

21 MAY 2010

ZIMBABWE

Official acknowledgment of displacement yet to be translated into strategies for durable solutions

Hundreds of thousands of people in Zimbabwe remain internally displaced as a result of government policies and actions. The two largest groups of internally displaced people (IDPs) are farm workers and their families who have been displaced as a result of the fast-track land reform programme, which began in 2000 and continues to this day; and people displaced as a result of arbitrary evictions in Zimbabwe's towns and cities. Others have been displaced by government campaigns against informal mine workers, and by politically-motivated violence.

The situation of IDPs varies widely, depending on the reasons for their displacement and the length of time they have been displaced. Accordingly, their needs range from emergency humanitarian assistance to interventions aimed at securing durable solutions. For a significant proportion of IDPs local integration in the place of displacement would be the preferred durable solution, but lack of security of tenure presents a major obstacle.

Since the formation of the Government of National Unity in February 2009, the government's approach to internal displacement in Zimbabwe has begun to improve. While the previous government did not acknowledge the existence of internal displacement in the country, the new government participated in a joint rapid IDP assessment with the United Nations in August 2009, and has called for a more comprehensive and nationwide IDP assessment to be conducted in 2010. Humanitarian access to some groups of IDPs has also improved.

In October 2009, President Mugabe signed the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa.

Background

Zimbabwe does not have any of the outward signs of other large displacement crises, such as camps for internally displaced people (IDPs): the displacement crisis in Zimbabwe is to a large extent hidden. It is nevertheless a crisis, with hundreds of thousands of people having been displaced as a result of government policies and actions.

A broad distinction can be made between the four different groups of IDPs (each of which is discussed in more detail below). First, the fast-track land reform programme, which started in 2000 and which continues to this day, has deprived hundreds of thousands of farm workers of their livelihoods and their homes on the commercial farms. Second, home demolitions and arbitrary evictions have left hundreds of thousands of people homeless in Zimbabwe's towns and cities. Third, thousands of mine workers have been displaced when the government ordered the destruction of their homes. And fourth, political violence has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people, both political activists and ordinary voters.

IDP figures

Until the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009, President Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government refused to acknowledge that its policies had caused internal displacement. Indeed, so sensitive was the issue of displacement in Zimbabwe that the term IDP could not be used by humanitarian actors; instead, IDPs came to be referred to as "mobile and vulnerable populations" (MVPs). Government obstruction meant that no agency was able to conduct a comprehensive survey to determine the number of IDPs in Zimbabwe. Moreover, organisations that worked with displaced people were reluctant to make public any detailed information about the people they assisted, including precise numbers of beneficiar-

ies, for fear that the government would interpret this as an attempt to discredit the government's policies and withdraw permission for these organisations to operate in the country.

With the formation of the GNU, the government's position has been modified so as to acknowledge the existence of internal displacement in Zimbabwe, even if the causal connection between that displacement and the government's actions cannot always openly be made. The government conducted a limited IDP assessment with the United Nations in August 2009 (Government of Zimbabwe and UN, February 2010). The report of this joint assessment called for "a joint quantitative survey and profiling of all IDPs in the country by the Government of Zimbabwe and the humanitarian community" (*ibid.*, p.22). Such a survey would be an important step towards establishing the extent of the displacement crisis in Zimbabwe.

In the absence of a comprehensive survey the only IDP figures are estimates, which can do no more than provide a rough indication of the scale of the displacement crisis. Estimating the total number of IDPs in Zimbabwe is made more difficult by the fact that a significant number of IDPs have been displaced more than once, in different waves of displacement. An estimate for the total number of IDPs can therefore not simply be obtained by adding up the estimates for the number of people displaced by each of the different causes of displacement. Moreover, as many as three million Zimbabweans are estimated to have left the country for political and economic reasons, mostly to neighbouring countries: an unknown number of these refugees and migrants were internally displaced in Zimbabwe before they went abroad.

The 2007 Food Security and Nutrition Assessment conducted by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) found that about eight per cent of the sampled population had been "asked to move" in the past five years, which was generally understood to mean that

they had been forcibly displaced (ZimVAC 2007; see also OCHA, 10 December 2007, p.36). If these figures are taken as indicative for the entire population, which in 2007 was estimated to be between 11 and 12 million people (FAO/WFP, 18 June 2008, p.7), the total number of internally displaced people in Zimbabwe in 2007 was between 880,000 and 960,000. It must be noted that since 2007 significant numbers of people have been newly displaced by political violence and ongoing farm invasions.

