NIGERIA:

Increasing violence continues to cause internal displacement

A profile of the internal displacement situation

8 June, 2012
About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org.
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OVERVIEW

Increasing violence continues to cause internal displacement

Internal displacement is a common consequence across Nigeria of inter-communal and political violence, flooding and forced evictions. While some of the conflicts appear to be caused by overlapping and mutually reinforcing regional, religious and ethnic divisions, but violence often stems from competition for scarce opportunities and communal resources.

Current levels of displacement are deemed particularly high by a number of organisations, but in the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, no accurate figures are available. Ad-hoc local registration exercises have hinted at the scale of the phenomenon, but those who seek shelter and support from family and friends - and who make up the majority of internally displaced people (IDPs) - tend not to be counted.

The government has not yet adopted a national IDP policy, leaving national, international and local agencies to assist IDPs in an uncoordinated way and on a sometimes selective basis. Ratification of the legally-binding Kampala Convention, which Nigeria signed on 23 October 2009, is expected to be completed shortly. This may signal the government’s intention to address internal displacement in a more consistent and coherent manner.

Background

Since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, thousands of people have been killed in recurring inter-communal conflicts and politically motivated violence that have also led to consistently large waves of internal displacement. Flooding and forced evictions have caused further, significant population movements. In April 2012, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (associated with the Oslo International Peace Research Institute) reported that the level of violence had increased drastically over the last few months, putting Nigeria on a par with Somalia in terms of the high number of conflict events it experiences.

A number of organisations suggest that current levels of internal displacement are particularly high, but in the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, in-depth data is, however, extremely hard to come by. Local media tend to be the main source of information on population movements, but while they cover crises they do not necessarily report on longer-term trends and developments.

The process of democratisation and decentralisation after 16 years of military regime through the creation of new local governance structures has allowed the expression of grievances. It has also fuelled overlapping and mutually reinforcing regional, religious and ethnic rivalries between northerners and southerners, Muslims and Christians and the three main ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo (Amundsen, 2010: 9; Best, 2011: 1, 21 and 35; Diprose, 2008: 4, 6 and 27; ICG, 2010: 9 and 12; Ibeanu, 2001 and 1999: 161 and 174; Meredith, 2005: 194 and 582). In response to the inequalities and injustices brought about by failures of governance, and the government’s inability to provide even basic services, ethnic and religious groups have resorted to primary loyalty to their kinsmen for aid and protection. Competition for scarce opportunities and communal resources such as farmland, pastures, fishing waters and oil-rich land have intensified.

Outbreaks of identity-based communal violence rooted in pervasive poverty, systemic social-economic inequality and discriminatory policies and practices, have become increasingly
common, occurring in virtually all of Nigeria's 36 states (CERD, 2010; Enweremadu, 2009: 2; Diprose, 2008: 27; HRW, 2006: 47; Ibeanu, 2001; Mberu, 2010; Meredith 2005: 582 and 585; Mustapha, 2007: 5; Okpeh, 2008: 53; USDoS, 2011: 35). Most conflicts have been small-scale, but some have led to the destruction of entire communities (HRW, 2006: 32). It is estimated that more than 13,500 people have been killed in several hundred separate clashes since 1999 (CERD, 2010).

The latest episodes of inter-communal violence include election-related clashes that forced more than 65,000 people to flee their homes in April 2011 (HRW, 16 May 2011). The January 2012 national strike called by labour organisations to protest the withdrawal of fuel subsidies led to communal tensions and resulted in the displacement of more than 4,000 people in Edo state (ICRC, 13 Jan. 2012). Renewed clashes over land between ethnic Tivs and Fulanis in the central state of Benue also displaced up to 15,000 people in March 2012 (African Herald Express, 11 March 2012; NRC, 7 May 2012).

Since 2009, the Islamist group Boko Haram has been responsible for the majority of violence carried out in the name of political objectives in northern and central Nigeria, leading to significant displacement. Prior to 2009, political violence was mostly in the form of fighting between government forces protecting oil installations in the Niger Delta and militants demanding more local control over resources. The level of such violence has decreased, but fighting still occurs periodically in Delta state.

**Displacement figures and patterns**

The full scope of displacement in Nigeria is unknown (Egwu, 2011: 2). There is no reliable information on the number and the situation of internally displaced people (IDPs), in part because of the complex displacement patterns, but also because of the limited capacity of federal and state governments to collect data (Blench 2003: 8; Mberu, 2010; USDoS, 2011: 35).

Estimates provided by the government and NGOs are inconsistent, generally not disaggregated by cause, age and sex, and often include only people who have sought refuge in temporary camps or shelters such as schools, churches, police and army barracks (Best, 2011: 72 and 99; CISLAC / IDMC, 2011; NRC, 7 May 2012). Most IDPs, however, are hosted by relatives (Best, 2011: 65; Blench, 2003: 9; Ibeanu 1999: 162). There are no permanent IDP camps in the country and makeshift settlements often lack basic sanitation and health facilities (Orji, 2011: 479). According to provisional data collected by the Nigerian Red Cross, almost 50,000 IDPs sought refuge in temporary settlements and shelters between January and May 2012 (NRC, 17 May 2012).

In figures supplied to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Federal Ministry of Justice put the overall number of people displaced by conflict and flooding at more than 1.3 million as of January 2011 (GoN, 2011: 75). In contrast, a year-long survey by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) suggested that fewer than 400,000 people were displaced as of October 2011, with some 74,000 living in camps (NEMA, 2011). In March 2012, the chairman of the board of the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) estimated that a million people were internally displaced (The Punch, 23 March 23 2012). No information on the methodology used was provided for any of these estimates.

In urban areas, institutional policies of forced evictions leading to intra-urban displacement have affected more than two million people since 2000, in violation of their right to adequate housing (AI, 2011, Agenda: 38).
Flooding and soil erosion also cause regular, large-scale internal displacement. Around a million people living on the low-lying plains of the Niger river are considered at risk (FMR, 2008: 37; USDoS, 2011: 35). According to NEMA, floods displaced thousands of people in 2011 and at least 500,000 in 2010 (BBC, 31 Aug. 2011; Sunday Tribune, 15 May 2011; Vanguard, 7 April 2012).

In the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, data on the duration of displacements, IDPs’ protection problems and the achievement of durable solutions is extremely scarce. The demolition of houses has, however, been a common practice during inter-communal conflicts, which is likely to prevent return and points towards lasting displacement (Je’adayibe, 2010). A May 2012 newspaper article reported that, a year after the post-electoral violence, camps set up to host IDPs temporarily were still in use in Kaduna state (Leadership, 5 May 2012).

Causes of displacement

1. Displacement caused by inter-communal conflict

The April 2011 presidential elections that led to the re-election of incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner from the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), were among the bloodiest ever. “Zoning”, an unwritten internal PDP power-sharing rule that envisages the swapping of presidential power between the north and the south every two terms, should have led to the election of a northerner (HRW, 16 May 2011).

Protests by supporters of the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner from the Congress for Progressive Change, degenerated into riots and sectarian clashes in a third of Nigeria’s 36 states. More than 1,000 people were killed and more than 65,000 displaced in the northern states of Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Gombe and Sokoto (Albert, 2011: 113; Chouin, 2011: 63; HRW, 16 May 2011; ICG, 2011: 1). In spite of attempts to prevent tensions through zoning, elections have regularly been marred by widespread inter-communal violence (AI, 2011, Agenda: 32; Enweremadu, 2011: 121-22; ICG, 2011: 1 and 7; Meredith 2005: 194).

On the whole, protracted inter-communal conflicts fuelled by religious, regional or ethnic divisions regularly lead to death and displacement throughout Nigeria, a country made up of a complex web of ethnic groups. The three main groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, represent more than half of the population, but they coexist with as many as 400 other groups (Alulaigba, 2009: 5; HRW, 2009: 3; Ibeanu, 2001; Mustapha, 2007: 3-4).

