



MALUKU ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM II PEACE STUDY

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Glossary

<i>Adat</i>	The traditional beliefs of Indonesian tribes and indigenous religions.
<i>Bapak Raja</i>	The traditional title for the head of the village. Literal translation is king.
<i>Klasis</i>	The sub-district level judicatory of the Protestant church.
<i>Latupati</i>	The <i>adat</i> leader at sub-district, district and provincial level.
<i>Marga</i>	The traditional extended family structures assumed by most Indonesian tribes.
<i>Matoke</i>	The <i>adat</i> leader of a village or tribe.
<i>Pela-gandong</i>	The <i>adat</i> structure binding two tribes or <i>marga</i> through common <i>adat</i> /social (<i>pela</i>) or familial (<i>gandong</i>) ties.
<i>Salam</i>	The Malukan form of Islam, influenced by local <i>adat</i> beliefs.
<i>Saniri</i>	The representative council of <i>soa</i> or <i>marga</i> that traditionally acts as an advisory panel for the <i>Bapak Raja</i> .
<i>Sarani</i>	The Malukan form of Christianity, influenced by local <i>adat</i> beliefs.
<i>Sasi</i>	Prohibitions issued at village level to regulate social affairs.
<i>Soa</i>	Representative body of one or more <i>marga</i> in <i>adat</i> village structures.
<i>Sopi</i>	Local hard alcohol (similar to moonshine) produced in the Maluku.

Introduction

This report represents the conclusions and recommendations for the development of peace-building activities to be carried out by Mercy Corps Maluku based on a survey of positive deviant behaviors and attitudes present in villages that abstained from the conflict that enveloped Ambon and Seram islands in Maluku from 1999 to 2004. The study sought to identify: a) prime influencers of peaceful participation in the conflict; b) key behaviors or socio-political systems that supported peaceful participation in the conflict; and c) areas for replication or expansion of identified positive deviant behaviors and/or practices. Because the aim of the study was to uncover responses by these communities to the conflict around them, a general assessment of the causal factors contributing to the conflict was included in the survey.

Upon commencement of this study, two villages were identified that had maintained a peaceful, neutral stance during the conflict: Hatu village in Tehoru sub-district, Central Maluku on Seram Island, and Wayame village in Baguala sub-district on Ambon Island. These villages were the focal point of a survey to determine the positive deviant behaviors and attitudes present, positive deviance influencers, and the socio-political environment required to support identified examples of positive deviance.

To develop a complete assessment of the requirements for positive deviant behaviors and attitudes, information concerning the positive deviant villages was complemented with interviews in neighboring villages, providing a comprehensive understanding of the drivers present in non-positive deviant villages that affected their involvement in the conflict. Analysis of the socio-political structures in villages involved in the conflict provided a basis from which to draw comparisons of the influencers, attitudes and community identity required to support peaceful involvement in a conflict situation.

The recommendations put forward in this report were developed based on the interviews conducted for the Peace Study, analyzed through a positive deviance lens. Because this is the first step in implementing positive deviance programming to support Mercy Corps' peace-building activities in Maluku, the majority of recommendations focus on programming that can shape core identities and attitudes, which will support longer-term growth of contextualized

positive deviant activities initiated by the target communities. Community-driven activities need to be affordable to increase sustainability, and complement the cultural constructs and activities already present in communities.

Recommendations stemming from this study will focus on activities and programs rooted in behavior change, for which the perceived reality of respondents is as important to the successful implementation of the activities as the actual reality. Therefore, wherever possible, concrete evidence will be included in the account of the causal factors presented in this report, and otherwise only causal factors consistently cited by respondents as their perception of the driving forces in the conflict will be noted.

Overview of Research

Research Methodology

Positive deviance is based on the theory that within communities there are individuals or groups that defy or deviate from the standard condition, and observation of the habits and attitudes of these examples can produce a set of implementable solutions to common problems on a larger scale. Most often used to analyze health and nutrition challenges, particularly among poor communities, for this study the positive deviance framework will be applied to examine the socio-political structures that influenced behavioral anomalies during the conflict that affected Maluku province in 1999-2004.

Prior to the commencement of this study, Mercy Corps Maluku identified two villages that had avoided direct involvement in the conflict: Hatu village, in Tehoru sub-district on Seram Island, and Wayame village, in Baguala sub-district on Ambon Island. Interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with political, religious and *adat* leaders in the village to examine the impact the crisis had on inter-group relations during and after the conflict, communication and information channels employed by the village, influencers within the village during and after the conflict, and areas for potential conflict in the future.

The focus of this survey is to identify the positive behaviors employed by these villages that enabled them to continue relatively peaceful relations with other villages. However, it would be remiss to discount the influencers and drivers of this conflict these villages were exposed to. Identifying positive deviant behaviors without understanding how they were used in response to external and internal factors driving the conflict would negatively impact the ability to develop systems for replication in other areas. As such, this study sought to identify the extent of the conflict in the surrounding regions, and the direct influence of the conflict within the positive deviant villages. Political, religious and *adat* leaders from neighboring villages were included in the survey, as well as leaders involved at the district and provincial levels to provide a macro perspective of the causal factors contributing to the conflict and successful peace building activities carried out from 2001 onward.

Positive deviance analysis is qualitative by nature, relying on first- and second-hand accounts of the events experienced by the participants, and their individual and collective responses to these

events. The recommendations for future programs that emerge from the results of the positive deviance study will focus on community-driven activities, requiring a strong focus on behavior change communications and programming to generate support for the programs and recognition of the benefits. The recommendations put forward will therefore outline a long- and short-term breakdown of activities, and how best to approach future stakeholders to increase the opportunity for their successful implementation.

Given the qualitative nature of the positive deviance methodology, ideally quantitative data would be collected to complement the perceptions of the survey respondents. Where available, data have been used to contextualize the qualitative results, and add to the analysis of perception drivers: mass media, government communications, and informal communications. However, quantitative data in many of the areas surveyed were often incomplete, inconsistent or unavailable, and in many cases could only be provided verbally due to their confidential nature. Any use of quantitative data in this survey for which the accuracy of the results is questionable will be noted and clarified in reference, allowing the reader to further analyze the results.

Research Questions

Examples of Positive Deviance in Areas that Abstained from the Conflict

What activities or communication channels were in place that helped you stay out of the conflict?

What activities or communication channels were in place that helped you maintain a solid relationship with the Muslims/Christians in your village during the conflict?

What activities or communication channels were in place with other groups when your village entered the conflict?

What activities or communication channels have been put in place since the conflict to facilitate reintegration?

Influencers in Positive Deviant Communities

Who was responsible for leading these activities?

How did you *feel* about others in your village during the conflict (other religions, other *margas*)?

How did you *feel* about other villages affected by the conflict?

Incentives for Positive Deviant Behaviors

What advantages were there for you or your village to abstain from the conflict?

What disadvantages were there for you or your village to abstain from the conflict?

Socio-Political Systems Employed in Positive Deviant Communities

Who makes decisions in your village?

Has the village returned to *adat* political structures?

To what extent have these structures been used to support reconciliation between religious groups?

To what extent have Indonesian government structures facilitated *adat* activities to reconcile conflicts?

To what extent have religious institutions contributed to reconciliation activities?

Identified Areas of Potential Conflict in Future

What do you think are the biggest threats to peace in the future?

What activities or communication systems are in place to address these threats?

Overview of the Causal Factors Contributing to the Conflict

Why do you feel the conflict started in your village?

What did you *see* that let you know that conflict had started?

How did you *feel* at the beginning of the conflict concerning its development?

How do you *feel* about conflict now?

Overview of the Nature of the Conflict

In your opinion, what was the conflict in your village about?

Who was key in organizing your community in response to the violence during the conflict?

Actors Involved in the Conflict

Who was involved in the conflict in your village?

Incentives Driving Involvement in the Conflict

What did you stand to gain by entering the conflict? (What motivated you to join?)

What did you stand to lose by entering the conflict?

Overview of the Conflict

Backdrop to the 1999-2004 Conflict

The Maluku islands have experienced ongoing smaller-scale conflicts throughout their history, rooted in longstanding inter-tribal and family conflicts. As the main channel for European and Asian traders for more than 1,000 years, the Maluku have been exposed to a multitude of cultures and foreign ruling authorities, which contributed to the evolution of a common identity across the region. The concept of a Malukan personality and characteristics is strong across the islands, which has served to preserve peaceful inter-religious relations historically. The conflict that arose in the area from 1999-2004 was unique in nature, as it drew for the first time clear identities based on religious affiliations into large-scale and prolonged conflict.

During this study, a number of historical factors affecting the socio-political cohesion of the region were identified by survey respondents as being of particular relevance to the 1999-2004 conflict. These historical contributors have influenced the behaviors and attitudes of Malukans, and exacerbated the religious tensions present during the conflict.

Culture of Revenge Fuelled by Individual and Tribal Pride

The Maluku people are characterized as strong and hard-headed. They distinguish themselves from Javanese culture through their brashness and proclivity to confrontation. In general, Malukans will describe the local culture of revenge as one of proportional response. On a larger scale, this can manifest through the mobilization of many members of one's *marga* or village in response to a perceived insult or losing of face, disputes arising between individuals or harassment of young women. This tendency to retaliate has been the cause of many inter-village conflicts, and is the primary driver of *adat* disputes spanning several generations.

