

PART 2

OFF THE GRID

Making progress in reducing internal displacement

2018 is an opportunity to take stock as we look back on 20 years of efforts to protect and assist IDPs through normative frameworks and assess the global scale and nature of internal displacement. The humanitarian origins of policies on IDPs have shaped their focus on humanitarian assistance and protection. What is missing is a more comprehensive framing of internal displacement risk and approaches to assess and reduce its negative impacts.

Significant data challenges also persist. These limit policy successes and consign IDPs to the margins of national economic and security agendas. The path ahead must be based on a broader and more ambitious goal of truly reducing displacement, led by the countries it affects.



A young returnee girl by the Kunar riverside in Behsud District, Nangarhar, Afghanistan. Photo: NRC/Enayatullah Azad, January 2017

NORMATIVE ORIGINS AND POLICY PROGRESS

Internal displacement is not a new phenomenon, but as a policy issue only emerged on the global agenda in the early 1990s. The sharp increase in internal conflicts during the post-Cold War era forced millions of people to flee both within and across borders, and raised the question of legal protection for those who remained in their countries. Refugees were afforded international protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention, but IDPs had no comparable rights.²⁴⁶ Francis Deng, the representative of the UN secretary general on internally displaced persons at the time, concluded in 1995 that a new legal instrument was required to ensure that IDPs' specific needs were recognised and addressed.²⁴⁷

The lack of respect for human rights and humanitarian law was recognised, but there was also a belief that specific legal instruments would be unable to address internal displacement as a whole.²⁴⁸ It was further argued that specific conventions and laws on IDPs would distract from existing norms, that countries had little political appetite for them and that they would be too narrow and unable to address the causes of displacement.²⁴⁹

Given these challenges, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were presented to UN member states in 1998 as an alternative to a formal convention. They included norms that cover prevention, assistance and solutions in principle, but in reality the prevention aspect and to some extent that of solutions receded into the background, leaving the focus to fall on protecting and assisting IDPs.

The strong rights-based approach – the “right not to be displaced” – was important, but it also meant that internal displacement was framed in a way that left concern for national economic and social development aside.²⁵⁰ This affected policymaking and implementation by countries with large populations of IDPs.

At the same time, the Guiding Principles have been an effective international soft law mechanism, and the basis for many national, regional and international laws, strategies and policies. Global initiatives based on them, such as IASC’s Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, its Operational Guidelines


on Human Rights and Natural Disasters and the UN’s Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, have shaped humanitarian action. The position of the special representative on IDPs, which later became the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, strengthened awareness of the need to establish laws, policies and actions to address and reduce internal displacement.²⁵¹


Two African instruments, the 2006 Great Lakes Pact and the 2009 Kampala Convention, became the first legally binding mechanisms on internal displacement based on the Guiding Principles.²⁵² Based on their provisions, 14 African countries had a law on internal displacement as of March 2018 and 15 were in the process of developing one. Seventeen had a national policy on IDPs’ protection and assistance, and 41 had other national instruments relevant to internal displacement.²⁵³

Despite this progress in policy development, however, internal displacement has continued unabated (see figure 11, p.59). In other words, international efforts to apply universal human rights and humanitarian principles to IDPs and their situations have only been partially successful. Their persistently high number tells us that the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection is not, and never will be enough to significantly reduce internal displacement in the long-term.

A shift toward prevention and risk reduction is needed. In order to increase awareness of internal displacement as an economic, security and political priority, we need a better grasp of how it comes about, and how its impacts generate new risk.

FIGURE 11: Internal displacement numbers and policy developments over the last 20 years





RE-FRAMING THE ISSUE: RISK AND IMPACTS

The large numbers of new and cyclical displacements presented in Part 1 of this report affect the achievement of economic and social development goals. Protracted displacement is increasingly becoming the norm and, combined with regular new displacement, it increases the vulnerability and exposure of already marginal populations and overstretches local governments' capacities to respond. As such, internal displacement is both a driver and outcome of a steady accumulation of risks, undermining progress on the 2030 Agenda, the Sendai Framework, the Paris Agreement, the Agenda for Humanity, the New Urban Agenda and their related national and regional strategies.