The rough overlap of ethnic, religious and regional divisions has allowed the reinterpretation of inter-communal violence along religious lines. According to the Nigerian academic Gwamna Dogara Je’adayibe (2008: 156), crises caused by religious tensions have produced the highest numbers of IDPs. In 1999, Zamfara state adopted sharia law as its only legal system. Several other northern states voiced their will to follow suit, and 11 had done so by 2002. This led to a series of uprisings and violent clashes in February 2000 between Christians and Muslims in the city of Kaduna. Many Igbo, who are generally Christian, were killed. For safety reasons, Christians and Muslims moved to areas dominated by people of their own faith, and as thousands fled the far north, religious tensions increased in other areas. In reprisal for the Kaduna violence, Igbo groups in the south killed hundreds of generally Muslim Hausa migrants from the north (HRW, 2003: 5; Meredith 2005: 586-87).

In 2001, religious clashes erupted in Jos, the capital of Plateau state, which sits on the dividing line between the largely Muslim north and Christian south. More than 1,000 people were killed and thousands more displaced (Best, 2011: 19; HRW, 2006: 43). Many settled in temporary camps or permanently in neighbouring Bauchi state (Blench, 2003: 10). Since then, deadly clashes leading to displacement have flared up regularly in and around Jos as a result of the
authorities’ failure to take adequate measures to prevent violence and protect people (AI, 2011, Agenda: 30; Orji, 2011: 479; The Economist, 13 April 2010). In 2010, as many as 30,000 people fled fighting in the area (USDoS, 2011: 35).

Tensions between communities have been aggravated by prejudicial government policies that relegate millions of Nigerians to second-class citizens by discriminating against “non-indigenes” or “settlers” who cannot prove roots linking them to the original inhabitants of an area (CERD, 2010; HRW, 2006: 2 and 2009: 3). The principle behind the concept of “indigenisation” was to protect the identity, rights and interests of the country’s numerous minority groups. It has turned, however, into a powerful means of exclusion under which non-indigenes are denied access to already limited resources and opportunities in terms of education, land ownership, participation in political affairs and public sector jobs, the state being a key employer (AI, 2011, Agenda: 31; HRW 2006: 10 and 2009: 3).

Article 42 of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity or place of origin, but non-indigenes are, in many respects, treated like citizens of a foreign country, which erodes the value of national citizenship (Alulaigba, 2009: 11; HRW, 2006: 1-2). More than a million Nigerians are labelled non-indigenes, and growing numbers of people are unable to prove that they are indigenous to a particular state. This increase has been caused by the proliferation of states and local government areas under various decentralisation processes since the mid-1970s (AI, 2011, Agenda: 31; HRW 2006: 10). Some of the bloodiest conflicts in recent years have pitted non-indigenes against “host” communities (Egwu, 2011: 8; HRW, 2006: 33; Ladan, 2011: 8).

2. 1. Displacement caused by political violence  
Northern and central Nigeria: Boko Haram attacks and counterinsurgency operations

Since 2009, increasingly frequent and sophisticated attacks and bombings attributed to Boko Haram and ensuing heavy-handed counterinsurgency operations have caused death, destruction of property and significant displacement (AI, 24 Jan. 2012; IRIN, 18 July 2011; SERAC, 12 Aug. 2011). According to Human Rights Watch, Boko Haram has killed more than 1,000 people since 2010 (HRW, 7 March 2012).

The group, which has been growing in ambition and capability, initially targeted the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Yobe and Kano. It began to operate beyond its home grounds in late 2010, when it bombed buildings in Jos, and has since pushed further south, bombing the police and UN headquarters in Abuja in June and August 2011 respectively (Shaka, 2011: 3; The Economist, 27 Aug. 2011, 8 Nov. 2011, 23 and 28 Jan. 2012). It initially targeted police and government facilities and churches, but began attacking bars and beer gardens in June 2011 and schools in February 2012 (AI, 24 Jan. 2012; HRW, March 2012).

Boko Haram, which in Hausa means “western education is forbidden”, was founded a decade ago in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri. It rose to prominence in 2009 after launching an insurgency against the government in several northern states in which more than 800 people were killed (Danjibo, 2009: 10; HRW, March 2012; Je’adayibe, 2010; Reuters, 9 April 2012). It campaigns for the strict implementation of sharia law, an ideology that is not widely supported in a country where Muslims tend to be moderate (IRIN, 20 Jan. 2012; The Economist, 27 Aug. 2011).

In late December 2011, a series of attacks in which more than 100 people were killed and some 90,000 displaced led the president to declare a state of emergency in large parts of the north and to send thousands of troops to fight the group (ICG, 2 Jan. 2012; The Economist, 14 and 23 Jan. 2012; Reuters, 9 April 2012). In January 2012, after Boko Haram issued a warning to Christians living in the Hausa-dominated north to leave or face retribution, Igbo leaders in the south-east
called on Igbo families to head for safety in the south and offered a free shuttle bus service (BBC, 15 March 2012).

Since then, thousands of people have reportedly moved and families split up to send women and children to safer areas in the south-east, a situation reminiscent of the population movements from northern states provoked by the religious clashes in 2000 (AP, 19 March 2012; BBC, 15 March 2012; Business Day, 18 April 2012; The Economist, 14 and 23 Jan. 2012; VOA, 30 Jan. 2012). NEMA has warned that the displacement of some 17,000 farmers from the north could cause a significant fall in agricultural production and lead to a food crisis in the region (Africa Review, 1 April 2012; The Guardian, 27 March 2012). Thousands of migrants from Chad and Niger have also fled northern Nigeria for their countries of origin in recent months because of the violence (IRIN, 6 March 2012).

In a context of mass poverty, unemployment and inadequate law enforcement, Boko Haram has gained support by playing on people’s frustrations and using religion to further its ends. Northern Nigeria is generally poorer than the rest of the country and residents complain of corruption, inequality and the government’s failure to address problems. Muslims have also accused predominantly Christian southerners of monopolising oil revenues and government posts (Danjibo, 2009: 3; Ibeanu, 1999: 172; ICG, 2010: 10; Meredith, 2005: 586; Mustapha, 2007: 5; The Economist, 27 August 2011).

In March 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross noted that although there is a situation of violence provoking casualties and displacement in Nigeria, it does not meet the criteria of an internal conflict (National Mirror, 22 March 2012). Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its commentary state that an armed conflict exists when the situation can be defined as “protracted armed violence”, which can be assessed using two criteria - the organisation of the parties and the intensity of the violence (ICRC, 2008: 5; Vité, 2009: 76). The latter must have reached a level that distinguishes it from internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots or isolated and sporadic acts of violence (Vité, 2009: 76).

**Niger Delta: A lull in the fighting between the government and MEND**
Until 2009, most political violence in Nigeria occurred in the south, in the densely populated Niger Delta region which is the home of the country’s oil and gas industry. Fighting between insurgents and government forces deployed to protect oil installations and personnel led to the death or forced displacement of thousands of civilians between 2004 and 2009 (IRIN, 22 May 2009). Militants claimed to be fighting for increased control of oil wealth by the local community, whose lands had been polluted and whose region remained one of the poorest and least developed parts of the country, despite its resources. Their campaign was directed against both the oil companies and the government (Falola, 2008: 235; Ibaugh, 2011: 252 and 258; Ibeanu, 2006: 7 and 11; Madubuike, 2009: 3 and 11; Meredith 2005: 576; The Economist, 12 Nov. 2009).

In October 2009, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), an umbrella group formed in 2005 to represent a number of militant factions, declared an indefinite ceasefire that brought relative peace to the region following a presidential amnesty. By the end of 2010, however, fighting had resumed, causing the destruction of at least 120 homes and the deaths of several civilians. In January 2011, MEND called off its ceasefire (AI, Annual Report 2011; IRIN, 25 Nov. 2011; The Economist, 12 Nov. 2009 and 14 Jan. 2012). The amnesty programme has been described as inadequate in addressing the roots of the problem, namely under-development and poor governance (Ibaugh, 2011: 64).

