Iraq: Challenges of forced displacement within Iraq

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^{31 December 2008}

Over 2.8 million people were internally displaced in Iraq by June 2008. These IDPs were distributed throughout the country with over 1.1 million in central provinces and over 800,000 in both the northern and southern regions. Most were dispersed in rented accommodation in towns and cities where they were relying on the support of host communities as well as national and international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental bodies, including some with political affiliation.

This IDP population – equivalent to one in ten Iraqis – was displaced in three phases. Around 1.6 million had since February 2006 fled sectarian and generalised violence including military operations by multinational, Iraqi and also Turkish and Iranian forces in northern Iraq. Approximately 190,000 were displaced by military operations and generalised violence from 2003 to 2005, and an estimated 1.2 million by the policies of the former government of Saddam Hussein, including the “arabisation” of Kurdish areas, destruction of marshlands in southern Iraq, and repression of political opposition.

In 2008, despite a relative improvement in security, the country remained volatile. The rate of new displacement declined, but people continued to flee due to military operations as in Sadr City in Baghdad, in Basra and Mosul, and near the border with Turkey, and sectarian violence such as that targeting the Christian community in Mosul. Returns were reported, principally to Baghdad, but the rate of return remained low, at around six per cent of total displacement by late 2008.

IDPs continue to face a wide range of protection concerns. Though the vulnerability of IDPs is likely to be greater, these concerns are often shared by non-displaced groups, including communities remaining in unsafe areas. Iraq’s many minority groups have faced particular threats, including Christian Assyrians, Faeeli Kurds, Yazidis, Palestinian refugees and also Sunni and Shia where they are in the minority. Children and women have faced recruitment by armed groups, sexual and gender-based violence, and labour exploitation.

Despite the decline in violence, the UN and the humanitarian community have continued to report human rights abuses and violations against civilians by militias, criminal gangs, and security and military forces; perpetrators of human rights abuses continue to enjoy impunity.

The standard of living of most Iraqis has declined despite attempts at reconstruction and rehabilitation. For the majority of IDPs, shelter, food and employment remain urgent priorities. Access to adequate shelter and basic services remain high priorities for all Iraqis, but unemployment particularly affects IDPs, who have left behind their sources of income and moved to areas where their skills might not be marketable.

The freedom of movement of displaced communities has remained restricted. Alongside dilapidated infrastructure, security measures in 2008 including checkpoints, curfews, permission requirements for IDP registration, and security fences or walls continue to restrict movement throughout the country. The prospects of durable solutions are limited for most IDPs. The insecurity and new sectarian make-up of areas of origin, the lack of basic services and humanitarian access, and the destruction or secondary occupation of private and public properties, are all serious obstacles to their return.

Though plagued by limited capacity and partisan politics, the Iraqi government took steps in 2008 to respond to forced displacement. In July, the Ministry of Migration and Displacement launched a National Policy on Displacement outlining the basic rights of displaced and returnee populations and the obligations of the Iraqi government and the humanitarian community to provide services and durable solutions. The government also enacted laws in September to address returns and property issues facing returnees in Baghdad, but these proved controversial with critics cautioning against premature and unsustainable returns.

Humanitarian space has been shaped by the activities of multi-national forces and non-state armed groups. The access of UN agencies, IOM and international NGOs has continued to be limited. Though coordination mechanisms have been revised, critics have noted continuing duplication and parallel coordination mechanisms, and the relationship between the UN and international forces have undermined the international humanitarian response.