IDPs tend to receive assistance as part of humanitarian responses, isolating internal displacement as an issue from core development processes at the local and national level. Yet poorly managed development, including economic investment and social expenditure, clearly influence displacement patterns and trends. From China to the Horn of Africa, from Pakistan to Burundi and from Turkey to Mexico, displacement risk is fuelled by conflict and political instability, economic concentration in hazard-prone areas, environmental degradation, weak governance, lack of social protection and high levels of poverty and inequality.

The perception has grown that conflicts and disasters affect increasing numbers of countries, the risk of crises is regularly featured in the media and discussions about the causes of migration and the drivers of displacement abound.²⁵⁴ UNHCR observed as far back as 1998 that "population displacements are more than ever perceived as a threat to economic, social and environmental stability, as well as political security".²⁵⁵ Yet risk-informed humanitarian and development action have not shaped the way we address internal displacement. If it is to be reduced, we need to shift our attention to the accumulation of risk.

Displacement risk may not be at the top of most national governments' agendas, but it is a contingent liability that affects countries' economic and development balance sheets as the years go by. All new development investment, whether in economic infrastructure, housing, urban development or agriculture, has the potential to either increase or reduce displacement risk. Today's risks have been shaped by how those policies

and investments were made in the past. The future sustainability and resilience of societies and economies will be influenced by how they are made in the present.

Between now and 2030 it is estimated that \$2 trillion to \$9 trillion a year will be invested in water, sanitation, energy, transport and housing infrastructure.²⁵⁶ More than 60 per cent of the world's population is expected to live in towns and cities by the same date, and around 60 per cent of the area likely to be needed to accommodate the influx is still to be built.²⁵⁷ If investments of this scale are informed by an understanding of how they are likely to affect displacement risk in the long-term, they could have a significant impact on global sustainability and resilience.

Slow progress in addressing risk drivers leads to increased internal displacement, forced migration and humanitarian needs, and cyclical crises challenge already limited capacities to manage risks and provide adequate basic services and infrastructure. Years of conflict and underdevelopment in Haiti have resulted in a vicious cycle of risk generation, increasing the impact of disasters which have in turn become drivers of new and protracted displacement. The impacts of geophysical and weather-related disasters and epidemics in recent years have combined to bring the island to the brink of socioeconomic collapse. It lost 120 per cent of its GDP after the 2010 earthquake, dependency on international humanitarian aid remains high and resilience has been severely compromised.²⁵⁸

Displacement risk is unevenly distributed, with low income countries usually bearing the greatest risk in relation to population size. High disaster displacement risk is concentrated in only 5 countries in South and South East Asia and the Pacific – India, China, Bangladesh, Viet Nam and the Philippines.²⁵⁹ All five are characterised by high levels of exposure of people and assets and only slow progress in national efforts to reduce vulnerability.²⁶⁰

Conflict displacement risk is also concentrated in particular regions and countries, but this is less well understood. The complex dynamics at play between conflict, drought and poor natural resource management in Middle Eastern countries such as Libya, Egypt

and Syria have been studied, but it is not possible to infer direct causality.²⁶¹ More research is required to unpack how these factors determine displacement dynamics.²⁶²

Comparisons with UNDP's Human Development Index show that low levels of human development correlate strongly with disaster displacement risk. A number of countries with high human development face both high economic loss risk – a reflection of significant exposure of physical assets – as well as high displacement risk. Most of the countries with high levels of displacement risk, however, are those with low levels of human development, highlighting the role of vulnerability and exposure of populations to disaster (see figure 12).

FIGURE 12: Correlation between human development, disaster displacement risk and economic loss risk





FIGURE 13: Conflict and disaster displacement relative to selected education and health indicators



Strong correlations are similarly evident between a broader set of development indicators and existing displacement.²⁶³ Here again, we are unable to infer causality, but they highlight areas that likely both generate displacement risk and are affected by displacement triggers such as conflict or disasters. The number of new displacements associated with conflict is higher in countries where fewer girls are enrolled in primary school and where infants are more likely to die (see figure 13). The quality of education and healthcare, represented through proxies of pupil-teacher ratios and the number of hospital beds per head of population, correlate strongly with disaster displacement.

