

# AUTONOMY & PEACE REVIEW

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## **Urban Safety Profile in the ARMM**



INSTITUTE FOR AUTONOMY AND GOVERNANCE



KONRAD ADENAUER-STIFTUNG

# Autonomy and Peace Review

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## **EDITORIAL**

*ELISEO “JUN” MERCADO, OMI*

The issue of safety in highly urbanized areas in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or ARMM has been the focus of the study-research undertaken by the Notre Dame University Research Center and the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) under a research grant given by UN Habitat.

There are five urbanized areas included in the said study. They are the following: Cotabato City, Marawi City, Zamboanga City, Isabela City and Jolo. Though Cotabato City, Zamboanga City and Isabela City are NOT ‘officially’ components of the ARMM, they are at the very hearts of the movements of peoples and commerce within the said region.

The study on urban safety for the stated places was based on the primary and secondary data available to the NDU researchers. After the first draft was submitted to IAG, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) composed mainly of stakeholders were conducted to validate the findings of the study. The inputs from the FGDs were incorporated into the second draft that was subsequently subjected to an Experts’ Group Discussion (EDG).

The study suggests that there is a need for a long-term urban development programming to effectively improve the living environment for all on a sustainable basis by providing appropriate interventions on the basic needs of the informal sectors- IDPs. It intends to reintegrate displaced persons in urban planning that will incorporate plans for better housing facilities, improved delivery of basic social services, clean and potable water, affordable health services and better educational facilities.

Also, among the findings of the study is the urgent need to create programs that are the sustainable and regular sources of livelihood for adult displaced persons and the families of the informal sectors. They should include the conduct of livelihood feasibility studies and a one-time grant funding to set up operations and capitalize a revolving credit enhancement fund to support livelihood initiatives of the informal sectors. It shall include initiatives that promote resource development and institutional capacity building for the viable livelihood management with the end view of improving the economy of the host urban areas.

The reading of the study will indicate the imperative to develop and enhance the capacity of local chief executives to manage threats to human security, particularly in the context of its five elements: food security, economic security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Local authorities are in the front line of services. They are closer to the people and so they know the ground situation better than any agencies of the national government. Thus, building their capacity to promote human security is necessary.

## **Introduction**

The safety of urban communities is increasingly becoming a very serious concern in Mindanao. Mindanao, the proverbial “promise land”, has been beleaguered by almost four centuries of armed violence. The chronic phenomenon of contemporary armed conflicts in the Southern Philippines has unleashed complex urban safety challenges not only among the affected but also to host communities, particularly in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). These challenges include panoply of complex and interrelated issues like the following:

- (a) Handling of cases of displaced persons by local, national or international agencies for the effective provision of their basic needs and rehabilitation;
- (b) Coordination for returns to their places of origin and provisions for resettlements for those who opted to stay in the host communities;
- (c) Readiness and ability of local government units (LGUs) to respond to displacements either for short-term or long term accommodations; and
- (d) Dealing with the many consequences brought about by the seemingly inevitable influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the host communities in terms of security and safety of both the original local residents and the “new residents” from the IDPs.

The interplay of socio-economic- political factors explains why armed conflicts generally occur in rural municipalities of the ARMM covered in this study. The difficulties of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to reach a comprehensive negotiated agreement for just and lasting peace in Mindanao and the concomitant problems of the IDPs exacerbate the complexities of these myriad of factors. Until a final settlement is reached, the situation continues to pose enormous urban safety challenges to local, national, and international planners and policy makers concerned on the prospects of peace and development in Mindanao.

Concerned with the security and safety of the people in Mindanao, particularly the sad plight of the displaced persons caught by the continuing armed conflicts in the area, the United Nations Habitat commissioned the Institute for Autonomy in Governance (IAG), in collaboration with Notre Dame University, to conduct a study on “*Urban Safety Situation in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with focus on urban*

*violence, crime and safety for the most vulnerable groups (specially IDPs) through City Profiling”.*

The profiling of five urban areas<sup>1</sup> was conducted in Cotabato City, Zamboanga City, Marawi City, Isabela City, and Jolo. Except for Zamboanga City, these urban study areas are found in the ARMM provinces. The findings of this study revealed the following:

1. Major armed conflicts<sup>2</sup> between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the MILF occurred in the years 2000, 2003, and 2008. IDPs sought refuge in nearest urban areas for their safety and security. A big number of the IDPs evacuated to Marawi City, Cotabato City, Isabela City, and Jolo. The influx of IDPs as a result of armed conflicts exacerbates the socio-economic burden confronted by the host communities in these urban areas.
2. IDPs apparent presence<sup>3</sup> is indicated by the sudden increase in the overall population growth, population density, and poverty incidence in urban areas accommodating the IDPs. Compared to 2000, the host communities registered in 2007 an increased in population growth, population density and poverty incidence when IDPs evacuated to the urban areas included in this study. High increase in the annual population growth rate, population density, and poverty incidence is evident in Cotabato City, Jolo, and Marawi City. In terms of housing arrangements among the IDPs in these urban areas, many opted to stay with their relatives and clan members and were therefore classified as “house-based displaced persons” (HBDPs)<sup>4</sup>. Some IDPs temporarily built their shanties outside of the evacuation sites while others settled “permanently” in vacant public or private lots, in river banks, roadside pavements, and creeks. These two groups of IDPs eventually ended up as “squatters” or informal settlers, which are considered vulnerable groups.
3. This study also observed crime rate increase in the urban areas covered by this report. Results of focused group discussions also revealed other threats to human security experienced by the people in the community. These are natural hazards (tidal surge, flooding, silting of rivers and waterways); kidnapping, car-napping, illegal drug trading, bombing, proliferation of loose firearms, and clan conflict, more known in Mindanao as *rido*.

4. Due to limited access to employment in formal sectors, most adult IDPs found their livelihood in the informal sector doing a variety of subsistence income-generating activities such as vending, and motorcycle or *trisikad* driving.
5. Other problems confronting the poor host urban areas are the following:
  - (a) Limited capacity of the business sector to accommodate the growing demands for employment among members of the labor force (including the permanent displaced persons);
  - (b) Weak capacity of the local government to manage human resource particularly in responding to the needs of the IDPs for sources of livelihood;
  - (c) Non-provision of housing among IDPs; and
  - (d) Lack of specific programs to meet the health and sanitation needs of the IDPs.

The findings marked and considered the five cities to be among the most vulnerable and unsafe urban centers in Mindanao if not in the country.

The study, specifically, aims to enable to:

1. Appraise the general condition as basis for overall resettlement program of the IDP's and the *informal sectors* who have no status;
2. Review and redefine the comprehensive land used plan (CLUP) of the five cities;
3. Review the resources and priority resettlement and development projects for the urban informal sectors;
4. Strengthen the delivery of basic services to address unplanned programs on the housing rights, water and sanitation rights, land tenure reform rights, women's and vulnerable population rights;
5. Conduct capability building activities to enhance LGUs capacities,
6. Reinstate in Cotabato the tax-revenue allocation and install this program in four other cities;

7. Design and launch advocacy campaign for the serious threats to the stability and social climate of the five cities, to sustainable and economic development, the quality of life and human rights; and
8. Make basic education support and services are mainstreamed as priority programs to local governance of the five associating municipalities- especially to their respective budget map.

Further, this project shall also jumpstart the sustainable resettlement and development plan for the sector once called the *excluded sectors* in five cities.

**EndNotes:**

<sup>1</sup> Among the five urban areas in Mindanao included in this study, only Zamboanga City is classified first class city. Cotabato City, Marawi City and Jolo are classified as third class city while Isabela belongs to the fourth class. The classification of these cities indicates that they are generally "urban poor" compared to other cities or urban areas in the entire island of Mindanao. Being in the "urban poor" classification reveals that the provision of basic services available to the people is utterly limited.

<sup>2</sup> Apparent immediate effects of the massive influx of IDPs in these urban areas were the sudden increase in the population growth rates, growing population density, and worsening poverty incidence.

<sup>3</sup> Accurate data on the absolute number and socio-demographic status of IDPs who have become permanent residents in their host communities are not yet available to date.

<sup>4</sup> The Planning and Development Officers attribute this increase to the presence of IDPs affected by armed conflicts in 2000 and 2003.

## URBAN SAFETY PROFILE COTABATO CITY

Cotabato City is described as “a city of rivers and islets” because it is found between two major rivers – Tamontaka and Rio Grande de Mindanao. It became a chartered city on June 20, 1959 pursuant to Republic Act 2364. Originally, it has five big barangays namely, Tamontaka, Rosary Heights, Poblacion, Bagua, and Kalanganan. In 1989, these five barangays were subdivided into thirty-two (32) barangays.




Figure 1. Map of Cotabato City

The city is located in the northwest part of Maguindanao province. It is approximately 689.9 nautical miles southeast of Manila and is more or less 220 kilometers away from Davao City. The city is bounded by the municipality of Sultan Kudarat on the north, by the municipality of Kabuntalan on the east, by the municipality of Datu Odin Sinsuat on the south (these three municipalities belong to Maguindanao province), and the Illana bay on the west. While Cotabato city is found in the province of Maguindanao, ARMM, it belongs to Region XII.

Cotabato City can be reached through land and air modes of transportation. From Manila, it can be reached by domestic planes in about one (1) hour and 45 minutes. It is about three (3) hours away from General Santos City, South Cotabato by land transportation, and about five (5) to six (6) hours away from Davao City by car or public transport.

Transportation system within the city is public utility jeeps (PUJs), and motorized and non-motorized pedicabs.

The City's climate belongs to the fourth type characterized by a more or less even distribution of rainfall through out the year. Dry season occurs in the months of November to February and the wet season is during the months of June to October. The average rainfall in the city registers at 7.07 inches. The City is located outside of the typhoon belt and is protected by hills and mountains. However, on the onset of heavy rains, flash floods occur in the low lying areas of the city. Half of the city's land area is below sea level. Approximately, 85% of the land areas have good external and internal drainage while 15 percent have poor drainage system.

Cotabato City has a total land area of 176 square kilometers.


The economy of the city is generally dependent on commerce and trade of agricultural products (rice, corn, vegetables, poultry products, meat); industrial raw materials; and aquamarine products (crabs, prawns, and fishes). Its major source of income is derived from taxes, fees and licenses on businesses and commercial establishments.

The City's gross income for 2007 was Php 352, 474, 101.85 while in 2008 was Php 417, 243,478.32.

There are thirteen (13) private commercial banks, five (5) government banks, one (1) Islamic bank, and one (1) rural bank that serve the banking needs of the city.

Major industry groups that provide employment to the workforce of the city include: (a) cooperative, manufacturing (home base) food processing, (b) wholesale and retail establishments—general merchant, hardware, grocery, dry goods/textile/ready to wear clothes (rtw) essential and non-essential communication items.


The City population in 2007 (National Statistics Office) was 259,153 while in 2000 it was



163,849, with a population growth rate of 6.52 percent per annum. The figure on population

growth is higher than the national population growth rate of 2.04 percent in the same year (Cotabato City Socio-economic Profile, 2009). There is a big increase in the population growth rate compared to 2.38 in 2000.

In 2000, more than 50% of the total population was Maguindanaon, followed by Visayan population with 22.74 percent. Others belonged to Tagalog with 9.61% and Iranon tribes with 7.48%.



The City is situated in the heart of Maguindanao province, where commerce and trade take place. Most products from the various municipalities of the province are brought to the City's market. Basic services on education, health, banks, and other services are generally accessed by the households, groups and individuals coming from the municipalities outside the City.

Being situated between two big rivers – Tamontaka and Rio de Grande - the economic growth and expansion for urbanization are very limited in terms of land use.

The periodic armed conflict between the AFP and the MILF forces in the neighboring municipalities makes the City highly vulnerable to the consequences of displacements. In the

Indicators	2007	2000	1995	1990
Total land area (in has./ln sq.km)	17,599 ha or 176 sq.km			
Total population	259,153	163,849	146,779	127,065
Population Growth Rate	6.52	2.38	2.74	4.24
Population Density	1,472.5	931.0	834.0	722.0
<b>Household Population by Sex</b>		<b>161,517</b>	<b>145,863</b>	<b>126,636</b>
Male	nd	77,971	71,102	61,557
Female	nd	83,546	74,761	65,079
<b>Household Population 10 year and over by Marital Status</b>		<b>124,547</b>		<b>92,174</b>
Single	nd	57,075	nd	44,091
Married	nd	57,711	nd	44,176
Widowed	nd	4,746	nd	3,261
Divorced/Separated	nd	1,175	nd	584
Others	nd	1,764	nd	14
Not Stated	nd	2,079	nd	481
<b>Number of Household and Average HH size</b>				
Number of Household	nd	31,227	27,093	22,726
Ave Household size	nd	5.17	5.38	5.59
Age Dependency Ratio	nd	60.1	65.5	68.9
Sex Ratio	nd	95.1	95.3	94.6
<b>Projected Population by five-year</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2015</b>
Total	165,000	179,600	194,800	209,400
Male	80,400	87,800	95,300	102,700
Female	84,600	91,800	99,500	106,700

Source: 2008 RSET, SOCCSARGEN Region

2000 war, the total of displaced persons in the City was 24, 179 (based on the World Bank Study, 2003). Of this number, a total of 13, 659 persons were classified as house-based displaced persons while 10, 520 were found inside the evacuation centers (ECs). Most of these displaced persons came from the municipalities of Buldon, Matanog, and Barira, of Maguindanao. The World Bank further reported that among the displaced persons, there were those who returned to their places of origin, but there were also those who opted to settle in the host City. Most of the reasons cited for not going back to their places of origin included the following: (a) it is not yet peaceful and conflict may arise again; (b) loss of house; (c) living condition is better in the host community; and (d) they already established a source of livelihood in the host community.

The 2008 armed conflict between the AFP and the MILF has resulted in another displacement, this time in a much bigger scale. Cotabato City became host to about 883 IDPs (a report taken from the Community and Family Services International, Cotabato City) in 2009. They are all home-based IDPs. Many of them came from the municipalities of Datu Piang, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Talitay, Mamasapano, and Talayan, all in the province of Maguindanao. The displaced persons in the City are found in the following barangays: Bagua Mother, Poblacion Mother, Rosary Heights 3, Rosary Heights 10, and Rosary Heights 7.

Access to livelihood and basic services in the host area seem to entice the displaced persons to establish permanent residence in the host City. However, there were no actual estimates of displaced persons who seek for permanent residency in the City. But a big increase of population growth rate of Cotabato City from 2.39 in 2000 to 6.52 in 2007 NSCB, 2008) was noted. One of the reasons cited by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) on the big increase in the population growth rate was the presence of displaced persons in the City. Other reasons are: (a) influx of rural migrants to the City for employment opportunities; (b) the City is the ARMM Regional seat since it was established in 1989; and (c) the natural increase with 12.2 persons per 1,000 populations annually (City Socio-Economic Profile, 2008).

What are the possible consequences brought about by the presence of the displaced persons in the City in terms of human security by considering the threats to: (a) economic security; (b) food security; (c) environment security; (d) personal security; (e) community; and (f) political security?

a. **Economic security.** The National Statistics Coordination Board (2009) reported a total of 105, 000 labor force for Cotabato City in 2003. The labor force participation rate was 68.9% while the unemployment rate was 10.2%. A 5.2% was computed as visible underemployment rate. Most of the City’s workforces are engaged in trading industry (www: cotabatocity.gov.ph). The visible impact of the presence of displaced persons can be seen in the transportation sector.

There is a big increase in the number of motorcycles/tricycles operating in the City with 2,946 in 2005; 3,183 in 2006; and 3,518 in 2007 (2008, Regional Social and Economic Trends). The

**Table 2. Number of motor vehicles registered in Cotabato City**

Year	Cars	Utility vehicles	Trucks	Buses	Motor cycles/ Tricycles	Trailers
2005	610	3,642	354	-	2,946	6
2006	917	3,791	265	-	3,183	1
2007	911	3,577	543	-	3,518	3

Source: 2008 RSET, SOCCSARGEN Region

figures indicate that from 2005 to 2006, the percentage increase was 8%, and in 2007 an increase of 10.5 was noted in the number of tricycles in the City. Their presence was also felt in the City’s markets, where many individuals were engaged in small vending activities. In a study on *Migration in Conflict Situation and its Implication on Local Governance* (2004) showed that most adult displaced persons used to engaged in economic activities through driving, vending, and farming.

In most cases, displaced persons thrive on subsistence economic activities. This is because displaced persons generally come from rural areas and many of them lack the necessary knowledge and skills required to be employed in the formal sector.

Poverty incidence among families in the City has increased from 26.4% in 2000 to 41.2% in 2003; but in 2006 it went down to 38%, but still high compared to poverty incidence in 2000.

**Table 3. Annual per capita poverty threshold, poverty incidence among FAMILIES and magnitude of poor families**

	2000	2003	2006
Annual Per Capita <b>Poverty</b> Threshold (in Pesos)	12,670	13,805	17,335
<b>Poverty Incidence Among Families (%)</b>			
Estimates (%)	26.4	41.2	38.0
Coefficient of Variation	17.3	13.5	24.5
<b>Magnitude of Poor Families</b>			
Estimates	8,049	14,132	13,414
Coefficient of Variation	17.5	20.1	32.9

Source: 2008 RSET, SOCCSARGEN Region

The 38% poverty incidence of the City is also high compared to the country’s

poverty incidence of 26.9% in the same year. The figures may imply any or all of the

following: (a) the limited capacity of the business sector to accommodate the growing demands for employment among members of the labor force; (b) limited investment in the City to create jobs for the new entrants; and (c) the capacity of the local government to manage its human resource is limited, particularly in responding to the needs of the displaced persons in terms of sources of livelihood.

