial government did establish a

policy that in general IDPs had a right to return, but it had reportedly little effect in districts where opposition to Madurese return persisted (Braithwaite, John, 2009, p.28). Many districts passed laws providing for the expulsion of returning Madurese failing to adhere to local customs. Candidates for return were screened by village leaders, based on both objective criteria such as whether they had a permanent job or were married to a Dayak woman, and subjective considerations such as their “good character” (WB, February 2005, p.18).

As a result of these regulations, many among the Madurese commercial and political elite did not return and those who did were reportedly barred from living in some neighbourhoods, denied access to employment opportunities or forced to pay compensation to those who had seized their land or property (UNDP, 2005, pp.72-73). The absence of any monitoring has made it difficult to assess how returns have progressed and what obstacles returnees continue to face. While it appears that the strong and common desire to “move on” has led most problems to be resolved, a large proportion of returnees have not been able to regain their land rights and have restarted their lives from scratch without any external assistance, often even without security of tenure over their houses (Cornell, 2008, p.246).

While return has been possible for most displaced Madurese in Central Kalimantan, this has not been the case in West Kalimantan due to continued opposition from local Dayaks (Cornell, 2008, p.248). Inter-ethnic violence between indigenous Dayaks and ethnic Madurese migrants displaced up to 78,000

Madurese in 1999. Most of them still live in camps outside the capital Pontianak, into which they were resettled after staying up to two years in makeshift sites in the capital. As these resettlement camps were established far from markets and job opportunities, and IDPs considered the land there unsuitable for the type of agriculture they were familiar with, some opted instead for the government’s “empowerment fund” and resettled independently (CRS, 2003, p.1).

In 2006, Madurese IDPs from Bengkayang living in Singkawang reported still being unable to return to their homes because of the hostility of ethnic Dayaks who had also seized their property. The loss of land certificates during the conflict has further complicated the restitution and compensation process in the absence of government support. While some of those who could prove their ownership managed to sell their land, the majority of the displaced have not received any compensation. This has undermined their chances of rebuilding their life elsewhere, and so many continue to live in poorly equipped IDP camps (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, p.148).

In Aceh, some Acehnese IDPs returning to Gayo land in central Aceh, where Acehnese constitute a minority, have been unable to reclaim their land and property and their attempts have received little support from the local authorities. Some reported preferring not to report their land ownership claims to the police because they were afraid of local militias who had allegedly attacked an IDP representative (UNDP & Bappenas, 2007, pp.135-136). Social reintegration for conflict victims including IDPs was report-

edly sometimes difficult in Aceh, with IDPs excluded from public services, village meetings or social activities (OCHA, November 2008, p.10).

In a society which traditionally discriminates against women, displaced women are often doubly vulnerable. They are often the primary victims of abuse and violence, which have become more frequent following lengthy stays in camps or relocation centres. Data collected by CARE in West Timor and in Central Kalimantan showed that 11 per cent of the 7,000 households selected as beneficiaries of their SENSE project were headed by women, usually widows (CARE, 6 May 2008, p 1). A significant number of displaced widows have also been denied their inheritance, guardianship and property rights. With the allocation of aid usually determined by men, women's access to aid has been more difficult. Excluded from important decisions regarding their future, including peace negotiations, but also the type of aid or housing needed, women have reported feeling powerless and marginalised (OCHA, November 2008, p.11). A study by the NHRC in Aceh found that many IDP women had been victims of abuses and discrimination including violence, denial of their entitlements as IDPs or preferential treatment between different women. Most had no idea about their entitlements and rights (Komnas Perempuan, November 2007, p. 3).

Poor integration of displaced populations with local communities may also be caused by cultural differences regarding, language, customs or religion, or competition for scarce land, natural resources or employment opportunities. Many IDPs do not have identity cards establishing

their village membership, or other official documents that would allow them to access basic services, social assistance or formal recognition of land ownership.

In West Timor, ex-IDPs and refugees living in camps or villages near the border with Timor Leste or near the capital Kupang have reportedly been poorly integrated with local communities mainly because of strong cultural differences, in particular in Kupang, but also because of land disputes as IDPs have occupied land owned by local communities (CARE, August 2007, pp.5-6). Often marginalised as "new citizens" and excluded from local social support systems, many are too poor to register for identity cards needed to receive social assistance (Li in *Inside Indonesia* No.90, December 2007).

### **Sustainable livelihoods, security of tenure and access to land**

For many displaced groups in camps or resettlement sites, two of the main barriers to recovery are their insecurity of tenure and their lack of ownership of land. Without access to land or to title deeds the displaced are at risk of eviction, deprived of sources of livelihood to rebuild their lives and discouraged from investing in the future with the long-term perspective needed to reach durable solutions.

