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## INDONESIA / KALIMANTAN

# New ethnic-related displacement while earlier IDPs struggle to make return sustainable


In late September 2010, an estimated 32,000 people fled their homes in Tarakan, a city in the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan on the island of Borneo, following inter-ethnic violence between indigenous Dayak Tidung and Bugis, migrants from South Sulawesi. Bugis comprised the majority of people internally displaced by the conflict. Most sought refuge in schools, police stations or other public buildings. Others fled the city and travelled back to ancestral homelands in South Sulawesi. Following the deployment of security forces and a government-mediated peace agreement, stability was quickly restored and most of the internally displaced people (IDPs) were able to return home. However some Bugis were still reported to be taking their families to South Sulawesi after the end of violence.

There is no confirmed information on the situation of thousands of Madurese people (whose ancestral homeland is Madura, an island off the north-eastern coast of Java) who fled their homes in 2001 and 2005 in fear of the spread of ethnic violence then affecting the neighbouring provinces of West and Central Kalimantan. It is believed that most have since returned home.

From 1997 to 2001, inter-ethnic violence pitting indigenous Dayaks and Malays against the Madurese displaced more than 200,000 people, most of them Madurese, in both West and Central Kalimantan. Most IDPs returned to their homes, but restrictions imposed by sub-provincial administrations and local communities have reportedly prevented some returnees from enjoying their rights to the same extent as other citizens. Resolution of property disputes, access to farming land and compensation for lost property have been recurring issues.

IDPs have not returned in West Kalimantan, in particular in Sambas regency where the local population still refuses to accept back the Madurese. Those who have taken over Madurese-owned land and property have been reluctant to give it up. Most IDPs have since 2002 been resettled in camps around the city of Pontianak, the West Kalimantan capital, while others have chosen to integrate in the city. They have struggled to find the basic necessities of life and rebuild sustainable livelihoods.

The government provided important security and humanitarian assistance during the West and Central Kalimantan displacement crises. In the post-conflict period, however, the government has failed to actively promote peace and reconciliation, effectively leaving the provincial and local authorities free to shape return, resettlement and reintegration policies even when they clearly violate the rights of the displaced Madurese. The rights of the Madurese have been subordinated to "higher" interests of stability and order. Overt violence may have disappeared, but its causes have not been addressed, and the perpetrators of violence have never been punished. This environment has made it difficult for IDPs and returnees to achieve durable solutions.



Source: IDMC

More maps are available at [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org)

## Causes and background

### *Violence and displacement in West Kalimantan (1997-1999)*

Inter-ethnic violence and large-scale displacement in modern West Kalimantan started in 1967 when indigenous Dayaks (a term coined by Europeans to designate ethnic groups considered as among the indigenous inhabitants of the island of Borneo) forcibly displaced tens of thousands of Chinese from their homes in the interior of the province. This violence took place at a time when the Indonesian military was supporting a nationwide pogrom against Indonesian Chinese due to their alleged pro-communist sympathies (Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, March 2010, pp.294-295). Soon after, Dayaks and Madurese, who had started migrating in large numbers to West Kalimantan in the 1920s, clashed as they competed to seize land and properties abandoned by the Chinese. This triggered recurrent cycles of conflict between two groups known for their propensity to resort to violence and revenge killings (WB, February 2005, p.25). The Malay and Dayak are substantial ethnic groups in the province, each representing roughly 34 per cent of a total population of nearly four million, and the Madurese are a small minority, a mere 5.5 per cent (UNDP, 2005, p.4).

In early 1997, a clash between Madurese and Dayak youth in Sanggau Ledo, Sambas regency, escalated into riots which spread to the provincial capital, Pontianak. By April 1997, some 3,000 homes had been destroyed, 500 people killed and an estimated 25,000 people displaced. The Madurese community was by far the most affected by the violence. While return was possible in some areas, most internally displaced people (IDPs) remained too afraid to return and ended up staying in camps while their land was taken over by Dayaks (UNDP, 2005, p.32; HRW, December 1997, chapter IV). In March 1999, inter-ethnic violence erupted once again when Dayaks and Malays attacked Madurese migrants in Sambas and Singkawang.