Despite this tendency for retaliation, outside of *adat* feuds and *marga* disputes over land, Malukan revenge is typically short lived. Once justice has been achieved, relationships are quickly rebuilt and inter-group relations can continue harmoniously.

Weakening Adat Political and Social Structures

In the 1960s, the Suharto regime carried out a series of programs to unify Indonesia under a common culture, through forced transplanting of Javanese through the transmigration program and legislative restrictions on *adat* governance structures by requiring one universal system and

structure of village governance. This slowly removed the presence of *adat* culture from the everyday lives of Malukans, and very little beyond the concepts of *pela-gandong* and inter-tribal feuds were maintained throughout the region.

Knowledge of local languages and traditions has waned from village cultures, which reduced the influence of *adat* practices that had been used to reinforce peaceful relations with other villages. During this period, personal identification through religious affiliations grew, and the *adat*-influenced religious dynamics described in the following section, shifted.

Horizontal Inequalities

Islam was first brought to the Maluku by Arab traders as early as the 1400s, and a culture of *adat*-fused Islam was predominant until Dutch colonizers entered the region in the 17th century. European traders were accompanied by missionaries, and the Dutch rulers fostered a stratification of Malukan society through preferential treatment of Christians, who were afforded better education and employment opportunities, particularly in the civil services.¹ Until the start of the conflict in 1999, the majority of government, teaching and bureaucratic positions were held by Christians, while Muslims were concentrated in trade, farming and the informal sector.

The official transmigration program of the Suharto regime promoted a significant growth of the Muslim population in the Maluku, with most newcomers originating from Java. This upset the traditional societal balance in the region; migrants were allocated communal land that had traditionally been used by local communities, resulting in the spontaneous displacement of local people and fostering resentment to newcomers.²


The shift in religious demographics was further experienced through migration from Buton, Bugis and Makassar, commonly referred to in Maluku as BBM. Coming to the area in search of employment, BBM typically filled mercantile roles, and their ties with Sulawesi brought with them a different understanding of Islam to the Maluku.

The strong presence of *adat* beliefs in Maluku developed a unique understanding and practice of outside religions. *Salam*, Malukan Islam, and *Sarani*, Malukan Christianity, both grew out of the

¹ D. Bartels, 'Politicians and Magicians: Power, Adaptive Strategies, and Syncretism in the Central Moluccas', in G. Davis, ed, *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1979).

² J. Leith, 'Resettlement history, resources and resistance in North Halmahera', in S. Pannell and F. von Benda-Beckmann, eds., *Old World Places, New World Problems: Exploring Issues of Resource Management in Eastern Indonesia*, (Canberra: Australian National University, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 1998).

fundamental principles of the Western religions, but were heavily colored and regulated by the *adat* principles of the region. The entrance of communities from other areas of Indonesia created challenges in the means available to communities to resolve small-scale conflicts. Local Malukans were subject to *adat* structures and practices in conflict resolution, often channeled through local religious authorities. Non-Malukans, however, did not fit into this hierarchy, as they did not have ties with Malukan *marga* or *adat* histories, requiring a tiered system for conflict resolution that was beyond the immediate means of Malukan societies. This paradigm was more prevalent among Muslim communities, who build bonds on religion, than in Christian communities, in which *adat* principles were more easily adopted by outsiders.



Actors Involved in the Conflict

Active participants in the conflict throughout the Maluku were largely men. In all accounts, from the rural setting in Tehoru and the urban context in Ambon, women did not have an active role in fighting. In Hatu, the women were sent up into the mountains for 6 months to 2 years to escape the threats of attack by neighboring villages, while the majority of men stayed behind to defend their village and property. In villages where entire religious populations fled, such as the Muslims of Hatumete, families would flee to safer areas to live with relatives, and often the men would be recruited into the conflict to support fellow Muslims in areas where they were stronger. This was not always the case, however, and some of the families who fled were more concerned with securing sufficient land to farm and feed their families, than supporting the conflict.

Hatumete had around 100 Muslim households before the conflict. During the conflict, they fled to Tehoru, across the bay, and to the neighboring Muslim village, Moso. When Moso attacked Hatumete in 2000, Hatumete villagers who had fled to Moso were placed on the frontline to increase the psychological impact on the people of Hatumete.

The idea of coming in armed conflict with our own people affected our familial and tribal lineage, and deepened religious ties and our resentment toward Muslims.

~ Eli Soptory (Christian leader) and Berry Lelihat (Saniri Head), Hatumete

Many accounts from respondents detailed the active and passive roles youth played in the conflict. In situations where conflict arose spontaneously, though with relatively high frequency, between neighborhoods or communities, youth were generally not actively sought to enter in the conflict by adults. In this context, children would organize themselves, and join adults in fighting by entering areas unreachable by adults, and looting houses before they were razed in the fighting.

Recruitment of child fighters in this context was informal. A heroic pride was ascribed to the experience of other children who had taken part in the conflict, which, in recounting their “war stories” would inspire their friends to join. When preparing to engage in actual conflict, the organization of child fighters was informal, with few strategic ties to the adults taking part in the conflict. This lack of organization likely stemmed from two sources: 1) the generally limited time for preparation when attacking or responding to attacks from other communities, and 2) the lack of intention to involve children directly in the conflict.

The extent of a child’s involvement in the conflict was largely determined by the degree of supervision by their parents. As could be predicted, children from low-income families, where parental supervision was limited, were much more likely to be involved in the conflict than children from lower-middle and middle-income families.

In the accounts of the intentional provocation of conflict between Christian and Muslim communities across the Maluku, many respondents described more proactive recruitment of children for fighting purposes conducted by “external forces”, particularly Laskar Jihad. In these cases, street and market children who had little to no parental supervision were actively recruited by fighters to enter communities as the first wave of an attack. Children were equipped with

bombs³ and sent into villages and neighborhoods to create an initial panic, to be followed up by adult fighters. In these cases, the main incentive for the children to join in combat was the feeling of inclusion in a group, the provision of food and the opportunity to profit from looting during and after the fighting.

Drivers of Conflict

Throughout the study, a common perception of several causal factors contributing to the conflict emerged. Personal accounts of these causal factors were consistent in interviews with a wide range of respondents; however, concrete evidence to support these claims was difficult to secure.⁴

The backdrop to the conflict outlined in section 4.1 provides insights into the pre-existing socio-political climate that formed the foundation on which a longer-term conflict could be built. However, despite the presence of these factors, the Malukan population had lived in relative peace before conflict erupted in January 1999. The following is an overview of the factors that contributed to the conflict that emerged from this study.

External Forces

Survey respondents referred to two main external forces responsible for inciting and perpetuating the conflict in Maluku. The first was the playing out of high-level political interests following the fall of the Suharto government in 1998, coupled with the separation of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) into the Indonesian National Police and the Indonesian Military (TNI) in 2000.

The political uncertainty that followed Suharto's fall in 1998, and threats to prosecute Suharto for human rights violations carried out during his rule, triggered a series of regional conflicts throughout Indonesia. Starting with the conflict in Situ Bondo in 1998, larger-scale conflicts erupted in Madura, East Timor, the Malukus and Sulawesi over the course of 1998-1999. TNI is largely thought to have been the driving force triggering these conflicts, combined with the

³ The term bomb is generally used in reference to Molotov cocktails, and occasionally in reference to homemade explosives

⁴ One of the primary contributors to the conflict indicated by respondents was driven by high-level political interests that arose following the fall of Suharto, manifested through military involvement in the area. While most of the accounts of the migration patterns and involvement of the armed forces are consistent, any concrete evidence to support these claims was provided verbally by representatives from the armed forces and police, as records were either destroyed or confidential.

Similarly, *adat* social structures and beliefs that contributed to the conflict are often restricted to oral inheritance: there are few written documents detailing the specific *adat* beliefs of each village, and many practices are intentionally withheld from external parties to preserve their sacred nature.

political sponsorship of Islamic fundamentalist groups from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, Malaysia, Philippines, East Java, Banten and South Sulawesi.

When ABRI was disintegrated in 2000, the role of the Indonesian Armed Forces was significantly reduced, and disputes arose between the armed forces and the police in an effort to secure their authority and need for their services. The string of conflicts that arose throughout Indonesia after the fall of Suharto is viewed by most survey respondents to be an active attempt by the Indonesian Armed Forces to justify their presence in home affairs and secure larger budgets for military expenditures.

Insufficient Communication

Insufficient access to reliable means of communication played a large role in allowing conflict to intensify between groups and perpetuating a climate of panic in communities, making them more inclined to overreact to rumored attacks. Particularly in rural villages, communication with those outside of the village was all but cut off, relying on CB radios (*HT*) to communicate with neighboring villages. Tehoru sub-district had no cellular access and villages usually shared access to one or two land lines, which were intentionally cut off during the conflict. Travel between villages was also limited for fear of attack, which prevented village leaders in rural areas from verifying rumors of attack or the position of conflict at any given time.

As a result, any information received by villagers had the potential to be true, which aggressors and drivers of the conflict used to their advantage when attempting to incite panic in conflict-potential areas. Rumors concerning the conflict were received by villagers through two main sources: 1) through individual provokers, and 2) through organized external groups.

