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GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Cities as a refuge, Cities as a home

The relationship between place
and perceptions of integration
among urban displaced populations in Iraq

Roger Guiu, Nadia Siddiqui

Background paper to the main report



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Social Inquiry

I. INTRODUCTION

Cities in Iraq have absorbed the bulk of internally displaced persons (IDPs) since early 2014, when the ISIL conflict erupted across the northern and central parts of the country. Indeed, at the peak of the conflict, only 12% of the 3.4 million IDPs sheltered in formal camps settings, with the remaining 88% living in urban areas.¹ The scope of this conflict-related population movement places Iraq within the top ten countries hosting IDPs in the world currently.² While IDPs have begun returning to their places of origin throughout the conflict as areas were retaken from ISIL, 1.8 million Iraqis remain internally displaced, predominantly in urban or peri-urban locations.³ Over half of this population has been displaced since 2014, indicating that IDPs are either in protracted displacement, moving toward local integration, or some combination thereof. Evidence from the field highlights this spectrum given that there is vast diversity in terms of how well integrated these IDPs are within their new communities:⁴

We cannot integrate or interact a lot with the society in Kirkuk because they don't like to socialize and they don't gather as we used to do in our place of origin. (Sunni Arab IDP from Fallujah, Al-Anbar living in Hay Al-Jamiaa, Kirkuk, housewife, female, 40 years old)

I used to feel that the other ethnicities hate us when we first arrived here because I have heard that there are conflicts between the different ethnicities and sects who have certain identities, but when I became displaced to this area, my perceptions changed. I realized that they treat us with respect and appreciation and I realized that all I heard was made up . . . [if conditions for return not met] I will stay here and integrate into this society because I have no other choices. (Sunni Arab IDP from Baiji, Salahaddin living in Altun Kupri, Kirkuk, student, male, 24 years old)

Whatever it takes not to be called IDP anymore. There have been attempts by people and authorities to make us feel welcome and in transferring the papers here. But it upsets me that my kids are still going to be called IDPs when they grow. There are a few people here with unmovable thinking about us. (Sunni Arab resident in Samad, Salahaddin, originally from Diyala, daily worker, male 30 years old)

These snapshots point to the differing realities that IDPs find in their places of displacement across geographical locations and the people they encounter there. Indeed, such heavy population movements to urban areas are compounded by the specific character of these cities, related to demographic diversity, community mobilization, governance and security, livelihoods and development neglect, and identity-based historic grievances.⁵ In addition, the way these realities manifest, in the context of Iraq, are shaped by the fact this most recent conflict-induced wave of displacement is not the first forced population movement in the country, affecting some of the current IDPs' places of origin and displacement. A key

¹ IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix.

² Figures as of December 2017, see, IDMC, *Global Report on Internal Displacement* (IDMC: Geneva, 2018).

³ IOM, Returns Working Group, and Social Inquiry, *Reasons to Remain: Categorizing Protracted Displacement in Iraq* (IOM: Erbil, 2018).

⁴ See, IOM and Social Inquiry, *Reframing Social Fragility in Areas of Protracted Displacement and Emerging Return in Iraq: A Guide to Programming* (IOM: Erbil, 2017); and DRC and Social Inquiry, *Social Dynamics in Tikrit and Al-Alam for Early Recovery Programming* (DRC: Tikrit, 2017).

⁵ IOM and Social Inquiry, *Reframing Social Fragility*.

challenge then entails understanding the relation between displacement and social fragility in Iraq, which requires examining factors that may contribute to a city being able to cope and facilitate the integration of the newly arrived population.

Research on integration has traditionally focused on how household characteristics and assets allow families to adapt and be resilient in displacement, but what has been the role of cities in this? Growing attention is now being paid to the role of “place” in facilitating or obstructing integration in conflict-affected contexts.⁶ Relevant place factors range from the physical to the cultural to the socio-economic (all of which may also influence feelings of integration or connectivity the host communities themselves hold as well).