In 1999, the Malays launched their own attacks against the Madurese again in Sambas. Scores of mosques and houses were burned down, at least 200 Madurese, probably many more, were killed and an estimated 70,000 fled their homes. Some sought shelter in camps within Sambas regency, but the majority fled to Pontianak regency and to the city where they took shelter in sport centres and other public facilities, or with relatives (UNDP, 2005, p.32). Other people fled to nearby towns, while as many as 10,000 were also escorted by ship to East Java or to Madura (UNDP; 2005, p. 24; USCR, June 2000). After staying for up to two years in makeshift sites in Pontianak, most displaced people chose to integrate in the city while others moved to resettlement sites located outside the capital (De Jong & Nootboom, 2006, p.463; World Vision, 4 July 2001). In 2004, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) questioned the long-term sustainability of the sites because of very limited income opportunities and poor access to markets (CRS, 31 March 2004, p.27). An OCHA visit to 12 of the 13 camps in 2004 confirmed that IDPs had few economic opportunities (UNDP, 2005, p.48).

### *Inter-ethnic violence and displacement in Central Kalimantan*

Clashes between Madurese and Dayaks, the majority ethnic group in Central Kalimantan, started in December 2000 but these incidents remained limited in scope and did not cause any displacement. Inter-ethnic violence exploded in Sampit, East Kotawaringin regency, in February 2001 when four Madurese were killed by Dayaks who were allegedly seeking revenge for the death of a relative killed a few months before. In the following days, over 1,000 Dayak fighters flocked to Sampit to violently confront the Madurese. Violence quickly spread to other regions of the province including Palangkaraya, the provincial capital, and Pangkalanbun, West Kotawaringin regency. By April, the violence had claimed between 500 and 1,300 lives, mostly Madurese, and displaced more than 150,000 people, almost the entire Madurese population of the province (Bouvier

& Smith, 2008, p.231; Van Klinken, October 2001). The expulsion of the Madurese was officially sanctioned as police and army units escorted them to East Java and to Madura (ICG, 27 June 2001, p.ii: HRW, 28 February 2001).

By 2004, only some 43,000 Madurese IDPs had managed to return to Central Kalimantan, most of them without any government assistance. Over 100,000 remained displaced in Java or Madura, living mainly with host families and in a small number of camps. Forced to live in sub-standard accommodation, most IDPs were struggling to make ends meet, with unemployment levels reaching 90 per cent (Bouvier & Smith, 2006, p. 217; OCHA, 30 June 2004). Some were reportedly forced to sell their daughters who left Indonesia and become exploited domestic workers (Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, March 2010, p.318). More Madurese started returning to Central Kalimantan after 2004 following the distribution of assistance packages by the government and the issuance by the provincial government of regulations promoting and facilitating their return (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.14). By mid-2005, an estimated 80 per cent of the Madurese had returned to Central Kalimantan. Since then there has been no further data available on returns although it is likely that most have now returned (Bouvier & Smith, 2008, p.246).

#### *Communal violence and displacement in East Kalimantan*

The Madurese community in East Kalimantan province, where they only represent around one per cent of a total population of 2.5 million, has not experienced the severity of inter-ethnic violence found in neighbouring provinces (De Jong & Nootboom, 2006, p. 460). However, the threat of violence has triggered significant displacement. In 2001, up to 15 per cent of the Madurese community fled to Madura in anticipation that violence in Central Kalimantan would spread to East Kalimantan. In November 2005, an incident between a Dayak and a Madurese

almost degenerated into mass violence and led hundreds of Madurese to flee to Madura (De Jong & Nootboom, 2006, p.469). Although tension between the Dayak and the Madurese has remained high in the province in recent years, no further violence or displacement has been reported. Most of the Madurese displaced in 2001 and 2005 are believed to have returned.

While the threat of mass violence between the Dayaks and the Madurese has been averted in East Kalimantan, inter-ethnic violence recently pitted Dayaks against another migrant group. In September 2010, at least five people were killed and an estimated 32,000 people displaced from their homes by several days of clashes between indigenous Dayak Tidung and migrant Bugis in Tarakan, East Kalimantan, where this group represents around 18 per cent of the population (Jakarta Post, 29 September 2010). The violence was reportedly triggered by the killing of a Tidung by Bugis men.

