

12 October 2007

Sudan: Outlook for IDPs remains bleak

In southern Sudan, around 140,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) returned to their homes in the first six months of 2007, adding to more than one million IDPs estimated to have returned since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the central government and the southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. The CPA marked the end of the 20-year civil war estimated to have caused the death of up to two million people and the internal displacement of up to four million. Despite improved security, a number of unfulfilled provisions, such as the withdrawal of central government troops from a contested oil-rich border area, may still lead to renewed war and displacement.

In western Sudan's Darfur region, ongoing conflict has caused 2.2 million people to be internally displaced since 2003, including almost 250,000 since the beginning of 2007. The conflict has also forced more than 300,000 people into neighbouring countries, in particular Chad. Several hundreds of thousands of civilians have died in what has been described as "the world's worst humanitarian crisis". Following concerted international pressure the central government has accepted the deployment of a 26,000-strong United Nations/African Union military force mandated to protect the civilian population.

Despite the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and numerous international political and humanitarian initiatives to stop human rights abuses and mitigate the consequences of forced displacement, the civilian population, including IDPs residing in camps, continues to be subjected to widespread killings, rapes, looting and other human rights abuses. Humanitarian conditions in the hundreds of IDP camps are worsening, and malnutrition rates are above emergency levels. Access for humanitarian organisations has worsened, with over a million people out of reach of urgently needed assistance as a result of deteriorating security conditions and denial of access to IDP camps.

The overall IDP figures in Sudan, particularly outside Darfur, are unreliable and there are few mechanisms to identify the specific forced migration patterns and protection needs of IDPs who are returning without the support of state institutions or international organisations. However the total is widely believed to be at least 4.5 million, making Sudan's IDP crisis the largest in the world.

Background and estimates of overall numbers

In 1956, the British-Egyptian colonial administration handed over the country to a northern elite which, despite internal tensions and competition, has consolidated pre-colonial disparities between the centre and the periphery. Northerners have taken advantage of control of the state structures inherited from the colonial administration to resume a pre-colonial policy of repression of minorities through cultural, political and economic marginalisation.

Consequently, civil wars have ravaged Sudan practically throughout the post-independence period, with various rebel groups in different parts of the country taking up arms against the Khartoum government. Forced displacement in the various regions of Sudan has mainly resulted directly or indirectly from fighting between government troops and their allied local militias on the one hand and various insurgent groups on the other. This conflict pattern has been further complicated by governments or rebel groups in neighbouring countries backing the different warring parties within Sudan.

Despite the scale of Sudan's displacement crisis, no systematic mechanisms to monitor population movements have been set up in the country and most figures are based on estimates and projections. As of September 2007, there was no official consensus on the overall number of IDPs in Sudan. With these reservations in mind, the UN in Sudan estimated over 2.1 million IDPs in Darfur as of July 2007, and (as of January 2007) over 2.2 million in northern Sudan, 245,000 in Southern Kordofan and

Blue Nile, and an unknown number in southern Sudan (Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator, 4 September 2007; UN Workplan 2007). The OCHA Regional Office for Central and East Africa, in its Displaced Populations Report, January - June 2007, uses an estimate of 4,465,000 IDPs for all of Sudan (OCHA, 30 June 2007).

Southern Sudan – civil war gives way to troubled peace

The north-south conflict which broke out upon the departure of the colonial administration in 1956 is by far the most devastating and longest running of the conflicts in Sudan. Broadly speaking, the north is led by Arab Muslims, with cultural, economic, political and historical ties to other Arab states, and the south by black Africans, predominantly Christian, with ties to central and east Africa. Exploitation of the south by northerners, including the trade in southerners as slaves, existed before the signing of a British-Egyptian agreement which largely carved out the current state borders. The colonial administration isolated the southern provinces of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile from northern influence, without attempting to modernise their economy or political system, instead investing far more in the north, seeking to modernise and liberalise political institutions in accordance with British standards. The result was a Sudan of two tiers on the departure of the colonial administration in 1956: the economically and politically stronger Arab and Muslim north, and the isolated, underdeveloped and less populous black African south.