Thus, in this paper we seek to explore the following question: how does the socio-ecological context and urban morphology of the cities where IDPs reside influence their feelings of integration? Incorporating a two-fold definition of the notion of integration (belonging and influence in displacement), we use existing large-scale datasets covering locations across 4 governorates in Iraq to test whether place, in addition to household factors, determines the likelihood of IDPs feeling integrated. We find that place factors matter and, rather unexpectedly, more fragile urban settings are more conducive to IDP integration. We argue for the importance not only improving conditions for all in fragile urban areas where IDPs reside, but in making more stable environments more inclusive as well.

What follows is a brief overview of the theoretical underpinnings of integration generally as well as description of place factors identified in the literature that are applicable to the Iraq context. We then describe the datasets, variables, and methodology used for this analysis, and findings. Finally, we discuss key findings and lay out implications for policy, programming, and research.

II. INTEGRATION, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, AND PLACE

While there is no consensus on the definition of integration among the literature related to refugees and migrants, it is often agreed what it is not: assimilation whereby minority identities are supplanted to produce one homogenous culture nor one-way adaptation or acculturation to the dominant culture and way of life.⁷ Rather, it can be thought of as a complex process in which both displaced and receiving communities undergo change to better foster the two living together. This process may be influenced by spatial, economic, political, legal, psychological, and cultural factors.⁸

One rubric for understanding integration among IDP populations is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) *Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons*. Within this framework, IDPs achieve local integration (or sustainable return or relocation) when they: (i) no longer have specific assistance and protection needs and vulnerabilities that are directly linked to their displacement and (ii) enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.⁹ There is recognition here too that this is a long-term process and the general indicators tend to focus on the structural acquisition of rights. This includes enjoyment without discrimination of safety and security; adequate standard of living including access to adequate food, housing, healthcare, and education; access to

⁶ See, for example, Mara Al-Sabouni, *The Battle for Home: the Vision of a Young Architect in Syria* (Thames & Hudson: London, 2016); Peter Kabachnik et al., “The Multiple Geographies of Internal Displacement: The Case of Georgia,” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 33 no. 4 (2014): 1-30; Ami C. Carpenter, “Havens in a Firestorm: Perspectives from Baghdad on Resilience to Sectarian Violence,” *Civil Wars* 14 no. 2 (2012): 182-204; and Craig Larkin, “Reconstructing and Deconstructing Beirut: Space, Memory, and Lebanese Youth,” *Divided Cities / Contested States Working Paper No. 8* (Queen’s University Belfast: Belfast, 2009).

⁷ Scottish Refugee Council, “Integration Literature Review” (2010), available at:

http://www.scottishrefugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/5709/refugee_integration_-_literature_review.pdf

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ IASC, *Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010).

employment and livelihoods; access to mechanisms for the restitution of housing, land and property or compensation if restitution is not possible; access to and replacement of personal and other documentation; voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement; participation in public affairs; and effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, reparations and information about the causes of violation.

These are critical needs and rights for IDPs to have to better resolve displacement, but alone may not capture the complexity of what it means to be a part of a place and community as a central tenet of integration.¹⁰ This meaning is experienced in the context of social networks and in relation to meaningful places in individuals' lives.¹¹ In other words, how people conceptualize the space and place they are in and the impact this has on self-identity, sense of belonging, and participation in society is also important in further elucidating what helps or hinders integration.¹² A step in this direction is understanding not only IDP characteristics at the household level, but also what host locations are like in terms of physical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors where they now reside. Exploring urban settings offer a particularly interesting window into this because cities tend to host the bulk of the internally displaced globally¹³ and enable a finer-tuned analysis of the practical, on-the-ground dimensions of fostering integration and building peace.¹⁴ Examining the host community and place in this way in part means exploring local fragility and social cohesion in tandem across locations.