In some countries this correlation may be as much a reflection of impact as of risk. Low health and education levels can be a driver of vulnerability, but also a direct impact of conflict and disaster. Infrastructure quality can also be both a determinant of displacement risk and a consequence of destruction by a hazardous event or war. New displacements associated with conflict are more common in countries where there is less internet access, where electricity consumption is lower and ports are less developed in the first place, but conflict also impedes infrastructure development. In

this sense, displacement drivers and impacts are closely related, particularly in situations of protracted or cyclical displacement. Unless the main causes and impacts of vulnerability and displacement are addressed, they will continue to fuel future risk. Moreover, just as displacement can be a result of poor economic and social development and human security, it also threatens development gains, heightening people's vulnerability in the process.²⁶⁴

Taken together, the situations in Nigeria and South Sudan illustrate this point well. The disruption of livelihoods caused by the shrinking of Lake Chad has undermined economic growth in Nigeria, paving the way for the rise of Boko Haram, counterinsurgency operations and widespread displacement.²⁶⁵ Armed conflict and displacement in South Sudan have exacerbated food insecurity because farmers are unable to cultivate their crops. They have also disrupted markets and driven up food prices, undermining people's resilience to other shocks.²⁶⁶

That large-scale internal displacement has severe social and economic impacts, not just for those displaced but also for communities of origin, host communities and countries as a whole, is widely recognised.²⁶⁷ Qualitative research and case studies have explored how the phenomenon affects the wellbeing of individuals and communities, and it has been shown to limit the economic potential of IDPs and their hosts.²⁶⁸ What is missing are systematic and quantitative assessments of its impacts on local and national economies, and attempts to cost them coherently and comprehensively at the global level.²⁶⁹

A key challenge in assessing the costs of internal displacement lies in differentiating between the impacts of a disaster, conflict or other trigger and the impacts of displacement itself.

Displacement may affect an economy through the loss of assets such as livestock, loss of productivity and other impacts that may be direct or indirect, tangible or intangible and immediate or longer-term. Current attempts to quantify these impacts only cover lost assets and the direct, tangible and immediate costs, and these only partially.

The immediate economic impacts of internal displacement can be understood as the cost of providing shelter, transport, food and healthcare to IDPs. Its longer-term impacts can be understood in terms of lost opportunities, or the economic potential of IDPs and their host communities.

The economic impacts of displacement can be either positive or negative, and sometimes both at the same time, depending on which part of the economy is considered and from whose perspective. Local employers may see a drop in wages driven by the arrival of IDPs competing for work as positive, but host community workers will see it as negative. Landlords may see rise in rents caused by increased demand from newly arrived IDPs as positive, but local tenants will see it as negative. A comprehensive assessment should consider both positive and negative impacts, including the question of who benefits and who pays.

Wider and less direct impacts, such as reduced consumption, taxation or exports, and lost productivity caused by ill-health and interrupted education, should also be assessed and can be quantified. Others, such as the disruption of social networks, psychological trauma, deterioration of social stability and diverted development investments are difficult to quantify, but can represent a significant economic burden. Many of these costs are often assumed by affected communities and humanitarian organisations, but they should be understood as contingent liabilities of governments and accounted for as such.

Existing studies have highlighted seven major areas in which internal displacement may affect an economy, through impacts on housing and infrastructure, livelihoods, social and cultural factors, education, health, security and the environment. These correspond to the dimensions of human security and sustainable development, and have underpinned a number of frameworks in recent decades, including the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach in the 1990s, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and most recently the SDGs.²⁷⁰

Individual security, prosperity and social progress and state security and stability relate to each other. They are affected by, and can also drive internal displacement. The different human security and economic development dimensions relate to displacement in multiple ways, and each dimension has links to others (see table 1, p.63).

Understanding the relationship of each of these dimensions with internal displacement has to become the basis for more effective approaches to assisting IDPs and reducing the phenomenon over time. Accounting

for future displacement needs to build on recent efforts to broaden the scope of metrics and move beyond the current focus on numbers of IDPs and their immediate needs.