In 1983, only a few years after oil was discovered in southern provinces, the central government retracted the autonomy the south had achieved in a 1972 peace agreement and imposed Islamic Sharia law nationwide. In response, southern troops mutinied and formed the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to fight against the Arabisation and Islamisation of Sudan, regain the lost autonomy and increase the southerners' share of political and economic power within a unified Sudan or eventually in a separate secular state. The prospects for a peaceful resolution of the conflict were dramatically reduced in 1989 after a coup against the government by the National Islamic Front (NIF). The NIF, led by the current president Omer al-Bashir, revoked the constitution, banned opposition parties and embarked on a repressive Islamisation campaign.

These measures fuelled opposition in the south, and plunged the country into prolonged conflict which caused the death of an estimated two million people and uprooted an estimated four million, including around 500,000 refugees who fled to neighbouring countries, in the largest forced displacement crisis in the world. A majority of the people forced to flee were southerners associated with or supportive of the SPLM/A; about half of them fled north from the war zone in the south and mostly settled around the capital Khartoum (UN, 30 November 2004).

In January 2005 the two parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which marked the official end of the conflict, but has yet to lead to sustainable peace or a durable solution for the millions of forcibly displaced people.

The CPA provided for an autonomous south with its own constitution, government and army for an initial six-year period leading up to a referendum to be held in 2011 on the final status of the south. The agreement also provided for the inclusion of the SPLM/A in the new Government of National Unity (referred to as "the central government" in this report, the GNU includes regional representation but the NIF retains executive control), inaugurated in July 2005, as well as the inclusion of representatives of the north in the new government of southern Sudan which was sworn in in October 2005. The planned 2011 referendum has made the return and reintegration process more than a socio-economic issue (ODI, 12 August 2007, p.3). The millions of uprooted people make up an important constituency and the votes of those who decide to return may be decisive in the referendum.

Contentious issues such as the demarcation of the north-south boundary, which would determine the distribution of income from the border area's huge oil reserves, remain unresolved (ICG, 26 July 2007). North Sudanese troops failed to comply with a July 2007 deadline to withdraw from the contested areas, as stipulated in the CPA, fuelling discontent in the south. While the CPA divides the oil income on a 50-50 basis, the government of southern Sudan has no means of measuring its distribution. Frequently contradictory policies towards Sudan by Western and Arab states, China and Russia have also undermined the implementation of the CPA and reduced the prospects for sustainable peace (ICG, 26 July 2007).

Return movements and reintegration prospects in the south

The period following the CPA has not led to the expected mass return of IDPs, particularly from the north to the south. Nonetheless, in the first six months of 2007 around 140,000 IDPs have returned from areas of displacement in the north to southern Sudan in addition to more than a million IDPs who remained in the south and returned home spontaneously since the signing of the CPA (ODI, 12 August 2007 p.11; UNMIS, July 2007; VOA, 20 July 2006; IRIN, 12 January 2006). As a result, the capacity of many of the receiving communities is stretched. A study of the reintegration process in the Southern Kordofan and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states found insufficient capacity to provide services, job opportunities and governance in the face of the large number of returnees (ODI, 12 August 2007 p.3). According to the study, these challenges are linked to and exacerbated by tensions between pastoralists and farmers, agro-pastoralist communities and returnees, farmers and traders and between returnees and sharecroppers on mechanised farms.

The different life experiences of the IDPs from Khartoum and those who stayed in the south present both concern and opportunity. IDPs who lived in urban areas are reported to have brought back the skills needed to build houses and infrastructure. On the other hand, their urban experiences have in many cases resulted in life expectations that are hard to realise in the rural south, particularly for returning young people.

While there are some rough estimates of the numbers of IDPs in the north, their socio-economic conditions and return intentions, very little is known about

IDP movements and numbers within the south. As of September 2007, the UN was planning for the return of 400,000 IDPs or more from the north to the south during 2008, but had not arrived at any planning figures for IDP returns within the southern regions (IOM, September 2007; UNMIS email, 5 September 2007). There is also a great deal of uncertainty related to a frequently-used figure of two million IDPs in Khartoum. The figure dates from the 1990s, and includes people living in IDP squatter areas and among the resident population, but has not been verified since then. According to a survey conducted by IOM in 2005, at least 36 per cent of Khartoum's IDPs intended to stay in Khartoum (UN 2007 Workplan, p.295). The number of southern Sudanese refugees in the neighbouring countries is better known. Out of a total of around 500,000 southern Sudanese who fled to neighbouring countries, 157,000 have returned, more than 90,000 spontaneously, almost 60,000 organised by UNHCR and the rest in the category of "self-assisted" (UNHCR; 22 July 2007).

