Section: Overview
Sub-section: Overview
Prevailing insecurity blocking solutions for IDPs
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Around 170,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Chad and living in 38 camps in mid-2010, as a result of internal armed conflict, inter-ethnic violence over land and natural resources, and attacks by bandits against civilians. The majority of internally displaced people (IDPs) had little or no means of sustaining themselves, making humanitarian assistance vital. Chad also hosts 270,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps along the eastern border with Sudan, and 81,000 Central African refugees in 11 camps along the southern border with CAR.
Ongoing protection monitoring of IDP camps has found the main protection risks of IDPs to be insecurity, circulation of small arms in camps, and violence against women including domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation (FGM). Displaced children have also faced a range of threats. In IDP camps they have had limited access to primary education and no chance of further schooling. In June 2010, Chad was one of six African countries that signed the N’Djamena Declaration to end the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups.
Since 2008, more than 30,000 IDPs have returned to their villages of origin. However, most have been forced to return by lack of access to land and lack of income-generating activities in IDP camps. While significant return movements were expected in 2010, the scheduled withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops from Chad makes it unlikely that conditions for the sustainable return of IDPs will be in place in the near future.
The government has taken steps to respond to the situation of IDPs, but their impact has been limited. In 2007, it established a national committee to assist IDPs, the Comité national d’assistance aux personnes déplacées (CNAPD), but it has limited resources and staff, and has delivered only sporadic assistance. The government has yet to enact national legislation to protect IDPs.
Background and causes of displacement
Of the 11.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Africa, three million live in the regional “conflict triangle” of eastern Chad, Darfur, and northern Central African Republic (CAR). The triangle is characterised by inter-related armed conflicts, high levels of insecurity despite the presence of international peacekeeping troops, widespread availability of small arms, and forced displacement within and across borders. In 2010, Chad, Sudan, and CAR were included in the list of the world’s ten most failed states, with Chad at number two after Somalia (The Fund for Peace, 21 June 2010).
From 2004, the war in neighbouring Darfur caused an influx of 270,000 refugees into eastern Chad. It also brought Darfuri rebels from the same Zaghawa ethnic group as Chad’s President Idriss Deby. His willingness to let them operate from bases inside Chad spurred the government of Sudan to allow Chadian rebels to operate from within Darfur. The two governments have accused each other of harbouring and funding the other’s armed opposition groups (OCHA, 21 June 2009). They have waged a proxy war in which these groups have carried out the actual fighting (Small Arms Survey, April 2008).
With these tensions as a backdrop, internal armed conflict erupted in Chad in 2006 after Deby changed the constitution in order to run for a third term. Chadian rebels based in Darfur accused him of limiting government and military posts to members of his minority ethnic group, and of using oil revenues to bolster the armed forces, instead of investing in social services and infrastructure to develop the country (ICG, 26 August 2009). Deby was re-elected in 2006, but the results were contested by the political opposition which boycotted the election, and which had never accepted the legitimacy of Deby’s initial rise to power by means of a military coup in 1990. Attempted coups in 2006, 2008, and 2009 highlighted the failure of efforts to consolidate peace in Chad (OCHA, 21 June 2009).
Inter-ethnic violence over land and natural resources, and attacks by bandits against civilians have also caused internal displacement in eastern Chad. Sudanese Janjaweed militias carried out cross-border raids against Chadian villages in 2006 and 2007, exploiting long-standing land disputes among ethnic groups. They perpetrated human rights abuses including massacres, rape, looting and burning of villages, and were referenced as the primary cause of displacement (HRW, June 2009). Chad’s military strategy of concentrating troops at key entry points along the border left villages within Chad without protection (AI, 28 June 2006).
While inter-ethnic violence has decreased considerably since 2007, it has been replaced by widespread attacks against civilians, including IDPs, refugees and humanitarian workers, by bandits and criminal gangs known as “
coupeurs de route” who have acted with total impunity. These criminal attacks have multiplied despite the presence of European Union forces, UN peacekeeping troops, and Chadian police units tasked with protecting civilians.