**b. Food Security.** Food security among the households in the City can be seen in two ways – availability of food in the market, and the purchasing power of the households. Household income is necessary to ensure that food is available. The supply of food in the City is more than enough to respond to the food needs of the households. The City is the trading center of agricultural products coming from the rural areas of Maguindanao. The problem on income generation becomes the primary concern among the households, particularly among the displaced persons who rely heavily on the food rations provided by the non-government organizations. The food assistance however, is limited and short-term. The City Social Welfare and Development Office (CSWDO) has also limited resources to provide long-term food assistance among the displaced persons. Most often, the CSWDO caters to the needs of walk-in clients (displaced and local residents). The City is classified as 3rd Class City in Region XII. Its primary sources of income are from taxes, fees and licenses on business and commercial establishments.

**c. Health Security.** The City has sufficient facilities in terms of hospitals, bed capacity, and man power. It has one (1) Regional Hospital and Medical Center and four (4) private hospitals. The hospital bed population ratio is 1:414, and there are 43 barangays health stations located in its 32 barangays.

**Table 4. Type of hospital, bed capacity, classification and category of hospital**

Type of hospital	Name of hospital	Address	Bed capacity	Classification	Category
Government	Cotabato Regional & Medical Center	Rosary Heights 10	200	General	Tertiary
Private	Cotabato Medical Specialist Hospital	Quezon Avenue	50	General	Tertiary
Private	Notre Dame Hospital & School of Midwifery	Rosary Heights 9	75	General	Tertiary
Private	Puericulture Center Maternity & Children Hospital	Don Rufino Alonzo Street	30	General	Primary
Private	Dr. P. Ocampo Hospital	De Mazenod Ave. Ext.	25	General	Primary

Source: 2009 Cotabato City Socio-Economic Profile of CCPDO

The 2007 data from the City Health and Sanitation Office (CHSO) showed that about 94 percent of the total households have access to safe water. Only six percent (6%) has unsafe sources of water. This percentage may be referred to households whose houses are found in squatter areas. About 61 percent of the households have access to sanitary toilets while 64 percent have access to satisfactory garbage disposal. These data show that many households are still exposed to unsanitary health practices, including the displaced persons who generally live in shanties situated along the river banks, creeks, and road-right of way.

**d. Environment Security.** As stated

earlier, Cotabato City's climate belongs to the fourth type characterized by a more or less even distribution of rainfall through out the year. Though the City is located outside of

**Table 5. Environmental Sanitation Statistics (Year 2007)  
Cotabato City**

Particulars	# of households	% to total # of households
Projected Number of Households-Yr. 2007	38,361	100.0
<b>I. Number of Households with Access to:</b>		
Safe water:	36,104	94
Level I	3,896	
Level II	3,886	
Level III	28,322	
Unsafe sources	2,257	06
Sanitary Toilet	23,372	61
Satisfactory Garbage Disposal	24,497	64
Complete Basic Sanitation Facilities	22,544	59
<b>II. Food Establishments</b>		
Total number of food Establishments	600	100
<b>Number and % with issued Sanitary Permits</b>	532	89
Without Sanitary Permits	68	11
Total number of Food Handlers (estimated)	3,000	100
<b>Number and % issued Health Certificates</b>	2,318	77
Without Health Certificates (estimated)	682	23
Sanitation complaints received/attended	16	

Source: OHS-FHSIS Coordinator & Sanitation Division

**Table 6. MORBIDITY- Leading Causes and RATE Per 100,000 Population, Year 2007 & Years 2002 – 2006 Compared, Cotabato City**

LEADING CAUSES	RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION							2007	Rank (2007)
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Ave. past 5 yrs			
Pneumonia	445	694	491	549	479	532	<b>538</b>	2	
Diarrhea	425	443	489	556	591	502	<b>588</b>	1	
Diseases of the Heart:									
Hypertension		142	117	170	221	165	<b>257</b>	3	
Other CVDs		179	84	92	108	116	<b>125</b>	5	
Total	216	321	201	263	329	267	<b>382</b>		
TB- Respiratory	82	119	83	115	102	100	<b>80</b>	7	
Typhoid & Paratyphoid Diseases	110	109	95	116	71	100	<b>108</b>	6	
Measles	72	107	07	0	0	37	-	-	
Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever	88	101	72	187	86	107	<b>225</b>	4	
Asthma	55	66	49	55	78	61	<b>70</b>	8	
Diabetes	06	29	07	39	28	22	-		
Kidney Diseases	02	26	06	44	38	24	-		
Gastritis	-	-	-	76	39	42	<b>59</b>	9	
SVI	-	-	-	-	-	-	<b>48</b>	10	

Source: OHS Disease Surveillance/ Hospital Reports

the typhoon belt, heavy rains create flashfloods in low lying areas as half of the City's land is below sea level. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that about fifteen percent (15%) of the city's landscape has a poor drainage. Heavily affected by the flashfloods are households found along the river banks, creeks and low lying areas where drainage system is very poor. These households are exposed to all forms of hazards affecting their health conditions. In 2007, diarrhea and pneumonia were reported number one and two leading causes of morbidity by the CHSO Disease Surveillance, Cotabato City. Rank number four (4) is Dengue (hemorrhagic fever).

**Table 7. Causes of fire incidents in Cotabato City (2006-2009)**

Indicators	2006	2007	2008	2009 Jan-Oct
Electrical Connections	1	1	1	3
Electrical Appliances	5	1	3	
Electrical Machineries				
Spontaneous Combustion				
Open flame due to unattended cooking/stove	1			2
Open flame due to torch or sulo	1			1
Open flame due to unattended lighted candle or gasera	2	1	1	
LPG explosion due to direct flame contact or static electricity	1			
Lighted cigarette butt	1			
Chemicals				1
Pyrotechnics				
Lighted matchstick of lighter				
Incendiary device/mechanism or ignited flammable liquids				
Lightning				
Bomb explosion			1	
Undetermined				
Others/unknown	3	1		3
Total	15	4	6	10
<b>Estimated Damage Php</b>	<b>3,290,000</b>	<b>3,390,000</b>	<b>5,310,000</b>	<b>4,470,000</b>

*Data Source: Bureau of Fire Protection, Cotabato City*

Households living in congested areas (usually in squatter areas and where displaced families constructed their shanties) are also exposed to fire hazards. In 2006, fire incidence was high with 15 cases reported resulting to more than three (3) million pesos damage to properties. In 2009 (Jan-Oct) 10 cases of fire incidences were reported. Common causes of fire cited include: (a) electrical appliances; and (b) open flame due to unattended cooking /stove/candle.

The City has identified the following problems related to housing: (a) proliferation of squatters due to in-migration and possibly the presence of displaced persons who had decided to stay permanently in the City; (b) inaccessible potential socialized housing sites (the City has limited land area for expansion); (c) high cost of land development; (d) insufficient private sector participation in housing development; (e) lack of seed capital to sustain city-initiated social credit housing program. With these problems, the City has difficulty in providing the affected households, more particularly the displaced families, a decent living condition in terms of affordable housing facilities and provision of other basic services such as water, health care and education.

The City Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) approved in 2001 indicates that the present state of the City's development is confronted with problems such as:

- Low agricultural productivity
- Degradation of the coastal area
- Underdeveloped areas
- Poor investment and marketing promotion
- Imbalance population pressure on land and other natural resources
- Inappropriate use of land
- High poverty incidence
- Poor rehabilitation of the wetland (mangrove) forest
- Inappropriate use of some small water ways as dumping of human wastes
- Population living in slum communities
- Limited capability to meet the growing demand for basic services
- Growing settlements in environmental-critical areas and other related problems
- Traffic congestions

The City Planning and Development Office made some revisions of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (2001) to cope with the pressing and growing demands due to physical development, presence of displaced persons, and population growth. The revised copy includes some policies pertinent to all sectors involved. Some of these issues/problems are gradually addressed upon with the implementation of the 2001 CLUP.

e. **Personal Security.** Cotabato City has posted high incidence of crime in 2006 with total crime volume of 180 and in 2007 with total crime volume of 172 cases. In 2008, about 159 cases of crime were recorded. All data on crime volumes were taken from the City PNP. Most cases of crime against person reported were murder and homicide, while crime against property was in the form of robbery and theft.

The Traffic Management Unit (TMU) has also reported cases of damage to property through reckless imprudence with 682 cases in 2007; 498 cases in 2009 covering the months of January to November). Cases of physical injuries through reckless imprudence were also

high with 254 in 2008; and 292 cases in 2009 (January-November). Violation of City traffic ordinances was exceptionally high with 1,773 violations in 2007 and 946 in 2009 (Jan-Nov). For a small City, the big numbers of cases of traffic violations simply show that the Traffic Management Unit has difficulty in enforcing the City Ordinances on traffic.

The Traffic Management Division of the City-based Philippine National Police (PNP) is the primary agency in-charge of the enforcement of land transportation regulations. The study of Buenbrazo in 2001 concluded that the most glaring violations of transport legislations include: illegal operation of vehicles-for-hire; illegal

**Table 8: Crime Incidence in Cotabato City**

CASE REPORTED	2005	2006	2007	2008
<b>Crime against person</b>				
Murder	11	33	23	34
Homicide	6	15	4	3
Physical Injury	16	18	2	0
Rape	9	3	4	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Crime against property</b>				
Robbery	21	27	35	38
Theft	12	16	22	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>48</b>
Total Index Crime	75	112	90	87
Index Crime Solved	64	103	84	57
Crime Solution Efficiency (in %)	85.3	91.96	93.33	65.5
Total Non Index Crime	39	68	82	72
Non Index Crime Solved	36	65	79	70
Crime Solution Efficiency (in %)	92.3	95.59	96.34	97.2
Total Crime Volume	114	180	172	159
Total Crime Solved	100	168	163	127
Crime Solution Efficiency (in %)	87.7	93.33	94.8	79.9

Data Source: Cotabato City Police Office

**Table 9. Cases handled by Traffic Management Unit (Cotabato City) Year 2007-2009**

CASE REPORTED	2007 Jan - Dec	2008 Jan -Dec	2009 Jan- Nov 5
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence	13	3	8
Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence	138	254	192
Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence	682	425	498
Violation of RA 4136	0	0	0
Violation of City Ordinances	846	1,773	946
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,679</b>	<b>2,455</b>	<b>1,644</b>

Source: Traffic Management Unit, Cotabato City Police Office

terminals, illegal parking, operating out of line, and obstruction of traffic.

Residents in Cotabato City are generally exposed to two major threats to personal security which are: (a) the high incidence of crime against person and property, and (b) the traffic hazards due to ineffective implementation of traffic regulations that can cause damage to property and physical injuries to persons.

**Table 10. Gender and person arrested**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 Jan-Nov
<b>PERSONS ARRESTED</b>					
Chemist	-	-	-	-	1
Cohort	-	-	-	2	-
Cultivator	1	1	-	-	2
Possessor	11	14	7	1	1
Pusher	11	28	81	123	68
Trafficker	2	-	-	-	-
User	6	45	94	29	11
Total	31	88	182	185	83
<b>GENDER AND PERSON ARRESTED</b>					
18 below : Male	-	5	1	1	-
18 below : Female	-	1	2	1	-
18 above : Male	24	70	147	138	56
18 above : Female	7	12	32	45	27
Total	31	88	182	185	83

Source: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Cotabato City

- f. Community Security.** Cotabato City is not spared from drug trading. The data taken from the local Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) showed an increasing number of persons arrested from 2005 to 2008. In 2005, 31 persons were arrested; 88 persons in 2006; 182 persons in 2007, and 185 in 2008. Most of these arrested were male.

Types of drug seized by the PDEA included: shabu, Bangkok pills, marijuana plants, marijuana seed/seedlings and marijuana dried leaves.

Very few cases of child abuse were reported in 2008 by the PNP, Women and Children's Protection Desk/OSWDS, Child and Youth Section, April 2009. This included rape (2 cases); child labor (2); homicide murder (1). Of these cases, two (2) were filed at the City Police Office; two (2) were referred to the Barangay; while only three (3) cases were settled.

**Table 11. Child abuse cases in 2008**

Nature of case	No. of cases Reported	No. of cases investigated	No. of cases filed to CPO	Referred to Brgy	Settled	Pending
Rape	2	2	1	1	2	-
Other forms of RA 7610	1	1	-	-	-	-
Child Labor	2	2	1	1	1	-
Homicide/ Murder	1	-	-	-	-	-
Total	6	5	2	2	3	-

Source: 2009 Socio-Economic Profile of Cotabato City, CPDO

Most crimes committed by children were robbery with 55 cases, murder with 47; and physical injuries/maltreatment with 38. The status and disposition of these cases is presented in Table 22.

Data from the City Social Welfare and Development Services (CSWDS) for five (5) years (2004-2008) revealed cases of children in conflict with the law. The nature of cases involved was: rape, acts of lasciviousness, physical injuries/ maltreatment, theft, RA 9165 (use of prohibited drugs) robbery, homicide, murder, malicious mischief, and other related crimes. In

the five year period, a big number of children who committed such crimes were posted in 2008. A total of 158 cases were recorded in 2008 as compared to 12 cases in 2004; 11 in 2005; 4 in 2006; 12 in 2007.

**Table 12. Cases of children in conflict with Law**

Indicator	Year					Total
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
<b>Nature of Cases</b>						
Rape	-	-	1	1	7	9
Acts of Lasciviousness	1	-	-	-	-	1
Physical Injuries/ Maltreatment	1	3	-	2	38	44
Theft	4	7	2	6	15	34
RA 9165 (Prohibited Drugs)	1	-	1	-	3	5
Robbery	2	-	1	1	55	59
Homicide	-	-	-	1	3	4
Murder	-	-	-	-	47	47
Malicious Mischief	-	1	-	-	-	1
Other Related Crimes	3	-	-	1	-	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>207</b>
<b>Status of Cases</b>						
Filed in Court	-	5	2	3	23	33
Pending Investigation	-	-	-	-	-	-
Referred to DSWD	-	-	1	2	4	7
Referred to Barangay	-	-	-	3	-	3
Settled Parties at PNP	12	6	1	4	-	23
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>Disposition</b>						
Arrested	-	6	1	7	-	14
At Large	12	2	-	3	4	21
Others	-	3	3	2	-	8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>43</b>

Source: 2009 Socio-Economic Profile of Cotabato City, CPDO

**Table 13. Programs of OCSWDS for Children**

Indicator	Number of Beneficiaries		
	Male	Female	Total
<b>Day Care Program</b>			
Number of Day Care Workers	-	58	58
Number of Day Care Children			
CY 2008	1332	1835	3168
CY 2007	1817	2040	3857
CY 2006	1968	2325	4293
CY 2005	1441	1544	2955
Number of Accredited Day Care			58
Number of Supplemental Feeding Parents Beneficiaries for Livelihood Assistance			10
<b>Day Care Program</b>			
Number of Street Children Served			
CY 2008	29	29	58
CY 2007	35	31	66
CY 2006	336	112	3718
CY 2005	363	284	3743
<b>Street Children at Social Development Center</b>			
Number of Children catered for: Temporary shelter Value Formation	18	10	28
Number of house parents	-	3	3
Number of children beneficiaries catered to various activities sponsored by private sector (gift giving, feeding, counseling, ministry services and others)	18	10	28
Number of children reunited with their families	17	10	27
Number of abused, battered, victim of child labor, abandoned children			
CY 2008	11	19	30
CY 2007	14	3	17
CY 2006	16	10	26
CY 2005	17	13	30
Number of Rescue Operation			2
Number of Minor Women Rescued		16	16
Number of Capability Building for BCPC Members			15
<b>Program for Street-Based Children</b>			
Number of children rescued and rehabilitated and who are returned to their families and back to school	9	4	13
Children in Specially Difficult Circumstances	11	19	30
<b>Nutrition Program</b>			
Malnourished Children	38	35	73
Severely and Moderately Underweight			
CY 2008			nd
CY 2007			1400
CY 2006			1448
CY 2005			1938
Number of Barangay Nutrition Scholar			37

Source: 2009 Socio-Economic Profile of Cotabato City, CPDO

The City Social Welfare and Development Services has designed and implemented programs specific to the needs of children. These include the following: (a) Day Care Program for 4-6 years old children; (b) Program for the Disadvantaged Children (specific street children); (c) Nutrition Program for severely and moderately underweight children; and (d) Youth Welfare Program.

**Violence against Women.** The data on violence against women were taken from the City Socio-Economic Profile, 2008. The cases involved were theft, physical injury, homicide, rape, and other related crimes. A total of reported cases against women on the second quarter of 2005 were 21 and on the first quarter of 2006 were 16 cases. About 18 cases in 2005 and 5 in 2006 were filed in court; two (2) in 2005 and 4 in 2006 were settled at the City PNP while one (1) in 2005 and 7 in 2006 were settled at the barangay level.

In the FGD conducted with the selected stakeholders in the City, some glaring problems related to community security surfaced. These are: (a) effects of the presence of displaced persons such as increase in number of squatters, increase in occurrence of crimes such as robbery and theft, and drug related, health and sanitation problems. Two FGD participants from the PNP and Drug Enforcement

**Table 14. Violence against women**

Status of cases	2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter (2005)	1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter (2006)	Total
Filed in Court	18	5	23
Settled in PNP	2	4	6
Settled in Barangay	1	7	6
Total Number of cases	21	16	37

Source: 2008 Socio-Economic Profile of Cotabato City from CPDO

Agency said that almost 80% of those who were arrested due to drug related crimes were displaced persons. (b) Carnapping (common for single motorcycles); (c) kidnapping (common target are rich Chinese businessmen); (d) domestic violence; (e) bombing; (f) drug trafficking; and (g) gun trading.