Humanitarian agencies have deployed staff to monitor return movements, and gather information about the number, gender, age and destination of returnees along routes of return (IOM, July 2007). UN assistance to IDPs returning in organised convoys includes food rations for three months, cooking utensils, agricultural tools, mine protection kits as well as micro-credit schemes to support the local economy. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by reports of IDPs returning to camps in Khartoum, humanitarian assistance alone may not be sufficient. There is a clear risk that lack of investment in infrastructure and livelihood opportunities in the south could derail the

process of reintegration of IDPs and refugees, and put the overall peace process in jeopardy (ODI, 12 September 2007).

In the dry season from the end of 2005 to the beginning of 2006, in an apparent response to low return figures, the government of southern Sudan and various state authorities in the south started helping IDPs to return independently of the UN by providing transport to the south. In total more than 300,000 people had been assisted outside the UN system as of April 2006, according to an informed estimate (UNMIS, 30 April 2006). But further to UN objections on its lack of methodology and coordination, and its failure to ensure reintegration, the return assistance ended and no similar programmes were reported from November 2006 to April/May 2007.

In February 2007, southern and central authorities, in collaboration with the UNMIS and the International Organization on Migration, started for the first time to assist and organise returns to the south by providing transport, food, shelter and water from the departure centres in Khartoum to the final destinations (IOM, 1 February 2007). The institutional framework to support the organised returns was designed with the capacity to support millions of returning people, but the overwhelming majority of the IDPs who have returned have done so on their own.

While the return process itself poses tremendous logistical challenges such as enormous distances, high transportation costs, and mined and flooded roads, the reintegration process is a source of particular concern for the international agencies involved in the implementation

of the CPA. Very many remaining IDPs, particularly in Khartoum, are wary of the conditions in their home areas. Their concerns are not unfounded; the civil war devastated the southern regions, leaving almost no schools, health clinics or water and sanitation facilities intact. In addition, after many years of displacement, the restitution of IDPs' land and property poses serious challenges.

Other problems in the return and reintegration process are inherent in the duration of the displacement. Many of the IDPs have spent most of their lives away from their place of origin, while their children have become second- or third-generation IDPs with few ties to the south and correspondingly few incentives to move. Thus to talk of "return and reintegration" for people moving to the south for the first time may misrepresent the process and its challenges.

The Khartoum government has forcibly relocated an estimated 900,000 IDPs and urban squatters since 1989. It announced in October 2005 a decision to resume the demolition of IDP camps and squatter areas in Khartoum after the end of the rainy season, and up to May 2006 forcibly relocated IDPs to resettlement areas on the outskirts of the city in what it described as ongoing urban development efforts (UN-OCHA, 1 April 2006; IRIN, 7 October 2005). While the government has plans to urbanise and upgrade the new settlements, these areas in most cases do not even provide the most basic services, and it is feared the relocation will lead to a major humanitarian crisis and push even more people to return to the south prematurely. Meanwhile, seemingly in preparation for the census planned for February 2008, the government of southern Sudan strongly and

openly encourages IDPs to return to the south, but without a clear focus on the sustainability of the process (SV, 21 May 2006).

The choice between staying in the north and returning south presents IDPs with a grim dilemma. Exposed to forced relocation by the government and escalating tensions related to the conflict in Darfur, many may opt prematurely to return. However, despite the pressure from the Khartoum authorities and the dire conditions in the camps around Khartoum, some of the returning IDPs have found the conditions worse in their areas of origin and have decided to go back again to the squalid conditions in the north. The main reasons for this are a lack of livelihood opportunities, insecurity, extortion, drought and lack of services (UN briefing, 18 October 2005). In one of the southern states, global acute malnutrition rates exceeded 20 per cent in 2006, but reportedly more as a result of inadequate health services than lack of food (Care 2006).