Individual provokers are blamed for starting the initial conflict in Ambon on January 19, 1999. When the argument between a local bus driver and one of his passengers escalated to armed threats, the passenger ran into the labyrinth of alleys in Batu Merah, a predominantly Muslim neighborhood, yelling that a Christian was trying to kill him. By all accounts, this was an odd presentation of the dispute, as usually religion was not the main driver of individual disputes, *adat* was.

On the same day, rumors spread through Muslim communities in Ambon that the Christians had burned the main mosque in the city. Though this was not the case, it awakened such emotion

among Muslims that they immediately sought to retaliate, burning the church in the center of the city.

In rural areas, many rumors concerning planned attacks would come from people passing by in boats or outsiders from other sub-districts and Ambon bringing information concerning the situation in their villages. The fundamental change in communication at this time was the focus on religious origins, which had previously been absent from disputes between individuals and groups.

The limited access to accurate information was capitalized on by external actors who had come to the region to incite a religious conflict. Their access to communication channels was key, however they were able to manipulate information to suit their needs. Incorrect information was common in rural and urban areas, where travel was limited to neighborhoods of their religion in the vicinity during the conflict, and used to re-incite conflict.

Media

The role of the media in any conflict is crucial in managing the perceptions of the people. The accuracy and impartiality of the news presented is important, and, if used properly, can support increased peace in warring communities.

Prior to the conflict, the media in Ambon relied heavily on external sources of news, primarily from Jawa Pos Group, and journalistic integrity was not strongly upheld. Indonesian media in general is prone to featuring violent and graphic footage, which has been blamed for desensitizing the people toward the effects of conflict.

In one interview, a respondent from Seram noted that in the first days of conflict in Ambon, the people of Seram remained relatively unaffected, and did not feel that the conflict had any connection to their circumstances. However, as SCTV played the footage of the church burning in Ambon many times per day for several weeks, the emotions and pride of both Christians and Muslims in Tehoru were affected, and they became increasingly susceptible to small triggers.

During the conflict, several journalists from Ambon were sent to Jakarta for a training in peace journalism facilitated by BBC London. They were taught how to portray conflict in productive ways, and the importance of focusing on peaceful activities in the midst of the conflict. Upon

return, the journalists established the Maluku Media Center, and participants from the training coordinated to develop positive news pieces featuring stories of peaceful activities and actors in the conflict. However, editorial demands and the competitive media environment pushed journalists to focus on conflict-related pieces.

Communication between journalists was difficult during the conflict, due to segregation of neighborhoods in Ambon that made travel to Muslim areas by Christians (and vice versa) dangerous. This polarization was formalized when the 'Muslim' publication *Ambon Express* split off from the 'Christian' publication *Suara Maluku* because Muslim journalists were physically unable to get to the *Suara Maluku* office, located in a Christian part of town.⁵

This segregation also affected journalists' ability to cross check stories about the conflict, lacking any access to sources from the 'other side' to provide a balanced account of incidences. This bias was compounded by the political influence of the editorial boards at the media houses in Maluku, and the personal partiality of journalists themselves.

The impact of the biases presented in the media, and segmentation of their readership, played a definite role in perpetuating the conflict. However, with little concrete quantitative or qualitative data depicting the actual events that unfolded during the conflict, it is difficult to estimate to what extent media in Maluku at the time of the conflict affected the religious tensions and prejudices of the Malukan people.

⁵ Sharpe, Joanne. *Using Newspapers to Monitor Conflict: Evidence from Maluku and North Maluku, Indonesia*. (World Bank, October, 2005.)

Identified Areas of Potential Conflict in Future

Given the religious nature of the large-scale conflict in the Maluku from 1999-2004, many peace-building programs implemented by NGOs and government agencies have focused on activities that promote interaction and cooperation between Muslim and Christian groups. These programs have met with varying levels of success. However, religious tensions are one of the least cited potential drivers of conflict indicated by survey respondents. The following areas were raised as the most prone to developing into future conflict:

Disenfranchised Youth

Overall, youth were seen as being the most likely drivers of potential conflict, and the community in most need of outreach. The young adults of today were children and teens during the conflict, which caused prolonged, and in some cases permanent, interruptions to their schooling. A large segment of young adults have entered the workforce with few productive professional skills, limiting their employment possibilities. Survey respondents indicated that youth who found employment in the formal sector had joined the police or armed forces, as much of their experience during the conflict was developed in combat, while the majority work in the formal sector as market vendors, small-scale farmers or fishermen, or thugs (*preman*).

Children are most susceptible to enduring long-term trauma as a result of living in an environment where the threat of violence is imminent and constant. As young adults, they are quick to react violently to perceived threats, which has put a greater strain on the opportunity for entrenched peaceful relations in the future. Government post-conflict programs focused primarily on rebuilding and expanding infrastructure, with only 1-5 percent being allocated for post-traumatic counseling and capacity building.⁶

Alcohol Abuse

The eastern cultures of Indonesia are known for being more prone to alcohol use and abuse. This is largely attributed to the predominance of Christianity in these provinces, which does not prohibit the use of alcohol, as Islamic law does. However, in the Maluku, alcohol consumption and abuse is prevalent in both Christian and Muslim communities, and can fuel small-scale conflict.

⁶ Rizard Jemmy Talakua, interview and Master's thesis for UGM on 'The Role of Minors in the Maluku Conflict, 1999-2004'.

The homemade alcohol unique to the Maluku region is called *sopi*, processed from the resin of the *mayang* tree or *sagu* (a tuberous vegetable similar to a potato). This moonshine is cheap and available in almost every village across the Maluku. Public drunkenness, particularly among youth, was cited as the number one threat to peaceful relations within and between villages, as it heightens pre-existing tensions and emotions and provokes more extreme reactions to otherwise commonplace incidents.

Alcohol abuse and public drunkenness was blamed for a number of ancillary problems, including increasing conflicts between youth groups motivated by revenge or “saving face”, community pride, particularly in inter-village competitions such as soccer matches, and theft or destruction of property. In Moso, village leaders have issued a *sasi*⁷ on the production, distribution or use of alcohol to discourage alcohol-related conflict in the village. Though this has effectively stopped all use of alcohol in the village, its jurisdiction is limited to the village, and many villagers from Moso go to neighboring villages to drink, resulting in an escalation in inter-village fighting caused by alcohol-fuelled arguments at parties.

A blanketing *sasi* issued at district or sub-district levels regulating the manufacture and use of alcohol could support more widespread control of alcohol abuse, but would exacerbate the already weak economic opportunities available in many villages. In Hatumete, the *sopi* industry is a large source of income for more than half the village, and supplies many neighboring villages. Village heads in Hatumete had discussed the possibility of issuing a *sasi* against the manufacture and consumption of alcohol, but met with strong opposition from villagers who see *sopi* production as the most lucrative business available to them. Averaging Rp 12,000 per bottle, *sopi* manufacturers can earn three to four times as much as small-scale farmers and fishermen in their village.

⁷ *Sasis* are an informal form of prohibition issued at the request of villagers or the initiative of village heads. A *sasi* will be discussed by a panel of village leaders, and socialized to villagers through the communication channels available to each leader. Village heads will post an announcement of the *sasi* at the village government office or their house, religious leaders will discuss the reasoning and ramifications of the *sasi* through prayer, linking punishment with higher powers, and traditional leaders will enforce the *sasi* through traditional hierarchies – first to Saniri heads, down through *margas* and heads of households. While *sasis* have traditionally been used to regulate the harvest of crops, both to prevent theft and to discourage early harvest that could impact the quality of crops, this form of prohibition can be used to regulate other areas affecting the peaceful cohesion of the village.

While alcohol abuse is a facilitator of many small-scale conflicts in rural and urban areas, it is generally a symptom of deeper social and economic problems, such as unemployment and political disenfranchisement, which require action to prevent an escalation of alcoholism.

Unemployment

As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the long-term effects of the conflict are becoming increasingly apparent among the youth in Maluku. Particularly in rural areas, where children often have to travel to other villages for junior high school or high school, the conflict had a massive impact on access to education, which is only recently manifesting itself as a larger-scale unemployment problem as the school children during the conflict reach adulthood with limited education and few professional skills with which to generate enough income to subsist.

According to the Maluku Central Statistics Agency (BPS), as of August 2007, around 12.2 percent (67,220 people) of the eligible workforce in Maluku was unemployed.⁸ This is a significant increase from 1998, when 3.7 percent of the workforce was registered as unemployed. However, these numbers are very unreliable and do not give much insight into the real situation in the Maluku labor market. Like in most other developing countries lacking a social welfare system, Indonesians have few incentives to register themselves as unemployed.

Underemployment, where a person holds a job which pays a salary that is insufficient to make ends meet, is a larger problem and also gives a better picture of the situation in the labor market in Indonesia. Most small-scale farmers and fishers fall into this category. While occasionally they are able to sell surplus crops at local markets or to travelling salesmen, generally the market available to them is small and oversaturated with the same crops harvested by others in their village. Their reliance on farming or fishing for subsistence is heightened.

Unfortunately, the “underemployed” category is not recognized in statistics in Indonesia, and the number of people classified as underemployed is not available. However, based on the GRDP per capita, underemployment is in all probability a serious problem in Maluku.