The fast-track land reform and resettlement programme

When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the country inherited an unequal and race-based land ownership pattern, with a few thousand white farmers owning 37 per cent of all land in Zimbabwe, while more than one million black families lived in overcrowded, arid "communal areas" allocated to Africans by the former colonial regime (COHRE, September 2001, p.11; HRW, March 2002, p.2).

To address this imbalance, Zimbabwe's new government embarked on an ambitious land reform and resettlement programme, with the aim of resettling black families on land acquired from large-scale commercial farmers. However, by the end of 1999, after almost two decades in power, the government had resettled only just over 70,000 black families, while about 4,000 large-scale commercial farmers (the vast majority of them white) still held 22 per cent of the land (COHRE, September 2001, pp.12, 15; HRW, March 2002, pp.6-7; Justice for Agriculture, May 2008, p.4; Tapera Knox Chitiyo, May 2000). The land reform programme's failure to live up to its ambitions was largely due to disagreement between the government of Zimbabwe and donor governments about funding for the programme, and to the government's own failure to allocate funds for the acquisition of land for resettlement (Kay Muir-Leresche,

August 1998, p.25).

In 2000, President Mugabe's ZANU-PF government announced the fast-track land reform and resettlement programme (Government of Zimbabwe, April 2001 and 2006). Thousands of privately-owned farms were listed for compulsory acquisition. In practice, the programme proceeded in large part through illegal farm invasions by so-called war veterans, who used violence and intimidation to force both farmers and farm workers off the farms (COHRE, September 2001; UNDP, January 2002; Justice for Agriculture, May 2008). Farm invasions have continued ever since (ICG, 3 March 2010, p.1).

At the start of the fast-track land reform programme, it was estimated that the large-scale commercial farms employed between 300,000 and 350,000 farm workers and a further 250,000 to 270,000 seasonal workers (IDMC, August 2008, p.32 and sources quoted therein). Farm workers, seasonal workers, and farm workers' families together numbered an estimated two million people, the vast majority of whom lived on the commercial farms. In 2008, UNDP estimated that one million people (200,000 farm workers and their families) had lost their homes and livelihoods since the start of the fast-track land reform programme (UNDP, September 2008, pp.157-158).

Fewer than one in ten farm workers is still employed on the commercial farms, either by the few remaining commercial farmers who are still on their land, or by the new farm owners. Other farm workers are still living on the farms where they used to be employed before the owner was evicted, but they are no longer employed there. As a consequence, they have no legal right to remain on the farms, and they are at risk of being evicted from their homes by the new farm owners.

The remaining group of farm workers have either been forcibly evicted from their homes on the farms in the course of the farm invasions, or they have been forced to leave because they could no longer survive in the absence of employment. They are among Zimbabwe's most vulnerable people, and very few of them have managed to put their lives back on a sustainable basis. Some have moved to live on other farms, where their presence is condoned but not secure, while others are squatting on government-owned land. Some have moved to the towns and cities, where they have joined the urban poor, and in many cases have been displaced again as a result of arbitrary evictions. Many of the former farm workers who went to work in the mining areas have also fallen victim to evictions and home demolitions by the government.

Displaced farm workers who went to the rural areas from which they or their ancestors originated have not necessarily fared much better. Some have been allocated small plots of land by their chief, but not everyone has been helped in this way. Sometimes chiefs have not been able to allocate land to displaced farm workers, because of the overcrowding in Zimbabwe's communal areas and the resulting shortages of land. In other cases, former farm workers have been denied land in the rural areas because of their perceived association with their former employers, the white farm owners, who in turn were perceived to be supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); the allegiance of the vast majority of rural chiefs has been to ZANU-PF (IDMC, August 2008, p.34; Walter Chambati, June 2007).

No more than about two per cent of farm workers have benefited from the fast-track land reform programme by being resettled on land acquired by the state for resettlement purposes (Economist, 19 March 2008). Even they do not have security of tenure, and remain at risk of being forced off the land once more.

Arbitrary evictions in urban areas

Zimbabwe has for many years been plagued by a desperate shortage of housing for people on low incomes. In 1995, the government stated that waiting lists for accommodation indicated a shortage of 600,000 housing units nationwide (UN Economic and Social Council, 25 September 1995, paras.100-101). As a consequence, people were forced to build makeshift structures, often referred to as "backyard extensions" since they were built in the yards of existing houses. While these backyard extensions did not comply with the building regulations, and no urban planning permission was given for these informal homes, local authorities often gave their explicit or tacit approval, and many families lived their undisturbed by the authorities for many years (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, June 2005, p.7).