Fragility can roughly be defined as a state in which governments or institutions "lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence."¹⁵ At the same time, fragility may also be seen as a function of the strength of civil society and the extensiveness of social capital.¹⁶ This indicates that the state alone is not the only actor or even the most powerful actor in staunching fragility and that varying physical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors at a number of levels can change the level of fragility, up or down, at the community-level. Integral to this relational framing of fragility is social cohesion taken here to mean a confluence of social inclusion, social capital, and social mobility.¹⁷ This framing of social cohesion recognizes that it involves, on the one hand, social connectedness in different life domains, such as political, socio-economic and socio-cultural spheres. And on the other, covers subjective representations (*perception*) as well as behavioural outcomes (*involvement*).¹⁸ Furthermore, it implies a confluence between groups in a society, offering a "measure of predictability to interactions across people and groups, which in turn provides incentives for collection action,"¹⁹ even if it cannot guarantee that all groups agree on all issues. Given this framing, a number of latent and proximate factors must be taken into account in unpacking the urban space and place IDPs find themselves in.

¹⁰ Nadia Siddiqui, Roger Guiu, and Aaso Ameen Shwan, "Among Brothers and Strangers: Identities in Displacement in Iraq," *International Migration* <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12478>

¹¹ Lisa M. Vandemark, "Promoting the Sense of Self, Place, and Belonging Among Displaced Persons: The Example of Homelessness," *Archives of Psychiatric Nursing* 21 no. 5 (2007): 241-248.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ IDMC, *Global Report on Internal Displacement*.

¹⁴ Scott A. Bollens, "Urban Planning and Peace Building," *Progress in Planning* 60 (2006): 67-139.

¹⁵ World Bank, *World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2011), xvi.

¹⁶ OECD Development Center, *Perspectives on Global Development: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World* (Paris: OECD, 2011).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ UNDP-UNHCR Joint Secretariat, *Regional Trends and Patterns in Social Cohesion: The Impact of the Syria Crisis on the Social Structures of Countries Affected* (Amman: UNDP-UNHCR Joint Secretariat, 2015).

¹⁹ William A. Marc et al., *Societal Dynamics and Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2013).

Perhaps one of the most obvious place dimensions, particularly in conflict- and post-conflict settings, relates to who lives there, how they got there, and in what configurations. Within Iraq, for example, ethno-religiously and/or tribally diverse host communities that were formed by forced demographic engineering, exhibit low social cohesion at the micro-level. In Kirkuk Governorate, for instance, which is home to Sunni Kurds, Sunni and Shia Arabs, Sunni and Shia Turkmen, Christians, and other minorities, diversity linked as it is to heavy demographic engineering by the state is at the core of the disputes and violence in cities and towns there.²⁰ Furthermore, communities or neighbourhoods across contexts with a long history of heavy displacement tend to show a frayed social fabric as inter-personal links remain weak and surrounded by tensions.²¹ Those communities with a history of homogeneity and stable population movements, on the other hand, tend to have strong cohesion, making it difficult for the newly displaced to integrate.²²

Beyond the existence of diversity in a given location, the way in which it manifests also matters. For example, those places with more diversity and no clear majority groups tend to be less prone to conflict and tensions.²³ This does not hold for all places with unclear majorities, if there is political contestation or competition.²⁴ Spatial dimensions also play a role in fostering better feelings of integration and belonging in that locations that do not have identity-based enclaves but rather allow for groups to live spread across neighbourhoods tend to again be less inclined to identity-based violence and allow for better inclusion of IDPs.²⁵ Linked to this, the availability and use of mixed public and work spaces also enables greater inter-group interaction and friendship.²⁶ This type of friendship is also correlated with greater levels of general social trust, inter-group trust, and tolerance toward outgroups.²⁷

Related to this, positive civic engagement, mobilization or activism within a community is frequently correlated with a higher capacity to face social change peacefully.²⁸ Undertaking such actions in a non-violent manner are shaped simultaneously by trust between community members, across groups, between groups and the state as well as the agency people feel to affect change in their communities. Erosion of this trust stemming from a legacy of mass, violent repression of civil rights are drivers of low agency and poorly coordinated social action in a number of contexts.²⁹