Primary threats to community security as mentioned during the FGD are presence of loose firearms, unemployment, loose sense of morality, clan conflict (rido), poverty, and presence of displaced persons. The presence of armed groups (lost command), extortion groups, private armies, gangs (TBS), organized groups, drug pushers/drug lords in the City also pose as threats to the community's security. Places in the City considered by the FGD participants not safe or secured for the people to go especially at night –

Supermarket, Poblacion 2, Mabini, Plaza, Bagua, and Almonte Extension.

Table below shows the ratio of police and firemen to population of the City. The ratio of population to police in 2005 was 1:1,036; in 2006 the ratio was 1:1,174; and in 2007 the ratio is 1:1,234. These figures are beyond the ideal police requirement per 1, 000 population.

The ratio of firemen to population is much higher compared to police ratio to population.

The figures showed the following: 1:4,496 in 2005; 1:4,605 in 2006; and 1, 4, 712 in 2007.

**Table 15. Ratio of police and firemen to population**

Year	Population	Policemen	Ratio	Firemen	Ratio
2007	259,153	210	1:1,234	55	1:4,712
2006	239,456	204	1:1,174	52	1:4,605
2005	224,783	217	1:1,036	50	1:4,496

*Ideal Policeman/Population Ration 1:1,000*  
*Source: 2008 RSET, SOCCSARGEN Region*

The City police- population ratio

in three year period has shown an increasing trend – 1: 1,036 in 2005; 1:1,174 in 2006; and 1: 1,234. All ratios indicate that the City did not meet the minimum requirement according to the Republic Act 6975 of one police per 1,000 persons. The same pattern was observed in the case of firemen ratio to population. The data showed that despite the increase in the number of manpower of police and firemen (in 2006 and 2007) the police–population and firemen – population ratios are still increasing. This indicates that Cotabato City needs more police and firemen to augment existing local security personnel in the city. Despite the limitations on security personnel, the city government has taken some safety measures to ensure public safety. The City Peace and Order Council has come up with an Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) in order to protect the lives and properties of the people, ensure public order and safety, and establish and/or maintain the stability of the government of the City against the inroads and negative influences of lawlessness, illegal drugs, and other forms of criminal activities.

While the Community Public Safety Plan of the City has already taken effect, the City government has still to do more to effectively implement the IA/CPSP in the City. FGD participants gave recommendations on how to improve the safety, peace and order in the

City. These include: (a) strong political will to strictly implement all city ordinances and other related laws; (b) improved justice system; (c) improved practice of good governance; (d) strengthened program on *Balik Armas* (loose firearms retrieval) at the barangay; (e) enhanced role of spiritual/religious leaders in peace advocacy and participation in the City Peace and Order Council, and (g) established rehabilitation centers for drug users in Cotabato City.

**Political Security.** Data on cases of human rights violations, disappearances, torture, and the like are not included in the City PNP reports on incidence of crimes. This is one concern to be addressed in the future research.

In summary, Cotabato City is one of the major cities in the Philippines with a high incidence of poverty. While the City is currently one of the centers for trade and finance in Region 12 and the ARMM, its poor physical infrastructure limits investment growth and impedes employment generation. Limited employment opportunities worsen poverty situation in the City. Frequent flooding in the City, as a result of poor infrastructure and city planning, creates heavy traffic that slows down economic activities and drives away potential tourists. Were it not for international development agencies and foreign non-government organizations operating in the City, Cotabato City would not have attracted foreign and local visitors. Thus, there is a need for Cotabato City to revise its CLUP and adopt an urban plan that will improve physical infrastructure of the city necessary for investment and tourism promotion.

Cotabato City also has a poor tourism promotion plan that can generate local employment. The influx of IDPs as a result of internal armed conflicts in its neighboring municipalities in Maguindanao exacerbates employment problems and creates human security concerns in the City, particularly in the areas of food security, health security and environmental security. It is therefore necessary for the government of Cotabato City to develop a comprehensive tourism plan as part of the over-all urban plan.

As part of the overall process of urbanization, Cotabato City faces personal security associated with index and non-index crimes. Issues of insurgency and terrorism in Central Mindanao also affect the City's overall security situation. While Cotabato City has the Community Public Safety Plan to involve the people in the promotion of urban

safety, there is still a need to build capacity of the City government to implement this Plan. While the City also has the Peace and Order Council, local officials continue to rely on the police and military operations to promote peace and order in Cotabato City. There is, therefore, a need for City officials to assert their inherent autonomous power to ensure the safety and security of the residents.

## URBAN SAFETY PROFILE IN THE ISLAMIC CITY OF MARAWI

Marawi City occupies 87.05km<sup>2</sup> land area consisting 2.26% of the 3,383.80 km<sup>2</sup> land area of the Province of Lanao del Sur. With 170,446 total population as of 2007 and a population growth rate of 2.96, it is presently the highly urbanized settlement within the Southern Lanao region – the ancestral territory of the Maranaw people of Mindanao.

Marawi City has not been the site of actual gun battle between the AFP and the MILF combatants since 2000. Even the latest episode of that conflict which broke out in August 2008 to September 2009 did not spill over in the city. Actual fighting occurred in the rural barangays of adjacent towns and municipalities. Nonetheless, Marawi City grappled with the effects of armed conflict in the context of varied but interrelated socio-cultural and political dynamics that are strongly manifested in terms of influx of IDPs, increased crime rate, unregulated housing build-up, and heightened threats to urban safety. The situation is complicated by the pervasive *rido* (clan feuds) among Maranaws. A marked increase in the volume of crime is reported by the city police in its 2008-2009 Total Crime Volume Report. It shows a 357% increase in crime volume within the 2008-2009 interval. Grave threats and illegal possession of firearms are reported as among the highest threats in the city. These types of crime posed the most serious threats to urban safety in 2008 and 2009 – on top of the very low showing of the city police force at 1:3,964 police-to-population ratio.

There were a total of 30,045 IDPs in 2008 and 2009. Most IDPs were house-based, as 27,129 of them have found shelter in the houses of city-dwelling relatives and clan members. City officials did not strictly impose housing regulations in the face of rising constructions of adjunct rooms and or small light material houses. IDP-related housing build up was left unmonitored



Figure 4. Locator Map of Marawi City

and unchecked, which resulted in an infrastructural situation where unregulated house constructions became a common phenomenon. These are usually put up as adjunct structures to

existing houses or as separate semi-concrete housing units within the compounds of relatives. Otherwise, the staying “former IDPs” proceed to build their own light material houses along riverbanks, vacant lots, and street pavements inside market areas.

## **THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE CONFLICT**

- a. Economic security.** The city has a total of 5,160 businesses in operation (2007 City Assessor’s Report) and has an employment growth of less than 15% (LGU Employment Services Office and DOLE Regional Office, 2007). Despite the presence of these business establishments, its economy is largely dependent on agriculture (rice and corn production), trade, and employment. Most of the trading businesses are actually small-scale family-owned ventures. These include hollow block-making, goldsmith, sawmill and small and medium cottage enterprises that are engaged in garment-making, mat and *malong* weaving, woodcraft, and brassware making.

Generally, Marawi City exhibits limited economic activities (Executive and Legislative agenda 2008-2010). For one, crop production is low in agriculture sector – way below its projected potential. Hence, only 28.53% of households derived their basic income from agriculture. The latest benchmarks of Per Capita Poverty Threshold Income (PCPTI) and employment rate are based on 2007 figures. Marawi City’s PCPTI is pegged at 3,857.00 pesos per month, considering an employment rate of 89.2% and 10.8% unemployment rate. Overall, the city has a poverty incidence of 43.5%, a condition affecting 6,994 families wherein average household income as per 2006 to 2009 data is pegged at P 7,000 per month (<http://nscb.gov.ph/activestats/>).

The situation is exacerbated by the consequences of August 2008 armed conflict and pervasive *Rido* incidence in the neighboring communities in Lanao. The influx of IDPs to the city strained the already poor services and its limited employment opportunities. It has been observed that business establishments in the city prefer to hire *bisaya* (non-Maranao) workers. Most Maranao employers are deterred by the fact that any minor problem with their Maranao employees will trigger a *rido* - hence, the preference for *bisaya* workers. Expectedly, unemployment rate increased especially among the Maranaos. Results of the FGD reveal that

the IDPs usually earn their income by helping their host relatives in the business of selling and vending goods such as surplus clothing (*ukay-ukay*), food, water in gallons, “antureras” (beadwork), and home-made delicacies. These business endeavors are usually put up as pavement stalls along the city commercial routes and road ways. Some have rented stalls inside shopping department stores and put up their own business. Most male IDPs earn their living by driving passenger vehicles and motorcycles. However, it is observed that the financial return generated from these economic ventures is generally minimal, as the city is already saturated with these kinds of businesses and income-generating activities. Overall, many IDPs remain jobless and simply depend on the support of their host relatives – increasing even more the number of unemployed individuals and poor families in Marawi City. It nurtures an increasing population with economic base that offers minimal job opportunities. Worse, the city government has no definite program to address poverty and unemployment problems. Moreover, data from the FGD workshop reveals that around 1% of IDPs have resorted to begging for economic sustenance.

With this major consideration, most of the young Maranaws - some of whom are professional - rather choose to engage in trade and entrepreneurial endeavors – establishing pavement stalls of electronic accessories in other towns and cities all over the country. They opt to manage their own businesses rather than work in another person’s establishment.

**b. Food Security.** Generally, food supply is not a problematic issue of Marawi City. There is abundance of food for the Maranaws who want to acquire it according to their food gathering and food preparation patterns. The issue largely lies on the capacity of the populace to purchase food. With a poverty incidence of 43.5% – a condition affecting 6,994 families wherein average household income is contained at 7,000 per month, the city residents simply maintains subsistence-level food sustainability grade. It is asserted that agriculture remains as the primary economic base of Marawi City. However, it is characterized today with low farm profitability, low farm income, and low agricultural productivity for Marawi City. These factors translate into the difficulty of converting agricultural activities into money - hence, resulting to the residents not having enough money to buy more food. Further, the weak purchasing power of the populace is exacerbated by the influx of IDPs who generally rely on

their host relatives for sustained food supply.

During massive displacement scenarios, food supply especially for the IDPs is maintained through relief operations by NGOs and CSWD. The LGU of Marawi City through DSWD Region 12 provided food commodities and other domestic items like mats, mosquito nets, kitchen utensils and bed sheets. The World Food Programme provided mongoes, rice and cooking oil. The International Organization and Migration (IOM) provided malongs, plates, blankets, glasses, hygiene kits, toothbrushes, toothpastes, towels, bath soaps and laundry soaps. The St. Mary's Parish Church of Marawi City provided milk, rice, noodles and sardines.

While increased crime rate can be identified as the indirect consequence of armed conflicts in Marawi City, its direct consequence, on the other, is attributed to the influx of thousands of IDPs. Its biggest number of IDPs originated from the 2008<sup>1</sup> armed conflict in South, Central, and Western Mindanao. The 2008 armed conflicts displaced a total of 30,045 persons who evacuated towards Marawi City beginning August 2008. The number reduced dramatically to 2,450 displaced persons in October 2009. The City Social Welfare and Development Office (CSWD) explained the city's handling of the IDPs needs, to wit:

*The LGU of Marawi City through DSWD Region 12 provided food commodities and other domestic items like mats, mosquito nets, kitchen utensils and bed sheets amounting to almost half a million. The Marawi Health Office provided medicines and vitamins, the World Food Programme provided mongo beans, rice and cooking oil. The International Organization on Migration (IOM) provided malongs, plates, blankets, glasses, hygiene kits, toothbrushes, toothpastes, towels, bath soaps and laundry soaps. The St. Mary's Parish Church of Marawi City provided milk, rice, noodles and sardines. The CSWD provided counseling and trauma healing sessions to the IDPs, especially among senior citizens, women, and youths.*

*Present services of the CSWD cover day care services, out of the ninety-six (96) barangays of Marawi City, it is able to serve only 16 barangays due limited financial resource as there are no funds available for the honorarium of Daycare teachers.*

*(CSWD Marawi City, November 18, 2009)*

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<sup>1</sup> *The breakdown of the peace negotiations over the issue of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) resulted to another explosive episode of the protracted GRP-MILF armed-conflict in August 2008 to September 2009.*

Most IDPs were house-based, as 27,129 individuals have found shelter in the houses of their city-dwelling relatives and clan members, who were conversely obliged by cultural norm to cuddle distressed kinfolks. Maranaws are known to be fiercely and passionately defensive of their *maratabat* or clan pride (Torres, 2007)<sup>2</sup>. It is for this that they do not allow any kinfolk to be branded as evacuees or displaced; lest other clans may call them ‘low class’ and weak for having failed to redeem cousins, nephews or nieces from the evacuation sites. Maranaws always feel duty-bound to protect their relatives from harsh conditions, such as an evacuation center situation – in order to keep the *maratabat* of the whole clan unblemished. This phenomenon manifests in the form of what other authors call, “Family-based social security networks” (Dani & de Haan, 2008). In Marawi City, this can be gleaned in the very large number of 27,129 individual house-based IDPs in 2008, compared to only 2,916 IDPs who opted to stay in the evacuation site, the same year (CSWD Marawi, 2009). The total number was reduced to 2,450 house-based IDPs (Ibid), as the armed skirmishes waned. No IDP stayed in the evacuation center in 2009. This cultural characteristic largely contributes to the transformation of house-based displaced persons into permanent city residents. Table 16 presents the inventory of IDPs in 2008 and 2009.

**c. Health Security.** The health service of the city is under the supervision of the local government unit and the administrative control of the Department of Health (DOH-ARMM). Its health services cover maternal

**Table 16: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 2008**

	No. of Families	No. of Persons
<b>Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 2008</b>		
Inside Evacuation Centers	433	2,916
House-based	5,432	27,129
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,865</b>	<b>30,045</b>
<b>Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as of Oct 2009</b>		
House-based	652	2,450
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>652</b>	<b>2,450</b>

Source: CSWD, Marawi City

**Table 17: Coverage of the City health Office in Maternal Care**

	2005			2006		
Pregnant with 3 or more prenatal visits	5315	2551	48%	5438	2175	40%
Pregnant given TT2 Plus	5315	2308	43%	5438	2067	38%
Postpartum w/ at least 1 postpartum visit	5315	2467	47%	5438	1950	42%
Postpartum mothers initiated breastfeeding	5315	2019	44%	5438	1894	41%
PP mothers complete iron dosage	5315	2205	48%	5438	1804	39%
BF mothers given vitamin A	5315	1677	37%	5438	1910	41%

Source: Marawi City Health Office, 2008

<sup>2</sup> The study on the common causes of large-scale inter-clan conflict in Mindanao confirms the prevalence and intensity of Rido among the Maranaws.

and immunization services thus catering mainly to the mothers and the children in the community. The City Health Office has twenty-seven (27) health personnel. So far, it only has 16 regular personnel and is complemented with contractual field health personnel serving its one and only Rural Health Unit (RHU). The city's health services are further comprised of eight (8) Barangay Health Stations.

Table 17 shows the coverage of the City Health Office in maternal care for 2005 and 2006. The decreasing coverage strongly indicates the city's lack of manpower to attend to the health care concerns of mothers. Only 3 of the 13 rural health workers have permanent appointments. In addition, the existing health facilities are also inadequate and birth attendants are ill-equipped to respond to birth deliveries. Hence, the overall health facilities in the city are **not accredited by the PHIC and the SSS**. Conversely, the same problem is compounded by the increased number of mothers who needed maternal care attention.

While the Amai Pakpak Medical Center is the only government-run health facility in the city, there are also ten (10) other private primary health facilities or hospitals. This existing manpower and health facilities however is observed to hardly cope with the maternal health care, birth deliveries and immunization needs of the city.

The influx of IDPs further strained the delivery of health services. FGD data presents the lack of running water provision for the IDPs. Marawi has 2 interrelated water supply problems: inadequate water supply and high water rate cost. Residents have resorted to erecting personal pitcher pumps to address those problems. IDPs rely on this water supply for their daily needs. Although authorities supply them with chlorine once a week; no official checking has been done to determine how safe their daily water supply is. Those who have babies buy bottled mineral water. FGD data reveal the following situation:

*Mataas ang singil sa tubig.dito sa Marawi City (the cost of water in Marawi City is high) - the reason why only few have faucets and some are using water pumps. Others get water supply from relatives and neighbors. Those who have faucets and are connected with the local water district are charged from P 1,000 to 5,000 per month (on the average) there are water pumps for outlying barangays, but when there*

is no power, there is also no water supply. The water is not safe for drinking specially for small children. Only few households in Marawi City have faucets. The cost of installation of a faucet is P 8,000. The IDPs have no access to faucets, *makikiigib na lang sa kapitbahay* (fetch water from neighbors' pumps).