In May 2005, with little warning, the government of Zimbabwe unleashed Operation Murambatsvina ("clear the filth"), whose official aim was to halt and reverse a process of disorderly and unregulated urbanisation by destroying illegal structures. Well over 100,000 informal homes were destroyed in the course of a few weeks; by July 2005 the UN estimated that approximately 570,000 people had been made homeless by the operation; a number which it warned was still growing due to ongoing evictions and destruction of properties (UN, 18 July 2005, pp.32-34). A simultaneous operation, Operation Restore Order, destroyed market stalls and small food shops.

The evictions were not carried out in accordance with Zimbabwe's obligations under national and international law and thus violated the prohibition on forced evictions and amounted to arbitrary displacement (UN, 18 July 2005, Chapter 6; COHRE/ZLHR, 23 May 2007; HRW, December 2005).

Operation Murambatsvina was by no means the first time that the government forcibly evicted its own citizens in Zimbabwe's towns and cities,

and neither was it the last; urban evictions have continued ever since Operation Murambatsvina, although not on the same scale.

Very few of the victims have found even a semi-permanent solution to their plight. Operation Murambatsvina has resulted in a significant part of Zimbabwe's population lacking a permanent place to stay, and many of the victims have been forced to move from place to place ever since their homes were destroyed in 2005. As a result, many victims are in a worse situation today than they were before Operation Murambatsvina, despite the government's insistence that it acted in victims' best interest by destroying urban dwellings that did not comply with the building regulations.

Today, the victims of Operation Murambatsvina can be divided in four broad categories in terms of the places where they have (temporarily) settled. First, some victims went to rural areas, which many found to be an unsustainable solution as they did not have any livelihoods there, often had no access to land, and had to compete for already limited food, resources and services. At the same time, many families could not afford to move back to the cities because of the desperate shortage of housing there and the resulting increase in rents. Many men had no choice but to go back to the towns and cities in search of employment, while wives and children stayed behind in the rural areas, thus leading to the separation of large numbers of families.

Second, some victims stayed in the towns and cities, often close to where their homes had been, because of livelihood opportunities and access to services. However, in urban areas that were badly affected by Operation Murambatsvina, the housing stock has been drastically reduced: by 2005, the government estimated the urban housing backlog to be one million housing units (OCHA, 30 November 2005, p.9). As a result, many of the Operation's victims now live in atrocious conditions characterised by severe overcrowding. In

many places water and sewerage infrastructure has crumbled under the pressure of too many people, with grave consequences for public health. In some high-density areas people are rebuilding informal homes to replace the ones that were destroyed in 2005. They do so in the full knowledge that their homes might be demolished again.

Third, a number of the Operation's victims are squatting illegally on private or government-owned land; they are at permanent risk of eviction. In some cases, the presence of squatters, while illegal, had been condoned by the authorities prior to Operation Murambatsvina. This did not, however, stop the demolition of the squatters' homes in the course of Operation Murambatsvina. Today, many of the squatters have returned to the sites of their former homes because they have nowhere else to go to, but they now live in much worse structures than the squatter homes that were destroyed in 2005. Having lost everything they possessed, victims do not have the means to rebuild the homes they once occupied.

A final group of victims of Operation Murambatsvina reside in transit camps or holding camps. These camps were created by the government in the immediate aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina. They were meant to provide temporary shelter for people who had been made homeless by the Operation until they had either made arrangements themselves to go to a rural area, or had been provided with government transport to their rural destinations. As with holding camps created by the government after previous eviction campaigns, these holding camps have acquired a semi-permanent nature, and several thousand victims of Operation Murambatsvina continue to live in these camps. With very few exceptions, people in the camps have no security of tenure. Just as previous government-created holding camps were subsequently demolished by the government in the course of Operation Murambatsvina, the people who reside in holding camps today have no guarantees that the govern-

ment will continue to permit them to stay there (IRIN, 7 July 2005).

Arbitrary evictions in mining areas

Many former farm workers who had been deprived of their livelihoods by the fast-track land reform programme turned to informal gold panning as their only alternative source of income. Similarly, petty traders who had been deprived of their market stalls by Operation Restore Order in 2005 also turned to the mines for alternative livelihoods. In November 2006, following the discovery of diamonds in the Chiadzwa area of Marange district in June 2006, the government of Zimbabwe unleashed yet another operation: Operation Chikorokoza Chapera ("no illegal panning"), in the course of which the homes of thousands of informal miners were destroyed (IRIN, 1 May 2008; HRW, June 2009, p.19).