This further highlights that social fabric is also then strongly influenced by people's feeling of living in a secure and equitable environment that allows them to carry out daily activities as well as fulfil individual and/or collective aspirations.³⁰ Corruption, bad governance and insecurity undermine this trust and the shared values that make a society work.³¹ Public dissatisfaction with corrupt leaders and with power

²⁰ Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise* (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

²¹ Marc et al., *Societal Dynamics and Fragility*; Ami C. Carpenter, *Community Resilience to Sectarian Violence in Baghdad* (New York: Springer, 2014); and Matthew Desmond, *Evicted: Poverty and Property in the American City* (New York: Crown, 2016).

²² Andrew Norton and Arjan de Haan, "Social Cohesion: Theoretical Debates and Practical Applications with Respect to Jobs," Background Paper for World Development Report 2013 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2013).

²³ Joan Esteban and Gerald Schneider, "Polarization and Conflict: Theoretical and Empirical Issues," *Journal of Peace Research* 45 no. 2 (2008): 131-141.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Carpenter, "Havens in a Firestorm;" and Claudia Trillo et al., "Integrating Communities: How Spatial Patterns Matter?" *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences* 223 (2016): 244-250.

²⁶ Jens Rydgren, Dana Sofi, and Martin Hällsten, "Interethnic Friendship, Trust, and Tolerance: Findings from Two North Iraqi Cities," *American Journal of Sociology* 118 no. 6 (2013): 1650-1694.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Marc et al., *Societal Dynamics and Fragility*.

²⁹ Pablo de Greiff, "Articulating the Links Between Transitional Justice and Development: Justice and Social Integration," Research Brief (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009).

³⁰ World Bank, *World Development Report*.

³¹ USIP, "Governance, Corruption, and Conflict," Study Guide Series on Peace and Conflict (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 2010).

structures perceived to be illegitimate, for instance, served as catalysts for change across the Middle East.³² Historical development neglect in terms of economic and public services infrastructure as compared to other communities, also contributes to this dissatisfaction and drives tensions in a community facing social change, particularly when this neglect was part of a purposeful marginalization policy by the state. Social exclusion in these instances then is intimately linked to fragility in the form of structural discrimination and systemic restriction of basic services and goods to specific groups.³³ Many areas in Iraq fall into this category having been neglected often for political and identity-based motives, which in turn engenders a sense of alienation with respect to being part of the wider society in the country. For instance, the Kurdistan Region, Nineveh Governorate and most of the southern governorates lag behind the rest of the country in terms of the educational endowment of working age adults as a result of decades-long state policies significantly restricting their endowment of educational services.³⁴ Following on this, communities under economic stress, where a significant segment of its members are deprived of access to livelihoods or adequate levels of well-being, would also be more prone to show tensions and divisions, especially with the arrival of new populations seeking shelter or economic opportunities.³⁵

Taken together, these often inter-related host community place factors and IDPs' perceptions of them may influence both the tangible and more psychological dimensions of local integration, making certain places more or less conducive for this durable solution than others, among subsets of the internally displaced. Grounded in these findings (and gaps), the subsequent analysis we present below seeks to elucidate more specifically the linkages between place, integration, and the wave of internal displacement caused by the ISIL conflict in Iraq.

III. DATA AND MEASURES

For the construction of this study's statistical model, we largely rely on the Longitudinal Study on Access to Durable Solutions for IDPs in Iraq (LS), implemented from 2015 to present by IOM and Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration.³⁶ Data from the first round of fieldwork, carried out between March and April 2016, is used for this paper. The LS consists of a sample of 4,000 households displaced in 2014 by the ISIL conflict. It covers four governorates of displacement (Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya) and its sampling is stratified to include a diversity of governorates of origin. The LS was developed to better understand the experiences of IDPs in accessing quasi-durable and durable solutions to their displacement. Hence, the survey is structured to cover different aspects of IDPs' situation based on the IASC *Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons*, as defined in the previous section.