The majority of the displaced sought refuge in schools but also at police stations and military barracks. An unknown number of Bugis also fled the city to their ancestral homes in Makassar, South Sulawesi (Jakarta Post, 30 September 2010). After a week of violence, a peace accord put a formal end to the conflict with both groups handing over their weapons to the police. Thousands of people reportedly returned to their homes in the wake of the peace agreement. Despite the end of violence, some groups consisting mainly of women and children continued to leave to South Sulawesi where they have waited for peace and order to be fully restored (Jakarta Post, 1 October 2010).

#### *Causes of violence and displacement in Kalimantan*

In both Central and West Kalimantan, the violence was partly explained by the dislocation experienced by the Dayaks. The large influx of Madurese, Javanese and other migrants since the 1970s has significantly altered the demographic balance. Political and economic competition

between Dayak and Malay elites has resulted in the manipulation of ethnic identities and the use of widely shared stereotypes of Madurese as arrogant, eager to resort to violence and untrustworthy (ICG, 27 June 2001, p.21). Under the authoritarian New Order system imposed during the rule of President Suharto (1965-1998), the Dayaks were deemed to be primitive and were purged from positions of authority and replaced with Javanese and Malays. The government seized Dayak land and distributed it to migrants, including Madurese, and to logging companies. The evicted Dayaks were also excluded from the resulting jobs and profits, which went to Malays and Madurese. The fact that the Dayaks lost access to government and military positions under the New Order and that most of the Madurese migrated to Kalimantan during that period helps explain why the Madurese became the target of Dayak attacks instead of the Malays, who were their real rivals in the contest for power (De Jong, & Nootboom, 2006, pp.464-472).

In both West and Central Kalimantan, the end of the New Order and the transition to non-agricultural economies provided opportunities to establish social, political and economic control, including of new non-agricultural jobs (Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, March 2010, p.312). Nationwide decentralisation at the end of the 1990s also opened up increased possibilities for local power-holders. Corrupt and weak government institutions failed to prevent social tensions and inter-communal conflict (WB, February 2005, p. 46, Van Klinken, April 2008). In West and Central Kalimantan, Dayaks and Malays used violence against the Madurese to achieve political and economic gains. In East Kalimantan Dayaks managed to improve their position by talking up the threat of violence (Bakker, January 2009, p.5).

Dayaks have also managed to further their influence over regional and provincial governments in relation to customary (*adat*) claims around ownership of land and natural resources. Dayaks have

asserted that violence against the Madurese was "just and legal", as the Madurese under the New Order had illegally gained control of Dayak land and violated *adat*. Dayaks have argued that further violence cannot be averted unless violations of their *adat* rights are acknowledged and addressed. The place given to *adat* rights by the governments of the Kalimantan provinces has grown in recent years: in Central Kalimantan, the provincial government decreed in 2001 that residents must respect *adat* and its interpretation by Dayak leaders (Bakker, January 2009, p.4). However, the practical observance of *adat* remains very limited. Recognition of *adat* rights has not managed to effectively protect Dayak forests from powerful logging, rubber and palm oil companies.

In recent years, the government has sponsored an increasing number of palm oil plantations throughout the Kalimantan provinces, and plans to massively expand them in a bid to increase biofuel production (Oxfam, June 2008, pp.23-24). Indigenous Dayak forest inhabitants gain few benefits from palm oil production and those who become landless may be forced to seek work in urban areas. Palm oil production has encouraged individual, rather than communal land title, further detaching Dayaks from their customs and culture. Social networks and solidarity have been strained by land acquisition processes which often create conflict within communities and families. West Kalimantan has reportedly the second highest level of land conflict related to palm oil plantations in Indonesia. When not properly managed and addressed these conflicts can assume an ethnic dimension, targeting outsiders such as the Chinese, the Madurese or the Javanese deemed responsible for loss of land and culture (Sirait, May 2009).

In East Kalimantan, the sudden eruption of Tidung-Bugis violence may bear similarities with the Dayak-Madurese conflict. The indigenous Tidung in Tarakan also reportedly feel politically and economically excluded by outsiders hold-

ing positions of authority (Jakarta Globe, 30 September 2010).

## Durable solutions

The conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan displaced up to 200,000 people between 1997 and 2001 (Bouvier & Smith, 2006, p. 216). More than ten years later, the majority have either returned home, resettled in camps, integrated in their area of displacement or moved to urban areas. The extent to which these different groups have been able to find durable solutions remains largely unknown and is not monitored.