**d. Community Security.** The 2008-2009 year interval saw a tremendous 357% rise in volume of crime in Marawi City from 58 (2008) to 207 (2009) – tremendously straining the policing workload of the city PNP. The PNP in the city fares poorly in terms of police-to-population ratio of 1:3,964 as of 2009. Threats to personal safety and property in Marawi include murder, homicide, physical injuries, kidnapping, robbery, theft, arson and carnapping. Physical injury and theft are among the biggest incidences that were reported to have threatened the security of the residents in the city for 2008. Threats to personal safety in the city vary from threat and coercion to cases of illegal possession of firearms. In 2008 gambling cases were recorded as among the highest and was followed by illegal possession of explosives. For 2009, illegal possession of firearms tops the list in the Other Crimes category. Likewise, police data on common crimes show rising cases of grave threat and coercion, and robbery within the city.

Official record confirms, among others, the presence of 30,045 IDPs in Marawi City within the same year interval. However, the police statistics does not categorically implicate the large volume of IDPs to the volume of crime as there is no inventory of crimes committed by the IDPs. Some inferences need to be established further, in order to draw out clearer connections in-between.

The following tables present the Volume of Crime and the Incidence of Other Crimes for 2008 and 2009.

While official police reports indicate a total crime volume of 58 cases in 2008 gone up to 207 cases in 2009, with grave threats and

**Table 19. Reported Crimes Against Moral Order and other Crimes for the Years 2008-2009**

CASE REPORTED	2008 Jan to Dec	2009 Jan to Nov
<b>Crimes vs. Moral and Order</b>		
Alarm and Scandal	0	1
Gambling	4	2
Slander and Libel	0	1
Threat and Coercion	0	12
Trespassing	2	0
<b>Other Crimes</b>		
Firearms, Illegal possession	2	121
Explosives/Ammo, Illegal Possession	3	2
Drunk and Disorderly Conduct	0	1
All other Ordinances	2	12
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>152</b>

Data Source: Marawi City Police Headquarters

coercion at its highest (12 reported cases), and robbery increased from 2 to 13 cases; substantive explanations need to bring in other qualitative factor to clarify issues informing the Marawi City criminality aspect.

Beyond the figures presented, Key Informants assert that *rido* or inter-clan feuding has been the biggest factor in the criminality aspect of the city– if only for its degree of pervasiveness and coerciveness -

**Table 20: Reported Cases of Crimes involving the use of Prohibited Drugs for the years 2008-2009**

CASES REPORTED	2008 Jan to Dec	2009 Jan to Nov
Prohibited Drugs (illegal possession)	4	12
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>

Data Source: Marawi City Police Headquarters

more than the GRP-MILF armed conflict itself. It is common public knowledge that the unrecorded incidence of *rido* and the resultant unrecorded displacements it has wrought upon the locals have had much greater effect in terms of criminal cases and influx of IDPs. Although the distinction between armed conflict-affected IDPs and the *rido*-affected IDPs has not been officially drawn; a city official is convinced that the latter type constitutes a sizable portion of the total IDP population. Furthermore, it is explained that the proliferation of loose firearms in the city is an accepted fact among the residents. Accordingly, they intentionally acquire these necessary weapons for two reasons: 1) to fight-off opponent clans against whom they have a standing *rido* situation, and 2) to defend them against criminal elements engaged in the illegal drugs trade. The first reason is the most compelling. This declaration manifests in the police record indicating a tremendous increase of illegal possession of firearms cases from a mere 2 cases in 2008 to a staggering 121 cases towards November 2009. Two of which are classified as illegal possession of explosives.

The police records do not indicate any case of bombing in 2009. However, two incidences of bombing have been reported in the media. On May 20, 2009, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded near a military camp and a bus station. There were no casualties in the said explosion. The second bombing incident occurred on October 20, 2009 with a grenade explosion at the Motor pool area. It caused the death of three (3) civilians and wounded 21 others. That second bombing incident was *rido*-related and was linked to heightened political rivalry between political clans. It was also election-related as it happened during the voters' registration proceeding at the Marawi City hall.

The link between the IDP scenario, increase in crime volume, and minimal access to security becomes implicit when viewed within the interconnection and confluence of the armed-conflict and the pervasive *rido* incidence in Marawi City.

**e. Personal Security.** Considering the tremendous 357% rise in volume of crime from 58 (2008) to 207 (2009), the city police is heavily strained with policing workload – on top of the low compliance in meeting the manpower requirement to provide better access to security and safety for its 170, 446 population. Table below presents the Ratio of Policemen and Firemen to Population.

Marawi City has very low policemen and firemen-to-population ratio, and statistics has been on a downtrend since 2004 when there used to be 90 enlisted police personnel. Then, it downsized to seventy-two (72) regular policemen in 2008 presenting a ratio of one (1) per 2,299 residents. The police force further decreased into forty-three (43) personnel corresponding to one (1) per 3,964 police to population ratio in 2009. The police points to the decline of the number of regular servicemen and the abolition of the Civil Security Unit (Striking force) in 2006 as the main reasons for its low crime solution efficiency rate in 2007 (71.59 percent) and 2008 (53.4 percent). The tremendous deficiency on the part of the police to fully respond to the security and safety needs of the populace has had negative repercussion in its effort to curb the proliferation of firearms. Consequently, the citizens were forced to fill-in the security and safety void by acquiring firearms for self defense – thus the heavy procurement of unlicensed firearms in 2008 - 2009. The same trend is showing on the statistics of firemen to population ratio, which dipped from one (1) to 7,883 in 2008 to 1:8,116 in 2009.

**Table 21: Ratio of Policemen and Firemen to Population**

Year	Population	Policemen	Ratio	Firemen	Ratio
2008	165,546	72	1:2,299	21	1:7,883
2009	170,446	43	1:3,964	21	1:8,116

Source: Marawi City Executive and Legislative Agenda 2008-2010

The police categorize Violence Against Women (VAW) as Crimes Against Chastity. The Table below presents the data of Crimes Against Chastity for 2008-2009.

**Table 22: Reported Crimes Against Chastity for the Years 2008-2009**

Case Reported	2008 (Jan to Dec)	2009 (Jan to Nov)
Abduction	2	1
Lascivious Acts	1	1
Rape	2	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>

Data Source: Marawi City Police Headquarters

Cases of VAW and the mechanism employed to mitigate these, are played-out within the frame of unique Maranaw socio-cultural dynamics. Necessary steps are undertaken in earnest in order to avoid a *rido*. When a rape case is reported, the family of the perpetrator immediately negotiates with the family of the rape victim. An amount is offered as payment for the crime and to appease the feelings of the offended party. Everyone knows that failure to arrive at a negotiated settlement will mean full-scale *rido*. To avoid the grim scenario, prominent clan members of the perpetrator marshal all resources at their disposal in order to satisfy a propitiatory negotiation with the aggrieved party. Or else, they all leave the area to become IDP in another place. The police confirm that all reported cases of VAW were perpetrated by persons under the influence of illegal drugs at the time of the crime. Police record confirms that cases of possession and use of illegal drugs rose from 4 to 12 cases within the 2008-2009 interval.

FGD participants described the following as the actual state of criminality in Marawi City. There is prevalence of *rido*. Robbery takes place during the morning prayers. Robbers enter the houses when people are praying in mosques. Illegal possession of firearms and abuse of illegal substance are prevalent. It is believed that narco-politics is prevalent. People use to say, “*druglord muna bago maging politician*” (be a druglord first before you can become a politician). Only the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) can effectively conduct legitimate raids because local police are easily charged of illegal raids. Gang riots are also common, as there are 70 youth gangs in Marawi.

FGD participants generally agree that many crimes have not been reported because witnesses tend to keep mum about them. Accordingly, some witnesses to crime simply keep quiet in order to avoid *rido*. They also declare that Marawi City does not have a witness protection program. Thus, witnesses to crimes prefer to remain silent for personal safety.

**f. Political Security.** Like other cities covered in this study, one of the major problems that beset the city is the prevalence of *rido* (clan feud). Under this condition, people have minimal access to security and safety. The 357% increase in crime volume plus the very lopsided 1:3,964 police-to-population ratio are indicators of police deficiency in providing access to security and safety for the city residents. The city government addressed the deficiency by

employing the services of four hundred-eighty (480) barangay *tanods* and fifty (50) civil security units to augment the police force. Its crime solution efficiency rate in 2009 now stands at 89%.

Other means of resolving conflicts and curbing violence is through the employment of settlement processes by the respected traditional and prominent political leaders of Marawi. Accordingly, the strategy has been effective in settling crimes like murder, theft, and kidnapping, as well as, cases of full-scale *rido*. In addition, the house-to-house campaign of the religious *Tableeg* group is seen as effective counter measure in the incidence of young residents being involved in the possession and use of prohibited drugs. FGD data reveal that the people are generally aware that there are government offices where they can approach for security concerns.

**g. Education.** With a population growth rate of 2.96%, Marawi City still has to cope with the provision of basic facilities and equipment for its continuously increasing population. The educational services of the city are comprised of 114 public and private schools in the pre-school, elementary and tertiary levels. Its annual increase in enrolment is recorded at 1.58% where majority of this increase is noted to occur in public schools. For its basic educational level, Marawi has 1,125 elementary schools and 286 secondary schools. Furthermore, the city has a 1:67 teacher-pupil ratio for the elementary and 1:60 ratio for the secondary.

An FGD conducted among teachers reveal the following endemic problem in education within Marawi City: “We have many schools here in Marawi City but there are problems like riots among existing youth gangs in schools, lack of books, no funds for repairs and painting of school ceilings, non- eligible teachers are assigned to teach, no hazard pay, no chalk allowances. Teacher’s clothing allowance has been long overdue for 1 year. Teachers shoulder classroom repairs in outlying schools. Out of the 96 barangays, only few have Day Care Centers due to lack of funds. Students contribute 200 to 300 pesos for repairs at the Amai PakPak Elem. School. It is also common practice that students are asked to contribute for the salary of hired security personnel because schools don’t have installed lighting

system.

**h. Unplanned urbanization.** With a land area of 87km<sup>2</sup>, and a density of 2,206/km<sup>2</sup> (2008 Philippine Statistical Yearbook), Marawi City appears to be the densest highly urbanized area within ARMM to date. Considering the steady rise of its population at 2.96% since 2000, it increases in population at a rate which is slightly higher than the national growth rate of 2.04% (Ibid). Relative to the sporadic and protracted nature of the armed conflict since 2000, Marawi City, at one point, had to carry an IDP highest population load of 30,045 persons (DSWD Marawi City, 2009). Presently, Marawi City has to cope with the provision of basic facilities and equipment for its continuously increasing population. The IDP needs for housing, water, health and sanitation, education, and sources of livelihood are not included in the city development plan. Some IDPs build makeshift houses along the lake shoreline and this create waste disposal problem. Because water system and toilet provisions are not available in their make-shift houses, IDPs dispose all kinds of waste into the lake or river. The City Planning and Development Officer confirmed during the Key Informant Interview that most of the IDPs are adopted by their city relatives for a very specific socio-cultural reason. Following the strict cultural requirement of the *maratabat*, city-dwelling Maranaws felt obliged to cuddle their IDP kinfolks. Eventually, 27,129 persons out of the total 30,045 IDPs in 2008-2009 ended up as permanent city residents.

IDPs in Marawi City are gradually absorbed by the immediate families of their city-dwelling relatives. Thus, the IDP status of families affected by armed conflicts does not last long. This phenomenon can be gleaned in the ELA 2008-2010 demographic description:

*The number of households in the city in the 2000 census was 20,375... About 10,967 households or 53.83 percent comprised the one nuclear family with other non-nuclear family members. 5,314 households are one nuclear family with 3,483 two nuclear families. The remaining 611 households are families of more than two (comprised 2 families).*

The adopted IDPs put up their own houses within the compounds of their relatives in the city and end up as permanent city residents. This explains why the city population density is

high. In reality, however, “former” IDPs establish two residences: their place of origin at the time of evacuation, and in Marawi City after evacuation.

A city official explains that housing regulations have not been strictly imposed because the authorities are careful not to aggrieve any party; otherwise a *rido* (clan feud) might ensue. The weak enforcement of housing regulations plus the lack of housing program for IDP have created an infrastructural situation where the unregulated house constructions become pervasive. A new construction is usually put up as either adjunct to an existing house or as separate semi-concrete housing unit within the compound. Where lack of space becomes a problem, the staying “former” IDPs build light material houses along riverbanks, vacant lots, and street pavements inside market areas. FGD participants suggest that the better way to address problems related to IDPs is to put up relocation communities with core housing units complete with water tanks and latrines. Further, it is suggested that the IDPs should be properly organized through sustained community organizing efforts.

For Marawi City, unplanned urbanization is driven by the random expansion of the urban sprawl as the result of unregulated construction of houses and shanties due to sudden increase in city population which is largely attributed to the periodic influx of IDPs from the nearby conflict-affected municipalities. Furthermore, strong cultural orientation of family-based social security network facilitates the permanent residency of IDPs in the city.

Despite the above-mentioned condition, FGD participants still assert that they want their children to grow up in Marawi City as the city can provide better opportunities for their future. They submit the following recommendations:

- *Spread/ inculcate Islamic way of life in all levels beginning with the children to adults*
- *More Police Personnel*
- *Enhance the capacities and capabilities of Barangay Chairmen*
- *Supervision of education should be brought back to the national [government] to avoid corruption. Those who are not eligible should not be allowed to teach in public schools. ONLY THE ELIGIBLE ONES SHOULD TEACH to ensure quality education*
- *The City PNP should be outside the influence of local officials*
- *Livelihood Trainings and funds for capital particularly for IDPs to start a business*

- *More Funds for medicines (DOH)*
- *Housing for IDPs*
- *Assessment of Day Care Centers and Day Care Workers/Teachers. Investigate if the funds intended to day care centers is properly spent*
- *Funds for school renovation , Improvement and maintenance*
- *Provision of Books/ reading materials for students in Elem. and High School plus computers to upgrade their learning*
- *Reduce water rates*
- *Sports facilities*
- *Impose drug-testing in High Schools – (rehabilitate the users and drug dependents)*
- *Enhance and support PNP Junior Hero Program wherein PNPs, give lectures on children's rights, child abuse, and techniques on what to do if there was a terrorist attack. This program develops the children to be good citizens*

From the foregoing, Marawi City has limited economic achievements as its industrial base remains weak. Though the classification of a city connotes a certain level of urbanization, the local economy of Marawi City is largely based on agriculture. In fact, its business activities are primarily anchored on small-scale family-owned establishments. Weak industrial base is attributed to the absence of credible urban plan. Urbanization process in Marawi City remains unplanned making it the densest highly urbanized area in the ARMM. Unless the City Government adopts a strong urban plan, Marawi City will not be able to strengthen its industrial base necessary for local economic development.

Because the City is agriculture based, food supply, interestingly, is not a major problem. Though the City has also become of the major destinations of IDPs that have increased the number of people in the City, the availability of food has not posed a serious problem. But the influx of IDPs affected health security situation in Marawi City, particularly on the availability of running water. Residents and IDPs raised concern on the high cost of drinking water supply in the City.


Having been urbanized, Marawi City faces some urban safety problems associated with crimes and inter-clan feuding (*rido*). Though mostly unreported, Marawi City has serious problems on crimes and *rido*. The limitation of the police to address the situation, with its low policemen-to-

population ratio, encourages civilians to arm themselves and this has promoted private armed violence in the City. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a serious security concern in Marawi City. Thus, Marawi City has to develop its own City Peace and Development Plan as part of its over-all urban planning.

## URBAN SAFETY PROFILE IN ZAMBOANGA CITY

Zamboanga City is one of the oldest cities in the country. Located at the southernmost tip of the Zamboanga Peninsula, it was the center of barter and trade among the natives and the Chinese-Malays as early as the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries. The Spaniards made their presence felt in 1593 and the Americans occupied Zamboanga in 1898. The imprint of these colonizers in the city is seen in the architecture, culture and dialect of the Zamboangeños .It became a chartered city on October 12, 1936. In November 22, 1983, the city was declared a highly urbanized city.

Zamboanga City is the de facto regional center of Western Mindanao in the areas of government, trade and commerce, transportation and communication, education, health care, and culture. This has always been so even before the advent of Spanish colonialism. Because of this, locals are used to the influx of migrants into the city. In fact, most of the inhabitants of the city are migrants. The only aborigines in the city would have to be the Subanons. Everyone else migrated from elsewhere, or are descendants of the migrants. What is now called as Zamboanga used to be known as Samboangan, which means a center of barter and trade among the natives. . However, archeological findings indicate that Samboangan was a flourishing coastal settlement even before the aforementioned dates, actively conducting barter trade activities with its neighboring communities.



As of 2008, the population of Zamboanga City was 774,407 (National Statistics Office), making it the 6<sup>th</sup> largest city in the country in terms of population. The city's growth rate is 3.54%. With a total land area of 1,483.3849 sq. km. (148,338.49 hectares), Zamboanga City is the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest city in the country in terms of land area. The city has 37,630.067 hectares of available lands for development in the following uses: (a) 5,224.25 hectares for residential use; (b) 5,598.407 hectares for commercial/industrial use; (c) 26,714.42 hectares for agricultural use; and (d) 92.99 hectares for institutional use.

The city's physical characteristics have the following advantages: (a) it has an even distribution of rainfall; (b) it has no liquefaction prone areas; (c) it is outside the typhoon belt; and (d) it is outside of any major fault lines. There are also no active volcanoes. The city's watershed of which 12,107 hectares of old growth forest is one of the three remaining intact watersheds in the country.

By geographic location, Zamboanga City commands the sea lanes of southwestern Philippines. It is the gateway of the country to Southeast Asia because the city is the nearest major urban center to our ASEAN neighbors such as Malaysia, Brunei, Sarawak, and Singapore. Within the country, it is the major service center in the southwest, and given the right investments, it can become the country's largest city in the area, servicing Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga del Norte, the islands of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and the neighboring Lanao and Cotabato provinces. It has an international airport and seaport in the region. The city is accessible to and from the key urban centers of the country such as Manila, Cebu and Davao. There are vessels plying the Zamboanga-Sandakan, Malaysia route.