TABLE 1: Examples of displacement drivers and impacts across dimensions of economic and human security

Dimension of economic and human security	Displacement driver	Displacement impacts:		Links to other economic and human security dimensions
		Short-term	Long-term	
Infrastructure and housing	Destroyed housing	Emergence of unplanned settlements	Increased cost of housing in host community	Disease outbreaks caused by poor sanitation in substandard housing
	Land grabs	Cost of building, renting or buying new housing	Investments in housing and infrastructure in host community	Unplanned settlements contributing to environmental degradation
Livelihoods and food security	Limited livelihood opportunities	Loss of assets	Decline in working conditions and wages caused by increased competition for scarce jobs	Rise in malnutrition and associated health concerns
	Food insecurity and malnutrition	Inability to cultivate crops Competition for work in the host community	Less capacity to save, buy and invest	Rise in poverty-driven criminality
Political, social and cultural factors	Ethnic, religious or other social tensions and violence	Disruption of social networks	Disintegration of cohesive communities and loss of traditional support mechanisms	Decreased investor confidence
	Conflict or criminality	Insecurity in camps and deprived urban settings, including sexual violence Clashes between IDPs and host communities	New demographic makeup resulting in political instability	Limited ability to engage in livelihood activities as a result of insecurity Health and psychological impacts of violence
Health and education	Lack of access to basic services	Disease outbreaks due to poor sanitation in displacement camps	Potential physical or mental disability reducing ability to work	Limited productivity and economic activity
	Disease outbreaks	Lower quality of education due to influx to host communities	Lost years of schooling and subsequent reduction in revenues	
Environment	Environmental degradation and deforestation	Reduced access to ecosystem-dependent livelihoods	Natural resource scarcity and economic degradation in host and transit areas	Loss of livelihoods caused by environmental degradation
	Sudden- and slow-onset hazards and associated loss of livelihoods	Higher exposure and vulnerability to hazards		Conflict over resources between IDPs and host communities

THE NEW CURRENCY: DISPLACEMENT DATA FOR DEVELOPMENT

When Francis Deng was appointed as the UN secretary general's first representative on IDPs in 1992, he and his team had no solid baseline to work from. A first assessment of the number of IDPs globally was a rudimentary exercise, but even this put the figure at 24 million.²⁷¹ There was little information on IDPs' situations or the measures countries were taking to support them, and no information available on the risk of future displacement.

The same year, a number of landmark policy instruments were launched by UN member states, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The first world conference on sustainable development, the Earth Summit, was held in Rio de Janeiro, and its two main outcome documents, the Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, set a course for the next 20 years. The vast body of scientific research that underpinned the conference and its outcome documents allowed the international community to devise a concrete programme of action, set baselines and outline priorities for a sustainable development pathway.

There was no such evidence base for internal displacement at the time, but the first Global IDP Survey was undertaken in 1997-98. This gave birth to the Global IDP Project in 1998, which later became IDMC. We have published annual global figures and analyses of patterns and trends for internal displacement associated with conflict since our inception, and in 2008 we began doing the same for that associated with disasters. Even today, however, there are major evidence gaps on local dynamics and global trends. There are numerous challenges in collecting and analysing basic metrics such as the number of IDPs, their locations and the duration of their displacement.

The current interest in data and statistics on development represents a significant opportunity to fill some of these gaps.²⁷² Data is key to policy development, planning and - of course - monitoring progress, but the drive for more data on international development has not necessarily meant higher quality.²⁷³ A new push is needed now, for validated, credible and interoperable data.

Standard sets of metrics and statistics on internal displacement are vital for the implementation and monitoring of a number of international agreements, including the 2030 Agenda. There are other important frameworks and strategies under the agenda's umbrella that have the potential to act as catalysts for action on internal displacement. They include the Sendai framework, the UNFCCC Paris Agreement, the Nansen Initiative's protection agenda for people displaced across borders by disasters, the Agenda for Humanity, the Valletta Summit action plan and the New Urban Agenda.²⁷⁴

Quality statistics are also needed to monitor progress toward targets such as the ambitious objective of reducing new and protracted internal displacement by at least 50 per cent by 2030, set by the then UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon in 2016.²⁷⁵ Key metrics are also needed to inform the agreement and implementation of the global compacts on refugees and migration, which are scheduled for adoption later this year.

There has been some progress in recent years in efforts to strengthen national capacities to monitor progress against SDG indicators, and with the establishment of the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS). EGRIS began its work in 2016 to identify a set of national statistics on internal displacement, and to develop recommendations for overcoming the challenges inherent in national-level data collection, analysis and standardisation.²⁷⁶

Several countries and territories have shown leadership in this regard. Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq's Kurdistan Region, Kosovo, the Philippines, Somalia, Uganda and Ukraine should be commended for acknowledging that internal displacement is an issue in their territories and committing to understanding the scale and nature of it.²⁷⁷ All ten have engaged with EGRIS and reflected on the serious gaps in their data on IDPs. They have been open about the challenges associated with collecting, validating and analysing data on internal displacement and applying it to policymaking and investment planning.