Operation Chikorokoza Chapera attracted less international attention than Operation Murambatsvina, in part because what happened in the mining areas was less visible than what happened in the cities. Nevertheless, Operation Chikorokoza Chapera affected tens of thousands of gold panners, and led to the arrest of more than 25,000 people (IRIN, 1 May 2008).

The victims of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera joined the hundreds of thousands of IDPs in Zimbabwe who have not been able to find a durable solution to their plight. Many of them were already the victims of the fast-track land reform programme or Operation Murambatsvina or both, and they are today in a much worse situation than before Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. Some have built shacks on or near the mines where their homes used to be, and continue to engage in illegal panning, despite the risks that this entails (IDMC, August 2008, section 6).

In October 2008, a month after a power-sharing agreement was signed between ZANU-PF and the two factions of the MDC, the army seized control of the Marange diamond fields in an operation called Operation Hakudzokwi ("no return"). The operation appears to have been designed both to restore a degree of order in the area and to allow loyal army units access to riches at a time when inflation in Zimbabwe was astronomically high and the country was on the brink of bankruptcy. The army committed serious human rights violations in the course of Operation Hakudzokwi (HRW, June 2009; ICG, 3 March 2010).

Government officials and local authorities have repeatedly told communities living on or near the diamond fields in Marange that they will be relocated to make way for mining operations. The communities involved have yet to be consulted about the proposed relocations, and have received no information about what, if any, compensation would be offered to them. Community members have stated that the proposed relocation site in Kondozi is unacceptable, given the lack of infrastructure there (HRW, June 2009, pp.44-46; ZELA, 29 October 2009 and 16 December 2009).

Political violence

While the period leading up to Zimbabwe's elections in March 2008 was generally reported to have passed relatively peacefully, political violence increased dramatically in the run-up to the second round of the presidential elections in June (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 5 May 2008; HRW, 25 April 2008 and June 2008; BBC, 12 June 2008; IRIN, 9 July 2008).

Tens of thousands of people were forced to flee their homes as a result of the violence. Precise figures are not available: in the circumstances that prevailed at the time, it was impossible to survey the numbers of people affected by the violence. The MDC stated that 200,000 of its supporters

had been displaced (BBC, 26 June 2008; ICG, 1 July 2008), while the UN used a significantly lower estimate of 36,000 (OCHA, 16 July 2008).

Independent observers argued that the displacement of thousands of MDC activists and ordinary voters was not merely a by-product of the violence, but was itself part of a systematic attempt to change Zimbabwe's political landscape (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 5 May 2008, p.6; HRW, June 2008, p.46). The BBC coined the phrase "electoral cleansing" to describe ZANU-PF's campaign to drive opposition supporters from the areas where they were registered to vote, thus depriving them of the opportunity to vote for the MDC (BBC, 7 May 2008; see also BBC, 12 June 2008).

The political violence did not die down after the second round of voting; on the contrary, according to the MDC the political violence against its supporters escalated after Robert Mugabe assumed the presidency (having won the election by default, since the MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai had pulled out) (IRIN, 9 July 2008; Telegraph, 8 August 2008; HRW, 12 August 2008).

While most of the people displaced have since been able to return to their homes, specific groups of victims remain in displacement. Some high-profile local MDC activists (and in some cases their relatives) continue to have fears about their personal safety should they return to their homes. Some of the hundreds of women who were raped in the course of the 2008 political violence have been abandoned by their husbands; they have had to seek shelter with their relatives, friends, or women's organisations. A further category of victims have been unable to return home because they have nothing to return to. This includes people whose homes were burnt down in the course of the political violence; people who had their assets and livestock stolen by political opponents, as a result of which they have lost the means to provide for themselves and their families; people who

have been denied access to communal land by traditional leaders for reasons of their (perceived) support for the MDC, as a result of which they are no longer able to grow their own food; and professionals such as teachers (many of whom acted as electoral observers) who were driven out of their jobs by political opponents and who have become dependent on relatives or friends.

Politically-motivated violence has continued also since the formation of the GNU in February 2009, albeit on a lower scale. Much of the violence has been connected to the constitution-making process, with the MDC factions accusing ZANU-PF and its allies of intimidating and beating MDC activists and forcing them into displacement (SW Radio Africa, 23 September 2009, 16 March 2010 and 18 March 2010; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 16 April 2010; Zimbabwe Human Rights Association, 21 April 2010 and 22 April 2010).