According to the Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, "a durable solution is achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement". A number of important principles should guide the search for durable solutions. Key principles relevant in the case of the Madurese IDPs and returnees, which the central, provincial and sub-provincial administrations all appear to have failed to guarantee, include:

- the "need to respect IDPs' rights to make an informed and voluntary decision on what durable solution to pursue";
- the "participation of IDPs in the planning and management of durable solutions";
- the right of IDPs seeking a durable solution "not to be subject to discrimination for reasons related to their displacement"; and
- the overarching principle that "the needs, rights and legitimate interests of IDPs should be the primary considerations guiding all policies and decisions on durable solutions".

Unlike other conflict-affected areas of Indonesia such as Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, there has been no truth and reconcili-

ation process in West or Central Kalimantan. The ethnic violence, the large-scale displacement of the Madurese community and the resulting land-grabbing, by and large condoned by the government, has continued to be defended by its Dayak and Malay perpetrators. Post-conflict processes of inquiry have not addressed either the structural injustice that Dayaks have suffered under Indonesian and Dutch institutions or the unjust way they have blamed the Madurese for their discrimination they have suffered. Mistrust of the Madurese remains but the key contestation for political control in the two provinces in recent years is between Malays and Dayaks (Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, March 2010, pp.293, 339; Jakarta Post, 28 February 2008). The return to "normality" in both provinces largely stems from the will of all groups to "move on". This has only been made possible by the acceptance by the Madurese of their "defeat", the loss of many of their assets and the decline of the status of their community.

Open violence has disappeared but the root causes have not been addressed and the perpetrators of violence have never been punished. This situation has failed to provide an environment conducive to the achievement of durable solutions for those displaced by the conflict, almost all of whom were Madurese. In areas to which they have been allowed to return, displaced Madurese have had to accept a number of limitations to their civil, political, economic and social rights and have become "second-class citizens" (Bouvier & Smith, 2008, p.246; UNDP, 2005, p.67). In both West and Central Kalimantan, the rights and interests of displaced Madurese are clearly secondary to those of the Dayak and Malays who have managed to heavily influence all public policies and decisions. With few exceptions, Madurese IDPs have neither been consulted nor involved in the planning of durable solutions.

*Long-term safety, security and freedom of movement*  
Prior to 2004, the conditions imposed on Madurese seeking to return to Central Kalimantan

were unacceptable for most of them: return was only allowed for landowners, those who had lived in the province for a number of years, had Dayak family ties, had not been involved in violence and were ready to apologise (Bouvier, & Smith, 2008, p.245). Since 2004, most IDPs have returned to Central Kalimantan, although severe restrictions continue to be placed on their freedom of movement and other fundamental rights. Some regencies passed laws providing for the expulsion of returning Madurese who fail to adhere to local customs. Candidates for return have been screened by village leaders, based on subjective considerations such as their "good character", as well as objective criteria such as whether they had a permanent job or were married to a Dayak woman (WB, February 2005, p.18).

While return to Central Kalimantan has been possible for most Madurese, this has not been the case in West Kalimantan due to continued opposition from local Dayaks and Malays (CHD, 11 March 2010; Bouvier & Smith, 2008, p.248). The murder of several Madurese who had returned to Sambas to dispose of their property in 2002 prompted the provincial authorities to decide against a general return of IDPs. Instead, the government decided to resettle the IDPs in 12 sites outside Pontianak, and where it provided housing and agricultural land to some 11,000 families (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.21; CRS, 2003, p.1). Other IDPs chose to move in with relatives in Pontianak city (De Jong & Nooteboom, 2006, p.463). Opposition to the return of the displaced Madurese is particularly strong in Sambas regency where Malay youth groups, politicians and those who have taken over Madurese land continue to discourage any Madurese return (Cahyono, 2008, pp.153-154).

*Access to mechanisms to restore housing, land and property or provide compensation*

In West Kalimantan, the eviction of the Madurese community, which had established control over sectors of both the formal and clandestine economy, in particular in Sambas, allowed Malays to

extend their domination and the Dayak to secure new sources of livelihoods and acquire land abandoned by the Madurese. There has since been no peace and no reconciliation as in the eyes of Malays and Dayaks this would have entailed the return of the Madurese, an option not considered as "realistic" (CHD, 11 March 2010). 12 years after the initial violence, Madurese IDPs are still not welcome back, in particular in Sambas. While many IDPs have managed to sell their properties to restart their lives elsewhere it remains unclear what proportion has been sold and how many properties have been forcibly seized (Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, March 2010, p.307).