Children from the Jiw community of Colombia, in a new house built by NRC in El Resguardo Caño la Sal, Guaviare, where the community returned.
Photo: NRC/Edgar León, March 2017



In general, however, nationally owned, validated and credible data is not easy to come by. Yet it will be key to increasing recognition of the phenomenon and making metrics and statistics for policymakers and planners more comparable and applicable. For countries to include addressing internal displacement in their local and national development plans and their reporting on the SDGs, they will need to either own or access data they can trust.

A number of countries are committed to making progress on this. They are trying to monitor progress on the SDGs in ways that include consideration of IDPs by collecting disaggregated data against specific indicators, or they have selected indicators as proxies for leaving no one - including IDPs - behind.

Afghanistan's voluntary national review highlights conflict and internal displacement as a key challenge to the country's development strategy, particularly in terms of economic performance, employment, inequality, public service distribution and governance. Internal displacement in particular is framed exclusively as an

impediment to SDG 1 on economic growth and poverty reduction. It is not mentioned under SDG 2 on hunger and food security, SDG 3 on health and wellbeing or SDG 5 on gender equality.

Azerbaijan's report focuses on the principle of leaving no one behind, and specifically mentions refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups including older people, people with disabilities, children, young people and women. It mentions IDPs under SDG 1 on poverty reduction and SDG 5 on gender equality. In its efforts to reduce poverty, the government focuses on the most vulnerable groups, including IDPs. Its progress report mentions that 250,000 IDPs have been provided with housing in more than 90 newly built settlements. It also states that one of the country's most serious gender-related problems is the violation of the human rights of more than a million refugees and IDPs, most of whom are women and children, as a result of the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.

These are promising developments, but many countries still face challenges in understanding, accounting

for and addressing displacement. They report a need for statistical capacity building, particularly in the use of information and communication technologies to monitor the SDGs.

Other countries with significant numbers of IDPs do not mention them at all in their voluntary national reviews, including DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, which regularly have the largest caseloads of new and protracted displacement associated with conflict. This points to a critical problem. IDPs may be recognised by a country's humanitarian bodies, but they are "off the grid" and ignored in its core development processes.

Beyond the 2030 Agenda's principle of leaving no one behind, internal displacement is directly relevant to all of the SDGs despite the absence of a specific target or indicator (see figure 14, p.67). Targets on migration and mobility under SDG 10 and high-quality disaggregated data under SDG 17 are clearly linked with internal displacement. SDG 11 on urban resilience and SDG 13 on climate action are also directly relevant, and can only be achieved if displacement is addressed.

AT A GLANCE: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN NATIONAL SDG PROGRESS REPORTING

As part of their efforts to monitor progress toward the SDGs, 65 countries submitted voluntary national reviews to the United Nations Statistical Commission in 2016 and 2017. At this early stage, most describe progress against the previous global agenda of the MDGs and their institutional arrangements for planning, implementing and monitoring the SDGs.

Regrettably, few of the countries worst affected by internal displacement have submitted a review, and even fewer mention the phenomenon. The three that accounted for the highest numbers of new displacements associated with conflict in 2017, Syria, DRC and Iraq, have not yet filed reviews. Of the 15 most-affected countries, only eight have done so and only two, Afghanistan and Nigeria, specifically mention internal displacement.

Different countries have established different institutional frameworks and policies to track their progress toward the SDGs. Some have set up a dedicated office within a ministry, the prime minister's office, presidency or national statistical body. Some include big data and information generated by private sector companies, while others rely on more traditional sources such as household surveys, censuses and administrative registers. Several countries mention the adoption of open access policies and online databases. All have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, country-specific indicators that are more or less equivalent to the global ones, though often fewer in number.