National response

Until the formation of the GNU in February 2009, the government's principal response to the displacement crisis in Zimbabwe, which was essentially a crisis of its own making, was to deny the existence of the crisis and to ban all references to internal displacement in the country. Humanitarian actors introduced the phrase "mobile and vulnerable populations" (MVPs) to refer to IDPs instead (IDMC, August 2008).

Since the formation of the GNU, the government's position has evolved, as shown for example by the fact that the 2010 Consolidated Appeal for Zimbabwe refers openly to IDPs for the first time (OCHA, 30 November 2009). Also for the first time, the government participated in a small-scale IDP assessment with the UN in August 2009 (Government of Zimbabwe and UN, February 2010).

In October 2009, at a Special Summit of the African Union in Kampala, President Mugabe was one of five Heads of State to sign the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (also known as the Kampala Convention). The Convention will come into force once it has been ratified by 15 AU member states. Zimbabwe has not yet ratified the Convention; however, President Mugabe's signing of the Convention must be taken as an important indication of Zimbabwe's intent to be bound by it.

The report on the joint IDP assessment contains a number of recommendations to the government, including to implement, together with the humanitarian community, a quantitative survey and profiling of all IDPs in the country; to develop a national IDP policy framework in line with the Kampala Convention; and to start a discussion with stakeholders on the identification of durable solutions for IDPs in Zimbabwe, with IDP participation (Government of Zimbabwe and UN, February 2010, Chapter 6).

Humanitarian access

The Global Political Agreement (GPA) between ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions provided that "all displaced persons shall be entitled to humanitarian and food assistance to enable them to return and settle in their original homes and that social welfare organisations shall be allowed to render such assistance as might be required" (ZANU-PF and the two MDC Formations, 15 September 2008, art. 16(4)(c)).

In practice, however, humanitarian access to IDPs has only slowly improved. The August 2009 joint IDP assessment represented a significant breakthrough in relations between the government and the international humanitarian community on issues related to internal displacement (although NGOs were excluded from the assessment). Nevertheless, in some cases humanitarian organi-

sations have continued to be faced with restrictions on access to IDPs. Access has often had to be negotiated with District Administrators and local authorities on a case-by-case basis, and especially in cases of people displaced as a result of new farm invasions, this access has frequently been denied.

International response

While the cluster approach was formally adopted in Zimbabwe in February 2008, it was not until 2009, after the formation of the GNU, that a protection cluster was finally established under the leadership of UNHCR. A particular feature of the coordination set-up in Zimbabwe is the existence of an IDP sub-cluster of the protection cluster. The existence of this sub-cluster means that there is a tendency for all issues related to IDPs to be referred to the protection cluster, even when the issues at hand are not in fact protection issues but humanitarian issues that should be addressed by other clusters. In recognition of this, the 2010 Consolidated Appeal for Zimbabwe calls upon humanitarian actors to mainstream assistance to displaced communities into their programmes (OCHA, 30 November 2009, p.38).

There is a growing recognition in Zimbabwe that the search for durable solutions for IDPs must be made a priority. This requires a shift away from humanitarian interventions and towards recovery and development interventions. However, a number of obstacles stand in the way of this transition. First, while there are many programmes and frameworks aimed at recovery and development in Zimbabwe (including the Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP); the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), administered by the World Bank; and the Zimbabwe UN Development Assistance Framework (ZUNDAF)), none of these make specific reference to the situation of IDPs and their particular needs in terms of recovery and development interventions.

Zimbabwe: Official acknowledgment of displacement yet to be translated into strategies for durable solutions

Second, since the formation of the GNU in February 2009, most donor governments have adopted a cautious approach; they continue to limit their assistance to Zimbabwe to humanitarian aid (including substantial amounts of food aid), while making development aid conditional on progress in the implementation of the GPA. As a result, it remains difficult to raise funding for interventions that would contribute to long-term solutions for IDPs, including livelihood interventions and permanent housing. At the same time, by early May 2010 only 35 per cent of the funds requested in the 2010 Consolidated Appeal for Zimbabwe had been made available by the donors, with the protection cluster funded at only three per cent.

Note: This is a summary of IDMC's internal displacement profile on Zimbabwe. The full profile is available online [here](#).