Darfur – protection challenges mount up

The conflict in the western Darfur region can be traced to the early 1980s when drought and desertification led to intensified competition for scarce resources and ensuing tensions between nomads and agro-pastoralists. These were further fuelled in 1988 when the government decided to arm the nomadic groups against an incursion by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A) in Darfur. This move disrupted the local balance of power and rendered local resolution mechanisms obsolete. Most of the government-supported perpetrators of the

current violence and displacement in Darfur come from tribes that were armed to fight the SPLM/A in the late 1980s (Sean O'Fahey, 3 August 2004).

In the three federal states of Darfur a rebellion erupted in February 2003 in response to the chronic scarcity of resources, decades of underdevelopment and the lack of government protection against recurrent raids by nomads. The negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the south were also reported to have influenced the eruption of the rebellion in Darfur. Rebel leaders in Darfur saw the progress in the north-south negotiations as confirmation that violence would bring the government to the negotiating table (ICI, 25 January 2005). Heavy fighting ensued between on the one hand the two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement / Army (SLM / SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and government troops and nomad "Janjaweed" militia on the other.

The government counter-insurgency campaign has included air and ground attacks, but has relied mainly on local Janjaweed groups. The government offensive has been accompanied by deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, involving massacres, rape, torture, maiming, abductions, child recruitment and systematic looting and burning of villages, denial of humanitarian assistance and access to education for children. Both government officials and the Janjaweed militias have been deemed responsible by a UN-appointed inquiry commission for having participated "directly in the commission of an international crime in Darfur" (ICID, 25 January 2005, p.135).

In May 2006, international pressure led to the Darfur Peace Agreement, but this had little effect on the ground. Only one of the rebel factions signed the agreement and fighting has continued unabated. The warring parties are reportedly continuing to systematically target civilians, following the same brutal pattern of behaviour as before the agreement (Watchlist, April 2007).

The scorched-earth tactics used by the government and its allies had directly or indirectly displaced an estimated 2.2 million people as of July 2007, including an estimated 170,000 displaced between January and June 2007 (UNMIS, 1 July 2007). Another 230,000 have fled into neighbouring Chad where international agencies are working to deliver protection and assistance under extremely difficult conditions (UNHCR, 5 January 2007; 14 July 2006). Militias supported by the Sudanese government have conducted cross-border attacks in Chad, forcing thousands of Chadians to flee internally and even into the war-torn Darfur region (Reuters, 6 July 2006; UNHCR, 14 July 2006).

Splits within rebel groups have led to inter-ethnic fighting and human rights abuses, and exacerbated the humanitarian situation of IDPs. The desperate situation for the displaced people in the camps and the recurrent raids, looting, systematic rapes and humiliation which they face have increasingly fuelled the cycle of violence and the politicisation of ethnicity. Scarcity of water and firewood and the extra burden on host community has fuelled animosity against those forced to flee their homes on both sides of the border (UNSC, 15 June 2006).

In response to the failure of a 7,000-strong African Union peacekeeping mission to protect the civilian population including the more than 2.2 million IDP residing in camps, the UN Security Council resolved in June 2007 to dispatch a 26,000-strong joint UN-African Union force (UNAMID) with a mandate to protect civilians by military means (UN SC, 27 June 2007, 30 August 2007). The force is expected to be fully operational by mid-2008, but the Sudanese central government has only reluctantly accepted its deployment and may seek to put obstacles in its way. Meanwhile, in September 2007, unidentified forces attacked an African Union base in Haskanita, South Darfur, killing ten peacekeepers and civilian police (HRW, 1 October 2007).

The full deployment of the joint force is expected to put an end to continued attacks on IDPs and humanitarian workers and may help to create leverage for renewed peace talks scheduled for October 2007 (IRIN, 9 September 2007). However, while the UN and AU prepare for the UNAMID deployment, armed groups continue to frequently harass humanitarian workers and loot and hijack their vehicles. This has resulted in reduced access to IDP camps and an ever-worsening humanitarian situation despite an agreement on humanitarian access signed by the warring parties in June 2007.