⁸ Maluku’s unemployment rate is higher than the national average, which was 9.11 percent as of August 2007.

The result is a threat of a “lost generation”, with many youth falling into negative unemployed patterns of alcoholism and thuggery, increasing tensions in their communities and making them more susceptible to recruitment by militias and general delinquency.

Land Disputes

Disputes over the rightful ownership or use of land for productive purposes has historically been a serious issue driving conflict, and continues to be one of the most sensitive issues for larger-scale conflicts in the future. Land disputes can arise from three primary sources:

1. Contested inheritance or land boundaries between families
2. Reclamation of land by returning IDPs
3. Regional restructuring by local governments

The most common source of land disputes is between family members. When surveyed, most respondents stated that though familial ties are the strongest bonds of identity in the Maluku, ownership of land and the pride and wealth attached to it would in most cases take precedence over blood ties.

These disputes can arise within and across village boundaries. When contained within a village, the conflict resolution process is clear: the first level of mediation falls to the heads of the *marga* or *saniri*, who call together the families in dispute to come to an acceptable compromise. Often, the methods used by these leaders refer to honoring the intentions of their ancestors, and not continuing unnecessary disputes that could besmirch the reputation of the family. If resolution cannot be obtained at this level, the dispute will be passed on to the *Bapak Raja*, who, together with a panel of village leaders, including religious and *adat* leaders, will facilitate discussions between the two families until an agreement is reached. The agreement will be announced by the *Bapak Raja*, which makes it binding for all parties involved. If any criminal acts were perpetrated during the dispute, the offending party will be turned over to the authorities, in most cases the police, and face legal repercussions.

If a land dispute arises between families living in separate villages, the mediation process remains similar, but involves leaders from both villages. In such cases, the *adat* and political relations between the villages play an equally large role in the likelihood of a successful resolution being reached. If the villages have any *pela-gandong* ties, attempts to resolve the

conflict amicably will be made to preserve the strong relations between the two villages. In villages with tradition-based feuds tracing back to vague concepts of their ancestral relations, resolution of land disputes may be more difficult to maneuver, and seemingly small disputes over land can escalate into larger conflicts between the villages.

In certain cases, those who fled their land during the conflict have been prohibited from returning by those who remained in the area. In Yafila village, Amahai sub-district on Seram Island, villagers fled at the beginning of the conflict, and their land was taken over by farmers from the neighboring village of Banda Baru. Immediate access to fully developed farmland with flourishing crops was appealing to the new farmers, and when the reintegration program was carried out by the government, the people of Banda Baru refused to return the land they had been farming for four years to the original owners.

The mediation process to resolve this dispute was led by the regency government; however, ultimately no agreement could be reached to return the villagers from Yafila to their land. Currently, they have been relocated to a make-shift village approximately two kilometers from Yafila proper. However, this solution has met with opposition from many sides. The original people of Yafila are not satisfied settling in an area that they do not consider to be the land of their ancestors, and have been forced to start over again on unworked farmland. The land they were given by the government is also subject to contention, with the armed forces and a neighboring village (Sepa) laying claim to the area. How this conflict will ultimately be resolved remains unclear, but mediation has already moved beyond the local and regional authorities, and will likely need closure at the provincial or federal level.

The third source of conflict concerning land is the creation of artificial borders during the demarcation of regencies in 2004. Imposed demarcation has been the intentional and unintentional root of conflict in many regions globally, and has caused multi-level conflicts on Seram Island.

When Seram was split into three regencies in 2004, East Seram, Central Maluku, and West Seram, the border between Central Maluku and West Seram deviated from the natural river border previously used to divide the sub-districts in the area. As a result, Elpaputih was included in Central Maluku, which contradicted *adat* mapping that would place it in West Seram. This has

been challenged at the federal Constitutional Court, with West Seram arguing that the area should fall under its governance in accordance with *adat* history and laws concerning land ownership.

During discussions in the area concerning the new demarcation, the villagers were also split on which regency they should belong to: some remained loyal to *adat* land boundaries, while others preferred the proximity to central regency government agencies in Central Maluku and supported the new boundaries.


Examples of Positive Deviance

Case Study #1 – Hatu

Context and Structures

Two positive deviant communities were identified for this survey: Hatu on Seram Island and Wayame on Ambon Island. Though the environment and demographics of these villages is very different, both were surrounded by conflict and exhibited similar positive deviant behaviors to respond to the challenges of the conflict.

Hatu is a remote rural community in Tehoru sub-district, Central Maluku district, on Seram Island. It has limited road access, and cellular infrastructure was only introduced to the area in February 2010. The majority of Hatu villagers are small-scale farmers or fishermen, who make their living selling excess crops in local markets. Approximately 95% of the village is Christian. The government structure in Hatu returned *adat* hierarchies to formal governance structures in its 2006 elections, and currently employs a mixed system of traditional and modern authority.



**Note: Official government and adat governing structures can be found in Annex I.*

Like most communities in the Maluku, Hatu's first course of action in resolving conflicts is to call together a panel of village leaders, in this case the *Bapak Raja*, *Matoke*, minister and *Saniri* head, to facilitate the dispute between the quarrelling parties. If the dispute involves younger villagers or members of several *marga*, the youth leader and *marga* heads will be included. If a dispute involves an external party, the village leaders from that community will be invited to discuss appropriate recourse. Any conflicts impacting the entire village will be discussed by all the village elders, including both Christians and Muslims.

The following positive deviance behaviors and attitudes were identified in the study, which contributed to Hatu's peaceful participation in the conflict.

Retention of Adat Culture and Traditions

The presence of *adat* culture is uniquely strong in Hatu. The *adat* elders in the village, particularly the *Matoke*, Pak Melly, have retained a significant influence over the political leaders of Hatu, and, as Christians, incorporate Christian traditions in *adat* practices.

The *adat* culture in Hatu prioritizes peaceful relations with one's neighbors; a principle that became the focus of *adat* teachings during the conflict. Hatu, despite being predominantly Christian, has strong historical ties with both Muslim and Christian religions, which have been incorporated in *adat* practices.

The following activities were carried out by *adat* leaders in Hatu during the conflict, which supported the retention of *adat* culture and traditions as an area of positive deviance.

Construction of an Adat House

Building an *adat* house is an important community-building activity, and involves anyone whose *marga* binds them with the village. People from all the villages along Hatu's side of the bay were involved in the construction of the *adat* house in 2003. This reinforced the familial ties that stretch across the boundaries of warring villages and re-awakened a sense of pride in *marga* and *adat* identities that overshadowed religious differences.

Strengthening of Pela Relations

The construction of a new *adat* house in Hatu opened the opportunity for the village to strengthen its *pela* relations with Haya, the primary Muslim aggressor in the region. *Pela* is the

adat concept of a common history between communities that binds them together. A *panas pela* is an agreement reached between two communities to formalize their shared histories, effectively changing the script of their *adat* traditions for future generations.

Hatu and Haya established *pela* relations in 2002-2003. This agreement was reinforced by the exchange of *adat* houses, which led to the construction of a new *adat* house in Hatu. Hatu's old *adat* house was dissembled and moved to Haya, and the new, bigger *adat* house was built. Because Haya has a much larger general and *adat* population, the new *adat* house in Hatu was given to Haya (but remains located in Hatu) for use in any *adat* ceremonies, while the smaller *adat* house located in Haya belongs to Hatu.

By establishing *adat* ties with Haya, and using the physical structure of the *adat* house to solidify their relationship, Hatu secured its position with the central point in Tehoru for militia training and influence from external actors. This strategic partnership strengthened its alliance with not only the biggest threat to neighboring villages during the conflict, but also the largest Muslim-dominant population in the area.

Revival of Adat Culture

Many *adat* traditions across Maluku faded from memory under Suharto's rule, during which their formal practice was outlawed. When *adat* was reinstated in village governance structures in 2005, Hatu initiated *adat* activities in the community to rekindle the *adat* identity among villagers.

Adat dances, art and songs have been reintroduced in the elementary and junior high schools in Hatu (the nearest high school is in Tehoru). This interactive means of reacquainting the younger generation with their history includes the historical accounts of how Hatu was formed and where their ancestors came from, emphasizing *marga* links throughout the district.

The *Matoke* has translated the Indonesian *Pancasila* into the local *adat* language, one of the few examples of *adat* language in writing. The text was written out to preserve the local language and make a clear link between traditional and modern systems to promote inclusion rather than ostracization of external influences. The parchment was given to Mercy Corps staff during the survey to be laminated for posterity.

Inclusion of Religion in Adat

Hatu believes it was the first entry point of Islam in Seram. *Salam* and *Sarani* religions are celebrated through *adat* tradition. After the conflict subsided, Hatu revived the tradition of sending off Hajj pilgrims from the region. Because the roots of Islam are found in Hatu, ironically now a Christian village, anyone travelling to Mecca must walk up the coast to Hatu, where they are received by the *Bapak Raja* and *Matoke* and given a white cloth to protect and bless them on their journey.

“It was very important to make sure people understood the importance of their role in the continuation of peace in the village. If there was a threat of attack, we would gather 100 villagers in the church for prayer led by the minister. This was to connect the concept of peace with their individual relationship with God. It made it more powerful.