It is not known whether IDPs have achieved durable solutions. A government report noted that Edo state was hosting some 250,000 people displaced from the Niger Delta as of January 2011 (GoN, 2011: 74).
3. **Displacement caused by forced evictions**

More than two million urban Nigerians, particularly slum-dwellers and other marginalised people, have been forcibly evicted from their homes since 2000, most notably in Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt. Government-sanctioned evictions carried out in the name of security and urban renewal programmes have taken place without adequate consultation, notice, compensation or offers of alternative accommodation. In addition to breaching victims’ right to adequate housing, forced evictions, amounting to arbitrary displacement, and often lead to violations of other human rights, such as the right to health care, education and livelihood opportunities (AI, 2011, Agenda: 39). Forced evictions have led to intra-urban displacement and left thousands of people homeless (AI, 26 Aug. 2011; AI, 2011, Agenda: 38; Mberu, 2010; USDoS, 2011: 35-36).

**National and international response**

The national and international response to internal displacement in Nigeria has generally been inadequate. There has, however, been increased interest on various levels since mid-2011 which could stimulate the development of a suitable and comprehensive approach.

At the national level, steps have been taken to finalise a national IDP policy, in the planning since 2003, as well as a draft law to amend the NCFR mandate for approval by the Federal Executive Council. Nigeria ratified the legally-binding Kampala Convention in April 2012, signed on 23 October 2009, and was expected to deposit its ratification instrument at the African Union in the following weeks (IRIN, 26 October 2009; NCFR, 2012).

In July 2011, Abuja hosted the first Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ministerial conference on humanitarian assistance and internal displacement. Participants committed to the adoption of adequate measures to prevent forced displacement, and to formulating coherent national IDP policies and legal and institutional frameworks which fully reflect the content and spirit of the Kampala Convention (ECOWAS, 2011).

International humanitarian organisations have had limited presence in the country, but in recent months the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has established a presence in Abuja and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has shown increased concern about internal displacement in Nigeria.

**National response**

In the absence of a clear policy, legal framework or comprehensive approach, efforts to prevent displacement, mitigate its effects and minimise its duration have been insufficient.

The response to displacement, generally included under disaster management mechanisms, has varied from state to state and has been uncoordinated and ad-hoc, leading to both shortfalls and duplication (USDoS, 2011: 35; CISLAC/IDMC, 2011). When support is provided, the tendency has been to focus on the provision of assistance and to neglect protection needs. Weaknesses exist in the operations of NEMA and NCFR, the two main government bodies responsible for the response to internal displacement, in part because their budgets are too small (Egwu, 2011: 3; USDoS, 2011: 35).

Local governments have prime responsibility for ensuring an adequate response to IDPs' needs, with State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) – which have varying capacity - expected to step in when local authorities are unable to cope. Assistance from the federal government, through NEMA, is only requested, and is subject to presidential approval, when the required response is beyond the capacity of both local and state authorities. NEMA is mandated to coordinate disaster management throughout the country and to respond to the immediate needs of displaced populations as necessary, but it has no specific policy on IDPs. It operates offices in
the six geopolitical zones of the country, for implementation of policy, coordination and communication purposes (NEMA, June 2009; NEMA, 30 July 2009; Economic Confidential, 2010; News Agency of Nigeria, 16 April 2012). IDP camps, described as a last and temporary resort, are usually run by NEMA or SEMAs and the Nigerian Red Cross, in conjunction with relevant agencies (Leadership, 15 April 2012; NEMA, National Contingency Plan 2011-2012; e-mail exchange NRC, May 2012).

NCFR has been mandated to manage internal displacement since 2002, but has no field presence. It focuses on post-emergency situations and long-term programmes aimed at achieving durable solutions for IDPs. If necessary, it assists NEMA with camp management, and has a dedicated unit working on internal displacement. It has developed a comprehensive action plan for resettlement, reconciliation, reconstruction and reintegration, but still needs to apply it on the ground.

The National Human Rights Commission and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution also have responsibilities with respect to the protection of IDPs’ rights and the prevention and resolution of conflict. Other government agencies and the military are brought in on a case-by-case basis.

Given that the response from government agencies is insufficient and slow as a result of bureaucracy or the competing interests of ruling elites, the Nigerian Red Cross, civil society organisations and faith-based groups have been providing immediate relief and assistance on an ad-hoc basis in the aftermath of violence (Okpeh, 2008: p. 63-64). Assistance provided by faith-based groups is, however, often determined by IDPs’ religion, and this may actually make religious tensions worse. Assistance also tends to be short-term and does not necessarily contribute to the longer-term reconstruction of lives and livelihoods (Best, 2011: 99; Orji, 2011: 474 and 486).

Overall, the response tends to target people in camps, even though the majority of IDPs are hosted by relatives or local communities, who bear most of the burden of assisting them (Ibeanu, 1999: 176; Best, 2011: 65).

In some cases, authorities have supported the resettlement of IDPs. In July 2010 the governor of Bauchi state announced that more than 30,000 IDPs displaced from Plateau state some six months earlier had been resettled with financial assistance from the state (Nigerian Tribune, 2 July 2010). In January 2011, the same authorities reported that they had allocated 748 plots of land to IDPs (Leadership, 24 Jan. 2011).

International response
Nigeria’s donors have generally favoured development assistance over humanitarian programmes. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is the largest and most influential bilateral donor, followed by Britain’s Department for International Development (DfID). Most multilateral funding has been channelled through the UN Development Programme, the World Bank and the European Union. Donors’ focus has been largely on providing support to tackle poverty through promoting good governance, democratisation, rule of law and human rights (Amundsen, 2010: xii and 36). The cluster approach has not been adopted in Nigeria. The UN Country Team coordinates the inter-agency response through its Emergency Preparedness Working Group.
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background

Ethnicity, identity, indigenes and “settlers”

With 162.5 million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa’s largest country. Its population is of a notable diversity. In addition to the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, representing more than half of the population, there are between 250 and 400 ethnic groups, depending on the criteria used, speaking some 500 indigenous languages (Aluaigba, 2009: 5; HRW, 2009: 3; Ibeanu, 2001; Mustapha, 2007: 3-4). Many of these groups had no meaningful relationship with one another before being regrouped into a colony by the British government in 1914. Existing pre-colonial relationships were marked with tension in some areas, notably in the Nigeria’s central Middle Belt, an area that comprises Kwara, Niger, Kogi, Nassarawa, Benue, Plateau, Taraba and Adamawa and States, as well as southern Bauchi, southern Zaria and southern Kaduna (HRW, 2006: 7).

The tripodal ethnic structure has proven both unstable and conflictual (Mustapha, 2007: 3). The predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani are the dominant ethnic group in the northern part of the country. The Nupe, Tiv and Karuni are also important groups in the area. In the southeast, the mostly Catholic Igbo are the largest ethnic group. The Efik, Ibibio and Ijaw also represent an important part of the population. The Yoruba, half of whom are Christian and the other half Muslim, are mostly living in the southwest (USDoS, 2000).

Religious differences in Nigeria have often been used for “stereotyping and demonising opponents.” It has provided a “legitimising framework for violence that would otherwise be considered unacceptable.” It has been argued that “religion is a cover for or a surface aspect of deeper antagonisms and that the factors causing and driving the conflicts transcend it to include a complex mix of history, political, economic, ethnic and other factors.” (ICG, 2010: 21)

Ethnicity and genealogy serve as the basis to determine if people are indigenes or not to their location of residence. Indigenes are people who can trace their roots back to the community who originally settled in a given location. Anyone who cannot do so is considered a non-indigene, a settler or an “allogene” (HRW, 2006: 1).

The principle behind the concept of “indigeneity” was to protect to guarantee ethnic parity in education and employment opportunities and to preserve traditional ways of life of Nigeria’s numerous minority groups. However, with increasing levels of poverty and unemployment, it has turned into a powerful mean of exclusion allowing the denial of access to already limited resources and opportunities to non-indigenes, notably in terms of education, land ownership, participation in political affairs and employment by the state, one of the main employers (AI, 2011, Agenda: 31; HRW 2006: 10 and 2009: 3).