To make use of the LS dataset for the purpose of this analysis, we focused on those IDPs living in urban and peri-urban locations, dropping the rural areas from the sample. This led us to work with 3,852 effective observations across 71 different subdistricts (the smallest administrative unit in Iraq) in the four governorates.

³² Joost Hiltermann, "MENA's Crisis: How to Address the Breakdown of the Social Contract," presentation given at the Economic Research Forum's 22nd annual conference, *Towards a New Development Agenda for the Middle East*, Cairo, Egypt,

March 21, 2016 and Transparency International, 2016) Transparency International, *People and Corruption: Middle East and North Africa Survey 2016* (Berlin: Transparency International Secretariat, 2016).

³³ ODI, *Report on Development, Fragility and Human Rights* (Washington, D.C.: Nordic Trust Fund / World Bank, 2012).

³⁴ World Bank, *The Unfulfilled Promise of Oil and Growth: Poverty, Inclusion and Welfare in Iraq, 2007-2012* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2014).

³⁵ OECD, *Perspectives on Global Development*.

³⁶ Rochelle Davis et al., *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq* (Washington, D.C. / Erbil: Walsh School of Foreign Service at the Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University and IOM, 2017).

To complete the empirical strategy and test additional place-related factors, we combined the LS dataset with additional secondary data about the subdistricts where respondents in the LS currently reside. As will be discussed in more detail below, spatial and demographic patterns of these locations are obtained from IOM's Integrated Location Assessment II (ILA-II).³⁷ More structural pre-conflict indicators of host locations / communities are extracted from the 2012 Iraq Statistical Office and World Bank's national Iraqi Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES)³⁸ and the 2011 Iraq Knowledge Network survey (IKN).³⁹

a. Dependent variables

One of the main challenges in this analysis is identifying a proxy to measure the degree of integration of the IDP into the host community. The IASC *Framework* provides criteria for durable solutions (i.e., the acquisition of rights), however they are difficult to merge into one measurable indicator. Furthermore, while the attainment of rights is seen as the initial structural pathway for local integration, it does not account for the "identificational" aspects of it – that is, the difference between participating in core societal institutions and identifying with them.⁴⁰ This latter factor is based on IDP perception and experience of their current locations and communities. The LS is an important and useful dataset in that it is built from the needs and rights-based framework, but also captures specific indicators linked to less physically tangible dimensions of integration, including sense of belonging and influence. We build our dependent variables from these two concepts.

As noted earlier, belonging is connected to social networks and relates to meaningful places in individuals' lives.⁴¹ One may not feel belonging due to the loss of a role within a group or loss of a familiar house or neighbourhood.⁴² Gaining a sense of belonging, particularly as it relates to the physical, cultural and socio-economic embodiments of place, involves physically and symbolically appropriating space and investing it with the meaning of home.⁴³ Similarly, influence indicates not only the ability to participate in society (an aspect of the IASC *Framework*), but that IDPs have the agency to do it and see this engagement as meaningful to themselves and the wider community in a positive way.

These two variables pulled from the LS are coded as binary in order to use them in a logit model. Thus, the belonging indicator is coded 1 if the respondent felt they belonged *completely* or *a lot* to their host community, and coded 0 if they belonged either *moderately*, *a little*, or *not at all*. The influence indicator is coded 1 if the respondent felt they had *a lot* or *some* influence in making their host community a better place to live now, and coded 0 if they felt they had *not a lot* of influence, *no influence*, or *did not know* if they had such influence.

b. Explanatory variables

Our empirical strategy combines both place and household factors to test IDP feelings of integration in their locations of displacement. Place factors refer to the overall physical, cultural, and socio-economic dimensions of respective host communities and household factors refer to individual IDP respondents' and their families' characteristics. Our main point of interest here are place factors. We have divided them into three groups in three different statistical models, while the household factors are one common set of indicators used in all models. The three groups of place factors explore different dimensions linked to the host community that may affect the likelihood of IDP integration. They are not combined together into one

³⁷ IOM, *Integrated Locations Assessment II: Thematic Overview* (Erbil: IOM, 2017).