At sundown, the villagers would be split, 50 would be sent to the southern border of the village, 50 to the northern border, and they would face our neighboring villages and pray all night. No one would take weapons, because it was not our intention to fight. Through prayer we could protect ourselves. If Hatu was attacked, it was a sign that the hearts of the Hatu villagers praying on that border were not pure, and that they did not have peace in their hearts.”

~Pak Melly, *Matoke*, *Hatu*, *Tehoru*, *Maluku Tengah*

Productive Engagement of Youth

Mentoring during the Conflict

The current *Bapak Raja* was the youth leader in Hatu during the conflict. He was mentored by the *Matoke* in *adat* styles of leadership and conflict resolution, and took his responsibilities of positively influencing the youth of the village very seriously, particularly concerning their response to threats of conflict.

“People used to pass by in boats and along the coast and yell at us that Hatu would be the next village to be attacked. One time a teenager from another village came up the beach and started yelling at me and my friends that Hatu was going to get hit next. He was being belligerent, and trying to goad us into a fight on the spot. I told my friends to stay where they were and went over to talk to the guy. I said, “Listen, you have no business being here. The people of Hatu don’t want to fight, and we don’t want people coming here trying to start problems. If there’s an attack, then we will have to defend ourselves, but we won’t fight with you.”

I followed him to the edge of the village without saying anything else, and he left us alone.”

~Pak Andy, Bapak Raja (Youth Leader during the conflict), Hatu, Tehoru, Central Maluku

During the conflict, all male (and some female) villagers were responsible for guarding the borders, particularly at night. The youth leader would make nightly rounds to meet with the youth stationed at these posts, and discuss strategies of engagement should they be confronted by attackers. The youth would also gather one-two times per week to discuss their feelings, fears, concerns and interpretations of neighboring villages, the internally displaced people (IDPs) who had come to Hatu to seek refuge, and the conflict in general. Issues would be discussed by the group, and the youth leader would lead the discussion with lessons of peaceful relations from *adat* and Christian traditions.

Sports Competitions

Hatu established a soccer tournament, involving youth from every village in Tehoru sub-district, in 2009. The goal was to increase interaction and good sportsmanship between youth, to foster positive relations between villages into the future. Because soccer matches in particular can be sources of conflict between players and spectators, the tournament was recreational in nature, with no scores kept and no ultimate champions. By controlling the competitive spirit of players and their supporters the tournament was carried out without any aggressive incidents.

Active Communication

During times of conflict, access to accurate information is integral to maintaining a peaceful atmosphere and preventing fear-driven panic that could lead to rash and aggressive reactions. Hatu established three levels of communication, which they maintained actively, to manage various actors affecting their village.

1) Communication with Surrounding Villages

Infrastructural limitations made communication between villages challenging at the best of times, but during the conflict, when mobility was difficult, communication was almost impossible. Each village was equipped with a CB radio, but these used open frequencies that could be accessed by anyone. To overcome this, the *Matoke* used the *adat* language of his *marga* to make communications harder to intercept by external actors and maximized use of *adat* networks throughout the district to secure accurate information concerning attacks and the movement of troops.

“We had heard that people were collecting in Wolu to wage an attack on Hatu, so we fled to the mountains. I was up in a little house I have close to our fields with other villagers when a call came in on the HT. They asked for the *Matoke*, and the HT was passed to me.

It was a relative of mine, who had run from Haya to Tehoru to use the HT at the sub-district office to call me. He used our *adat* language to confirm that it really was me on the line, and once he was convinced he told me that militants from Haya had gone to Wolu to join with Muslims from villages on this side of the bay to attack Hatu. He said there were people from Pakistan and Afghanistan, who were accompanied by Javanese and Hayans.

He asked me to collect up all of our relatives living in Hatu, and all of their belongings, and he would send two speed boats over to pick them up. I spoke frankly with him. I said, ‘Please call off the attack. You know that we are peaceful people and don’t want to be involved in the conflict. We’ve already left the village, so there’s no one left to attack. Tell them to honor our ancestors and leave Hatu alone.’

The attack never happened.”

~*Pak Melly, Matoke, Hatu, Tehoru, Central Maluku*

2) Communication with Displaced Hatu Villagers

Hatu villagers who had fled to the surrounding mountains ran a heightened risk of attack because they had no access to information from neighboring villages. Hatu villagers made daily trips to the IDPs whenever possible to update them on the unfolding situation and discuss their planned response to any confirmed threats.

Village leaders also made trips up to the mountains to boost the morale of Hatu villagers there, and address any issues that arose amongst the IDPs. The church provided a strong motivator for Hatu villagers, and gave them hope beyond any other instrument at the disposal of the village leaders. To strengthen their will to carry on and maintain good relations

between the IDPs, the minister would hold worship services for the IDPs, and lead reaffirm their peaceful stance in the eyes of God.

3) Communication in the Village

Those who remained in the village during the conflict lived in constant fear of attack by land and water. Regular gatherings were held at the church to address these fears and discuss rumors of impending attacks, as well as to organize the villagers in the event of an actual attack. Runners were used to travel between the border posts at night to keep both sides informed of any activity and boost morale. In the event of an emergency, the loudspeakers outside of the manse, in the center of the village, were used to call everyone to the church.

The role of *adat*, engagement of youth and maintenance of good lines of communication were cited by the village leaders as being most influential in supporting Hatu's neutral role in the conflict. However, mention must be made in this report of a potential negative deviant behavior demonstrated in Hatu, which may have been a significant contributor to their ability to escape attack. During the survey, respondents from other villages indicated that Hatu was suspected of providing information to attacking forces, including TNI, about the situation in neighboring villages and possible points or times of entry, facilitating attacks on their neighbors in exchange for their own safety. Regardless of the validity of these claims, these rumors have strained relations between Hatu and neighboring Christian villages in particular. When asked whether these claims were true, the *Bapak Raja* of Hatu said he was aware that Hatu had this reputation, but neither confirmed nor dispelled their validity.

Case Study #2 - Wayame

While Hatu maximized the role of pre-existing structures and *adat* identity in the village to protect themselves from entering the conflict, Wayame took active steps to establish new systems and village identity to directly respond to the nature and needs of the conflict in order to secure their position as a neutral community in the conflict.

Wayame is a suburb of Ambon located across the bay from the urban center. The majority of villagers are professionals, working either in the city of Ambon or at the local Universitas Pattimura campus. The population is a mix of Christians and Muslims: the village has one church

and two mosques. Wayame has already returned to the *adat* governance structures, though both modern religions are far more prominent in influencing the villagers than *adat* traditions.

Approximately six months after the first conflict broke out in Ambon, the youth leader (currently the *Bapak Raja*) approached the minister, John Salese, about establishing a team of influential members in the community who would formally manage the internal and external affairs for the village. *Tim 20* was formed, comprising 10 Christians and 10 Muslims, including the minister, imam, academics and village leaders.

Tim 20 acted as an organized unit, taking strategic steps to prevent Wayame from becoming involved in the conflict.

Deterritorialization of Identity

Tim 20 understood that in order to protect a peaceful environment in the village, it was necessary to create an identity that superseded any other strong personal identities the villagers held. This included their Malukan (ethnic), *marga (adat)* and religious identities. To establish this identity, *Tim 20* involved all villagers in the protection of peace in the village.

During the conflict, it was common practice for the drivers of the conflict to identify sympathetic allies in villages and use them to provoke conflict between religions in their village. This was done through discriminatory graffiti, the planting of small bombs in (generally Christian) neighborhoods, spreading false rumors about attacks that had happened elsewhere, and razing individual houses. The theory was that the panic and resentment towards the other religion incited by such provocation would lead to conflict in the village.

In Wayame, *Tim 20* made all villagers responsible for their conduct, and took severe action against anyone who acted to intentionally spark conflict in the community. Anyone who was identified as attempting to provoke conflict in the village was tracked down by members of *Tim 20*, beaten and exiled from the village. A warning was sent out to all villagers to uphold the peaceful identity of Wayame, and respect their position in the village. To go against the identity of Wayame was to sentence oneself to life in a village wrought with conflict.

“Wayame was attacked once. People came in and burnt a Christian villager’s house to the ground. We had received word that this attack would happen, and that area of the village had already been evacuated. The villagers stayed with neighbors, and could see what was happening. Members of Tim 20 went out to talk with the attackers. We told them one house was enough, and that we wouldn’t let them get any further. It took awhile, but they left without burning any other houses.

Can you imagine the restraint it must have took to watch your house burn down and not do anything to retaliate? That’s when we knew the villagers understood the importance of peace in Wayame.”

~Umar Semarang, Imam, Wayame, Baguala, Ambon

To further entrench this identity, *Tim 20* projected their stance as a peaceful community in the conflict outward. Through communications with neighboring villages (detailed in the following section), including attempts to expand peace throughout the sub-district, Wayame did not endorse violence of any kind, and cut off its boundaries to anyone passing through to engage in conflict. If any neighboring villages were travelling to attack other communities, they could not go through Wayame; they would have to go by boat or travel up through the hills to bypass the village limits.