The centrality of Zamboanga to life in Western Mindanao is mainly due to its being in the geographic hub of Western Mindanao as well as to its other unique geographic advantages. It is a land rich in natural resources that enjoys a favorable climate and

location away from the paths of typhoons and earthquakes. It is also peopled by citizens who have for centuries lived in peace with peoples of other faiths and cultures.

The key development challenges facing the city are the following: (a) preservation of history, culture, and protection/sustainable development of natural resources; (b) improvement of the city's financial capability for further development of the city's infrastructure and delivery of basic services; (c) promotion of conducive and friendly investment climate for the generation of more business activities, employment, and livelihood; (d) development of human resources for global competitiveness; and (e) development of new growth areas and business districts.

Being strategically located in Western Mindanao, Zamboanga City is the commercial, educational, governance, communication and transportation center of Western Mindanao. As such, the city is the catchment area of migrants. The consequences of the influx of migrants to the city have impacts on the security of the Zamboangeños in terms of (a) economy; (b) food; (c) environment; (d) personal; (e) community; and (f) political.

**a. Economic Security.** The year 2008 has seen the establishment of more industries and commercial establishments in the city. Among these are the establishment of a multi-level shopping mall, the entry of new players in the transportation and communication sector, the establishment of credit and commercial banks, franchise establishments, and a canning factory. All these gave the people more employment opportunities.

**Table 23. Investment and Employment Performance, 2007-2008**

Particular	Investment (In Pmillion)			Employment		
	2007	2008	% Change	2007	2008	% Change
Total Directly Impacted	2,332.770	3,458.743	48.3	17,393	18,969	9.1
Business Name Registration	1,102.315	729.445	(33.8)	9,842	6,315	(35.8)
Loan Facilitation	0.000	1,357.140		0	3,675	
Industry Cluster	635.239	909.775	43.2	3,312	3,649	10.2
CARP	5.550	8.125	46.4	469	627	33.7
Industry Priority Areas (IPAs)	410.044	243.172	(40.7)	3,577	1,212	(66.1)
One-Town-One-Product	15.122	187.769	1141.7	124	3,421	2658.9
Others	164.500	23.317	(85.8)	69	70	1.4

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

Although Zamboanga is experiencing a comparative economic advantage, in-migration has become a problem to the local government. The city is now dealing with rapid population growth. Close examination of population statistics shows that the city's growth rate is due to net migration rather than to natural increases (birth).

However, there is a lack or even absence of recorded data on in-migration to Zamboanga. When migrants arrive to Zamboanga, they seek shelter with relatives and friends rather than declare themselves to government agencies. This would seem to indicate that majority of in-migrants are not really IDPs to avoid armed conflict but rather individuals and families seeking greener economic pastures. This would be supported by the fact that in its annual report regarding IDPs in Mindanao, the National Disaster Coordinating Board (NDCB) did not include Zamboanga City in the list.

Zamboangeños see in-migration as both a "pain" and a "gain". Migrants are gains because they increase the city's human resources; they provide additional revenue from employment; they increase economic activities. At the same time, migrants could be a "pain" to the city in the sense that they bring about undue pressure on the carrying capacity of the city: congestion, delivery of basic services, inadequate infrastructure.

- b. Food Security.** The food supply for the city is more than enough to meet the demands of the city populace. Zamboanga City offers one of the cheapest prices in food in the region, if not in the country. This is not to mention the variety and accessibility of the commodities taking into consideration its geographical advantage. Aside from the individuals and families who migrate to the city due to armed conflicts in their places of origin, the city government has to contend more with the "*halaws*", the mendicants and vagrants. The Department of Social Welfare and Development could temporary offer food, shelter and clothing. But this form of humanitarian assistance is draining the resources of the city. The displaced persons rely so much on the food donations coming from private individuals and

organizations, funding agencies, and the like. While Zamboanga is a rich city, allocation of funds to meet the demands brought about by in-migration is inadequate.

**c. Health Security.** The year 2008 was a year

of challenges and opportunities for the health sector of Zamboanga sector. The challenges were seen in the outbreaks of diseases like dengue, pneumonia and leptospirosis. Maternal deaths also registered an increase. Responding to these challenges, the City Government, through the City Health Office, saw this as opportunities and strengthened its campaign to deliver quality health services.

The dengue outbreak was controlled through various interventions such as clean-up drives and massive information campaigns. Same is true for pneumonia. The increase in leptospirosis cases may be partially attributed to an increase in case detection by physicians. Two cases were confirmed through laboratory tests while the rest were clinically diagnosed. In order to effectively deliver quality health services, all fifteen Main Health Centers have been certified as “DOH Sentrong Sigla facilities

by the Department of Health (DOH). Medical and dental missions were conducted to far-flung areas. Throughout the year, the CHO innovated its health services by improving environmental sanitation services, increasing the health workforce and improving the health information systems.

**Table 24. Top Ten Leading Causes of Illness in Zamboanga City, 2008**

(Total Number and rate Per 100,000 Population)

Causes	Male	Female	Total	Rate
Acute Respiratory Tract Infections	27,807	30,863	58,637	7,572
Diarrheal Diseases	2,788	2,500	5,278	682
Skin Disease	2,240	2,481	4,717	609
Hypertension	1,653	2,541	4,194	542
Pneumonia	2,016	1,877	3,890	502
Influenza-like Illness	1,177	1,849	3,007	388
Wound	1,751	1,172	2,923	377
Injuries	1,890	966	2,853	368
Animal Bite	1,464	1,144	2,608	337
Urinary Tract Infection	610	1,336	1,946	251

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment

**Table 25. Top Ten Leading Causes of Death in Zamboanga City, 2008**

(Total Number and rate Per 100,000 Population)

Causes	Male	Female	Total	Rate
Diseases of the Heart	392	259	651	84
Pneumonia	193	161	354	46
Stroke	197	137	334	43
Cancer (all types)	153	159	312	40
TB (Respiratory)	116	54	170	22
Diabetes Mellitus and its complications	83	83	166	21
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease	99	34	133	17
Hypertension	69	51	120	15
Gunshot Wound	71	7	78	10
Sepsis	37	41	78	10

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment

In order to improve occupational safety and environmental safety, the CHO distributed 1,000 toilet bowls to indigent schools and day care centers, and also constructed communal toilets in selected barangays.

**d. Environment Security.** As already mentioned, Zamboanga City has a total land area of 1,483.3849 sq. km. (148,338.49 hectares), making it the third largest city in the country. It has 37,630.067 hectares of available land for various development uses.

As of 2008, the population of Zamboanga City was 801,821, making it the 6th largest city in the country in terms of population. The City's growth rate is 3.54%

The Housing and Land Division (HLMD) of the Office of the City Mayor has effectively implemented the programs and services of the City in terms of housing. Given the main program thrust which was the Resettlement and Relocation Program, the Office was able to submit for bidding four (4) Resettlement Sites for the completion of the survey and eventually the titling of individual lots. The Office, being the Secretariat of the City Anti-Squatting, also successfully spearheaded the conduct of demolitions/clearing operations involving illegal structures in the City. The Office implemented successfully the Urban Poor Affairs Program (UPAP), which included land acquisition project of each organization being facilitated by the Office as per request of each association. It also dealt with Special Programs specifically focused on Solid Waste Management and Cooperative Livelihood Programs.

Due to the increase in population, the City has to cope with rapid urbanization. As such, the Anti-Squatting Committee, with the assistance of the demolition team of the City Engineer's Office, has cleared certain areas of illegal structures, specifically the areas in the main market and at the Bagsakan market.

The City Engineer's Office also contributed its share in the urbanization of the City by the structures it has completed such as Construction of Bus Terminal, bridges, school buildings, concreting of roads and farm-to-market roads. On-going projects include rehabilitation of slaughterhouse, certain concreting of roads, construction of a 2-storey Male cell Building at the City Reformatory Center in Zone

e. **Personal Security.** Zamboanga City has eleven (11) Police Stations. During the period covered (2008), a total of 892 crime incidents were reported. The distribution of crime volume per Police Station is as follows:

**Table 26. Police Stations**

Unit/Station	Crime Volume	Unit/Station	Crime Volume
ZCPO	381	ZCPS4	34
ZCPS6	114	ZCPS1	28
ZCPS7	91	ZCPS2	26
ZCPS9	75	ZCPS8	25
ZCPS5	47	ZCPS10	15
ZCPS3	44	ZCPS11	12
<b>TOTAL (892)</b>			

Source: Zamboanga City PNP Report 2008

Index crimes posted 560 incidents registering a decrease of 43 incidents from the 603 of the previous period. Out of this number, 378 were crimes against persons while 182 were crimes against property.

Of the total index crimes, physical injury was the highest with 290 incidents and rape cases recorded the lowest with 4 incidents.

The total crime against person was 378 (lower than the 398 of last year), while crime against property totaled 182 (lower than the 206 of last year).

Non-index crimes registered 332 incidents, which was higher by 44 compared to the 288 incidents of last year. The Average Monthly Crime Rate (AMCR) for the period was 11.50 which is slightly lower by 0.01 as compared to the 11.51 AMCR of the previous period. The CSER for the period was 93.81% which is higher by 1.95 as compared with the CSER of 91.86 of the previous period.

**Table 27. Crime Against Person and Crimes Against Property**

	01 Jan 2007 to 31 Oct 2007	01 Jan 2008 to 31 Oct 2008
<b>Crimes Against Person</b>	<b>398</b>	<b>378</b>
Murder	56	57
Homicide	34	27
Physical Injury	288	290
Rape	20	4
<b>Crimes Against Property</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>182</b>
Robbery	49	48
Theft	156	134
<b>Index Crime</b>	<b>603</b>	<b>560</b>
<b>Non-Index Crime</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>332</b>
<b>Crime Volume</b>	<b>891</b>	<b>892</b>
<b>Average Monthly Crime Rate (AMCR)</b>	<b>11.50</b>	<b>11.51</b>
<b>Crime Solution Efficiency Rate (CSER)</b>	<b>91.86</b>	<b>93.81</b>

Source: Zamboanga City PNP Report 2008

**Table 28. Status of Cases at Zamboanga City Reformatory Center**

Children in Conflict with the Law	2007	2008
<b>Total No. of cases served</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>49</b>
Acquitted / Dismissed	2	3
Released on Recognizance	10	13
15 years old below	6	2
Desistance	2	4
Died	-	1
Transferred to Adult detention cell	-	3
<b>Total No. of Cases presently inside ZCRC</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>23</b>

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

Recently, Zamboanga City has become the hub of kidnap-for-ransom activities in Western Mindanao.

Zamboanga City has a Task Force Turista Zamboanga Peninsula (“TG Turista ZAMPEN”), which provides both covert and overt security for the protection and security of local and foreign tourists during their stay or visit in the City. During the period 2007-2008, eleven (11) security coverage for foreign visitors, and eighty seven (87) security operations for special occasions/events were provided by the PNP in Zamboanga City. Forty eight (48) covert and one hundred thirty eight (138) overt security personnel were deployed during the activities.

**Table 29. Crime Incidence and Crime Solution Rate (2003-2007)**

Indicator/City	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total Crime Volume	1,153	1,066	1,164	1,055	827
Index	622	527	604	671	590
Non-Index	531	539	560	384	237
Total Crimes Solved	1,103	1,010	1,108	982	757
Crime Solution Efficiency Rate (%)	95.7	94.7	95.2	93.1	91.5

Note: 1) Index Crimes include murder, robbery, physical injury, theft and rape  
 2) Non-index Crimes include negligent manslaughter, non-aggravated assault, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, stolen property, vandalism, weapons, prostitution & common law vice, sex offenses, narcotic laws, gambling offenses against family & children, driving under the influence of liquor, disorderly conduct, and all other crimes not here or in the index crime.

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

The Zamboanga Central Police Station Women and Children Protection Unit have reported 129 cases perpetrated by minors in 2008, lower than the 154 cases reported in 2007. Petty crimes committed by minors were settled amicably at the police/barangay level with only five (5) cases filed in court.

**Table 30. Status of Cases Served**

Child Abuse	Year		Children in Conflict with the Law	Year	
	2007	2008		2007	2008
Cases filed in Court	43	38	Filed in Court	-	5
Amicable Settlement	259	167	Amicable Settlement	92	58
Turned Over to Institution	8	9	Refer to Barangay	4	15
Refer to Barangay	56	56	Refer to Institution	58	51
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>242</b>		<b>154</b>	<b>129</b>

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

OCSWD Staff participated in the Regular Monthly Stakeholders Meeting as a member of the Zamboanga City Sea-based Taskforce on Trafficking of Women and Children (RA 9205). To minimize, if not totally eradicate Trafficking in Person in the city, the following activities were undertaken: extensive advocacy on RA 9208; strengthening of the social welfare structures in the barangay level like the BCPC, Anti-Bugaw Committee, conduct of regular meetings with the stakeholders and

capability-building among the implementers. Through partnership and coordinative efforts with Bahay Silungan sa Daungan, DSWD, DOLE, and the Sea Based Anti-Trafficking Task Force, a total of 118 victims of trafficking were rescued in 2008.

Social Welfare programs and projects were geared towards the disadvantaged sectors that have, by various circumstances, been marginalized. This represents 30 percent of the poorest of the poor which include the indigent families and communities, elderly, persons with disability, women, out-of-school youth, abused child, and child in conflict problem situations that call for interventions.

Due to the efforts of the City Government in addressing the social welfare concerns, the local Chief Executive of Zamboanga City was awarded the “Most Outstanding City Mayor” by the Association of Social Welfare Officers of the Philippines, Inc.. To top it all, Zamboanga City was conferred for the first time the region’s “Most Child-Friendly City” for 2008 under the Highly Urbanized City Category for exemplary performance in children-related programs.

- f. **Community security.** Thirty (30) operations against prohibited drugs were conducted during the period which resulted in the apprehension of sixty two

**Table 31. Statistical Accomplishment**

	Target	Actual	%
<b>Headcount</b>			
Victims of Violence	12	27	225
<b>Service Count</b>			
Homelife	12	17	141.67
Health Services	6	8	133.33
Psychological Evaluation			
Legal Services			
Counseling	12	24	200
Livelihood Skills Development	1	2	200
Group Work	1	2	200
CPSD			
Modular Session	1	2	200
Referral	6	9	150
Spiritual Enrichment	12	24	200

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

**Table 33. Clientele Assisted By The Public Attorney’s Office (2003-2007)**

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Indigent Persons Served	17,392	15,578	15,908	7,185	6,152
Clients benefited with documentation	4,900	2,912	1,862	1,528	1,121
Beneficiaries of legal counseling	2,611	3,533	2,245	1,852	1,373
Clients benefited with administration oath	9,881	9,133	11,801	3,805	3,658

Source: Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), Department of Justice (DOJ), Region IX

**Table 34. Cases Handled, Terminated and Pending (2003-2007)**

Indicator/City	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Zamboanga City	3,834	5,416	3,898	4,056	5,594
Handled	1,917	2,672	955	955	2,797
Terminated	852	886	676	934	756
Pending	1,065	1,858	2,267	2,167	2,041

Source: Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), Department of Justice (DOJ), Region IX, 2008

(62) suspected drug traffickers. The biggest accomplishment was the discovery and busting of clandestine drug laboratories in the city last February 22, 2008. Since then there has been a decline on drug-reported cases in the city, an indication that the drug problem had gone down. A total of fifty one (51) suspected drug traffickers were charged in court.

Continuous implementation of the Gun Ban was enforced by the Zamboanga City Police Office (ZCPO) through random checkpoints. As a result, twenty two (22) violators were apprehended and a total of twenty two (22) assorted firearms were confiscated. Nineteen (19) cases for violation of PD 1866 (“Illegal Possession of Firearms”) were filed in court against the arrested suspects.

Cases involving child abuse were reduced by 29% from 366 cases in 2007 to 260 in 2008. Support services such as counseling and financial assistance were provided to victims of child abuse. Likewise, a series of psychological evaluation and trauma management sessions were conducted to victims while parenting capability session/counseling were given to parents by the Women in Child Protection Unit-Child Abuse Protection Intervention Network (WCPU-CAPIN).

The Women Crisis Center was operationalized last October 1, 2008, it was conceived to address the need of marginalized women who are victims of exploitation, and any forms of domestic violence such as physical, psychological, emotional or economic abuse. The center which provides temporary shelter and operates on a 24-hour and 7 days a week basis, aims to facilitate the healing process and recovery of women who suffered traumatic experiences in order to hasten their return to normal lives and reintegration of families/relatives and communities. To achieve this goal, package of social services appropriate to women’s needs are availed to women victims to help restore their dignity, rebuild their lives and enable them to become productive individuals.

Among the integrated services rendered are individual and group counseling, medical and legal assistance, self-awareness session to help build women victim-survivor’s self-esteem; stress-reduction/crisis management session; livelihood/

entrepreneurship development spiritual enrichment and others along socio-cultural activities.

Furthermore, whenever necessary, the children of victims who are 7 years old and below are admitted together with their mother victims in order to avoid further trauma. For 7 years old and above, arrangements are made with immediate relatives for their care and protection.

The center is manned by gender sensitive social workers/houseparents, guidance counselor and center head who continuously provide a nurturing environment in which trust, respect, self-esteem are fostered to mother the healing process.