The difference between the two groups entails mainly that the indigenes are regarded within the local community as the rightful holders of certain traditional, political and economic rights that settlers do not have. The concept took root in the 1979 Constitution and although not expressly supported in the 1999 one, it has continued to be used as a practice of Nigerian federalism. As opposed to the one from 1979, the 1999 Constitution does not define what it means to be an indigene of a state or whether length of residence in another state qualifies for the acquisition of such a status elsewhere.
Even though article 42 of the 1999 Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity or place of origin, non-indigenes are, in many respects, treated like citizens of a foreign country, which erodes the value of national citizenship (Aluaigba, 2009: 11; HRW, 2006: 1-2). Over a million Nigerians are labelled as non-indigenes in the place where they live, while an increasing number of people are unable to prove that they are indigenes to any state. Such rise results from the proliferation of states and local government areas (AI, 2011, Agenda: 31; HRW 2006: 10).

Key online documents:


Elections and Political system

Nigeria is currently experiencing its longest period of civilian rule since its independence, in 1960. The April 2011 elections, one of the bloodiest ever, were the fourth ones since the return to civilian rule in 1999. They led to the re-election of incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner from the ruling People's Democratic Party. “Zoning”, an unwritten internal PDP power-sharing rule that envisages the swapping of presidential power between the north and the south every two terms, should have led to the election of a northerner (HRW, 16 May 2011).

Post-election protests by supporters of the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner from the Congress for Progressive Change, degenerated into violent riots and sectarian strife in a third of Nigeria’s 36 states. More than one thousand people died and over 65,000 people were displaced in the northern states of Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Gombe and Sokoto (Albert, 2011: 113; Chouin, 2011: 63; HRW, 16 May 2011; ICG, 2011: 1). In spite of attempts to prevent communal divisions through zoning, Nigerian elections have regularly been marred by widespread inter-communal violence (AI, 2011, Agenda: 32; Enweremadu, 2011: 121-22; ICG, 2011: 1 and 7; Meredith 2005: 194).

Human Rights Watch (2006: 8) underlines that “Nigerian politics has always revolved around an obsession with the difficult task of forging a nation out of all of Nigeria’s complex diversity while ensuring that no ethnic group, religion or geographical region could ever come to dominate the rest of the country. Nigeria has had four constitutions since independence, and each of them has been crafted around core provisions designed to strike the finest possible balance in the allocation of political power and government resources.”

The government of Nigeria is divided in three layers: the federal government, the government of each of the 36 states, and local government councils governing the country’s 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs). Various decentralisations programmes since the mid-1970s have led to a proliferation of LGAs, necessitating the redrawing of existing local boundaries (OMCT, 2002: 12-13). Such process has created inter-communal tensions and reopened a number of old inter-communal rivalries (Ibeanu, 1999: 172).

The Constitution provides for all three levels of government to be run by popularly elected administrations. A parallel system of traditional governance including Chieftaincies and Emirates
also exists throughout the country. Traditional leaders generally represent only their own ethnic communities. They are recognized by the government, but are not elected in the same manner as government officials: they are selected according to the traditions of their community. While they are not holding formal positions in the government, they wield considerable political influence, especially at the local level.

**Key online documents:**


**Inequity, poverty and economy**

Despite Nigeria’s vast resources, more than half of its population is considered poor. Nearly 65% of the country’s population lives with less than US$ 1.25 a day (UNDP, 2011). The latest Human Development Report on Nigeria (2008-2009) highlights that the country is one of those with the highest inequality levels in the world. Overall inequality is visible in the widening income gap and access to economic and social opportunities between genders; growing inequality between and within rural and urban populations; between ethnic groups; and widening gaps between the federating units/economies (Diprose, 2008: 27; UNDP, 2009).

Such a situation points to corruption, the absence or failure of redistribution policies, significant institutional shortcomings in the provision of basic services, as well as many years of mismanagement of public resources, among many other causes. A variety of re-distribution programmes woven around poverty reduction and women’s empowerment have been implemented to tackle inequality, but improvements have been slow in coming.

Nigeria’s top two primary products, agriculture and oil, continue to dominate both sectoral contributions to GDP and, in the latter case, exports. Agriculture continues to account for more than 50 per cent of employment while the oil sector accounts for over 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and 80 per cent of government revenue.

**Key online document:**


Conflict prevention and resolution

Formal and traditional mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflict have often failed at addressing the roots of the problems, thus at maintaining and restoring durable social concord. Intercriminal tensions have frequently become protracted and the response to politically motivated violence has often focussed on short-term solutions. The response has mostly been at the community-level and security and legal level (ICG, 2010: 24).

Prevention through the police has not been successful, partly because it suffers from poor coordination and gathering and use of intelligence (ICG, 2010: 26). The formal response to the eruption of violence has often been slow, even though the government can call on an additional mobile police force and the army to restore law and order. Thus, violence has time to escalate (Best, 2011: 72). In some instances, such as in Benue state in 2001, the involvement of the military and the police has had disastrous consequences. In retaliation to the killing of several military, the forces sacked ten villages and towns, reportedly killing hundreds of civilians and destroying homes, shops, public buildings and other property. In other cases, such as in Jos, in 2001, the military played a positive role in preventing the conflict from degenerating further (Okpeh, 2008: p. 64-65).

In their study on the role of traditional authorities in conflict prevention and mediation in Nigeria, Blench and al. recall that during colonial era, the response to riots and civil disturbances was usually military. Policy changes were top-down and decided by colonial authorities. Responses to civil disorder leading to losses of lives and properties in the years that followed independence have been different: in several instances, a Commission of Enquiry was established, worked for a few years and produced recommendations that were not followed. From 1995, conflict resolution became a popular topic and the Government was encouraged to create an Institute for Peace and Conflict resolution, which has been made ineffective due internal political disputes (Blench, 2006: 9).

In parts of the country, traditional authorities and rulers play a significant role in community coherence and traditional justice systems. In some areas, especially in the North and Middle Belt, they have been more effective in conflict resolution than official mechanisms. Due to their familiarity with different sections of the community, they have also been able to take pre-emptive action, while the government has a tendency to be reactive (Blench, 2006: i). Their role is most prominent in settling family matters, cases of witchcraft, land disputes and religious disputes, notably because taking such cases to the courts and the police is more expensive and can turn them into protracted disputes “with no greater chances that a fair judgement will be reached” (Blench, 2006: 73).

However, the creation of new chieftaincies to reinforce ethnic agendas or reward political donors have undermined the power and legitimacy of traditional rulers and councils (Blench, 2006: i and iii).

Key online document:


An annotated bibliography on conflict in Nigeria can be found at: [http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD702.pdf](http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD702.pdf)
Causes of displacement

Displacement caused by inter-communal conflict

Protracted inter-communal conflicts fuelled by religious, regional or ethnic divisions regularly lead to death and displacement throughout the country, (Aluaigba, 2009: 5; HRW, 2008: 3; Ibeanu, 1999; Mustapha, 2007: 3-4). The rough overlap of ethnicity, religion and regional divisions has allowed the reinterpretation of inter-communal violence along religious lines (c.f., section 1.1.1). According to Je'aadayibe (2008: 156), crisis induced by religious divisions have produced the greater numbers of IDPs in Nigeria.

In 1999, Zamfara state adopted Sharia law as its only legal system. Several other northern states voiced their will to follow suit, and ten did. This led to a series of uprisings and violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in the city of Kaduna, in February 2000. Entire neighbourhoods were 'religiously cleansed' and many Igbo, generally Christian, were killed. As thousands of people fled the far north, religious tensions increased in other areas. In reprisal, Igbo groups in the south killed hundreds of generally Muslim Hausa migrants from the north (Meredith 2005: 586-87).

In 2001, Jos, the formerly peaceful capital of the Plateau state that sits on the dividing line between the largely Muslim north and Christian south, was engulfed in religious clashes that killed more than one thousand and displaced thousands more (Best, 2011: 19; HRW, 2006: 43). Many settled in temporary camps or permanently in neighbouring Bauchi state (Blanch, 2003: 10). Since then, deadly clashes leading to displacement have regularly flared up, as the authorities have failed to take adequate measures to prevent violence and protect people (AI, 2011, Agenda: 30; Orji, 2011: 479; The Economist, 13 April 2010). In 2010, up to 30,000 people fled clashes near Jos (USDoS, 2011: 35).