“At one point two boats came into Wayame: one full of people, the other full of arms. They were Muslim, and quickly brought the arms to the mosque to prepare for an attack from within. I went to the mosque immediately to talk with them. I told them I didn’t care that they were Muslims; Wayame was not a place for conflict. If they didn’t take their weapons and leave immediately, no one would be leaving the village alive. They left very quickly.”

~ Umar Semarang, Imam, Wayame, Baguala, Ambon

Active Communication

Internal

Tim 20 took active measures to dispel any separation between Christians and Muslims in the village. As people of Wayame, all villagers were encouraged to respect leaders from both religions as representatives of the village who were working together to maintain peace in their community. To solidify this, on Fridays and Sundays after worship, the villagers would gather at the mosque and the church to listen to the teachings of peace from the imam and minister, and what the beliefs of that religion meant to the ongoing peace in the village.

The village would also meet up to 3-4 times per week for two-way discussions about the rumors involving attacks on the village, updates on the work of *Tim 20*, personal experiences and question from villagers. *Tim 20* documented all reports of violence in the sub-district, and any movement of troops in the area that could pose a threat to Wayame.

External

To support the continuation of peace in Wayame, *Tim 20* actively engaged neighboring villages in discussions about the costs of the conflict, and the benefits of peace, with the goal of influencing all of the villages in Baguala sub-district to disengage from the conflict. While they were not successful in expanding peace throughout the region, *Tim 20* was able to maintain relative peace in their village.

Particularly when dealing with outside actors with a vested interest in pursuing the conflict, the right approach was necessary to convince others not to attack Wayame. Members of *Tim 20* said that, because the conflict was religious in nature, and the majority of drivers of conflict were perpetuating the conflict in the name of religion, focus on religious symbols and the role of religion in preserving peace was most effective in engaging outsiders and securing a neutral position for Wayame on their terms.

When dealing with real threats to the peace in Wayame, *Tim 20* would meet to discuss any information they collected from other villagers or people passing through the village, and assign a group to travel to the village rumored to attack to negotiate with them. If the aggressor was a Christian village, the 10 Christian members of *Tim 20* would be sent to meet with village leaders, and, likewise, Muslim aggressors would require a response from the 10 Muslim members of the team. Again, in these negotiations, members of *Tim 20* would reference the religious reasoning behind their decision not to engage in conflict, and leverage the economic benefits Wayame's neutral position afforded the region to strengthen their request to avoid attack.

Receiving accurate information about potential impending attacks was crucial to *Tim 20*'s ability to manipulate the conflict in their favor. Without access to information, the team was exposed to attacks beyond the reach of their diplomatic power. To ensure they received timely and accurate information about developments in the conflict, *Tim 20* engaged the War Commander (*Panglima Perang*) in Silalahitu, who provided them with all information he received concerning the

conflict in the area. In 2001, they purchased a cellular phone for the War Commander, and paid all his phone bills, to ensure he was able to call them at any time with updates.

Economy

Understanding that a solid economic foundation is key to preserving peace in any community, *Tim 20* worked with merchants in Wayame to establish the Peace Market (*Pasar Perdamaian*), which became a hub for trade during the conflict, when most supplies were difficult to obtain. The market bordered on the coast of the bay, allowing for easy access by boat, the safest means of transportation during the conflict. Even within the city of Ambon, travel between neighborhoods was difficult, as the city had split into Christian and Muslim areas that could not be crossed by members of the opposite religion.

“It was really amazing. Sometimes people would come into our market from opposite sides of the city. Family members who hadn’t seen each other for months, sometimes years. They would meet at the market in Wayame and just start crying, they were so happy to see each other.”

~*Jusuf Alaperu, Professor, Universitas Pattimura, Wayame, Baguala, Ambon*

Anyone coming to the market to trade would be fully searched upon docking – any boats carrying weapons were sent away from the village while their unarmed passengers were at the market. The market was monitored by villagers for any disputes that could lead to small conflicts. Disagreements were immediately facilitated, and if no agreement could be reached, patrons were escorted from the village. In most cases, the threat of losing access to the market was enough to motivate people to come to a peaceful agreement.

Recommendations for Future Peace-building Programs

Positive deviance in the peace building context can be used to produce guidelines and general examples on which to base similar activities for implementation in other regions. However, these activities are fully contingent upon a conducive socio-political setting in target areas. If the hierarchical constructs within a village or between village leaders does not support the activities, they could have no impact or potentially trigger latent conflict.

The recommendations put forward in this report have been developed to support long-term, sustainable programs. To be successful, programs stemming from positive deviance analysis must be community driven in nature. The recommendations have therefore been developed with the following criteria in mind:

1) They must be affordable

Mercy Corps has indicated that its budget for MERP II peace building activities is limited. To compensate for this, and to increase the likelihood that the recommended programs can be continued in the long-term by the target communities, the majority of the recommended programs are affordable, with Mercy Corps leading the initial coordination and ongoing monitoring, but assuming a passive role in the actual implementation.

2) They must complement the community interests and habits

All recommendations have been developed based on the experience of this consultant in program development based on the positive deviance methodology. Specific activities stemmed both from direct feedback from interviewees during the survey and analysis of the current socio-cultural environment in which they will be carried out.

The activities outlined below are meant to provide a starting point from which Mercy Corps can engage communities, and may require modification based on the specific needs of the target stakeholders and proposed program leaders.

Both Wayame and Hatu offer strong examples of positive deviant behaviors that supported their neutral, peaceful roles in the 1999-2004 conflict. The largest areas of overlap between these two villages is their approach to improving and expanding communications channels with external actors, and maximizing the role of faith, through *adat* and religion, which allowed village leaders

to manage the emotions and fears that could lead villagers to respond irrationally to perceived threats.

However, fundamental to all of the positive deviant behaviors in both villages was the inherent attitude already present among the village leaders, and fostered among the villagers through the creation of a micro-identity, which overshadowed conflicting ethnic (Maluku) and religious identities.

In order for positive deviance to be successful in the Malukan context, it must focus on strengthening the positive deviant attitudes identified through this survey, rather than the specific behaviors. The Moluccas represent a mosaic of backgrounds, ethnicities and beliefs, which respond to different influences and motivators in approaches to affect behavior change.

The promotion of *adat*, for example, as a vehicle for inter-village peace, can be a double-edged sword. While certain villages can use the *pela-gandong* relations to support peace, many *adat* traditions equally believe they have irreconcilable feuds tracing back to their ancestors. To implement a blanket program that forces unnatural interaction between *adat* communities could just as easily awaken latent historical tensions as encourage the expansion of *pela-gandong* relations.

The nature of the positive deviance methodology requires the promotion of activities that are driven by the communities themselves, not imposed by external actors. To achieve this, the most important positive deviance attribute to be replicated is the moral identity that was present in both villages. Moral identity is more important in influencing our ability to react appropriately when faced with external threats than any other form of constructed or natural identity we may subscribe to.

Identity manifests itself in two ways: our private identity, which is rooted in the very core of our being, and the public identity, which means being true to ourselves in action.⁹ To realign the roots of someone's identity, the influences they are exposed to need to be managed from a very

⁹ Erikson, E. H. *Insight and Responsibility*. New York: Norton, 1964.

early age. To create a moral identity, moral traits must be recognized as good and internalized, then projected outwardly to position ourselves in society as moral actors.¹⁰

To affect large-scale behavior change that can decrease the likelihood of conflict in the Maluku, one must initiate long-term immersion and integration programs that position positive deviance leaders as role models, and are sustainable by the communities beyond MERP II programming.

The following are a set of recommendations for peace building based on the analysis of positive deviance behaviors demonstrated in Hatu and Wayame, as well as additional recommendations based on direct feedback from survey respondents.

Mapping of the Socio-political Structures of Target Villages

Particularly in smaller, rural villages, *adat* practices can be used to support a non-aggressive identity among the people, and peaceful relations between villages. However, as mentioned above, *adat* traditions can also fuel longstanding conflicts between villages. Disputes between village or *adat* leaders from neighboring villages, and inconsistencies in their understanding of *adat* histories, have led to problems with *adat*-focused programs in the past. Before engaging in any *adat*-related programs, a comprehensive survey needs to be conducted to gauge the capacity of villages to leverage their *adat* traditions for peace.

The survey should be carried out by Mercy Corps Maluku staff in Tehoru and Baguala sub-districts initially, to capitalize on their proximity to the positive deviant villages, and can expand to one neighboring sub-district in each area every year. The survey should map: the strength of *adat* leaders, inter-village *adat* conflicts, *pela-gandong* relations, commonalities and differences between *adat* histories and traditions, and *adat* capacity to identify which activities are appropriate to be carried out in each area.

Mercy Corps staff should also collaborate with leaders at the district and sub-district levels who are engaged in *adat* forums to further survey the needs and sensitivities of *adat* leaders and inter-*adat* cultures in the region. Haji Sawed Silawani in Masohi leads the Inter-*adat* forum in Central Maluku, and has led several initiatives to establish peace agreements between villages and MoUs with *adat* leaders.

¹⁰ Aquino, Karl. *The Relationship between Moral Identity and Moral Outcomes: A Social Cognitive Framework*. University of British Columbia – Okanagan Research Seminar Series, 2009.