In support to its mandate of protecting the family, various programs and services were provided. A total of 5,659 families in twenty-seven (27) depressed barangays were reached out and served through the following family and community welfare programs and services: Advocacy Sessions on Preventing Domestic Violence, Enhancing Parental Effectiveness Sessions, Capability-building Trainings, Mass Weddings, Enhancing the Roles and Paternal Abilities Training (ERPAT) for the fathers to enhance their performance of multiple roles, and Family Day and Family Week Celebrations.

The Social Development Center is a residential facility that provides temporary shelter in a Home life atmosphere for the city's street children and other children with special needs. It was inaugurated on February 22, 2003 and made operational to date. The building amounted to 4.5 M donated by AUS-AID thru the DILG and the City Government of Zamboanga City.

SDC has been accredited by DSWD Central Office as Child Caring Institution since December 8, 2008. The purpose of the accreditation is to ensure the Center is operating based on the standard rules & regulations as shelter facility for street children and other children in difficult situation.

**Table 35. Statistical Accomplishment Report**

INDICATOR	2007			2008		
	Plan/Target	Actual/Served	%	Plan/Target	Actual/Served	%
<b>I. FAMILY OUTREACH HEADCOUNT</b>						
No. of Youth age 7-17 y/o served	300	545	182	300	558	186
• Sexually Abused	Not target by	Case Category		25	19	76
• Physically Abused				25	27	107
• Abandoned/Neglected				10	24	240
• Street Children (involved in gambling, begging, rugby, sniffing, petty theft)				200	399	199
• Ran away				20	399	199
• Lost and Found				10	47	470
• CICL				10	10	100
<b>II. PROGRAMS / SERVICES</b>						
No. of wards provided Homelife Services/basic services i.e. food, clothing, temporary shelter	300	545	182	300	558	186
No. of wards extended counseling	300	545	182	300	558	186
No. of wards extended stress Debriefing	300	545	182	300	558	186
No. of wards extended Educational Services						
• Formal Education	80	159	198	80	89	111
• Tutorial/Alternative Learning Service	26	41	457	80	250	312
• No. of children attended skills training	20	35	20	20	55	275
• No. of children attended street education				20	30	150
• No. of participated in sports development/ socio-cultural activities	25	48	192	300	422	140
• No. of children value formation, spiritual enrichment and socialization activities	25	189	756	300	459	153
• No. of children returned/ re-united with families	100	348	348	250	367	146
• Case Management	25	24	96	80	81	101

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

Twelve (12) barangays benefited from the livelihood projects sponsored by the Gender and Development Program. The projects undertaken included RTW Dressmaking, Seat Cover Making, Curtain, Sari-Sari Store, Buy and Sell, Vending of Native Delicacies, Vegetable Gardening and Vending, Crab Fattening, Food Vending, Palay Production, and Hog Fattening.

**Table 36. Sea GAD Livelihood Program**

Calendar Year	No. of Clients	Amount Invested	Total Rollback	%
Oct 2007	19	57,000.00	12,500.00	0.22
2008	16	48,000.00	18,300.00	0.38
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>105,000.00</b>	<b>30,850.00</b>	

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

**Table 37. Barangays and Project Undertaken**

Barangays	Projects Undertaken
Tulungatung, Malagutay, Upper Calarian, Baliwasan, Vitali, Tictapul, Licomo, Sangali, Victoria, Lubigan, Latuan, Quiniput	RTW – Dressmaking, Seat Cover, Curtain, Sari-Sari Store, Buy and Sell, Vending of Native Delicacies, Vegetable Gardening and Vending, Crab Fattening, Food Vending, Palay Production and Pig Fattening

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

The PWDs were benefited with services and trainings sponsored by the City Government or with support from other organizations. Two differently-abled women attended the Women Forum in Hongkong sponsored by WOW Leap; 500 PWD patients were provided with medical services at the City Health Office thru the PWD Deck managed by a physically challenged volunteer; 29 PWDs were provided with wheel chairs and crutches; the Zamboanga City Medical Center and the Tzu Chi Foundation extended medical services to 53 PWDs; the Tzu Chi Foundation also extended free medical check ups and treatment to 12 Down Syndrome persons; thirty PWDs underwent computer training sponsored by the Ateneo de Zamboanga University and Congresswoman Beng Climaco. Two of them are now employed as computer encoders. Twenty PWDs participated in two-day training on RA 9208; celebrations of Deaf Awareness Week, National Disability Rehabilitation and Prevention Week were also observed.

**Table 38. Statistical Data of Accomplishment**

Headcount	2007			2008		
	Target	Actual	%	Target	Actual	%
PWD	250	292	116%	120	300	250%
Senior Citizen	1,670	3,798	134%	1,452	1,958	116%
<b>Service Count</b>						
Information Dissemination on Disability Prevention	1,300	1,459	112%	1,570	2,317	147.58%
Assistance to Physical Restoration	33	23	0.69%	19	29	152.63%
Self-Enhancement Skills Development – assisted and actively participating in family and community activities	930	2,155	231%	1,640	3,764	229.57%
Special Social Services (Enabled to form interest group and self-help organization)	1,240	2,604	210%	1,640	3,306	201.59%
Practical Skills Dev't (PWD)		9		4	30	750%
Senior Citizens		9		4	8	200%

Source: Zamboanga City 2008 Accomplishment Report

Under the Office of the Senior Citizens Affairs (OSCA), a total of 20,672 Senior Citizens were registered and issued the national OSCA ID from 1998 to December 10, 2008. Of this number, 3,924 were issued in 2008. Zamboanga City has 64 active Senior Citizens Organizations with 2,789 members. Some of the benefits which the elderly received were the following: senior citizens aged 70 years old and above received P500.00 cash subsidy under the “*Katas ng VAT, Tulong Para kay Lolo at Lola*”; free medical services for diabetes and hypertension sponsored by the City

Health Office(CHO), together with NETRA PHARM Patriot and the Pilar College of Nursing; free medical check ups rendered by the CHO personnel every 1st and 3rd Wednesday of each month; Botika ng Barangay was introduced by Dr. Rolando Bucoy to 35 senior citizens; two boxes of medicines donated by Rep. Ma. Isabelle G. Climaco; socialization and physical exercises conducted by OSCA at the Field Offices; a Valentine's Party; and various meetings/conventions such as the Citywide Midyear Consultation Evaluation Conference, Lecture on Healthy Living conducted by the PADO Summit Marketing; Battle of the Brains for the Citywide Mathematics and Statistics Quiz Bowl Competitions for Senior Citizens sponsored by Western Mindanao State University (WMSU) in collaboration with OSCA, *Sangguniang Panlungsod* Committee on Elderly and Disadvantaged Group, and ABS-CBN TV- 3 Zamboanga.

- a. **Political security.** Data obtained from the records of Commission on Human Rights – Region IX show that there are cases of torture, unlawful arrests, threats and grave misconduct, murder, maltreatment of prisoners, physical injuries, sexual harassment, unjust vexation, and the like. These were the docketed cases for the year 2008 and from January – October 2009. The status of these cases is pending, dismissed, amicably settled, or archived.

Being one of the oldest cities in the Philippines, Zamboanga City has become the regional center of trade, commerce, transportation, culture and governance in Western Mindanao. Its geographic location also makes the City a gateway to other Southeast Asian countries. Because of these endowments, Zamboanga's industrialization process is one of the fastest in the whole of Mindanao along with Davao City, General Santos City and Cagayan de Oro City. Because of its current stage of industrialization, employment opportunities are one of the highest in the Southern Philippines. Thus, the City is attracting in-migration, which creates some governance concerns for the city government. One of these concerns is rapid population growth that is largely attributed to in-migration. Rapid population growth has bearing on food security, health security, and environmental security of the City, which have all been

previously discussed. Thus, Zamboanga City has to revise its CLUP or its Master Development Plan to incorporate the impact of rapid population growth on land use. Its urban plan shall also take into account migration factor.

As a rapidly urbanizing city, Zamboanga City has peace and order concerns associated with index and non-index crimes. Recently, Zamboanga City has become the epicenter of KFR (kidnap-for-ransom) activities in Western Mindanao. This is odd considering that the Western Mindanao Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is camped in Zamboanga City. Thus, the government of Zamboanga City must develop a Peace and Development Plan that will integrate the role of local governments, armed forces and police forces in the promotion of peace and development of the city.

## Urban Safety Profile in Isabela City (Basilan)

Isabela City is still classified as a 5th class city. It is the capital of the province of Basilan. The City is located on the northern shore of Basilan. It could be reached via ferry boat from Zamboanga City within one-hour. While the Basilan province is part of the ARMM, Isabela City is not. Administratively, it is part of the Zamboanga Peninsula Region.




Figure 6. Map of Isabela City

In the 2007 census, the City has a total population of 87,985 and 13,753 households. About 73% of the population profess the Christian faith (predominantly Roman Catholic), while 27% are Islamic believers. The biggest ethnic groups are the Chavacano, Tausug and Sama. Other tribes are composed of Yakan, Samal/Bajao, Maranao, and Ilocano.

The topography of Isabela is characterized by an irregular, rolling terrain. The climate in the City is classified under Type III zone, in which there are no pronounced maximum rain periods with short dry seasons lasting from one to three months.

Isabela City has a total land area of 220.645 square kilometers (22,645.21 hectares) with 45 barangays, (18 are classified as urban barangays, 27 are rural barangays and 8 are island barangays) It has an average growth rate of 2.70 (year 2000 total population 73,032 representing an increase of 14,953).

The economy of the City is basically agricultural with 90% of the land area devoted to agriculture. Almost all trading activities are handled by the residents of Chinese ancestry. They also have significant presence in the professional field. Chavacanos are mostly working as professionals, like City Government employees. Tausugs and Maranaos are engaged in retail commerce, vending and fishing while the Bisaya are into small enterprises and rural farming. Yakans are mostly copra dealers, traders or Provincial Government employees.

Isabela City is the center of development in Basilan Province. The seat of the Provincial Government and all Line Government Offices is located in the City. It is also the center for commerce and industry. Being the center for development, there is the presence of the City Government. It has functional and serving Government Offices which administer the delivery of basic social services. Being the host for educational growth, it has three college institutions which serve the young people from the nearby towns of Maluso, Lamitan, Sumisip, Tipo-Tipo, Lantawan and Tuburan.

However, Isabela City, being the center of commerce and government, also experiences the influx of IDPs from the nearby town and villages. Because it is a peaceful city, people, especially those who are educated, prefer to make a living in the City. It is also noticed that provincial government officials, elected and non elected officials of other municipalities, are also having their permanent residences in the City. Record shows that as of the year 2000, there was a total of 2.1% influx of residents to the City (NSO, 2000 census of population and City Planning & Development Office 2004). Statistics shows that in 1975, the City's population increased at a rate of 6.64%. This enormous growth has been due to the influx of residents to the City. The rate started to pick up again during the first half of the decade (1990-1995), registering an annual growth of 3.02%. For the year 2000, the growth rate has decreased to 1.27% almost half compared to the 1995 data registered.

It was observed that Isabela City used to be a peaceful place, where Christian and Muslim inhabitants live together harmoniously. Inter-marriages were even a reality in the province. Isabela City came to be known as the City of Cultural Diversity in terms of population and tribes.

**a. Political Security.** The effect of Martial Law and the long years of war and conflict had an impact on the lives of the people in Isabela City. The threats to religious and cultural biases could have divided the people, but there were ample efforts to educate sectors about Peace Building and Peacekeeping. Isabela City is still a safe place for everyone to live peacefully. In recent years, however, the threat of lawlessness and terrorism has made the Isabeleños insecure even in the sanctity of their abodes. Some of the lawless activities that have occurred of late are the following:

- Extortion letters for the business sector are being circulated. Some of these businessmen have been kidnapped and killed. (2007,2009)
- The murder of Isabela City Mayor Luis Biel Sr. (March 3, 2006)
- Kidnap of professionals (mostly teachers) and NGO workers (ICRC volunteers). Some of these teachers were brutally murdered (2008, 2009)
- Bombing and explosions have been experienced (Jollibee April 2009)

**This recorded violence in the city** is only minimal. But it has great impact on the people's

sense of insecurity. These situations only calm down when there is visibility of law enforcers, government leaders in action, in-place institutional alliances between government, non-government and private sector partnership efforts.

- b. Community Security.** Being part of the province of Basilan, Isabela City is affected by the over-all threat of terrorism and insurgency emanating from three major threat groups: the ASG, the MILF and the MNLF. The threat of terrorism and insurgency in Basilan is high being the stronghold of the ASG, which has operational presence in Isabela City. ASG leaders, Khair Mundos and Puruji Indama, are operating in Isabela City. These two leaders have been accused of masterminding many kidnap-for-ransom activities in the City. Aside from the Abu Sayyaf threat, the 114<sup>th</sup> Base Command of the MILF is in Basilan using Isabela City as one of its operational areas in the province. Though there are MNLF personalities in Isabela City, they are not, however, responsible for any major violence in the area.

To ensure the security of the community in the City, Isabela has an organized Peace and Order Council (POC), organized in accordance with E.O. No. 773. The Council has come up with an Integrated Area Community Public Safety Plan. Isabela has a Police Station, a Fire Station and a City Jail. (Source – Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS) Year Profile -2009).

Like other major cities in the Philippines, Isabela City also suffers from index and non-index crimes. From January 1 to December 2008, there were a total of 96 crimes committed versus persons. Crime versus property had a total of 22. For index crimes with a total of 118, police were able to solve 80 of them. For non-index crimes, with a total of 32, police were able to solve 31.

From January to October 31, 2009, crimes versus persons totaled 96, and crimes versus property totaled 40. For index crimes committed, the total was 136, and 110 of these crimes were solved. For non-index crimes committed, the total was 62, and 61 of these were solved.

Traffic accidents are also among the problems that affect the safety of the people. A maximum of 14 traffic accidents were reported and a minimum of eight (8) per month- a total of one hundred fifty three (153) traffic accidents were reported in 2008. In addition to the usual reasons for the cause of these accidents, authorities say that reckless driving among minors or even those driving without licenses are the most frequent. This is perhaps attributed to the undisciplined drivers, among who are the IDPs who become settlers in the City. It is also feared that there were more traffic accidents that happened as the, data for the three (3) quarters of 2009 showed that the incidence had increased to 163 cases. (Source Traffic Management Unit, Isabela City).

Last February 2009, the PNP reported one (1) incident of kidnapping in Isabela City. A seven-

year old boy was abducted in the vicinity near the BFP Fire Station. The boy was abducted, and fortunately, with the fast and reliable information, the PNP/AFP was able to save the kidnapped boy and killed the (2) kidnappers during the operation. In Isabela City PNP, for the year 2008, there were no reported kidnapping incidents. But in reality, there had been unreported incidents of kidnapping in Isabela City and the neighboring municipalities. (Source: FGD conducted with stakeholders).

Alleged threat and extortion letters for Businessman and other prominent people in Isabela City remain unrecorded. There has been no police report that can prove the veracity of threats and extortions in the City.

The PNP, in coordination with the Military, in its effort to keep law and order, has been at its utmost vigilance in safeguarding and safe keeping activities. There are one hundred forty three (143) members of the police force in Isabela City PNP. With a total population of 87,985, Isabela City police-to-population ratio is 1:615. The data shows that police performance rating in solving crimes has increased in its crime solution efficiency.

While Isabela City is confronted with this safety and security issues, the City Local Government Officials, Law enforcers, Government and Private institutions are doing their

**Table 39. DSWD Data**

Year	Category	Number of Cases	Remarks
2008	Abandoned Children	7 children ages ranging from 1 to 14	The father was jailed as alleged ASG member
2008 to -2009	Neglect Children	4 0 children ages ranging from 1 to 18	Marital problem of the parents that cause the abandonment of the children
2008	Maltreated children	3 cases	Cases wherein children were physical maltreated or abused
2009		14 cases	
2008	Rape	9 cases	Most of these cases were already in court
2009		14 cases inclusive one incest case	
2008 - 2009	Acts of lasciviousness	1cases	
2008-2009	Cases of Women Abuses such as emotional, economically, physically abused	11 cases reported	

*Note: Other data on children and women abuses can be verified at the police stations because not all cases were being reported to the DSWD*

*Source Isabela City Accomplishment Report 2008 and Isabela City PNP Women's Desk, 2009*

best efforts to address the spread of violence and crime. These institutions have their own security and safety nets. To strengthen stakeholders' alliances and community coordination, schools, for example, frequently conduct Parent-Teachers Forum on threats and security, implement dry run activities, and raise awareness on bomb detection, etc. Isabela City has also recognized the need for a task force mechanism to keep law and order in the city.

In Table 50, we can see a comparison of crimes committed against children for the years 2008-2009. The table shows that there has been a reduction of crimes in 2009, particularly on physical injuries. This can be attributed to the massive information campaign conducted in schools, as well as the strong visibility of the law enforcers.

The data on violence against Women and children were from the PNP women's desk. There are partnership efforts between the DSWD and some active NGOs who cater to the need and protection of children and women. The structured City and Barangay Council for the Protection of Children has been active and plays a critical role in the barangay to protect and preempt any abuses committed against them.