Madurese IDPs from Bengkayang (formerly part of Sambas) living in Singkawang have reported being unable to return to their homes because of the hostility of Dayaks who have seized their property. The loss of land certificates during the conflict has further complicated the restitution and compensation process in the absence of government support. While some of those who could prove their ownership managed to sell their land, the majority of the displaced have not received any compensation. This has undermined their chances of rebuilding their lives elsewhere, leaving many forced to stay in poorly equipped IDP camps (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, p.148). In the resettlement sites, many IDPs have also reported facing problems related to the ownership of the land they were living on (UNDP, 2005, p.48).

While it appears that in Central Kalimantan the strong widespread desire to "move on" has meant that most problems have been resolved, a number of returnees have not been able to assert their land rights and have restarted their lives from scratch without any external assistance. Often, they are even unable to obtain secure tenure of the houses they live in (Bouvier & Smith, 2008, p.246). There are clear instructions from the central government that the ownership rights of Madurese should be guaranteed and their

property protected. However, local officials have done little to protect the rights of IDPs and help them to obtain necessary legal documentation of ownership (Sukandar, June 2007, p.171). IDPs have often faced difficulties in getting land title certificates due to the lack of proper documentation or ID cards. There is legal ambiguity regarding land bought on credit but not yet completely paid for. Another major obstacle has been the difficulty in determining boundaries when land has been bought by groups (CARE, 6 May 2008, p.8).

#### *Effective remedies for displacement-related violations and access to justice*

Access to justice for victims of displacement-related violations in both Central and West Kalimantan has been very limited. Perpetrators generally enjoy impunity in both provinces. While some people have been jailed in West Kalimantan for participating in ethnic violence, the ringleaders have never been indicted (Van Klinken, April 2008, p.39). The majority of cases affecting IDPs relate to land and property. In Dayak-majority rural areas, there has been a resurgence of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in parallel with the formal justice system. Displaced Madurese seeking redress or compensation for lost property may therefore be obliged to use both the formal and non-formal justice systems. In both arenas it is hard for them to effectively represent themselves and to advance durable solutions to their displacement and property losses.

The politicisation of Dayak identity and the capacity for violence Dayaks have demonstrated against the Madurese made their claims around *adat* land tenure rights more effective, as the local authorities were forced to pay more attention to local interests. *Adat* law also gained more ground in dispute resolution processes at the village level. This is particularly evident in regencies where Dayaks are in a clear majority, such as Bengkayang in West Kalimantan where the inter-ethnic violence was particularly intense and where Madurese are still not welcome to return and face land and

property disputes. Since the inter-ethnic violence, the police have reportedly started using *adat* laws, respecting leaders and giving villagers the choice of seeking redress from *adat* institutions or the police. Not all are happy: some complain that the administration of *adat* justice sometimes favours Dayaks over non-Dayaks (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, pp.179-180).

Madurese IDPs originally from Bengkayang who fled to Singkawang in 1999 were still unable to return seven years later due to opposition from Dayaks who had taken over their land and property. Most of them did not retain proof of ownership and have since been trying to get adequate compensation for their losses. IDPs have been particularly frustrated by inaction on the part of government representatives and the police who they see as not doing enough to guarantee their property ownership rights or protect them from Dayak violence and threats. The Madurese displaced "complained to the sub-district government, who have reported that they are waiting for the district government to take action, who in turn are waiting for the provincial government to provide guidance" (UNDP & Bappenas, December 2006, pp.151-156).

#### *Access to employment and livelihoods*

As a result of the strict regulations in place in many regencies of Central Kalimantan, many among the Madurese commercial and political elite have not returned. Those who have are reportedly barred from living in some neighbourhoods, denied access to employment opportunities or forced to pay compensation to those who had seized their land or property (UNDP, 2005, pp.72-73). Some occupations remain "off-limits" for Madurese (Bouvier & Smith, 2008, p.246). Some government officials and local leaders have reportedly decided that Madurese "must not be given important positions in the government" (Sukandar, June 2007, p.168). The absence of any monitoring has made it difficult to assess how returns have progressed and what obstacles return-

ees continue to face. Those who may have chosen to remain in Madura also face major challenges to sustain themselves as they are classified as “temporary visitors” and cannot access public services and land (WB, February 2005, p.46).