Development of Mentoring Systems throughout Sub-Districts

Youth Mentoring Program

The development of a new identity, rooted in peace and tolerance, cannot be accomplished through one-off activities. To reshape the influences youth are exposed to, Mercy Corps needs to establish a mentoring system that brings together leaders in positive deviant communities with youth from their sub-districts. If, for example in the case of Hatu, positive deviant leaders representing both religions are not available, leaders from other communities can be engaged. However, it is not recommended to involve too many leaders from outside of the positive deviant villages, as the impact of the mentoring program will be lost.

This program should engage youth leaders from all villages in the Tehoru and Baguala sub-districts as representatives for their village. Together with the positive deviant leaders, they will be asked to brainstorm fun youth activities they can do together. It is important that the ideas come from the youth leaders themselves, so that they feel ownership in the program and will be able to promote these activities effectively to the other youth in their village. The activities must be suitable for large groups and be inexpensive enough that the community itself could pay for it.

Depending on input from the positive deviant leaders, this program could be started by a large youth gathering hosted in their village. Using any field available, at the local school or an open lot, youth could be invited for a day of team building games, such as spoon and egg races, three-legged races, *Panjat Pinang* (an Indonesian game in which teams have to work together to climb an oiled up banana tree), recreational soccer and volleyball matches, and relay races. Everything required should be readily available in the village, and the only expense should be for food and drinks during the day.

To prevent disputes from arising between village leaders concerning the program, the program should be socialized to other village leaders as a program for youth, by youth. The mentoring element will happen naturally, and does not need to be the focus of the program to external actors. Likewise, Mercy Corps' involvement or support in the program does not need to be highlighted. Feedback from survey respondents indicates that prominent display of an INGO's name often changes the expectations of stakeholders, who assume the money for all activities

will be supplied by the INGO, and fundraising on their part is unnecessary. This contributes to the lack of sustainability of many programs once the INGO ends its involvement.

Young Entrepreneurs Camps

Building on the concept of integration through immersion to increase social tolerance, Young Entrepreneurs Camps in Hatu and Wayame would provide a cost-efficient and effective means of implementing a mentoring system with positive deviant communities and developing practical skills in youth.

Candidates for the Young Entrepreneurs Camps can be selected from local schools or nominated by village leaders. The selected candidates will be sent to the target communities for a one-month immersion program in which they live with local farmers, fishermen and tradesmen and spend half of their days working alongside their host families. While working, their host will be responsible for teaching them practical skills based on their experience in the field.

The campers will return to the village to eat lunch together, at a donated facility. Rotation between the mosque, church and public schools is desired if the facilities are available. After lunch the campers will attend one-hour skills building sessions to learn general professional skills, including bookkeeping, purchasing, inventory management, resource management, financial management, distribution channels and cooperative management from Mercy Corps staff or local experts, as well as specific skills related to their trade such as grafting, crop rotation, trawling and engine mechanics. The specific skills-building topics should be developed in coordination with local experts in the positive deviant villages, and modified if necessary based on additional needs identified during the practical component of the camp.

Following the specific skills-building sessions in the early afternoon, campers will participate in fun, team-building activities (as described in the Youth Mentoring Program above as well as business-focused activities) from mid-afternoon until dinner. Mercy Corps staff or local youth leaders can be engaged to lead this component of the program. Evenings will be free time for them to help their host-families with chores at home or socialize.

To increase the impact of passive peace-building lessons and increase participants' awareness of and tolerance for the diversity of the Maluku, ideally, the Young Entrepreneurs campers will be taken out of their environment for the program. Urban youth from the Baguala sub-district will

attend the camp in Hatu, while rural youth from Tehoru will travel to Wayame to attend the camp. The children of the host families in the positive deviant communities will remain in their village and work together with the exchange campers in all aspects of the program.

Re-establishment of *Adat* Structures and Practices

Development of a Toolkit to Strengthen *Adat* in Villages

The success of any program requires the buy in of the local community and village leaders to be successful and independently sustainable. To best reach villages through programs focused on strengthening *adat* traditions, Mercy Corps should develop an *Adat* toolkit, with multiple program products that can be implemented depending on need and community requests. Developing MoUs with village leaders for specific services will increase the likelihood of adoption and ownership by target communities. Based on the results of the survey, the toolkit could include the following required services:

Understanding New Village Governance Structures

Many villages have yet to adopt the *adat* governance structures returned to the province through the regional regulation issued by the province in 2006, due to either a lack of understanding of what the regulation entails or absence of village elections since the regulation was passed. Facilitated discussions between representatives from the district, sub-district and village-level governments are necessary to identify areas of confusion and build a forum for communicating problems that arise in implementing the regulation/

Understanding the Role and Use of Village Regulations

The new regulation on village governance structures provides villages with the right to develop new laws concerning the specific *adat* practices at the village area. However, most villages do not have the legal capacity to develop laws. Discussions with legal experts from the district-level government on criteria for village laws and tips for drafting a village law is necessary to empower *adat* in village-level governments.

*Transcribing *Adat* Histories*

Many *adat* histories are at risk of being lost because they rely on oral transfer from generation to generation. With the 40 year hiatus on active *adat* practice in villages, today's youth have a limited knowledge of their familial and village history, have not learned the local language, and have lost the respect for their elders inherent in *adat*

culture. Transcribing *adat* histories will assist in re-entrenching *adat* lessons in village culture.

Adat Activities for Youth

In support of the *adat* cultural programs introduced through the local traditions curriculum in schools, Mercy Corps could assist the growth of *adat* arts and culture by supporting extracurricular youth groups for dance, music and song, drawings and poetry in local languages. Mobile exhibitions of these groups could be initiated, with performances at local traditional events, weddings, and parties to inspire more youth to join. By actively embracing *adat* arts and culture, the children will become more connected with the history and meaning behind their *adat* traditions, strengthening their respect for the peaceful aspects of *adat*.

Promotion of *Adat* Curriculum in Schools

Promoting a common understanding of the *adat* history of the Maluku was cited as both an important driver of potential conflict and a crucial instrument in promoting peace. Differences in understanding about the roots of certain *marga* – whose ancestors were first to inhabit a village or district, or how *adat* traditions are to be carried out – trigger many *adat* conflicts. Meanwhile, shared *adat* roots can secure peaceful relations between *marga* and villages throughout a district. Promoting one common *adat* lineage in schools can overcome misunderstandings about *adat* relations caused by lost histories, and bind future generations closer.

The UNDP Peace to Development (PTD) program developed a curriculum that teaches the fundamental, common concepts of Maluku *adat* histories to school children. They worked together with the provincial Board of Education to implement the curriculum in elementary and junior high schools. This program is a good initiative to strengthen the positive influence *adat* can have on community relations; however, no monitoring of its implementation is planned, and the PTD program is coming to an end this year. Monitoring of the implementation of this program is essential, as it has the potential to widen separations between *adat* groups. Feedback from teachers should be collected to survey students' reactions to the curriculum, as well as a cross-cutting survey of the students themselves, to identify any negative trends in youth perceptions concerning other communities stemming from the curriculum in order to make corrective changes as early as possible.

Provision of *Adat*-based Peace Trainings for Village Leaders

Tony Pariela, Professor of Sociology at Universitas Pattimura, worked together with the mayor's office in Ambon and FKIP to conduct peace trainings based on *adat* traditions in a number of villages on Ambon Island. The trainings focused on peaceful means of conflict resolution, and facilitated discussions with *adat* leaders to accept that they had different accounts of their history, but focus on their common bond as Malukan people. Tony said that the response to and immediate results of the trainings were very good; however, there was no follow up by the trainers concerning the long-term implementation of the training material, so there are no indications of lasting changes in approach to differing versions of a shared history.

Tony said he would be more than happy to work together with Mercy Corps to continue with these facilitated discussions to *adat* leaders, or to support any other *adat* activities we carry out. This can be done in a number of ways:

1. Mercy Corps coordinates peace trainings led by Tony Pariela and other academics who participated in the original exercise, and focus on long-term monitoring to ensure the key lessons are internalized
2. Mercy Corps invites Tony Pariela and other academics to provide their staff with a Training of Trainers on the peace training curriculum for Mercy Corps staff to carry out in target villages
3. Mercy Corps invites Tony Pariela or other academics to participate as experts or guest speakers at Mercy Corps-initiated *adat*-based peace-building programs

Capacity Building

Capacity Building for Religious Leaders

Religious differences drove the 1999-2004 conflict, and as a result, most peace-building and conflict resolution programs initiated since the conflict have focused on fostering interactions between Christian and Muslim communities. Most respondents indicated that focusing on religion through community programming was no longer necessary, and that people were at the point where they could grow together naturally.

While the majority of the recommendations produced from this survey focus on general programming involving communities regardless of religion, strengthening the capacity of

existing inter-faith organizations in the regions surveyed would be beneficial to coordinate programs supporting peace initiated by religious leaders.

Two main inter-faith organizations were identified during the survey: Lembaga Antar Iman (LAI) based in Ambon and Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB) in Masohi. Unfortunately, no representatives from LAI were available for interviews during the survey period. Further mapping of the specific organizational and community outreach needs of LAI is necessary to determine capacity building requirements in the Ambon region.