While there was a strong view among constituents that drug addiction has been a problem in Isabela City, authorities

revealed that there are no available profile of users, as they are more inclined to run after drug pushers. A source from the PNP revealed that Shabu or Metamphetamine Chloride is the most popular substance used. The PNP of Isabela City can only conduct raids on suspected lairs of drug dealers/ pushers if they are accompanied PDEA representatives. PDEA personnel are detailed at Isabela City PNP upon the discretion of the Regional PNP based in Zamboanga City. However, the detailed PDEA personnel only have a maximum of three (3) months to stay at the PNP Basilan Unit because most of them are based in Zamboanga City. Nonetheless, the Basilan City PNP was able to conduct drug raids at a maximum seven (7) raids in 2007. This was attributed to the detail of a good and active PDEA Officer. Other raids conducted were as follows: 2006- 3 raids, 2008 - 1 raid and now 2009- 2 raids. It has also been observed that the raids conducted are just near the Isabela City PNP station. It has also been stated that most of these raids conducted are through a by Buy-Bust operation, where there are no court orders or search warrants delivered. (Source Isabela City PNP).

In 2008 there was a total of five (5) fire incidents reported, with one (1) reported injured and no damages caused against person, Damages caused against property was only minimal.

Government Authorities are making every effort to keep Law and order in this City. The PNP, in coordination with the Military, in its effort to keep law enforcement has been at its utmost vigilance in safeguarding and safe keeping activities. The ratio of policemen to

**Table 40. Crime Against Children**

	2008	2009 (3 <sup>rd</sup> Qtr)
Rape	11	5
Physical Injuries	20	9
Threat	3	-
Act of Lasciviousness	6	3
Abduction	3	1
Seduction	2	2

Source: Isabela City PNP women's Desk

**Table 41. Violence Against Women**

	2008	2009 (3 <sup>rd</sup> Qtr)
Physical Injury	12	21
Rape	3	2
Adultery	1	1
Cuncubinage	1	1
Slander by deed	1	-
Abandonment	4	1

Source: Isabela City PNP women's Desk

populace is 1 policeman for every seven hundred (700) populace. This ratio is much better than other cities wherein 1 policeman is to more than a thousand populace.

- c. Economic Security.** Urban growth in Isabela City is slow compared to Zamboanga City. This is due to the fact that Isabela's economic base remains largely agricultural. Such condition is also exacerbated by the unstable peace and order condition pervading the whole island province of Basilan.

Everyday there are four (4) Slow and fast craft boats that carry thousands of people to Zamboanga City. This indicates that people are doing business/ economic transactions in Zamboanga City; hence, Basileños and Isabeleños also contribute a lot to the economic growth of Zamboanga City.

With a total of twenty seven (27) barangays classified as rural barangays, most of these are largely agricultural (agriculture/fishery). Low agricultural profitability, income and productivity are among the factors that contribute to the poverty of the people. In the urban areas, opportunities to earn in small business are hampered by the unstable peace and order condition pervading in Basilan Province, which also affects the business activities in Isabela City. In 2007, the unemployment rate in Isabela City was 0.0572 percent and those not in the labor force was 0.3357 percent. At present, the projected unemployment rate is 20,424 vis-à-vis the population of 87,985.

The influx of the IDPs, especially those who are coming from the nearby towns of Lantawan, Pilas Island, Tuburan, Sumisip and Tipo-tipo contribute to the rapid increase of Isabela City's population, and put a strain on the resources of the city. However, there has been no accurate data to accurately describe IDP phenomenon in Isabela City. Available data shown in 1975 revealed a rapid increase of the population by as much as 6.64%. This increase was due to massive evacuation during those years. Later, in the first half of the decade (1990-1995), the annual growth rate was 3.02%. Presently, the annual growth rate of Isabela City is 2.70%. Isabela City as the center and capital city of Basilan, was never the center of violence and lawlessness, but it has carried with it its identity as the host city in cases of displacement and other conflict or violence related incidents. It is for this reason that the City Government of Isabela is strengthening its programs and services, especially on activating its City/Barangay Peace and Order Council to be vigilant so as prevent/control lawless and criminal activities.

- d. Environmental Security.** The influx of IDPs in Isabela City contributed to the effects of Urban growth. Such is the case of Barangays Aguada, Doña Ramona T. Alano, Isabela Eastside, Isabela Proper, Cabunbata, Sumagdang, Menzi, La Piedad, Riverside, San Rafael, Marketside Poblacion, Seaside, Tabuk, Port Area Poblacion and Timpul. These barangays are now considered urban. But, they presently suffer the consequences of unplanned urbanization. **They** now have a thick population producing unabated pile of rubbish and building housing

units and facilities that do not coincide with proper zoning plan of the city. Houses and shanties sprouted like mushrooms. This rapid increase in housing units resulted in problems such as road –right- of- way, land boundaries and land ownership, as well as the provision of basic social services.

While this picture describes the state of urban barangays in the city, the influx of IDPs also had its effects on the coastal barangays of Carbon, Diki, Lampinigan, Lukbuton, Marang-marang, Panigayan and Tampalan. In these seven barangays found in the coastal Northwest of Isabela City (to include the Riverside and Sunset barangays), there was a surge in their population growth rate during the first half of the decade (1990 – 1995). They registered a staggering growth rate of 3.02%. Most of them were residents of the municipalities of Lantawan and Pilas Island. They were migrants from these two conflict affected areas. They moved to Isabela City for reasons of security and livelihood.

With their coming came the accompanying problems of 1) Poor Sanitation – Human wastes are dumped improperly at the coastal side of the city, leading to the degradation and eventual destruction of the city’s marine resources, 2) Contributing to the SLUM way of living in which they live in congested and cramped areas, making the situation conducive for the outbreak of diseases that could lead to epidemic magnitude. They also have a limited capacity to meet the growing demand of “human living”, such as access to education, water, sanitation, health, and other basic needs.

**e. Health Security.** Health services in Isabela City are served by Barangay Health Centers, locally known as “Ilan”. Isabela City has three (3) private hospitals, several medical clinics owned and operated by private medical practitioners. The Basilan General Hospital, a government hospital, is also located in the city. There is also one infirmary hospital in the city. The influx of IDPs, however, poses a threat to the health of the community. As stated earlier, because they live in congested areas and under unsanitary conditions, they are prone to diseases. Since they are not financially capable to avail of the medical services of private medical practitioners, they flock to government owned and operated hospitals and barangay health centers. Below is a table showing the programs and activities of the City Health Office for the years 2007 and 2008.

**Table 42. Programs and Activities**

Program/Activities	2007			2008		
	Target	Acc.	%Acc.	Target	Acc.	%Acc.
<b>I-A MCH: PRENATAL</b>						
1.A. Pregnant Women w/ 3 or more prenatal visits	3,009	1,434	48%	3,080	2,094	68%
2.A. Pregnant given TT2 Plus	3,009	1,716	57%	3,080	2,302	75%
3.A. Pregnant Women given Vitamin "A"	3,009	296	10%	3,080	425	14%
4.A. Pregnant Women given complete iron	3,009	1,708	58%	3,080	2,145	70%
<b>I-B Total Number of Live Births</b>						
1.B. Total Post Partum Home Visits	2,579	4,230	164%	2,640	4,409	167%
2.B. Women Initiated Breastfeeding	2,579	1,861	72%	2,640	2,060	78%
3.B. Post Partum Mother Given Vitamin "A"	2,579	1,444	56%	2,640	1,718	65%
4.B. Post Partum Mother Given Complete Iron	2,579	1,310	64%	2,640	1,381	65%
<b>II – FAMILY PLANNING</b>						
2.A. New Acceptor (all methods)		1,123			1,566	
2.B. Other Acceptors (all methods)		175			173	
2.C. Current Users (all methods)		2,853			3,013	
2.D. Number of Drop Out (all methods)		987			1,380	
<b>III- CHILD CARE</b>						
3.A. Total Live births attended	2,579	1,865	72%	2,640	2,046	76%
3.B. 0-1 Year Old Registrants	2,579	3,178	123%	2,640	2,358	91%
<b>IV – CONTROL ACUTE RESPIRATORY INFECTION</b>						
4.A. Pneumonia cases seen	736	220	30%	752	179	24%
4.B. Pneumonia cases treated	220	220	100%	179	175	98%
<b>V- CONTROL DIARRHEA DISEASE</b>						
5.A. Diarrhea Cases	3,491	795	23%	3,573	692	19%
5.B. Diarrhea Cases Treated with Oresol	975	793	99%	692	692	100%
<b>VI- EXPANDED PROGRAM ON IMMUNIZATION</b>						
6.A BCG	2,579	2,352	91%	2,640	2,512	95%
6.B. DPT1	2,579	2,266	88%	2,640	2,537	96%
6.C. DPT2	2,579	2,183	85%	2,640	2,554	97%
6.D. DPT3	2,579	2,099	81%	2,640	2,511	95%
6.E. Number of DPT Drop-Out Rate	10%	4%	4%	10	0.6%	0.6%
6.F. OPV1	2,579	2,244	87%	2,640	2,550	96%
6.G. OPV2	2,579	2,224	86%	2,640	2,578	98%
6.H. OPV3	2,579	2,175	84%	2,640	2,540	96%
6.I. Number of OPV Drop-Out	2,579	3%	3%	2,640	0.3%	0.3%
6.J. Hepatitis I	2,579	2,191	85%	2,640	2,516	95%
6.K. Hepatitis II	2,579	2,091	81%	2,640	2,524	96%
6.L. Hepatitis III	2,579	2,003	78%	2,640	2,503	95%
6.M. Measles	2,579	2,344	91%	2,640	2,526	96%
6.N. Fully Immunized Children	2,579	2,204	85%	2,640	2,533	96%
6.O. Measles Drop-Out Rate	10%	3.4%	3.4%	10%	0.4%	0.45%
<b>VII-NATIONAL LEPROSY CONTROL PROGRAM</b>						
7.A. Case Detection (Case Finding)	5,717	580	10%	5,852	524	9%
7.B. Case Detection Rate		83%	83%		72%	72%
7.C. Sputum + Discovered	173	95	55%	177	84	47%
7.D. Positively Rate		16%	16		16%	16%
7.E. Cure Rate	85%	95%	95	85%		
7.F. Completion Rate		4	3.6%			
7.G. Success Rate	111	98	88%			

Continuation of Table 42

Program/Activities	2007			2008		
	Target	Acc.	%Acc.	Target	Acc.	%Acc.
<b>VII-NATIONAL LEPROSY CONTROL PROGRAM</b>						
7.A. Case Detection (Case Finding)	5,717	580	10%	5,852	524	9%
7.B. Case Detection Rate		83%	83%		72%	72%
7.C. Sputum + Discovered	173	95	55%	177	84	47%
7.D. Positively Rate		16%	16		16%	16%
7.E. Cure Rate	85%	95%	95	85%		
7.F. Completion Rate		4	3.6%			
7.G. Success Rate	111	98	88%			
<b>VIII- NATIONAL LEPROSY CONTROL PROGRAM</b>						
8.A. New Cases Diagnosed		5			0	
8.A Number who completed treatment		4			2	
8.A. Continuing TX at the end of the year		7			5	
<b>IX- NUTRITION PROGRAM</b>						
9.A. MASS OPT	17,196	15,115	88%	17,603	16,380	93%
9.B. Normal		14,029	93%		13,335	81%
9.C. Below Normal (Low)		52	0.3%		1,927	12%
9.D. Below Normal (Very Low)		538	3.5		297	2%
9.E. Above Normal (Above Normal)		496	3.2%		829	5%
<b>X- DENTAL PROGRAM</b>						
10.A. Pre-Schooler (Curative)						
10.B. Schooler (Preventive)						
Schooler (Curative)				2,408	2,032	84%
10.C. Pregnant Women (Preventive)				2,508	2,703	107%
Preventive Women (Curative)				718	682	95%
10.D. Other Adults				1,078	913	85%
<b>XI- ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION</b>						
11.A. No. of Households with access to safe water				4,924	5,794	117%
11.B. No. of Households with Sanitary Toilet						
11.C. No. of Households with Satisfactory Garbage Disposal	14,330		77%	14,669	11,479	78%
11.D. No. of Households with complete Basic Sanitation Facilities		11,034	65% 64%	14669 14669	9818 9769	67% 66%
11.E. No. of Food Establishments with Sanitary Permit	14330	9314	53%	14669		54%
11.F. No. of Food Handlers	1333	9171				
11.G. No. of Food Handlers with Health Certificate			100%	889		100%

Source Isabela City Accomplishment Report 2008

**f. Personal Security.** As stated earlier, Isabela City is still a peaceful place having earned the moniker “City of Cultural Diversity”. Of late, however, with the rise of lawless activities, Isabeleños, feel that they are not secure even in their homes. Key Informant Interviews conducted with stakeholders in the city stated that the Isabela of today is much different from the Isabela a few years back. Today, people would rather stay in their houses than venture out, especially at night. Recent kidnappings have sowed fear and terror among the populace. Even if the kidnapping incidents were done outside Isabela City, the perpetrators of the crime dump the salvaged bodies of their victims in the city. Another key informant stated that whenever he goes out to work, he brings with him a bladed weapon as a precaution against muggers and lawless elements.

**g. Food Security.** Isabela City is blessed by nature with abundance both from the land and from the sea. Its economy is basically agriculture – based. Marine resources are abundant. With the influx of the IDPs, and the consequences it entails, (unplanned urbanization, rapid increase in population, unstable peace and order situation, and the like), this has somewhat affected the Isabeleños in terms of food supply. When conflict happens in the adjacent municipalities, the people flee to Isabela City, leaving their farms and farm animals. They can only return to their places of origin when the conflict has subsided, which takes days or even weeks. Hence, the city of Isabela has to feed them, shelter them, and clothe them for humanitarian reasons. Again, the City has to rely on some private agencies, organizations and individuals to help alleviate the plight of the IDPs.

During our interview with key informants, one of them (a fisherman) said that sometimes he would rather stay at home than go out to fish because he is afraid of sea pirates. But he cannot do otherwise because he has to feed his family and fishing is the only way he knows to feed his family.

In summary, Isabela City is the center of commerce, trade and governance in the whole province of Basilan. It is blessed with many natural endowments and its agricultural base is strong. However, its industrial base remains rudimentary as local and foreign investors prefer to set up business in neighboring Zamboanga City than in Isabela City. In fact, many entrepreneurs in Isabela City are investing more in Zamboanga City because of peace and order concerns in Isabela. Thus, economic growth in Isabela City is slow. This situation also slows down poverty reduction in the area because of limited livelihood opportunities beyond farming and fishing. Poverty situation is worsened by the influx of IDPs. As the hub of economic and political activities in Basilan Province, Isabela City has also become the major destinations of IDPs affected by internal armed conflicts.

Yet, Isabela City does not have an updated CLUP or city development plan that can incorporate the issue of IDPs. Isabela City remains a 5<sup>th</sup> class city and there is a great deal of development efforts to elevate the status of city to a higher level. There is a need for the city to conduct a comprehensive city development planning exercise that will identify the short, medium and long-term actions to promote peace and development of Isabela City.

Being part of Basilan where Muslim rebels operate, Isabela City is tremendously affected by a host of peace and order problems. Aside from index and non-index crimes, Isabela City is also known for KFR activities and IEDs operations perpetuated by various threat groups. Violent criminal activities remain a problem in Isabela City aside from being a target of terrorist activities of the ASG. Thus, the City Government of Isabela shall also develop a City Peace and Development Plan that aims to reduce and prevent violence in the city and enhance

the feeling and safety not only among its community members but also of tourists and international development agencies operating in the area.

## URBAN SAFETY PROFILE IN JOLO

The municipality of Jolo is touted as the “show window” and the capital town of the province of Sulu. The population of Jolo as of 2007 (National Statistic Office) is 140,307 with population growth rate of 6.64%. It has a density of 3,255 per square kilometer. Individual barangay figures indicate that barangay Bus-Bus is the most densely populated among its 8 barangays. However, recent interview with the PNP pegs the total population at 536,201 (Jolo PNP, 2009).

Several factors contributed to the concentration of population in Jolo. Firstly, being the center of commerce, trade and institution, Jolo represents livelihood opportunities for the jobless. Secondly, the presence of basic services and facilities attracts the people from other municipalities to reside in Jolo. Thirdly, the precarious peace and order situation in the neighboring municipalities pushed the residents to migrate to Jolo.



Figure 7. Locator Map of Jolo

The most recent armed conflict occurred on 20 September 2009. It affected 5 barangays resulting to another round of internal displacement of people who converged towards the urban center. However, there are two major causes of internal displacement in Jolo. These are natural calamity, and armed conflict. Natural calamity in the form of the chronic tidal surge and flooding is the major cause of the bigger displacement in the town of Jolo. Of its total 6,641 IDPs in 2009, there are 5,770 who were displaced due to flooding and tidal surge. The armed conflict between the Abu Sayyaf and the Philippine military caused the displacement of 871 people. All displaced persons were housed in various evacuation centers within Jolo. FGD data reveal that most IDPs were housed in the elementary schools. The Municipal Social Welfare and Development (MSWD) provided only food rations. Later, many moved to the homes of relatives who eventually adopted them.

## THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE CONFLICT

In 2009, Jolo experienced its own share of natural calamities in the form of storm surge, which affected 5,770 victims. They were temporarily housed at the evacuation center and attended to by

the Rural Health Unit (RHU). Complete physical examinations were done and free medicines were given to those who were sick. Medicines were supplied by IPHO. Cases were mostly respiratory tract infection, diarrhea and skin infections. Sanitary Inspectors also inspected the evacuation center and noted poor garbage disposal, absence of toilets and overcrowding.

a. **Economic security.** There are more or less 4,000 business establishments in the town of Jolo (Comprehensive Development Plan – Executive Legislative Agenda 2008-2010, CPD-ELA). It is openly asserted that Jolo, being the “show window” of Sulu, thrives on commerce and trade. Its residents engage in procuring bulk quantities of commodities from Zamboanga, Cebu, and or as far away as Manila or from nearby Malaysia and Singapore, and selling these among the town residents including those coming from nearby islands. It is asserted further that almost all basic commodities of different kinds, including those produced in Malaysia and Indonesia; abound in the commercial town of Jolo. Small-time market vendors, who display their trade in the public market or alongside the road within the town’s commercial route, are the more dominant actors in the economic life of the town. Thus the business venture of selling basic commodities has become so lucrative that it has also been the major occupational source of income in Jolo. Abaca fiber production is another lucrative income generator for Jolo residents. In 2008, a recorded 30,926 bundles or 2,319,450 kilograms of abaca were shipped out from the town (Fiber Industry Development Authority, FIDA).

The availability of potential human resources both the skilled and non-skilled laborers for small industries are readily available in the municipality. However, there is a need for the government to improve and enhance the technical skills and developmental capabilities of these human resources. The latest information on the strategic plan of Metro Jolo can be derived from its 1998 output. It shows that approximately 80% of household in Jolo are employed in 2 or more gainful activities. Buy and sell estimated to about 30% the total household population while trading accounts to 50% and the rest accounts to other gainful activities.

There are 7 financial institutions in the municipality of Jolo composed of 4 government banks and 2 private commercial banks. Other lending institutions such as cooperatives are also

present in the town of Jolo. The list of government banks include: Developmental Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Islamic Bank of the Philippines (IBP), Land Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The 2 private commercial banks are Metro Bank and Allied Bank; while the 2 credit unions are Notre Dame of Jolo (NDJ) Kilusang Bayan for Credit Incorporation and Jolo Integrated Cooperative Incorporated (JICI). In addition, there are 24 registered pawn shops that operate business in the town of Jolo.

In general, the Jolo CPD-ELA for 2008-2010 reports that the resource of the Municipal Government for FY 2007 alone is 74,379,519.19. Accordingly, 66.6% of that amount would be derived from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). However, revenue from local taxes was 6,742.40 with a balance of 3,229,389.19. With this bulk of monetary resource, one wonders where the poverty of Jolo lies. The Municipal Government has not kept official figures of the various indicators in its entrepreneurship, business and industry, as well as its agriculture and fisheries development. However, the CDP-ELA identifies the following challenges to economic development in the town: inadequate technical skills training on livelihood programs, lack of fund for implementation of tourism plan, lack of income-generating programs, no public commercial trade center, and insufficient local fund for infrastructure projects and public facilities.

- b. **Environment Security.** The municipal government reports that one of the primary problems in the environmental management department is the improper disposal of garbage. This remains to be a pestering problem despite the fact that the municipal government has been the recipient of numerous orientations, seminars, and trainings on solid waste management (CDP-ELA, 2008 -2010). It is reasoned that the non-actualization of those inputs is conditioned by the lack of funds. The municipal government still waits for donor agencies to provide the needed funds and equipment as, according to the CDP-ELA report, Jolo could hardly afford to improve and sustain its Solid Waste Management Program.

**Table 43. Number of Internally Displaced Person (2009)**

Type of Disaster	Number of Person	Source of Relief Goods
Storm Surge & flooding	5,770	DSWD Nat'l/ACC/LGU/NGO
Armed Conflict	871	DSWD National
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,641</b>	

Source: DSWD, Jolo

This environmental problem is compounded by natural calamity – tidal surge and flooding. This calamity is actually a confluence of 2 unique features of Jolo. Firstly, Jolo’s coastline and shorelines are prone to tidal surges brought about by the natural seasonal cycle. Secondly, many residents of Jolo, being culturally orientated to the sea, tend to build stilt houses on the coastal shelf. In fact, it has been observed that the building of stilt houses has

gradually increased as the urban sprawl has encroached towards these areas. Furthermore, it has been reported (CDP-ELA, 08-10) that the coral reef has decreased from 78 percent to 74 percent in 2005 and to 2006, respectively. The stilt houses and their inhabitants are time and again victimized by tidal surges and strong waves. The January 2009 episode of this natural phenomenon proved to be the most calamitous among the stilt inhabitants. The tables below present the number of the displaced persons, and the DSWD inventory of victims and damages caused by tidal surge. One senior Key Informant declares that unlike in the past, people today are hard-headed because they do not want to follow municipal regulations pertaining to proper waste disposal. Accordingly, this attitude explains why Jolo today is dirty.

Presently, the municipal government identifies the following as the major concerns of environmental management sector:

- No permanent dumpsite

**Table 44: DSWD Inventory of Victims and Damage of Tidal Surge in January 2009**

Name of Barangay	Inside Evac Center	Outside Evac Center	Total Family Heads	Total Dependents	Total Person	Total FH Served	Total Person Served	Totally Damaged Houses	Partially Damaged houses
Tulay		152	152	622	774	152	774	19	134
Bus-Bus	130	514	644	3,232	3,876	644	3,876	180	4
Port Area	46	140	186	710	896	186	896	120	22
Chinese Pier		36	36	171	207	36	207	5	36
Takut-Takut		648	6	11	17	6	17	5	1

Source: PSWO-DSWD SULU BRANCH

- Inadequate Solid Waste Management (SWM) heavy equipment such as garbage truck, compactor, and bulldozer
- Unreported cases of dynamite fishing
- Unresolved flooding problem
- Lack of knowledge on SWM among new barangay officials, as there are presently 87% who are considered neophytes to the public office.

c. **Personal Security.** FGD data reveal that bombing, proliferation of illegal drugs, **gangsterism**, salvaging, and the presence of the Abu Sayyaf Group are considered major

**Table 45: Identified threat to Personal Safety Per Barangay**

Barangay	Threats to Personal Safety
Town Proper	Bombing, kidnapping, rido, rape
Bus-Bus	Hide-out of Abu Sayyaf, hide-out of drug pushers and drug users, gangs
Kasanyangan	Salvage victims are disposed here

Source: FGD December 2009

threats to personal safety within the Municipality of Jolo. Specifically, Barangays Bus-Bus and Kasanyangan are the 2 identified barangays which the FGD participants generally consider as unsafe. The Office of the Regional Personnel and Human Resource Dev't Division, PNP ARMM logs the police-to-population ratio of Jolo as of 2007 at 1:840. **Table 55** presents the identified threats per barangay. FGD participants declare that there exists a general perception of fear and insecurity pervading among the ordinary citizens. There are certain places within the town that they feel unsafe to loiter around, especially at night. This general perception was formed due to the prevalence of bombing, kidnapping, rido, and rape incidences. The youths, most especially, feel that overall security in the town is minimal, as they say that law enforcement is weak. They further declare that some "untouchable people" enjoy more privileges on law enforcement than ordinary civilians. One youth FGD participant said: "*Kasi ang nagloko-loko dito yung mga namamahala, meron mahuhuli palabasin, Kawawa ang civilian na tulad namin. Kaya walang asenso ang "lupah sug" (Sulu), ganun*" (It is those in authority who twist the law. Those (criminals) who are caught violating the law are set free. Civilians like us are helpless. The mayor has many good projects running, but crimes are not curbed. This is the reason why there is no development in Jolo). The youths have doubts about better future for their children and the next generation in Jolo. Despite this negative perception, they maintain that the following ways may trigger the improvement of the town: electing trustworthy leaders, and civilian-led movements for good governance. Although they recognize that the second suggestion is more difficult, as it would fit the civil society against big political clans who possess more power and influence. Older key informants attest that such negative perception did not exist among the populace in the past, as Jolo was safe and very peaceful. They attest further that they used to hold night classes till 9 pm in the college. Today, both teachers and students are in a hurry to go home comes 5:30 pm to avoid being victimized by kidnapping, robbery, rape, or bombing. *Rido* is also very common phenomenon among more influential clans. The "tao maas" (leaders) could not fully enforce the law because many people have guns and are willing to fight back the authorities and they show no respect to leaders. Even priests have security escorts to protect them against lawless elements. Some families have their kids attend schools in Zamboanga or Cebu. Others have completely abandoned Jolo and migrated to safer places in other parts of the country. Thus older folks always feel nostalgic about the past days of the town. According to them,

things began to turn for the worse in Jolo beginning in 1974 when Nur Misuari organized the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to wage war against the government. Since then, things were not normal again. Today, these older folks don't enjoy going out to town anymore as much as they did in the past, for fear of bomb explosions.

- d. **Community Security.** The crime incidence and volume data for Jolo are presented in table below. The available data taken from the office of the PNP reflect the second quarter and fourth quarter of 2009. Among the crimes listed, six (6) murder cases and four (4) rape cases were reported.

Presently, the municipal police have in its record only the 2009 crime incidents in Jolo. The table below presents the comparative crime statistics of the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of 2008 and the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarters of 2009.

The police record does not present a history of the incidence of crime in Jolo – as its official record indicates only the 2009 figures, which unfortunately are not strongly supported by details. For instance, the series of bombings which happened very recently in 2009 does not appear in the official report – except in the media. Meanwhile, a church-based NGO which also monitors the occurrence of criminality in the municipality presents the following crime inventory in 2009: 6 kidnapping incidence, 3 bomb explosions, 5 arrested for possession of illegal drugs, 11 murders, 9 frustrated murders, 4 arrested for illegal possession of firearms, and 4 robbery cases (Center for Justice, Peace, and Integrity of Creation, 2009). While the latest official police record presents a crime volume total of 13 crimes committed, the inventory of inmates by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) reveal a

**Table 46. Crime Incidence and Volumes. Data on crime incidence was taken from the Office of the Philippine National Police, Municipality of Jolo, 2009.**

<b>CASES REPORTED</b>	<b>1<sup>ST</sup> Qtr 2009</b>	<b>2<sup>ND</sup> Qtr 2009</b>	<b>3<sup>RD</sup> Qtr 2009</b>	<b>4<sup>TH</sup> Qtr 2009</b>
<b>Crime Against Person</b>				
Murder	-	6	-	0
Homicide	-	1	-	0
Physical Injury	-	0	-	0
Rape	-	0	-	4
Maltreatment	-	0	-	0
Kidnapping	-	0	-	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	-	<b>7</b>	-	<b>5</b>
<b>Crime Against Property</b>				
Robbery	-	2	-	0
Theft	-	2	-	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	-	<b>4</b>	-	<b>0</b>
<b>Crime Against Chastity</b>				
Abduction	-	1	-	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	-	<b>1</b>	-	<b>0</b>
<b>Crime Against Moral and Order</b>				
Prohibited Drugs	-	4	-	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	-	<b>4</b>	-	<b>2</b>
<b>Other Crimes</b>				
Explosive/Ammo., Illegal Possession	-	3	-	2
Bombing		2*		
Threat/Extortion Letter	-	0	-	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	-	<b>5</b>	-	<b>6</b>

Source: <http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=16716>

more telling picture of the magnitude of criminality in Jolo. BJMP record shows that murder and homicide are frequently committed crimes in the municipality. Table 48 shows the types of crimes committed by inmates of the municipal jail as of 2009.

**Table 47: Comparative Crime Statistics (4<sup>th</sup> Qtr 2008, 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr 2009 & 2<sup>nd</sup> Qtr 2009)**

	4 <sup>th</sup> Qtr. 2008	1 <sup>st</sup> Qtr. 2009	2 <sup>nd</sup> Qtr. 2009
Crime Volume	10	19	13
Index Crime	8	11	10
Non-Index Crime	2	2	9
A.Q.C.R	2.38	3.09	4.51
Crime Solved	3	3	9
Crime Solution Efficacy	30%	23.08%	47.37%

Source: Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, 2009

Aside from the problem of criminality, terrorism also poses a grave threat to community security in Jolo. A study made by the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) states that the security risk in Jolo is high because it is the major operational area of ASG. Yassir Igasan, the nominal leader of the ASG, is operating in Jolo. There were also sightings of *Jemaah Islamiyah* groups in Jolo to purchase materials for the manufacture of home made bombs and IEDs. Though presence of government security forces is strong in Jolo, police stations do not have enough manpower compared to the magnitude of threats in the area. Thus, Jolo relies heavily on military forces to promote community security in the municipality.

**Table 48. List of Inmates (as of November 20, 2009)**

Type of Crime	# of Inmates
Attempted Parricide	38
Attempted Rape	7
Attempted Murder	3
Murder with Frustrated Murder	5
Murder	12
Multiple Murder with Frustrated Murder	2
Murder, Attempted Murder	1
Frustrated Murder	10
Homicide	2
Multiple Frustrated Homicide	2
Rape	4
Forcible Abduction with Rape	1
Abduction with Rape	1
Robbery	12
Robbery with Double Homicide and Arson	1
Theft, Robbery	1
Theft	2
Estafa	5
Libel/Estafa	1
Assault upon a person agent in authority	1
Violation of RA 6539	1
Violation of PD-1866	7
Violation of RA 9165	23
Violation of RA 8294	1
Violation of RA 7610	1
Temporary Detainees	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>161</b>

Source: Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, 2009

- e. **Political Security.** One broad issue in the political security of Jolo refers to governance aspect. Noticeably, the municipal government has not maintained systematic and coherent record about recent updates on Jolo's demographics. This general observation applies to the following vital departments of the local government: police, economic, education, health, social welfare, and revenue. A social welfare personnel confirms that the following social

services structures are lacking in Jolo town: drug rehabilitation center, mental hospital, and refuge center for street children. Overcrowding within the town also limits the establishment of these centers due to unavailability of space. There used to be a psychiatrist and therapist for drug addicts and mentally ill, but are presently not reporting to Jolo anymore. Parents who willingly submit their drug-dependent children for rehabilitation have to go to Zamboanga City for proper medication and rehabilitation. What was supposed to be a drug rehabilitation center in Jolo has been converted into jail for criminals. It is observed that Jolo is also poor in terms of the coherent clerical accounting of its social and material capitals. Consequently, this particular situation weakens a major part of its political security aspect – lack of clear accounting in governance. Its most obvious manifestation is absence of official records despite the actual occurrence of events and incidents in the urban area and despite the declaration of those who actually witnessed those events.

- f. **Unplanned Urbanization.** Based on the latest records from the Lands Management Bureau, Manila, the estimated land area of Jolo is 2,364 hectares which constitute about 1.48% of the total land area of the province of Sulu (160,040 has.) of which 596 hectares comprised the dry land area.

However, the total land area of Jolo shall increase to about 12,640 hectares after a complete cadastral and official survey shall have been conducted and approved. As to the official delineation from one barangay to another, there has been no official survey ever conducted yet, hence, no official data can be provided as of the moment. Because of the economic growth of Jolo as a trading commercial and institutional center of Sulu, mixed land uses proliferated within the town. As a matter of fact, coastal or foreshore areas of Jolo are being utilized for dwelling permanent houses on stilts. It even extended beyond its territorial boundary towards areas under the territorial jurisdictions of Patikul and Indanan municipalities. More or less, of the 2,364 hectares, the dry land consisting of 596 hectares are already built-up areas with considerable portions utilized as agricultural areas planted with fruit-bearing trees and coconut including cash crops like vegetable, corn and cassava.

As to the areas of sectoral land uses, there is no official delineation of boundary from barangay to barangay at present. Nevertheless, the municipal of Jolo still uses the unofficial data of 1987 SEP for Jolo's land uses by sector and by barangay, which was surveyed by then Municipal Development Staff (MDS) Office of Jolo, now called as the "Municipal Planning and Development Office."

By virtue of Resolution No. 9 series of 1993, the present boundary of *poblacion* of this municipality has been expanded from Barangay Walled City to its adjacent barangays. Presently, it partly occupies barangays Tulay, Chinese Pier, Takut-Takut, Alat, and Bus-Bus. However, the land area of the latter has not been measured. Nonetheless, the municipality of Jolo is generally considered as Urban Area.

To summarize, Jolo, as the capital town of Sulu, is a commercial and governance hub in the province. In fact, the town was the center of government at the height of Sulo Sultanate in 15<sup>th</sup> century. While Manila was just an embryonic town at that time, Jolo was already a developed one.

The Municipality of Jolo is endowed with human and natural resources. However, a doable development plan is needed to unleash the great economic potential of the town. At present, Jolo has a gargantuan peace and order problem because of the presence of various threat groups emanating largely from the ASG. There are also private armed groups in Jolo that are engaged in drug trafficking and smuggling of dutiable goods from Sabah. The peace and order situation in Jolo is retarding local economic development necessary for the alleviation of poverty of its residents. Because of poverty and lack of economic opportunities, young people have joined armed groups to mount KFR activities. Unless economic opportunities are broadened through the improvement of local governance, it is very difficult to unleash Jolo's huge economic and political potential.

## *About the Institute for Autonomy and Governance*



**The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) is an independent and non-partisan think tank founded in 2001 to generate ideas on making autonomy an effective vehicle for peace and development in the Southern Philippines.**

**IAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving concept that encompasses any political structure that is less than an independent state. It provides the country's minority Muslim and Indigenous Peoples platforms to evolve self governance structures whether federal, autonomous or associative.**

**IAG continues to conduct research, fora, roundtable discussions, and conferences on the issues of autonomy, good governance and political settlements between the GRP and the Rebel Fronts (MNLF and MILF). It has published policy papers and journals on political, economic, and security issues that define the much needed measures to be undertaken for meaningful self-governance in the region.**

**IAG also provides support to the ARMM Executive and the Iranon Development Council (Buldon, Barira, Matanog, Parang and Datu Blah Sinsuat), specifically in capacity-building with focus on the processes of policy formulation and legislation.**

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