Tensions between communities have been aggravated by prejudicial government policies that relegate millions of Nigerians to second-class citizens by discriminating against “allogenues” or “settlers” who cannot trace their roots back to the original inhabitants of an area (c.f., section 1.1.1; CERD, 2010; HRW, 2006: 2 and 2009: 3). In recent years, some of the bloodiest conflicts have pitted indigenes against “settlers” (Egwu, 2011: 8; HRW, 2006: 33; Ladan, 2011: 8).

In general, as inter-group conflict is often related to competition over scarce resources, there tends to be a greater incidence of conflict in densely population areas and where the land is valued for farming (Okpeh, 2008: 60).

Key online documents:

A general overview of internal displacement immediately after the return to civilian rule:

On citizenship and indigenes / settlers tensions:

On ethnic and religious tensions:


Displacement caused by violence carried out in the name of political objectives

Since 2009, most violence carried out in the name of political objectives has been perpetrated by the Islamist group Boko Haram in northern and central Nigeria. It has led to significant displacement. Prior to 2009, political violence was mostly in the form of fighting between government forces protecting oil installations in the Niger Delta and militants demanding more local control over resources. While the level of such violence has decreased, fighting still occurs periodically in the Delta.

Northern and central Nigeria: Boko Haram attacks and anti-insurgency operations

Since 2009, increasingly frequent and sophisticated attacks and bombings attributed to Boko Haram and ensuing heavy-handed anti-insurgency operations by the police and military forces have caused death, destruction of property and forced thousands to flee (AI, 24 Jan. 2012; IRIN, 18 July 2011; SERAC, 12 Aug. 2011). According to Human Rights Watch, violence by the sect has claimed more than 1,000 lives since 2010 (HRW, 7 March 2012).

The group, which has been growing in ambition and capability, initially targeted the northern states, but started expanding beyond its home grounds in 2010, bombing buildings in the central city of Jos. In 2011, it pushed farther south to the capital, Abuja, with the bombing of police and UN headquarters (Shaka, 2011: 3; The Economist, 27 Aug. 2011, 8 Nov. 2011, 23 and 28 Jan. 2012). At first, Boko Haram mostly attacked police and government facilities, as well as churches, but started hitting bars and beer gardens in June 2011 and schools in February 2012 (AI, 24 Jan. 2012; HRW, March 2012).

In late December 2011, a series of strikes that killed more than a hundred people and displaced some 90,000 prompted the president to declare a state of emergency in large parts of the North and to send thousands of troops to fight the group (ICG, 2 Jan. 2012; The Economist, 14 and 23 Jan. 2012; Reuters, 9 April 2012). In January 2012, after Boko Haram issued a warning to Christians living in the Hausa-dominated north to leave or face retribution, south-eastern Igbo leaders called on Igbo families to head south for safety, offering a free bus shuttle. Since then, several media reported that thousands of people have moved and that several families had split to send women and children to safer areas in the South-East (AP, 19 March 2012; BBC, 15 March 2012; Business Day, 18 April 2012; The Economist, 14 and 23 Jan. 2012; VOA, 30 Jan. 2012). NEMA has warned that the displacement of some 17,000 farmers could lead to a food crisis, by severely impeding agriculture (Africa Review, 1 April 2012; The Guardian, 27
March 2012). In addition, thousands of migrants from Chad and Niger have returned to their country of origin (IRIN, 6 March 2012).

Boko Haram, which in Hausa means “Western education is forbidden”, was founded a decade ago in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri. It rose to prominence in 2009 after launching an insurgency against the government in several northern states, in which more than 800 people were killed (Danjibo, 2009: 10; HRW, March 2012; Je’adayibe, 2010; Reuters, 9 April 2012). It campaigns for the strict implementation of Sharia, an ideology that is not widely supported in a country where Islam tends to be moderate (IRIN, 20 Jan. 2012; The Economist, 27 Aug. 2011).

In a context of mass poverty, unemployment and inadequate law enforcement, Boko Haram has gained support by playing on people’s frustrations and using religion to further its ends. Northern Nigeria is generally poorer than the rest of the country and residents complain of corruption, inequality and the government’s failure to address problems. Muslims have also accused predominantly Christian southerners of monopolising oil revenues and government posts (Danjibo, 2009: 3; Ibeanu, 1999: 172; ICG, 2010: 10; Meredith, 2005: 586; Mustapha, 2007: 5; The Economist, 27 August 2011).

While some analysts and the Nigerian authorities claim that international terrorist networks support Boko Haram, northern religious and political leaders believe the group is mostly a mix of criminal opportunists and disgruntled politicians (ICG, 2010: 19; The Economist, 14 Jan. 2012). In April 2012, AFP and RFI reported that members of Boko Haram were present in Tuareg-held northern Mali and supporting the rebellion (AFP, 9 April 2012; RFI, 10 April 2012).

In March 2012, the International Committee of Red Cross indicated that even though there is a situation of violence which provokes casualty and displacement in Nigeria, it did not meet the criteria of an internal conflict (National Mirror, 22 March 2012). Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its commentary assume that an armed conflict exists when the situation can be defined as “protracted armed violence”, which can be assessed against two criteria: the organization of the parties and the intensity of the violence (ICRC, 2008: 5; Vité, 2009: 76). The later must have reached a level that distinguishes it from situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots or isolated and sporadic acts of violence (Vité, 2009: 76).

Key online documents:


Niger Delta: A lull in the fighting between the government and the MEND

Until 2009, most political violence in Nigeria occurred in the South, in the densely populated Niger Delta, the home of the country’s oil and gas industry. Ongoing fighting between government forces, deployed to protect oil installations and personnel, and insurgents led to the death and forced displacement of thousands of civilians between 2004 and 2009 (IRIN, 22 May 2009).
Militants claimed to be fighting for increased control of oil wealth by the local community, whose lands had been polluted by oil companies and whose region remained one of the poorest, least developed parts of Nigeria, despite its resources. Their resistance was directed at the companies, but also at the government (Falola, 2008: 235; Ibaba, 2011: 252 and 258; Ibeanu, 2006: 7 and 11; Madubuike, 2009: 3 and 11; Meredith 2005: 576; The Economist, 12 Nov. 2009).

In October 2009, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), an umbrella group representing a number of militant factions created in 2005, declared an indefinite ceasefire that brought relative peace to the region, following a presidential amnesty. However, by the end of 2010, fighting had resumed in Delta State, causing the destruction of at least 120 homes and the death of several civilians. In January 2011, MEND called off its ceasefire and violence has increased in intensity since the beginning of 2012 (AI, Annual Report 2011; IRIN, 25 Nov. 2011; The Economist, 12 Nov. 2009 and 14 Jan. 2012). The amnesty programme has been described as inadequate in addressing the roots of the problem, namely under-development and poor governance (Ibaba, 2011: 64; Newson, 2011).

It is unknown whether people displaced by the violence have achieved durable solutions. A report by the Government of Nigeria noted that Edo State hosted some 250,000 people displaced from the Niger Delta, as of January 2011 (GoN, 2011: 74).

Key online documents:


Displacement caused by forced evictions

More than two million Nigerians, especially slum-dwellers and marginalized people, have been forcefully evicted from their homes in urban areas, notably in Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt, since 2000. The Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC), the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Amnesty International (Agenda 2011: 38) have reported that in Lagos, forced evictions were taking place on an almost weekly basis between May and July 2008; in Abuja, some 800,000 people were forcibly removed from their house between 2003 and 2007 and hundreds more in June 2011; and in Port Harcourt Waterfronts, the demolition of informal led to the eviction of up to 17,000 people.