In Masohi, two representatives of FKUB were interviewed: Haji Sawed Silawani, Head of the Indonesian Ulemas' Council and Sara Latuni, head of the Central Maluku *Klasis* for the Indonesian Protestant Church. FKUB involves Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist and Hindu leaders. Initially, meetings to discuss inter-faith issues were well attended, but lack of direction, weak leadership and personal interests have resulted in reduced participation in the forum.

However, the FKUB respondents surveyed indicated continued interest in pursuing future activities through the forum. It is the opinion of this researcher that outside facilitation focused on producing clear, realistic program targets would be both well received and productive in supporting inter-faith activities that could help overcome potential religious conflict in future.

Again, for this program it should not be Mercy Corps' role to lead the FKUB members of produce ideas for programming, but rather to work with FKUB to determine: 1) specific capacity building needs in leadership, organizational development, strategic planning, logical framework development and community mobilization. Identified training needs can involve local experts, and Mercy Corps staff should be involved in their coordination, as well as facilitating the development of a strategic plan and logical framework, as well as monitoring their implementation to provide support to FKUB members and identify any capacity building needs that arise.

Many INGOs and government initiatives have been implemented in the Maluku since the conflict, focused on promoting peace and developing the local economy and infrastructure. This survey identified that the greatest contributor to the failure of these programs to affect impactful change was the lack of consistent monitoring. Implementing one impactful program with

consistent monitoring for the duration of the MERP II program would produce far better results for the program stakeholders than a number of one-off programs with no follow up.

Framework for Mercy Corps Maluku Peace-building Program

The following framework has been developed based on the assumptions put forward in the recommendations in this report. Some of the specific inputs and timelines required for the programs detailed in this framework may vary depending on feedback from communities and Mercy Corps staff during their implementation.

Program	Requirements for Successful Implementation			Projected Timeline	Projected Outcomes
	Individuals	Inputs	Political Structure		
Youth Mentoring Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Youth Leaders ▪ Village leaders ▪ Youth from PD sub-districts ▪ Mercy Corps Staff ▪ Rosa (for recruitment and support) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Food & beverages for initial gathering/activity ▪ Potential matching scheme for funds raised by community or specific support for transportation out of the village for field trips ▪ Any equipment required for team-building exercises 	Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems should be included in this survey.	The youth mentoring program is meant to be an ongoing, community-driven program. Mercy Corps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Long-term transition of youth identity through peaceful influences ▪ Increased cooperation between youth from different villages ▪ Decreased disputes and larger-scale conflicts between youth groups
Young Entrepreneurs Camp	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PD Leaders ▪ Families in PD villages ▪ Village leaders (for selection) ▪ Headmasters and teachers (for selection) ▪ Local farmers, fishermen, tradesmen ▪ Experts in professional skills ▪ Youth from PD sub-districts ▪ Mercy Corps Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation for all participants to camp location ▪ Transportation for trainers and Mercy Corps staff ▪ Lunch for all participants (breakfast and dinner should be provided by host family) ▪ Camper t-shirts and hats ▪ Any equipment required for team-building exercises 	Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems should be included in this survey.	The month of July (school vacation) every year.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased cooperation between youth from different villages ▪ Increased awareness and tolerance of other communities by participants ▪ Increased professional and economic opportunities for participants
Mapping of the Socio-political Structures of Target Villages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Adat</i> leaders at village, sub-district and district level ▪ Village heads or <i>Bapak Raja</i> ▪ Mercy Corps Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation for Mercy Corps staff 	Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems should be included in this survey.	A general survey of <i>adat</i> structures could be completed in 2-3 weeks in each sub-district, while an in-depth mapping of histories and practices could take 2-3 months.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Deepened understanding for Mercy Corps staff of the current <i>adat</i> structures and histories present in the target sub-districts, progress in shifting to the <i>Bapak Raja</i> system, support requirements and opportunities for future capacity building programs.
Establishing MoUs with <i>Adat</i> and Village Leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Adat</i> leaders (<i>Matoke</i> and <i>Latupati</i>) ▪ Village leaders ▪ Mercy Corps Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation for Mercy Corps staff 	Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems can be included in this survey, dependent upon willingness of village head and <i>adat</i> leaders.	Establishing MoUs with <i>adat</i> leaders need not be restricted to a limited amount of time, however an initial round of MoUs should be possible within six months of completing the Mapping of Socio-political Structures of Target Villages.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased understanding of specific <i>adat</i> needs and targeted program goals with <i>adat</i> communities to develop peaceful <i>adat</i> practices ▪ Increased capacity of <i>adat</i> and village leaders to develop programs targeting peace through <i>adat</i> relations and culture
Understanding New Village Governance Structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Adat</i> leaders ▪ Village leaders ▪ District and sub-district government representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Venue (should be secured at the sub-district office) • Transportation for all participants 	Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems should be included in this survey.	These sessions should be facilitated monthly until Mercy Corps' involvement is no longer required.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased legal and political capacity of village leaders ▪ Established two-way communications between leaders at village, sub-district and district levels

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mercy Corps Staff 	<p>(consideration must be taken for the loss of daily income the participants may suffer as a result of not being able to harvest crops to feed their families that day)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food & Beverage – including meals for family members that would have been provided by the day’s work 			
Understanding the Role and Use of Village Regulations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Adat</i> leaders ▪ Heads of Village, <i>Bapak Raja</i>, and <i>adat</i> leaders from villages ▪ District and sub-district government representatives (Legal experts) ▪ External experts in legislation ▪ Mercy Corps Staff 	<p>These sessions can be held in conjunction with the Village Governance Structures discussion, or held separately, rotating between <i>adat</i> houses in the sub-district.</p>	<p>Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems should be included in this survey.</p>	<p>These sessions can be facilitated through the same meetings as the Village Governance Structures discussions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Empowered villages, able to develop local laws ▪ Strengthened local cultures through legal support to <i>adat</i> systems
Transcribing <i>Adat</i> Histories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Adat</i> leaders willing to discuss <i>adat</i> histories and traditions ▪ Village elders ▪ Mercy Corps staff with a solid background in <i>adat</i> histories from the area 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation for Mercy Corps staff ▪ Recording equipment ▪ Publication costs (optional) 	<p>Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems should be included in this survey, providing the presence of <i>adat</i> knowledge among village elders is strong.</p>	<p>Dependent upon survey results.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Clear records of <i>adat</i> histories and customs ▪ Documentation to assist in clarify disputes, and missing aspects of <i>adat</i> histories
<i>Adat</i> Activities for Youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Villagers with an active knowledge of traditional <i>adat</i> arts and a willingness to teach ▪ Buy in from teachers/headmasters for use of school grounds and equipment for practice ▪ Supportive <i>adat</i> leaders to guide lessons in the history of the arts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coordination by Mercy Corps staff to find interested parties and assist them in approaching schools for participants and program support ▪ Socialization in other villages to expand program and opportunities for performances ▪ Possibility of start-up funds for costumes, instruments or supplies 	<p>Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems should be included in this survey.</p>	<p>Mercy Corps’ involvement should be in the beginning stages only, for coordination with local villagers and identification of initial needs. Ongoing monitoring can be carried out during visits for other programming needs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enriched knowledge of <i>adat</i> culture among youth ▪ Heightened appreciation for local traditions ▪ Increased respect for traditional village elders, leading to increased social harmony
Promotion of <i>Adat</i> Curriculum in Schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Representatives from local Boards of Education ▪ Teachers (whenever possible, survey participants should represent an equal balance of gender, <i>marga</i>, and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation for Mercy Corps staff to all regions included in the survey – at least five times ▪ Re-publication of PTD curriculum for schools 	<p>Both Village Head and <i>Bapak Raja</i> systems should be included in this survey.</p>	<p>One year for coordination with schools and monitoring.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enriched knowledge of <i>adat</i> culture among youth ▪ Heightened appreciation for local traditions ▪ Increased respect for traditional village elders, leading to increased social harmony

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> geography) ▪ Students (whenever possible, survey participants should represent an equal balance of gender, <i>marga</i>, and geography) ▪ Data entry specialist ▪ Mercy Corps staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> included in survey (with written permission by UNDP and only if necessary) ▪ Training in <i>adat</i> curriculum and histories for teachers 			
Provision of <i>Adat</i> -based Peace Trainings for Village Leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tony Pariela and other academics from initial Peace Training program ▪ Village leaders ▪ Government representatives from district and sub-district level ▪ Mercy Corps staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Venue (can likely be secured in the village) ▪ Lunch, snacks and beverages for trainers and participants ▪ Transportation for Mercy Corps staff and trainers ▪ Presentation materials and handouts ▪ Stationary 	This program should be carried out in villages where <i>adat</i> culture is still strong, and between villages with notoriously violent histories in particular.	Depending on need, but approximately one training per month for 12 months (due to time constraints of the trainers).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased understanding and tolerance for different understandings of <i>adat</i> history ▪ Increased willingness and capability to resolve inter-village and inter-<i>adat</i> disputes peacefully
Capacity Building for Religious Leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Members of FKUB and LAI (upon survey of needs) ▪ Mercy Corps staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation for Mercy Corps staff 	The target villages for direct-to-community programs will be determined by the inter-faith organizations.	Facilitation of one coordination meeting per month to track progress after initial strategic plan and logical framework are developed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Re-invigorated inter-faith coordination, with impact on congregations