Most countries rely on internationally standardised demographic and health surveys (DHSs) or multiple indicator cluster surveys (MICSs) to populate a number of SDG indicators. Such household surveys tend not include information on IDPs, however, effectively making them invisible in national statistics. People forced to move from their habitual place of residence are often not listed in the administrative registries of their host region. As these registries serve as the basis for household surveys, IDPs usually do not appear in the lists of households to be visited by interviewers. Some countries have attempted to address this issue by conducting specific surveys for other "invisible" groups such as pastoralists. A similar approach could be applied for IDPs.

FIGURE 14: Internal displacement and the SDGs





FIGURE 15: Ownership and responsibility for internal displacement data



The focus on data for monitoring progress against a range of international frameworks, not least the SDGs, demonstrates a growing recognition that accountability starts with counting. Slow but steadily growing responsibility for accounting for displacement reflects this progress. The main data sources for that associated with conflict are still international humanitarian agencies, but governments are increasingly collecting and analysing information on displacement associated with disasters (see figure 15).

Many countries, however, face serious challenges in building the required statistical, administrative and analytical capacity. Setting national targets, identifying indicators and collecting and analysing data to track progress against a plethora of national, regional and global development strategies consume human and financial resources that are much needed elsewhere.

That said, the internal displacement figures currently reported will not suffice. Until now we have only been able to monitor outcomes in the form of stocks and flows, that is the number of IDPs at a specific point in time, and the number of people moving in and out of displacement over a specific time period. As discussed below, however, countries will need to monitor progress against a much wider set of issues, including governance arrangements; local, national, regional and global policies, programmes and investments; development and humanitarian indicators that determine risk and countries' capacity to support IDPs; and more complex displacement metrics, including duration and severity.

WHERE NEXT? MONITORING PROGRESS IN REDUCING INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

The above review of internal displacement monitoring over the last two decades points to two critical gaps. There is no comprehensive assessment of how displacement risk has increased or decreased over time or what has driven it, and there has been little analysis of how progress has been made in reducing existing displacement or what has hindered it. As a result, the evidence available is of limited use to inform effective programmes and policies at the national or local level.

Efforts by governments, the UN system, civil society experts and academia to address internal displacement remain dispersed and incoherent, because they lack a framework for action and accountability. Given that countries are committed to making progress against 17 SDGs and their 169 targets and 232 indicators, the inability of national and international stakeholders to set clear priorities for action and targets for progress on internal displacement is a glaring gap. It also presents a political obstacle at the national and local level, because those advocating for IDPs' protection and durable solutions find it difficult to make the case for greater political will and investment.

There have been previous attempts to provide such a framework, most notably in 2005, when the Brookings Institution tried to answer the question of what national responsibility for internal displacement means, and how it could be promoted and supported.²⁷⁸ The primary focus of the study was on governments, and it made recommendations in a number of vital areas, including the establishment of institutional focal points on IDPs, the development of national policies on internal displacement, data collection, awareness raising and the allocation of adequate resources.

The framework was also problematic, however, in that it failed to fully account for the realities of displacement drivers and adopted an essentially top-down approach. Recommendations for applying the Guiding Principles ran parallel or counter to national priorities and perspectives, and they contrasted with national guidance documents developed to support other international agreements such as the MDGs and SDGs.²⁷⁹

What is required now is a country-led framework, aligned with broader development goals and which allows for the development of national and global programmes, targets and standards for reducing internal displacement and displacement risk. Such a framework should recognise the relevance of the Guiding Principles, but take as its starting point the priorities set by governments and communities facing internal displacement. These may include needs and risk assessments, investment planning and budgeting, and contingency planning.

The right questions, indicators and metrics will need to be defined to plan for, invest in and monitor progress over time, and they need to cover the three areas of inputs, outputs and outcomes discussed above:

- | What do countries and their partners invest in displacement governance and how do they do it?
- | Which resulting capacities and conditions determine a country's displacement risk and its ability to support IDPs?
- | Is internal displacement increasing or decreasing in terms of the number of IDPs and distribution, duration and severity of the phenomenon?

Action can be taken across these three areas and progress monitored within existing national strategies and programmes and with existing resources, but real progress will require additional support, particularly for capacity development at the national and local level.

DISPLACEMENT GOVERNANCE

Thirty-one countries currently have dedicated policies and strategies on IDPs. This has been presented as a success, but given that 143 countries and territories were affected by internal displacement due to conflict and disasters in 2017, it means only a small minority have taken explicit responsibility for the phenomenon. Aside

from dedicated policies, overall governance arrangements and the ways internal displacement is reflected in sector strategies and programmes are also critical.