In Tentena, Central Sulawesi, some 200 families living on land owned by a church since they were displaced in 2001 were asked to move to another location seven years later, because the land was to be used to build an extension for a school. Most IDPs refused to leave as they had integrated in the neighbourhood both socially and economically, and

feared having to start from scratch again (ICG, 22 January 2008, p.9).

On West Seram island, Maluku province, some 250 families were still living in 2007 in a resettlement site eight years after being displaced. Situated 15 kilometres from their original homes near Seriholo village, the site was on land owned by a clove plantation company that was seeking to evict them, having originally agreed to let them live there for three years. The displaced had received several notices of eviction, but were prevented from returning by their former neighbours who had taken their land, and so they had nowhere to go to. Their main livelihood was provided by the plantation company that intended to evict them (Interviews by IDMC, December 2007).

In West Timor in 2008, at least 2,000 former IDPs and refugees, considered by the government as “new citizens”, had been living in Noelbaki camp near Kupang for the past ten years. Most were likely to be displaced again or resettled as the government intended to shut down Noelbaki and other camps hosting thousands (West Australian, 26 July 2008). The camp, which had not seen any recent improvements as the government discouraged support from international agencies, lacked even the most basic services including electricity and running water. With no access to land, the IDPs, most of them farmers, had limited sources of income and felt completely abandoned (The Age, 28 July 2008).

In 2006, it was estimated that between 4,000 and 7,000 former refugee families were still living in camps near the border between Timor-Leste and West Timor and near Kupang with very limited re-

sources or facilities (UNDP, 2005, p.46; UCA News, 2 October 2006; EC, 2006; Li in *Inside Indonesia* No 90, December 2007). Shelter and infrastructure improvements were in 2008 hampered by the IDPs’ limited access to natural resources compared to local community members, regular changes in the government’s IDP policy as well as the high mobility of IDPs (CARE, 6 May 2008, pp.10-11). Thousands had been resettled by the government with the assistance of international NGOs such as CARE and Oxfam GB, but many former refugees remained unwilling to move to resettlement sites often situated far from towns, where job opportunities and access to health services were reportedly very limited (CARE, August 2007, p.8). Lack of access to land ownership has also been reported as a major challenge to recovery in resettlement sites (West Australian, 26 July 2008; UCA News, 2 October 2006).

Even when the displaced have been able to buy land they have struggled to get legal certificates proving their ownership of it. In both West Timor and in Central Kalimantan IDPs faced difficulties in getting the certificates were due to the lack of proper documentation of land transactions, lack of ID cards or lack of clarity of the status of land bought on credit when payments had not been completed. Another major obstacle identified was the difficulty in determining boundaries when land had been bought by groups (CARE, 6 May 2008, p.8).

### **Issues related to IDP recovery fund and reintegration assistance**

In several provinces government assistance never reached the displaced, or only part of it was disbursed (UNDP & Bap-

penas, December 2006, p.50). Corruption, unreliable data on the displaced, unclear registration processes and the lack of capacity of local authorities to implement the assistance programme all undermined local responses and undermined IDPs' chances of a successful recovery.

In West Timor, former IDP and refugees have protested, sometimes violently, against the perceived insufficiency of government funding. The government's assistance to them ended in 2005 when their status was removed, but many complained that they had not received anything and had simply been abandoned (Kompas, 21 March 2006). A social assimilation assistance fund was set up in 2005, but it only benefited those who agreed to resettle and integrate with local communities. Many also failed to register in time and were left out. In 2008, some 2,000 former refugee families, most of them still living in camps, were still demanding assistance from the government to rebuild their lives. According the head of the provincial Social Services Office, they were not entitled to the assistance fund because they have not registered with the authorities in time and because they had not assimilated locally (Jakarta Post, 2 April 2008).

In Maluku province, the majority of up to half a million people displaced by inter-communal violence since 1999 have long returned or resettled. Although a number of unresolved issues continued in 2008 to prevent the full recovery of some displaced groups, the main outstanding issue, which had dragged on for many years, remained the disbursement of the IDP compensation package (BBR) to an

estimated 10,000 to 12,000 families (Jakarta Post, 29 January 2008).