Notwithstanding the deployment of international troops and the signing of various peace agreements aimed at resolving the country’s internal armed conflict, the causes of internal displacement have not ended. With UN peacekeeping troops scheduled to withdraw by the end of 2010, a worsening food security crisis that has already affected two million people in Chad (WFP, 22 June 2010), severe limits to the access and capacity of humanitarian organisations, and a government committed to military spending rather than social development, it is unlikely that conditions for the sustainable return, integration or resettlement of IDPs will be in place in the near future.
Peacekeeping operations
In response to growing levels of insecurity and human rights abuses in eastern Chad, the UN Security Council authorised the creation of MINURCAT, the UN Mission in CAR and Chad, in 2007. It was mandated to help improve Chad’s justice system and monitor the human rights situation. At the same time the European Union (EU) deployed a force known as EUFOR to protect Chadian IDPs and Sudanese refugees, safeguard humanitarian operations, and help restore stability.
EUFOR was largely unable to ensure security in the absence of government forces (HRW, June 2009), and ill-equipped for the task of combating criminal gangs (IRIN, 16 May 2008). EUFOR was replaced in March 2009 by MINURCAT troops with an extended one-year mandate (UNSC, 14 January 2009). However, despite authorisation to deploy 5,200 troops, MINURCAT never reached more than half operational capacity (UNSC, 14 October 2009). This was due to lack of funds and problems in the acquisition and transportation of equipment by troop-contributing countries.
MINURCAT was also commissioned to train a specialised Chadian police force, known as the
Détachement intégré de sécurité or DIS, to provide security in IDP and refugee camps and patrol main towns in eastern Chad. As of September 2009, MINURCAT had trained over 800 DIS officers (UNSC, 14 October 2009). To better address issues of gender-based violence, the DIS recruited and trained a group of 80 female officers (OCHA, 30 November 2009). However, a lack of capacity and resources resulted in permanent DIS posts being set up only in refugee camps. This left most IDP camps unpatrolled, and called into question the impact of the group of female DIS officers on the safety of displaced women and girls (PHR, May 2009). Furthermore, humanitarian organisations have voiced serious concerns about the conduct of DIS officers in light of reported abuse (AI, September 2009).
In early 2010, President Deby called for the replacement of MINURCAT’s military component by national security forces that would take responsibility for the protection of civilians in eastern Chad (ISN, 18 May 2010). Deby stressed that the force had been slow to deploy and had failed to protect civilians or build promised infrastructure projects. In May 2010, in adopting Resolution 1923, the UN Security Council approved the withdrawal from Chad of all MINURCAT troops and civilian components by the end of 2010.
Peace agreements
Facilitated by the EU, the Government of Chad and the political opposition signed an electoral reform agreement in August 2007 to oversee the legislative and presidential elections scheduled for November 2010. In July 2009, the Government and a coalition of three rebel groups signed a peace agreement in Tripoli under the sponsorship of the Libyan government (ReliefWeb, 26 July 2009). In both cases, the agreements excluded certain armed insurgents. Critics have highlighted the need for inclusive political negotiation between the Government and all opposition groups, both armed and unarmed, if the internal political crisis and armed conflict are to be resolved (Enough, February 2008).
International observers have increasingly expressed concern about Libya’s strong influence over Chad’s affairs, despite welcoming its involvement in the past. President Gaddafi has publicly opposed the EU and UN peacekeeping presence in Chad and is thought to be supporting several rebel groups (ICG, 23 March 2010).
Sudan and Chad have broken diplomatic ties on more than one occasion, and none of the numerous peace agreements which they have agreed have succeeded. The two most recent were the Dakar Agreement of March 2008 and the Doha Agreement of May 2009. Relations between the countries have improved since a meeting of the presidents in January 2010, when Deby traveled to Khartoum for the first time in six years. The countries agreed to stop arming or sheltering each other’s insurgent groups, and to deploy a joint force along their common border to end the presence of rebels on each other’s territories (ReliefWeb, 17 June 2010).
Following this pledge, the Government of Sudan signed a truce with the most powerful Sudanese rebel group in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement or JEM (UNSC, 29 April 2010). It was brokered by the Government of Chad in N’Djamena and formally signed in Doha (Irish Times, 22 Feb 2010). Chad’s participation in the talks is significant, as Deby has been accused of supporting JEM, whose members are from his Zaghawa ethnic group. Further steps to normalise relations between Sudan and Chad have included the reopening of the border between the two countries and renewed commitment to security arrangements and border monitoring.