Eastern Sudan – a little-known displacement crisis

In eastern Sudan, hostilities have abated between government forces and the Eastern Front alliance of the Beja Congress and Free Lions rebel groups, following a peace agreement that included rebel commanders in the central gov-

ernment and allocated funding to develop the eastern region (Sudan Tribune, 20 August 2007). Grievances have been accumulated over decades as a result of social, political and economical exclusion. The region has among the highest mortality and illiteracy rates in the country and almost 20 per cent global acute malnutrition rates, compared to 12 per cent in Darfur (ICG, January 2006, p. 25).

Access to health facilities is extremely limited with most health centres concentrated in Port Sudan. The impoverishment of the region has been exacerbated by mechanised agricultural schemes and the mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan, according to a study on the causes and consequences of under-development in eastern Sudan (Pantaulino, September 2005). Animosity against the central government is particularly strong among young Beja people, many of them destitute and unemployed, notably in Port Sudan.

In late 2004 and early 2005 accumulated grievances led to bloody confrontations and the government deployed thousands of troops to quell the uprising and the potentially devastating threat to the oil installations in the region (Sudan Tribune, 2 October 2005; Justice Africa, 23 February 2005). The Khartoum government has frequently hindered the access of humanitarian organisations to the region, and reliable IDP numbers are hard to come by. Yet UNHCR was reported to provide food to around 25,000 out of more than an estimated 100,000 IDPs in the eastern states (UN 2007 Workplan).

National and international responses to the various conflicts

The huge combined response of the international community, represented by UN agencies, the Security Council, private and public aid organisations, the African Union and national governments, has mitigated the humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Darfur and contributed to the return and reintegration of uprooted people in the south. In June 2007, there were more than 11,500 aid workers in the Darfur region (UNMIS, 1 July 2007). The UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions on Sudan, issued two presidential statements in response to the various national conflicts and established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to support the implementation of the CPA. The African Union has deployed troops to protect the resident population and IDP camps in Darfur, and international pressure led to the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006.

The very magnitude of the crisis in Darfur and the challenges in the south has exceeded the capacity of the various international institutions. The return and reintegration process in the south have been hampered and exacerbated by problems either beyond the control of the particular organisations or inherent in their working methods. By way of example, World Bank procedures and negotiations between the Bank and the UN have slowed down the implementation of reintegration projects (ODI September 2007 p.12).

Yet, as outlined above, these efforts have only delayed or alleviated the consequences of the human rights violations inflicted on the civilian population by the warring parties and their humanitar-

ian conditions. Escalation of inter-ethnic fighting in Darfur as well as attacks against IDPs, resident populations and humanitarian workers have hindered access to the IDP camps and worsened the humanitarian conditions in the camps (UNMIS, 20 August 2007). The return and reintegration process of IDPs to the south is slow, and has potential to lead to a new conflict if the outstanding issues such as the demarcation of border areas and the withdrawal of troops are delayed (ICG, 27 July 2007).

The delivery of humanitarian assistance in Darfur and recovery efforts in the south have been hampered not only by logistical challenges such as a long rainy season, national armed groups and bureaucratic obstacles set up by the government in Khartoum, but also by rebel groups from neighbouring Chad and Uganda. For example, the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has a long history of causing widespread insecurity in southern Sudan, killing aid workers and local civilians (IRIN, 26 April 2006). Peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA – a long-time ally of the Khartoum government in its fight against the SPLM/A – were stalled as of September 2007 over issues related to the indictment of the rebel leaders by the International Criminal Court (IRIN, 26 September 2007) as well as reconciliation and reintegration of LRA members and compensation for victims. The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) set up by SPLM/A in 1985 to coordinate and facilitate humanitarian assistance has had limited impact. Little has changed with the formation of the government of southern Sudan which, though supportive, is far from being in command of the means and institutional capacity to re-

spond adequately to the massive needs of displaced and returning people.

The central government on the other hand may have the resources, but lacks the will to protect and assist displaced populations. In Darfur, for example, the government's continued support of the Janjaweed militias responsible for displacement and harassment of IDPs lends a hollow ring to any expression of commitment to solving the displacement crisis.