Sources:

BBC News, 26 June 2008, 'Zimbabwe Rejects Mandela Rebuke'

BBC News, 12 June 2008, Key Role for Mugabe's Security Chiefs

BBC News, 12 June 2008, Military Involved in Mugabe's Re-election

BBC News, 7 May 2008, Mass challenge over Zimbabwe poll

Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), September 2001, Land, Housing and Property Rights in Zimbabwe

COHRE/ZLHR, 23 May 2007, Operation Murambatsvina: A Crime Against Humanity

Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 16 April 2010, The Daily Catalyst

Food and Agriculture Organization & World Food Program, 18 June 2008, Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe

Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2006, Progress Made So Far in Line with the Current Land Reform Programme

Government of Zimbabwe and United Nations, February 2010, Joint IDP Assessment - Final Report

Human Rights Watch (HRW), June 2009, Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe

Human Rights Watch (HRW), December 2005, Zimbabwe: Evicted and Forsaken: Internally displaced persons in the aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina

Human Rights Watch (HRW), March 2002, Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe

Human Rights Watch (HRW), 25 April 2008, Surge in State-Sponsored Violence

Human Rights Watch (HRW), June 2008, "Bullets for Each of You": State-Sponsored Violence since Zimbabwe's March 29 Elections

Human Rights Watch (HRW), 12 August 2008, "They Beat Me like a Dog": Political Persecution of Opposition Activists and Supporters in Zimbabwe

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), May 2008, Operation Glossary - a guide to Zimbabwe's internal campaigns

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 7 July 2005, Concern that transit camps will become permanent

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 9 July 2008, Political Violence Surges after Mugabe Assumes Presidency

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), August 2008, The Many Faces of Displacement: IDPs in Zimbabwe

International Crisis Group (ICG), July 2008, CrisisWatch No.59

International Crisis Group (ICG), 3 March 2010, Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition

Justice for Agriculture, May 2008, Land, retribution and elections: post-election violence on Zimbabwe's remaining farms 2008

Kay Muir-Leresche, August 1998, Agriculture and Macro-Economic Reforms in Zimbabwe: A Political Economy Perspective

SW Radio Africa, 18 March 2010, ZANU PF faces new accusations of re-oiling its violence machinery

Sources:

SW Radio Africa, 16 March 2010, Billy Rautenbach Fingering in Escalation of Violence in Manicaland

SW Radio Africa, 23 September 2009, Crisis group warns that ZANU PF violence is on the rise

Tapera Knox Chitiyo, May 2000, Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe's Land and War Veterans' Debate

Telegraph, 8 August 2008, Zimbabwe: Robert Mugabe seeks dominant role in coalition government

The Economist, 19 March 2008, Coming to a Crunch

United Nations, 18 July 2005, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2002, Zimbabwe, Land Reform and Resettlement: Assessment and Suggested Framework for the Future (Interim Mission Report)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), September 2008, Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe

United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 25 September 1995, Initial State Party Report (E/1990/5/Add.28)

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 November 2009, Consolidated Appeal for Zimbabwe 2010

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 16 July 2008, Weekly Situation Report: Issue Number 15

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 November 2005, UN Consolidated Appeal for Zimbabwe 2006

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 10 December 2007, Zimbabwe: Consolidated Appeal

Walter Chambati, June 2007, Impact of FTLRP on Farm Workers and Labour Processes in Zimbabwe

ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations, 15 September 2008, Agreement between ZANU-PF and the two MDC Formations on Resolving the Challenges Facing Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association (ZELA), 16 December 2009, ZELA Assists Members of Chiadzwa Community Development Trust to Take Legal Action

Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association (ZELA), 29 October 2009, Press Statement on the Situation in Chiadzwa Diamond Mining Area

Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), 22 April 2010, Political pressure mounts on Masvingo residents

Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), 21 April 2010, MDC supporters suffer silently, without police protection

Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, June 2005, Order out of Chaos, or Chaos out of Order? A Preliminary Report on Operation "Murambatsvina"

Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (HRF), 5 May 2008, If you can't join them, beat them! Post-election violence in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC), June 2007, Food Security and Nutrition Assessment

About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people.

In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org.

Contact:

Nina M. Birkeland

Head of Monitoring and Advocacy

Tel.: +41 (0)22 795 07 34

Email: nina.birkeland@nrc.ch

Katinka Ridderbos

Country Analyst

Tel.: +41 22 799 07 17

Email: katinka.ridderbos@nrc.ch

IDMC

Norwegian Refugee Council

Chemin de Balexert 7-9

1219 Geneva, Switzerland

www.internal-displacement.org

Tel: +41 22 799 0700

Fax: +41 22 799 0701