In Central Sulawesi, widespread corruption has marred the recovery process and prevented many IDPs from receiving promised assistance to rebuild their homes or re-start their lives (Aragon, March 2004). In September 2007, the former district head of Poso was sentenced to two years in prison for stealing money intended for assisting the IDPs' return back in 2001 (ICG, 22 January 2008, p.10). Many other politicians and civil servants, particularly those working for the provincial and district-level Social Affairs Office, through which most of the IDP fund disbursements were made, are suspected of having profited from the large sums which flowed to Central Sulawesi (McRae in *Inside Indonesia* No.85, March 2006).

### **National and international response**

Since 2004, when the IDP status was withdrawn in most regions in exchange for assistance or compensation packages, the government has considered its IDP problem largely solved. The displaced largely ceased to exist as a category deserving specific attention, despite the fact that in many regions hundreds of thousands had not ended their displacement and were still in need of assistance. The government's decision was clearly dictated primarily out of concern to restore the nation's dignity (Cornell, 2008, p.4).

Also, after a number of years the attention of the government but also of donors and international agencies moved to other humanitarian emergencies, mostly linked to the many natural disasters the country

has experienced on a regular basis. In 2005, most international agencies and donors in Indonesia shifted their attention to Aceh and North Sumatra province where the largest humanitarian relief operation in history was deployed in response to the December 2004 tsunami. The tsunami-induced IDPs largely replaced the conflict-induced IDPs both in Aceh (where the government only considered as IDPs those displaced by the tsunami) and nationally (where all former conflict-IDPs were now considered as “vulnerable poor”).

While adopting this formal “no more IDPs” stance, the government did however continue to provide assistance to ex-IDPs it considered in need of specific assistance, or more broadly through general development programmes benefiting the whole community. As vulnerable poor or “new citizens”, some former IDPs continued to benefit from some degree of assistance. The assistance provided since 2005 by a number of government programmes and internationally sponsored projects has tended to target both IDPs and host communities in an effort to foster inclusiveness and reintegration. Some of the programmes that have addressed IDPs’ needs include the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), a community-driven poverty alleviation programme supported by the World Bank, and Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA), another World Bank-supported programme aimed at helping the government address problems of governance and poverty in the 100 poorest districts of the country.

At the central level, the Directorate of Social Assistance for Victims of Social Disaster of the Ministry of Social Affairs

(BSKBSB-Depsos) is the government body responsible for assistance to IDPs now included in the broad “Victims of Social Disasters” category. However, since 2007, responsibility for IDPs has been transferred to provincial and district authorities, with central government funding discontinued. District governments are now the decision-making bodies for IDP assistance with provincial governments invited to provide the funding. This is in line with Indonesia’s devolution since 1999 of fiscal and political power to district level. In Maluku, one of the few regions still receiving central government IDP funding, the provincial administration handed over authority for the IDP programme to municipal and regency administrations in June 2007.

The government has also made steps to strengthen its capacity to respond to disasters and emergencies. In 2007, it passed a new law on disaster management and established a National Disaster Management Agency to lead and coordinate emergency assistance with a particular focus on disaster risk reduction, a stated priority for the coming years (UNHCR, October 2008, p.4). Under the law, civil society groups were also set to participate more actively in the national response.

Since 2006, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) has conducted programmes in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Aceh, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, where a number of IDPs with unmet needs were identified. CARE and OXFAM have carried out several programmes addressing the needs of former IDPs, mainly in Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and West Timor. In the past two years, CARE has conducted a

SENSE programme (Support for Empowerment of Non-Integrated IDPs to improve Settlement and Economy Project) in West Timor and Central Kalimantan, which has targeted 7,000 households in the two provinces, including both ex-IDPs/refugees and host communities (CARE, August 2007, p.14).

The UN no longer assists conflict-induced IDPs as a separate vulnerable group. Instead their needs are addressed through conflict-sensitive reintegration and development projects which aim to ensure that the needs of the most vulnerable are included in the planning of community-level development programmes and that livelihoods and economic opportunities improve. UNDP's Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit is currently conducting a five-year "Peace through Development" programme in North Maluku, Maluku and Central Sulawesi, which is due to come to an end in June 2010.

IOM has since 2005 been providing recovery assistance to conflict-affected people, including IDPs in Aceh, through a post-conflict reintegration Programme aimed at strengthening peace.

The cluster approach was activated in Indonesia in response to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. So far it has only been applied to humanitarian emergencies resulting from natural disasters, but there is an agreement that the cluster approach will be used for any future major humanitarian emergencies including those resulting from conflict or civil unrest (IASC-Indonesia, 12 June 2008, p.6). UNICEF is the protection cluster lead.

*Note: This is a summary of the IDMC's Internal Displacement profile. The full profile is available online [here](#).*

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## **About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre**

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org).

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