Although the the central government set up the Humanitarian Aid Commission in 1995 to protect and assist IDPs, the forced demolition of camps in Khartoum and the attacks on IDPs in Darfur continue. While the presence of thousands of aid workers resulted in increased access and improved conditions in the IDP camps at the outset of the crisis, the escalation of the violence following the peace agreement of May 2006 not only jeopardised the humanitarian operations in the area, but also the fragile achievements of the CPA in the run-up to the 2011 referendum on the status of southern Sudan.

Note: This is a summary of the IDMC's country profile of the situation of internal displacement in Sudan. The full country profile is available online [here](#) .

Sources:

BlackElectorate.com, 3 August 2004, "Asking The Right Questions About Darfur, Sudan"

Human Rights Watch (HRW), September 2007, Darfur 2007, Chaos by Design: Peacekeeping Challenges for AMIS and UNAMID

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 7 October 2005, SUDAN: Khartoum destruction triggers southern returns

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 January 2006, SUDAN: Interview with Bob Turner, UNMIS head of Returns, Reintegration and Recovery

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 18 September 2007, Thousands more flee violence in Darfur - UN

International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 25 January 2005, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 Geneva

International Crisis Group (ICG), 17 March 2006, TO SAVE DARFUR

International Crisis Group (ICG), 26 July 2007, A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan

International Organization for Migration (IOM), July 2007, IOM Sudan Newsletter, Vol. 15, June/July 2007

International Organization for Migration (IOM), 27 September 2006, IDP Intentions Survey North Sudan 2006

International Organization for Migration (IOM), 21 August 2007, Tracking of Spontaneous Returnees in Sudan January to June 2007

International Organization for Migration (IOM), 10 November 2006, IOM Newsletter

Justice Africa, 23 February 2005, Prospects for Peace in Sudan Briefing

Office of the UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator, 4 September 2007, Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 28 - Situation as of 1 July 2007

Overseas Development Institute (ODI), August 2007, The Long Road Home: Opportunities and Obstacles to the Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees Returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas

Reuters, 6 March 2007, U.N. seeks to speed return of refugees to S. Sudan

Sara Pantuliano, September 2005, Comprehensive Peace? Causes and Consequences of Underdevelopment and Instability in Eastern Sudan

Sudan Tribune, 2 October 2005, Eastern Sudan conflict threatens peace in the south

Sudan Vision, 21 May 2006, Darfur: Inside Al-Siraif Camp

United Nations, 30 November 2004, 2005 United Nations and Partners: Work Plan for the Sudan

United Nations (UN), 2007, Work Plan for Sudan 2007

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 5 January 2007, Displacement from deteriorating security in eastern Chad tops 100,000

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 22 July 2007, Sudan Operations. Sudan Situation Update 76.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 8 August 2006, Chad: UNHCR concerned about the safety of humanitarian workers

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 24 May 2007, An overview of UN activity in the South Published by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 17 September 2007, Sudan Humanitarian Overview, August 2007

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), June 2006, Progress Return Reintegration Recovery Report January to April 2006

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 3 April 2006, UNMIS protests

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 14 October 2005, Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 16 May 2006, SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSES AFRICAN UNION DECISION ON NEED FOR CONCRETE STEPS IN TRANSITION TO UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN DARFUR

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 28 July 2006, Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 20 August 2007, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 15 June 2006, Security Council Told Recent Mission to Sudan Successful, Although Agreement Not Reached on Transfer of Peacekeeping to UN

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 June 2007, Sudan Humanitarian Overview 1 May-30 June 2007

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), April 2006, Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 23

Voice of America (VOA), 20 July 2006, Southern Sudan: Refugees and Returnees

Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, April 2007, Sudan's Children at a Crossroads: An Urgent Need for Protection

About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org.

Media contact:

Jens-Hagen Eschenbächer

Head of Monitoring and Advocacy Department

Tel.: +41 (0)22 799 07 03

Email: jens.eschenbaecher@nrc.ch

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

Norwegian Refugee Council

Chemin de Balxert 7-9

1219 Geneva, Switzerland

www.internal-displacement.org

Tel: +41 22 799 0700

Fax: +41 22 799 0701