A few key questions can guide local and national governments in planning for implementation and reviewing progress:

- | Where in the government is political leadership on internal displacement located?
- | Does a national policy or strategy for reducing internal displacement exist?
- | Are dedicated budgets available to address internal displacement, and where does responsibility for their execution lie?
- | Does the country have the capacity, and is there a centralised system for collecting, analysing and reporting data on internal displacement? And if so, is it aligned with systems and standards for reporting against the SDGs?

As well as monitoring local, national and international policies on internal displacement itself, we should track relevant policies and frameworks on forced displacement, migration, disaster management, climate change, conflict and peacebuilding and poverty reduction.

CAPACITIES AND CONDITIONS

To effectively assess the risk of new displacement and address existing displacement through protection, assistance and support towards durable solutions, specific capacities and conditions at the local and national level that determine displacement risk need to be identified and monitored. These cut across a number of development domains and sectors and across the SDGs, some indicators of which could be used as proxies.

The data needed to feed into this monitoring framework is often publicly available in global databases at the national level, but lack disaggregation. The SDGs' 232 indicators cover a broad range of aspects relevant to policies and drivers of internal displacement, but a large library of indicators is not practical for programming and investment planning, or for regular and systematic

progress monitoring. Instead, a limited number should be chosen as proxies and provide sufficient explanatory value. Presented within a composite index, they can be used to assess and track the conditions that shape a country's displacement risk over time and its capacity to address and reduce internal displacement.

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT METRICS

Numbers of IDPs and information on their situations, including their location and the duration and severity of their displacement, should be recorded consistently at the local and national level. It is vital to improve the way numbers and metrics on patterns and trends of new displacements, and the numbers of existing IDPs are determined. Combined with advances in tools, methodologies and technological innovation, this will enable monitoring to be broadened out to include different types of displacement, such as that associated with development projects, urban displacement and slow-onset hazards, and to increase geographic and demographic coverage. In addition to monitoring numbers of IDPs, metrics on the severity of their displacement and the costs resulting from it need to be developed.

This three-tiered approach to monitoring would provide countries and the international community with a more realistic sense of whether internal displacement can be expected to increase or is being reduced. If implemented regularly and over time, it would provide a more solid basis for agreeing and planning more effective approaches to addressing the phenomenon. Monitoring in this way would also allow us to understand progress regardless of spikes caused by flare-ups in conflict or the impact of disasters, and to guide countries' investments over time.

We will test this approach in 2018 in a number of countries with significant levels of displacement, and present our initial results to them for discussion. Together with these pilot countries, we propose to develop a systematic national review of indicators on the policies, drivers and impacts of internal displacement that need to be monitored over time. Our aim then is to expand the approach to all countries facing internal displacement and regularly provide information in the form of a country dashboard (see table 2, p.71). We will also analyse the results in our future GRIDs.

TABLE 2: Example of a country monitoring dashboard²⁸⁰

[Country name]			
Displacement governance	Capacities and conditions	Displacement metrics	
Government collects and publishes data on IDPs	Y / N	Affected by conflict Y / N or generalised violence	Number of new displacements associated with conflict
Displacement risk assessments and early warning tools exist	Y / N	At high risk of disasters Y / N	Number of new displacements associated with disasters
Responsibility for internal displacement located at highest level of national government	Y / N	Education: % of children out of primary school	Number of planned resettlements associated with development projects in the past year
Decentralised and dedicated budget for local governments to support IDPs	Y / N	Health: neonatal death rate	Number of people displaced by conflict
National policy on internal displacement or IDPs	Y / N	Environment: rate of deforestation	Average duration of displacement (displacement days)
Internal displacement in other policies: – Disaster risk reduction – Peacebuilding – Poverty reduction – Infrastructure and investment plans – National policy on resettlement – Signatory to international frameworks on internal displacement or migration	– Y / N – Y / N	Economy: – Ease of doing business – Trade integration – CO2 emissions per capita – Infrastructure: electricity consumption per capita Governance capacity: – Tax/GDP ratio – Social expenditure	Displacement severity index ranking ²⁸¹ Humanitarian assistance for IDPs in the past year