Food security crisis
The World Food Programme estimates that two million Chadians, including IDPs, are facing severe food shortages. Changing weather patterns led to a serious drought in 2009, crippling local farmers and resulting in a 34 per cent fall in agricultural production and the loss of 780,000 cattle during the year (WFP, 2 March 2010). The UN has predicted that food insecurity will affect up to 18 per cent of the population (Reuters, 25 February 2010), with a potential to initiate new displacements in the country (IRIN, 9 March 2010).
A nutrition survey of children under the age of five conducted by Action Against Hunger (ACF) in December 2009 found 29 per cent underweight. This is almost double the emergency threshold set by the World Health Organization at 15 per cent (IRIN, 9 March 2010). UNICEF has requested an additional $9.5 million to respond rapidly and adequately to children affected by malnutrition (OCHA, 4 June 2010).
In January 2010, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated US$3.8 to humanitarian organisations in Chad to respond to the food and nutrition crisis (CERF, April 2010).
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Latest displacement figures
As of July 2010, there were around 170,000 IDPs (OCHA, 4 June 2010) living in 38 camps in eastern Chad (UNSC, 29 April 2010). The majority of IDPs have little or no means of sustaining themselves, making humanitarian assistance vital (OCHA, 30 November 2009). The number had fallen slightly from the highest number of IDPs reported to date by the UN: 185,000 in mid-2008 (OCHA, 9 June 2008). These figures translate roughly into one in five of the local population in eastern Chad being internally displaced (Oxfam, April 2009). No new internal displacements were reported in 2009 or to date in 2010.
Chad also hosts 270,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps along the eastern border with Sudan, and 81,000 Central African refugees in 11 camps along the southern border with CAR (UNHCR, 2010).
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Protection and assistance needs of IDPs
Ongoing protection monitoring of IDP camps conducted by UNHCR and partner NGOs found the main protection risks of IDPs to be insecurity, circulation of small arms in camps, and violence against women including domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation (FGM). Domestic violence and FGM were the two most frequent types of violence against women in IDP camps (OCHA, 4 May 2009). MINURCAT also documented cases of women and girls facing rape and other forms of sexual violence by members of the Chadian army and other armed groups, including militias (UNSC, 29 April 2010). However, the lack of comprehensive data and information makes it difficult to determine whether this is a systematic feature of the conflict in Chad (UNSC, 13 April 2010).
Displaced children have also faced a range of threats. In IDP camps they have had limited access to primary education and no chance of further schooling. One of the main problems is the lack of qualified school teachers. UNICEF and partners including the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) and
Première Urgence (PU) have trained teachers from displaced communities to fill this gap, but displaced parents have been unable to pay their wages, making the process unsustainable. UNICEF has continued to lobby the government to employ qualified teachers to work in IDP camps (OCHA, 20 April 2009).
As required by Security Council Resolution 1612, the UN country team in Chad has established a task force on children and armed conflict, co-chaired by MINURCAT and UNICEF. The task force visits IDP and refugee camps to monitor the recruitment of children by armed groups. In June 2010, six African countries signed the N’Djamena Declaration, a binding legal document on ending the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups (HDPT, 14 June 2010). Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan also pledged to sign the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC). Chad and Sudan have signed and ratified the OPAC. Cameroon and Nigeria have signed, but have not yet ratified. CAR and Niger have neither signed nor ratified (SOS Children’s Villages, 6 June 2010; UNICEF, 6 June 2010).
UN Security Council Resolution 1923 on the withdrawal from Chad of UN peacekeeping troops require Deby’s government to submit a plan of action to the Council by the end of July demonstrating how it will undertake protection of civilians and ensure ongoing support for a new Chadian police force and the existing DIS. Although the Council acknowledged the Government of Chad’s commitment to take full responsibility for the protection of civilians (UNSC, 25 May 2010), other UN officials have warned that Chad’s security forces lack the training, leadership, and technical capacity to ensure security (Turtle Bay, 26 May 2010). Analysts have noted that national security forces are more likely to focus their attention on potential offensives by Chadian rebel groups than on protecting IDPs and refugees (Diplomacy and Power, 6 February 2010).