In West Kalimantan, conditions in the resettlement sites outside Pontianak have often been described as inadequate. Reportedly, three quarters of funds allocated for house construction have been corruptly misappropriated. Relocation sites are often isolated, far from markets and job opportunities and arable land is generally of poor quality (Davidson, 2008, p.79). There have also been few income-generating programmes and livelihood opportunities in the camps (CRS, 31 March 2004, p.4). Tension with surrounding host communities has also been reported (CHD, 11 March 2010). At least ten per cent of the Madurese refused to move to these sites, and chose instead to receive the government’s “empowerment fund” to resettle independently (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p.21; CRS, 2003, p.1). Others who had initially agreed to move to the sites later decided to move back into the city (UNDP, 2005, p.48).

Struggling to find employment or other livelihood opportunities, Madurese IDPs are reportedly easy prey for human traffickers who have sent girls abroad as domestic workers, bonded labourers and sex workers (Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, March 2010, p.300). West Kalimantan is known to be a major centre of human trafficking and Pontianak to be a gateway where women and children from all over Indonesia are gathered before being secretly moved to other Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore or Japan, as well as the Middle East. Internal trafficking is also a serious problem in Indonesia, with many women and children becoming entrapped in domestic servitude or prostitution networks (USDoS, 14 June 2010).

## National response

The response of the government to the violence and displacement in both West and Central Kalimantan provinces between 1997 and 2001 included a wide range of protection and assistance initiatives which primarily focused on security measures, provision of material support and logistical assistance to evacuate the Madurese to temporary camps or to Madura. Although the initial government response was relatively fast, its effectiveness was undermined by widespread corruption, coordination problems and, more importantly, by a lack of long-term vision and strategy. In East Kalimantan, the provincial government prevented the spread of ethnic violence of 2001 by bringing together representatives of all major ethnic groups to encourage them to publicly commit to peace (De Jong & Nooteboom, 2006, p.470). In November 2005, and during the last violence in September 2010, the swift intervention of the police and military kept the violence under control and allowed for a relatively quick restoration of peace and security.

The national IDP policy established in 2001 offered Indonesian IDPs the options to return, integrate locally and resettle. However, by 2004, when the policy officially ended, almost no support had been offered to those wishing to return (Sweeting, Conway & Hameed, September 2004, p.40). In 2002, an inter-provincial meeting between governors of the Kalimantan provinces and East Java and representatives of the central government decided against a general return of the Madurese out of fear that their return would disrupt peace (WB, February 2005, p.18). Although it has made some efforts to bring the different parties together and to find acceptable solutions, the government has never really promoted peace and reconciliation between the conflicting parties or advocated for the unconditional return of the Madurese, in particular in West Kalimantan (Cahyono, 2008, p.155). The state’s failure to safeguard the post-conflict interests of the Madurese has, in effect, left Dayak

and Malay elites free to impose their views on all matters related to IDP return and reintegration (Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, March 2010, p.307; CHD, 11 March 2010). Peace and reconciliation has not been high on the agenda of provincial administrations controlled by these dominant groups. While an incremental and selective return process took place in Central Kalimantan, segregation through resettlement was seen as the preferable option in West Kalimantan.

In Central Kalimantan, return of the displaced Madurese did take place but only after several years of exile in East Java and under stringent conditions (WB, February 2005, p. 18). Most Madurese IDPs returned to Central Kalimantan after 2004 following the distribution of assistance packages by the government and the issuance by the provincial government of regulations promoting and facilitating their return (OCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 14). They returned largely on their own in a process which, according to the provincial government, had to be "natural" (Bouvier & Smith, 2008, p.246). To be considered for repatriation, Madurese IDPs had to re-register with local authorities and provide a previous ID card, proof of housing and land ownership and evidence of a permanent job. The return package, which consisted of a lump sum up to a maximum of Rp 5.5 million (\$570) per family was often not paid in full to IDPs as middlemen collected a "fee" and perpetrated other forms of embezzlement (UNDP, 2005, pp.61-65, Bouvier & Smith, 2006, p. 218).