The COHRE has stressed that "women, children, youth, older persons, indigenous people, ethnic and other minorities, and other vulnerable individuals and groups all suffer disproportionately from the practice of forced eviction. Women in all groups are especially vulnerable given the extent of statutory and other forms of discrimination which often apply in relation to property rights (including home ownership) or rights of access to property or accommodation, and their particular
vulnerability to acts of violence and sexual abuse when they are rendered homeless." (COHRE, 2008: 108).

Forced evictions have taken place without adequate consultation, notice and compensation or alternative accommodation, in violation of people’s right to adequate housing. Government-sanctioned evictions, carried out in the name of security and urban renewal programmes, have led to intra-urban displacement and left thousands of people homeless (AI, 26 Aug. 2011; AI, 2011, Agenda: 38; Mberu, 2010; USDoS, 2011: 35-36).

In addition to breaching the right to adequate housing, forced evictions often lead to violations of other human rights, such as the right to health-care, to education or to earn a living (AI, 2011, Agenda: 39).

The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasized in its general comment No. 7 that evictions may be carried out only as a last resort, once all other feasible alternatives have been explored and all procedural protections are in place, including an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; adequate notice for affected persons prior to the date of eviction; information on the proposed evictions, and, where applicable, on the alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used. Where those affected are unable to provide for themselves, states must take appropriate measures to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive land is available. When evictions are carried, they should not result in homelessness and vulnerability to human rights violations. The use of force should be avoided and in cases where it is used, it should not be disproportionate.

Key online documents:


Displacement induced by natural disaster

In 2009 and 2010, Nigeria ranked 12th and 11th amongst countries with the highest reported levels of displacement by sudden-onset disasters worldwide, according to IDMC’s global data. Flooding and soil erosion in the states along the Niger River and its tributaries, River Katsina Ala and River Benue regularly cause internal displacement. About a million people living in the low-lying plains of the River Niger are considered at risk (Chinedu, 2008: 37; USDoS, 2011: 35).

Floods displaced another 140,000 people in 2009 (Dartmouth Floods Observatory). Affected states included Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, Benue, Adamawa, Nassara, Sokoto, Jigawa, and Abuja.

**Key online documents:**

IDP POPULATION FIGURES

Overview of displaced populations

Scope of displacement

The full scope of displacement in Nigeria is unknown (Egwu, 2011: 2). There is no reliable information on the number and the situation of IDPs, in part because of the complex displacement patterns, but also because of the state’s limited capacity to collect data (Blench 2003: 8; Mberu, 2010; USDoS, 2011: 35).

Estimates provided by the government and non-governmental organizations are inconsistent, generally not disaggregated by age and sex, and often include only people who have sought refuge in temporary camps or shelters, such as schools, churches, police and army barracks (Best, 2011: 72 and 99; CISLAC / IDMC, 2011). Yet, most displaced people are hosted by relatives (Best, 2011: 65; Blench, 2003: 9; Ibeanu 1999: 162).

Number and locations of IDPs, disaggregated by age and sex where data are available

Number and locations of IDPs

Provisional figures compiled by the Nigerian Red Cross indicate that almost 50,000 people have been displaced between January and May 2012 and have settled in temporary settlements and shelters (NRC by email, 22 May 2012).

Numbers reported by the Federal Ministry of Justice to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights tally to over 1.3 million people displaced by conflict and flooding, as of January 2011 (GoN, 2011: 75). However, a survey by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) indicates that less than 400,000 people were displaced in October 2011, with some 74,000 living in camps (NEMA, 2011). Yet, in March 2012, the Chairman of the Board of the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) indicated that a million people were displaced in the country (The Punch, 23 March 2012). In all cases, no information on the methodology used was provided.

The following are the most detailed available global figures on displacement caused by conflict or natural-disaster. They were included in the Federal Ministry of Justice’s report to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2011 (GoN, 2011: 75).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of IDPs, as of Jan. 2011</th>
<th>Causes of displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Boundary conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>Boundary Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Conflict Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebonyi</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Boundary Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>Spill over from Plateau crisis 2001-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>70,296</td>
<td>Floods and international boundary conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jigawa</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Floods, 2006 &amp; 2010 Religious and Ethnic Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>Religious and Ethnic Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>Tribal conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Spill over from Plateau Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>IDPs from Niger Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Boko Haram cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>Floods victims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The report also indicates that Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Bayelsa and Edo are respectively home to 50,000, 325,000, 18,000 and 8,000 Bakassi returnees from the ICJ. This refers to the International Court of Justice’s judgment on the dispute opposing Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula. The 2002 ruling awarded the peninsula to Cameroon, based on an early 20th century colonial agreement between Britain and Germany. Before then, the peninsula was ruled by Nigeria and home to some 300,000 people considering themselves Nigerian. Following the judgment, thousands of people moved from the peninsula to Nigeria (BBC, 14 Aug. 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7559895.stm). It is unknown whether they have been able to locally integrate or resettle in another part of the country.

Known instances of internal displacement since the Dec. 2011 include:

- In late December, some 90,000 people fled Damaturu city in Yobe state following deadly attacks and clashes between the Islamic group Boko Haram and security forces, according to the NEMA (IRIN, 19 Jan. 2012).
- In January 2012, Boko Haram issued an ultimatum to Christians living in the north instructing them to leave the area. Since then, at least 2,000 people have found refuge in the south of the country (Vanguard, 2 January 2012; BBC, 15 March 2012). NEMA has also indicated that some 17,000 farmers had fled (Africa Review, 1 April 2012).
- On 9 January 2012, some 10,000 people were displaced in Benin city, in the southern Edo state, following attacks on Hausa residents (Sunday Nation, 10 Jan. 2012).
- In March 2012, renewed clashes over land access and ownership between Fulani herdsmen and Tiv peasants in Benue and Taraba states, central Nigeria, left several people dead and forced thousands to flee.

Fearing that the crisis would spill over several residents of neighbouring town in Nasarawa state sought refuge in a primary school that has been used as a temporary shelter by IDPs for several months (Daily Trust, 9 March 2012).

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported that 3,605 people - 905 men, 1,499 women and 1,201 children -, had found refuge in four temporary camps in Utanga, in neighbouring Cross River State (Daily Sun, 11 April 2012). By the end of April, the governor
indicated that IDPs sheltered in camps had been returned to their state of origin, even though the NEMA had asked to the state government to allow time for proper coordination among the stakeholders and the state governments of Benue and Taraba (The Punch, 23 April 2012; Daily Trust, 23 April 2012).
IDP POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND PATTERNS

Population movements and patterns of displacement

Patterns of displacement

No comprehensive information on population movements and the patterns of displacement is available. Non-governmental organisations and governmental actors typically indicate that flood-induced displacement is commonly of a temporary nature, while displacement induced by inter-communal conflicts tends to be of a longer duration. The demolition of houses to their very foundation, which has been a common occurrence during inter-communal conflicts, points towards lasting displacement, since such destruction is likely to prevent return (Je’adayibe, 2010). Je’adayibe (2008: 170-171) has underlined that such crises have led to population shifts in urban areas, in several instances, notably in Kaduna and Plateau states: Muslims and Christians have moved to neighbourhoods considered safe, i.e., areas dominated by people of their religion and ethnicity.

Attacks by Boko Haram and counter-insurgency operations seem to provoke both temporary displacement and longer-term displacement. Many people appear to flee outbursts of violence and return to their homes once calm resumes (ITW ICRC, 19 April 2012). However, several medias have also reported that thousands of people have moved to safer areas in the South-East or in the North and that several families have split to send women and children away (AP, 19 March 2012; BBC, 15 March 2012; Business Day, 18 April 2012; The Economist, 14 and 23 Jan. 2012; VOA, 30 Jan. 2012). This could turn into lasting displacement. Business Day noted that, for the time being, there was no evidence that people who had left due to the insecurity had returned (Africa Review, 1 April 2012; The Guardian, 27 March 2012). In addition, thousands of migrants from Chad and Niger have returned to their country of origin because of the increasing violence (IRIN, 6 March 2012).
Physical security and integrity of IDPs

In the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, no substantial information is available on the physical security, dignity and moral integrity of displaced populations. This is also true with respect to IDPs’ liberty and freedom of movement.