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Issues of return
Since 2008, more than 30,000 IDPs have returned to their villages of origin (OCHA, 4 June 2010). However, they have gone back to unstable conditions, forced to return by lack of access to land and lack of income-generating activities in IDP camps.
In January 2010, UNDP brought together 150 participants for a two-day workshop to define ways of promoting the peaceful co-existence of conflict-affected communities in eastern Chad, and the sustainable integration of displaced populations returning to their areas of origin (UNDP, 5 January 2010). The workshop included military, religious and community leaders from the Department of Dar Sila, home to nearly 95 per cent of all IDPs (UNHCR, 2008).
Despite such initiatives, return is not yet a viable option for most IDPs in eastern Chad. Some are still traumatised by the violence of forced displacement, while others cite ongoing insecurity, loss of land and property, and lack of basic services in villages of origin as major obstacles to their return (HRW, June 2009). While significant return movements were expected in 2010, the scheduled withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops from Chad makes it unlikely that conditions for the sustainable return of IDPs will be in place in the near future.
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National and international responses to internal displacement
National response
Despite being an oil-producing country, Chad ranked 175th out of 182 countries on the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). With a view to reducing poverty in Chad and improving governance through the best possible use of oil revenues, the World Bank financed the building of an oil pipeline from Chad through Cameroon to the port of Kribi (WBG, 20 November 2009). In the six years since the pipeline became operational, Chad has used its increased oil revenues to buy weapons with which to fight insurgent groups, instead of investing in social services, reducing poverty and improving governance, all of which are essential components for protecting and assisting IDPs and achieving durable solutions.
Deby has continuously responded to violent attacks by armed groups by prioritising Chad’s military spending, which has soared from US$14 million to US$315 million since 2000 (SIPRI, 2 June 2010). In 2007, Chad spent 4.5 times more on the armed forces than it did on health, education, and other social spending combined (AlterNet, 2 December 2009). It is estimated that arms imports to Chad from countries including Ukraine, Libya, Belgium, China, USA, Israel, Switzerland, Serbia, and Portugal, were five times higher between 2004 and 2008 than between 1999 and 2003 (SIPRI, August 2009).
The government has taken steps to respond to the situation of IDPs, but their impact has been limited. In 2007, it established a national committee to assist IDPs, the
Comité national d’assistance aux personnes déplacées (CNAPD), but CNAPD has limited resources and staff, and has delivered only sporadic assistance. In 2008, the government also set up the CONAFIT committee to coordinate humanitarian activities with MINURCAT, EUFOR and the humanitarian organisations working in Chad. The government has yet to enact national legislation to protect IDPs.
In October 2009, the African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the first legally binding regional instrument to protect the rights of IDPs. The Convention cannot enter into force until it is ratified by 15 African States. Chad has signed but not ratified the Convention. While the number of IDPs in Chad is not as high as in other African countries, ratification of the Convention by Chad would show its commitment to protecting the rights of IDPs and achieving their durable return, resettlement or reintegration. By ratifying the Convention, Chad could act as a positive example for the region, given its strategic geo-political position between CAR and Sudan.
International response
The UN’s humanitarian response is led by the Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator who is also the UNDP Representative, while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has overall responsibility to coordinate the requests for funding of humanitarian organisations through a consolidated appeals process (CAP). More than 70 international humanitarian organisations provide assistance to displaced communities in eastern Chad, including IDPs and refugees from Darfur. The cluster system was introduced in Chad in 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Thirteen clusters are now operational in Chad, including the protection cluster.
As of May 2010, the consolidated appeal for Chad is 43 per cent funded (OCHA, 4 June 2010). The 2010 appeal is for $458 million to support emergency relief activities while emphasising programmes that increase self-sufficiency of displaced communities. In March 2010, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) recognised that Chad was an underfunded emergency, and allocated $7 million for life-saving assistance programmes targeting approximately 800,000 people (CERF, April 2010). The mid-year review of the 2010 consolidated appeal for Chad emphasised the urgent need for additional funds to respond to the developing food security crisis (OCHA, 25 May 2010).
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