The failure of the central government to adopt a clear return and reconciliation policy, the absence of any specific return plan or action by the provincial government, and the lack of dissemination of the provincial return and reconciliation policy, meant that local authorities and communities had limited means of promoting reconciliation activities. At the regency level, decisions related to return and reconciliation were often postponed while awaiting for provincial-level instructions (WB, February 2005, p.19). Some regencies did

develop their own local regulations (*Peraturan Daerah/Perda*) to encourage or to limit return, but many did not adopt a formal policy, particularly in areas in which intense opposition to Madurese return persisted (Common Ground Indonesia, January 2004, p.7; Braithwaite, 2009, p.28). The effectiveness of the regulation adopted by the East Kotawaringin regency to facilitate return and protect Madurese rights was reportedly hampered by the absence of implementing guidelines (Sukandar, June 2007, p.148). In Palangkaraya, conditions for Madurese return also included having a Dayak spouse, non-involvement in the conflict and being able to adapt to local people and culture (UNDP, 2005, p.62).

In West Kalimantan, where the central government provided Rp. 67 billion (\$7.6 million) for humanitarian assistance, the only solutions envisaged were those of resettlement and local integration, (officially described as "empowerment"). In the months following the March 1999 evacuation of the displaced Madurese to Pontianak the provincial government offered them the possibility of relocating to sites some 30 kilometres south of the city. The remoteness of the sites, and the poor quality of soil led most IDPs to turn down the offer. Many were also hoping to be able to return to Sambas (Davidson, 2008, p.76). By April 2002, however, the combination of attacks against Madurese IDPs in Pontianak and the killings of several Madurese who had tried to return to reclaim their land and property, made the resettlement or the local integration options inevitable. The government thus distributed relocation packages to IDPs to convince them to leave the camps. Those who chose to move to one of the 12 resettlement sites around Pontianak received a house, plus Rp. 2.5 million (\$260), while those who opted to integrate in the city or elsewhere by the own means received twice that amount (Davidson, 2008, p. 80).

The humanitarian and resettlement programme was undermined by widespread corruption, poor

communication between provincial and regency governments and disputes between government agencies (Cahyono, 2008, p.156). Many former IDPs consider that they have not received promised assistance as it has largely been pocketed by intermediaries and contractors delivering sub-standard resettlement housing. It is alleged that only one quarter of the housing programme funds were used for their intended purpose (Davidson, 2008, p.80). In early 2010, a group of former IDPs organised a protest at the West Kalimantan parliament requesting an audit on how the funds had been used.

Reconciliation efforts have remained insufficient in the Kalimantan provinces. The lack of interaction between the Madurese and the Dayaks, reinforced by segregation, appears to have bolstered ethnic prejudices which are now seen as the main obstacles to reconciliation between the Madurese and the Dayaks, in particular in Sambas, West Kalimantan (CHD, 11 March 2010).

## International response

There has been limited international engagement in Kalimantan's displacement crises, mainly because the Indonesian government and provincial authorities saw no need for a significant involvement of the international humanitarian community. In West Kalimantan, international relief organisations were explicitly discouraged from providing assistance and protection to Madurese in Pontianak's camps so as to encourage them to leave faster (Davidson, 2008, p.76; MSF, 6 November 2008).

In West Kalimantan, international NGOs which have provided assistance to IDPs in camps and resettlement sites or supported peace-building activities include Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save the Children, World Vision and Oxfam. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and some UN

agencies such as UNICEF have also helped the displaced. An NGO, Search for Common Ground in Indonesia, was particularly active assisting IDP children cope with their trauma, promoting non-violence by facilitating peace-building meetings between Dayaks and Madurese and establishing a peace journalism centre (Common Ground Indonesia, January 2004).

In Central Kalimantan, CARE and Oxfam (with funding from the European Commission) have implemented programmes targeting IDPs and returnees since 2005. Between 2007 and 2009 CARE ran a programme called Support for Empowerment of Non-Integrated IDPs to Improve Settlement and Economy Project (SENSE) which targeted some 3,000 households, including both returnees and host communities (CARE, August 2007, p.14).

**Note:** This is a summary of IDMC's internal displacement profile on Kalimantan, Indonesia. The full profile is available online [here](#).

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## About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people.

In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org).

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