One NGO interviewed by IDMC denounced the forced return of some 3,500 IDPs from Cross River to Benue and Taraba states, in violation with Principle 15 (d) of the GP. Fulani herdsmen fled to Cross River state following violent clashes with Tiv farmers over land access and ownership (c.f., section 2.2). Yet, the Ministry of Information of Cross River state has presented the returns as voluntary and indicated that the conditions for a durable return were now in place (Giant Strides, April 2012).

Cases of physical aggression and sexual violence against IDPs, in some instances perpetrated by police force, have been reported to the National Human Rights Commission (ITW NHRC, 25 April 2012). Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly denounced the excessive use of force and extrajudicial killings by the Nigerian police force (AI, 2009; HRW, World Report 2011). Rapes of women and girls by the police and security forces in Nigeria have been described as endemic in a 2006 Amnesty International report. It noted that the vast majority of rapes are not reported and when they are, only a small number of cases result in convictions (AI, 28 Nov. 2006: 1, 3, 4, 28, 29).

It is generally acknowledged that when women are forced to flee their homes, they are further exposed to the risk of sexual violence or exploitation (The Refugee Council, 2009).
Basic necessities of life

In the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, no substantial information is available on the access to basic necessities of life by IDPs. However, it is generally acknowledged that the provision of assistance to IDPs is sporadic, often late and tends to target the minority who temporarily settles in inadequate camps and temporary shelters (ITW NHRC, 25 April 2012). Shortages of food and water and deficient hygiene and sanitary conditions in the camps have been reported in several instances, e.g., in Jos, in 2008 and 2010 (IRIN, 27 January 2010; IRIN, 4 December 2008), in Akwa Ibom state in 2008 (IFRC, 10 Nov. 2008).

The fact that the majority of IDPs is hosted by relatives and receive no humanitarian assistance means that already meagre resources have to be shared, which may lead to additional deprivation for IDPs and the host communities (ITW National Human Rights Commission, 25 April 2012, and Action Aid, 20 April 2012). Action Aid reports that in some instances, IDPs have resorted to begging.

Given that more than nearly 65% the country’s population lives with less than US$ 1,25 a day, that the access to potable water is limited, and that health care is not free, it is unlikely that a majority of IDPs has an adequate access to essential food and potable water, basic shelter and housing, appropriate clothing and essential medical services and sanitation (GP 18; IFRC, 10 Nov. 2008; UNDP, 2011).

It is also impossible to assess whether IDPs with special needs, including the disabled and victims of sexual or other abuses, have access to appropriate services. Such services are sometimes provided by non-governmental organisations in temporary IDP camps, but not on a systematic basis (ITW ActionAid, 20 April 2012).
PROPERTY, LIVELIHOODS, EDUCATION AND OTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Property issues

In the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, no substantial information is available on the protection from arbitrary deprivation and restitution and compensation mechanisms (GP 21). However, it is known that displaced people have often lost their homes during conflicts, as the demolition of houses to their very foundation during inter-communal crisis has been a common occurrence (Je’adayibe, 2010). The National Human Rights Commission (NRHC) indicates that loss of property is one of the most common complaints voiced by IDPs (ITW NHRC, 25 April 2012).

In urban areas, government-sanctioned expulsions have been conducted without proper compensation mechanisms (c.f., section 1.2.3). Thousands of people have been left homeless (AI, 26 Aug. 2011; AI, 2011, Agenda: 38; Mberu, 2010; USDoS, 2011: 35-36). In addition to breaching the right to adequate housing, forced evictions often lead to violations of other human rights, such as the right to health-care, education or to earn a living (AI, 2011, Agenda: 39).

Access to education and to livelihoods

IDPs’ access to education has not been documented (GP 23). It is possible that when IDPs are displaced in the vicinity of their usual residence, children keep their access to school, when security allows it. It is not known if special measures have been taken by the authorities to ensure that schools resume their activities as soon as conditions permit. Media have occasionally reported that displaced children face challenges in accessing education. For example, in May 2012, in an article about people who remain displaced in Kaduna state a year after having fled the post-election violence, the daily Leadership quoted a mother stating that displaced children still had no access to education (Leadership, 5 May 2012).

IDPs’ access to work and livelihood opportunities also remain undocumented (GP 22). The NHRC indicates that loss of livelihood and lack of means to pay for school fees are also a common complaint received from IDPs (ITW NHRC, 25 April 2012).
FAMILY LIFE, PARTICIPATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, DOCUMENTATION, AND OTHER CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Family life

In the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, no substantial information is available on the respect for IDPs’ family life, tracing and reunification mechanisms (GP 16 and 17). The National Human Rights Commission indicates that no family tracing mechanism exists (ITW NHRC, 25 April 2012).

Access to justice and political participation

It is also unknown whether IDPs experience specific problems in accessing justice and in obtaining or replacing necessary documents for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights (GP 20).

The authorities have not indicated that necessary means to allow IDPs to exercise their right to vote and participate in governmental and public affairs, such as transportation to poll stations and safety and security measures, have been established (GP 20). There was no monitoring of whether IDPs were prevented from voting in the subsequent state governor elections, but many were reportedly not planning returning to the villages where they were registered to vote, for fear of further violence.
PROTECTION OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF IDPS (AGE, GENDER, DIVERSITY)

Special categories of IDPs

In the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, no substantial information is available on measures taken to ensure that women and men, boy, girls and adolescents, older persons, physically and mentally disabled and indigenous people, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with a special dependency on and attachment to their lands are protected in an appropriate manner.

In its sixth periodic report on Nigeria, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 2008: para 37-38) expressed concern “about the situation of internally displaced women, including women with disabilities, displaced by violence and conflict, particularly in view of their precarious living conditions in camps where they are at increased risk of sexual and other forms of violence, and lack access to health care, education and economic opportunities.” The Committee requested the adoption of a national policy on internal displacement that would address specific vulnerabilities of women and girls.
DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY)

Durable solutions

Reporting on IDPs in its report to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2011, the Federal Ministry of Justice notably highlights the presence of 45,000 IDPs in Bauchi state, as a result of spillovers from Plateau crisis 2001-2010, and of 200,000 IDPs in Jigawa state, as a result of religious and ethnic conflicts in 2006 and 2010 (GoN, 2011: 75). This would point toward the absence of durable solution for substantial numbers of IDPs in the country.

The demolition of houses to their very foundation during inter-communal crisis has been a common occurrence. Such destruction is likely to prevent return and also points towards lasting displacement. Similarly, since 2010, several states have sent buses to crisis zones to “repatriate” indigenes (Je‘adayibe, 2010).

In some cases, authorities have supported the resettlement of IDPs. In July 2010 the governor of Bauchi state announced that more than 30,000 IDPs displaced from Plateau state some six months earlier had been resettled with financial assistance from the state (Nigerian Tribune, 2 July 2010). In January 2011, the same authorities reported that they had allocated 748 plots of land to IDPs (Leadership, 24 Jan. 2011).

However, in the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, no substantial information is available on the protection from arbitrary dispossession and of the property left behind by IDPs (GP 21), on the establishment of conditions and the provision of means to allow the return, local integration or resettlement elsewhere in the country of IDPs (GP 28).

Similarly, the absence of discrimination against former IDPs who have achieved durable solutions remains undocumented, just as their recovery of property and possessions or just compensation when this is not possible (GP 29).
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Overview

International human rights and humanitarian law framework including references to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c=NG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention or Treaty</th>
<th>Ratification/Accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
<td>16.12.1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
<td>20.11.1989</td>
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<td>Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict</td>
<td>25.05.2000</td>
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<td>Convention relating to the Status of Refugees</td>
<td>23.10.1967</td>
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<td>Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees</td>
<td>02.05.1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
<td>10.12.1984</td>
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<td>International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
<td>07.03.1966</td>
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The 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protections of victims of armed conflicts

20.06.1961

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Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions 10.10.1988

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OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa 23.05.1986

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 22.06.1983

Ouagadougou Protocol creating an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 25.05.2004

Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa 17.04.2012

References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation: None

Other references to the Guiding Principles: Draft National IDP Policy (not yet available).

Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages: None

Training on the Guiding Principles:

**IDMC / CISLAC conference (2011):** The Abuja-based Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) in partnership with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre / Norwegian Refugee Centre (IDMC/NRC) organized a two-day multi-stakeholders’ conference on IDP protection and on the Kampala Convention. The Conference aimed at examining the plight of IDPs in Nigeria in the light of relevant international and domestic legal frameworks and designing a plan of action for its ratification and domestication, as well as identifying measures for attaining durable solutions to the challenges of internal displacements in Nigeria. The Conference was attended by some 75 participants from Civil Society and Faith-Based organisations, academia, international and national humanitarian organisations, relevant government institutions and media (CISLAC/IDMC, November 2011).

**Date:** 21-22 Nov. 2011

**NRC training workshop (2003):** The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), in collaboration with the National Commission for Refugees (NCR), held a 3-day training workshop on the Guiding Principles in the city of Jos, the state capital of Plateau state. The workshop was part of a global NRC effort to disseminate and explain the Guiding Principles to representatives of governments, NGOs, the UN agencies and the displaced themselves, in order to ensure better protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. A total of 59 participants attended the workshop: 34 participants represented different state emergency agencies, the National Commission for Refugees and regional state authorities from all over Nigeria; national and international non-governmental organizations sent 22 representatives and the UN system was represented by UNICEF and UNHCR (3 participants).

**Date:** 17-19 February 2003
Despite positive developments in recent months (c.f., section 10), in the absence of a clear policy, legal framework and a comprehensive approach, efforts to prevent arbitrary displacement, to mitigate the effects of displacement and to minimise its duration have so far been insufficient.

The response to displacement, generally included under disaster management mechanisms, has been uneven, depending on the state affected, uncoordinated and ad hoc. The lack of adequate planning, monitoring and evaluation and the politicisation of assistance have led to deficiencies and duplications (Je’adayibe, 2008: 173; USDoS, 2011: 35; CISLAC/IDMC, 2011). The tendency has been to focus on the provision of assistance and to neglect protection needs. Weaknesses exist in the operations of the two main government bodies tasked with responding to internal displacement, the NEMA and the NCFR, notably because their budgets are inadequate to cover the needs (Egwu, 2011: 3; USDoS, 2011: 35).

The agency mandated to coordinate disaster management throughout the country, NEMA, has no specific IDP policy, but is charged with responding to the immediate needs of displaced populations when necessary. Local governments are the first responsible for ensuring an adequate response. State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) with varying capacity are expected to step in when local authorities are unable to do so. Assistance from the federal government is only to be requested when the required response is beyond the capacity of the local and state authorities. Upon the president’s decision, necessary support is provided through NEMA, which operates offices in the six geopolitical zones of the country, for implementation of policy, coordination and communication purposes (NEMA, June 2009, with IDMC; NEMA, July 2009; Economic Confidential, 2010; News Agency of Nigeria, 16 April 2012). IDP camps, described as a last and temporary resort, are usually run by NEMA or the SEMAs and the Nigerian Red Cross, in conjunction with relevant agencies (News Agency of Nigeria, 15 April 2012; NEMA, National Contingency Plan 2011-2012; e-mail exchange NRC, May 2012).

The National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) was established by Decree 52, now Cap N21, to oversee all refugee matters in Nigeria. In 2002, its mandate was extended to include the assistance and protection of internally displaced people, as well as their resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration (NCFR, 2008, Explanatory note of the NCFR/NGO Humanitarian Framework of Cooperation, para 1 and 2, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/A2E7225FBFAF2AF7C125751500444658/$file/NCFR-NGO+Framework.pdf). It focuses on post-emergency situations and long-term programs aimed at enabling durable solutions for IDPs. If necessary, it assists NEMA with camp management, and it has a dedicated unit working on internal displacement. It has developed a comprehensive Plan of Action for resettlement, reconciliation, reconstruction and reintegration, but still needs to translate this into reality.

The National Human Rights Commission and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution also have responsibilities with respect to the protection of IDPs’ rights and the prevention and resolution of conflict (GoN, Draft IDP Policy, 2009, with IDMC). Other government agencies, as well as the military, are brought in on a case-by-case basis.
Humanitarian access and assistance

The humanitarian response from government agencies tends to be insufficient and slow due to bureaucracy or competing interests of ruling elites, the Nigerian Red Cross, civil society organisations, and faith-based organisations have been providing immediate relief and assistance on an ad-hoc basis in the aftermath of violence (Okpeh, 2008: p. 63-64).

Assistance tends to be short-termed and does not necessarily contribute to the longer-term reconstruction of the lives and livelihoods of those affected. In addition, assistance provided by faith-based organisations is often focused on IDPs of their religion, which might contribute to exacerbating religious antagonisms (Best, 2011: 99; Orji, 2011: 474 and 486).

Overall, the response usually targets people in camps, even though the majority of displaced people are hosted by the community. Thus, relatives and communal networks carry most of the burden of hosting and assisting displaced persons (Ibeanu, 1999: 176; Best, 2011: 65)

International Response

Nigeria’s donors have generally favoured development assistance, rather than humanitarian programmes. The American USAid is the largest and most influential bilateral donor, followed by the British DFID. Most multilateral funding has been channelled through UNDP, the World Bank and the European Union. Donors have mostly focused on providing support to tackle poverty through promoting good governance, democratization, rule of law and human rights (Amundsen, 2010: xii and 36). The cluster approach has not been adopted in Nigeria. The UN Country Team coordinates the inter-agency response through its Emergency Preparedness Working Group.

Recommendations by international human rights bodies

Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC): In its 54th session (2010), the CRC expressed concerns “at the absence of a comprehensive legislative and policy framework on IDPs to effectively address the situation of IDP children, especially those displaced in connection to recent political and inter-communal unrest and violence, flooding and evictions, and ensure their long-term reintegration in society. The absence of a data collection system on internally displaced persons is furthermore of concern to the Committee. » (para 75)

The CRC urged Nigeria to:
a) Adopt a comprehensive national policy on IDPs which, *inter alia*, identifies the agency responsible for the registration, monitoring and protection of IDPs, including children;

(b) Ensure that, until such policy is in place, the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) and the Nigerian Red Cross are provided with the necessary resources to effectively protect and ensure the rights of internally displaced children. (para 76)

Committee on the Rights of the Child, 11 June 2010, Committee on Rights of the Child concludes fifty fourth session. Concluding observations: Nigeria.

**Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD):** In its 66th session (2010), the CERD recalled its concerns about “prejudices and feelings of hostility among some ethnic groups in Nigeria, including active discrimination by people who consider themselves to be the original inhabitants of their region against settlers from other states and about the persistence of inter-ethnic, intercommunal and interreligious violence in Nigeria stemming from these hostile sentiments as well as disputes over commercial interest and resource control.” (para 1)

It urged Nigeria to:

“Take all the appropriate measures to immediately stop the ethnic violence, to protect the victims; and to avoid the repetition of such killings in the future in compliance with its obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.” (para 5)

“Investigate the massacres, bring to justice those responsible and to provide redress to the victims and their families.” (para 6)

“Conduct studies on the underlying causes of the ethnic violence in Nigeria; to firmly address all underlying causes of tension leading to this repeated violence, and to promote dialogue between different ethnic communities in view to achieve tolerance and peace.” (para 7)


**Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW):** In its sixth periodic report on Nigeria (2008), the CEDAW expressed “concern about the situation of internally displaced women, including women with disabilities, displaced by violence and conflict, in particular in view of their precarious living conditions in camps where they are at increased risk of sexual and other forms of violence and lack access to health care, education and economic opportunities.” (para 340)

The Committee urged Nigeria to adopt a national policy on displacement, addressing specific vulnerabilities of women and girls, and to formulate and implement “gender-sensitive plans and programmes for social reintegration, capacity-building and training of internally displaced persons.” (para 341)

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