³⁸ CSO and World Bank, *Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey* (Washington: World Bank, 2012).

³⁹ CSO & International Labour Organization, *Iraq Knowledge Network Survey* (Geneva: ILO, 2011).

⁴⁰ Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckmann, *Integration of Migrants: Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities* (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006).

⁴¹ Vandemark, "Promoting the Sense of Self, Place, and Belonging Among Displaced Persons."

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Sabine Vassart, "Habiter," *Pensée* 12 no. 2 (2006): 9-19 as quoted in Gruia Badescu, "Dwelling in the Post-War City: Urban Reconstruction and Home-Making in Sarajevo," *Revue d'Études Comparatives Est-Ouest* no.46 (2015): 35-60.

model due to a certain degree of conceptual overlap, that is, factors in one group may directly or indirectly be related to factors in the other group. Cross-analysis of these place factors as a whole, however, provides a comprehensive understanding of what influences integration, especially when controlling for household-related factors. Finally, the statistical analysis includes control variables for governorate of origin and of displacement, controlling for specificities from these places not captured in the other variables. Annex 1 shows the summary statistics for all groups of variables.

Indicators of IDPs' experiences and perceptions vis-à-vis their host community. This group is formed by indicators already available in the original LS survey. They allow us to capture different experiences and perceptions that IDPs develop in displacement, arising from their interactions with the host community and environment. They also serve as an intermediary between purely place-based factors and household or individual factors because responses to these indicators are dependent not only on IDP identity but that of the host community and the organization and functioning of said community. More specific detail on these indicators follows below.

One of the first indicators in this grouping is if IDPs self-report that their households are able to provide for basic needs, understood as access to housing, health care, education, food and water. This variable should indirectly capture the satisfaction with service provision and accessibility. Those locations with better provision and access should be correlated with a higher number of respondents indicating that they feel able to provide for their needs and, therefore, we expect this in turn to be correlated with higher integration. Linked to access, we include an indicator on whether IDP respondents report restrictions on IDPs' freedom of movement where they currently reside. Restrictions that are seen to apply to all people, both IDPs and host residents, are not considered as such here. We also include a variable indicating whether the respondents have family ties within the host community.

Another set of indicators measure different levels of social interaction between the IDP respondents and their respective host communities. Here, we control for the number of close friends that respondents report among the host community as well as among the IDP community where they live. In addition, we control for whether respondents report being members of any group, association or informal network in their current locations. The inclusion of these types of variables is common in assessments of social capital in general, with more inter-group interaction associated with higher levels of social trust and tolerance.⁴⁴ Thus, we expect more social interaction to be related to more likelihood of integration.

The final set of indicators in this grouping aim to capture how IDPs perceive their host communities. Multiple factors are at play here, so the variables we use cover elements such as safety, trust, religious tolerance, and cultural compatibility. For safety, we create a dummy variable identifying those respondents who reported feeling unsafe in their place of origin but, comparatively, safe in displacement, accounting for a positive relative improvement. Trust in the host community is proxied through respondent agreement or disagreement on a general daily life statement. Religious tolerance is measured by respondents' feelings of being able to practice their religions completely freely in their current locations and finally, cultural compatibility relates to IDPs' perception that their cultural values align with those of their host communities. Overall, we expect that positive outcomes across all these perception indicators are correlated with a higher likelihood of feeling integrated.

Indicator on ethno-religious similarity between IDPs and host community. We create a dummy categorical variable comparing the ethno-religious groups present in the host community with the identity of the IDP respondent. Thus, this indicator categorizes respondents into, first, belonging to the largest (or only) ethno-religious group in the host community or, second, belonging to an ethno-religious group that is not the majority present in the host community or, finally, belonging to an ethno-religious group that has no pre-displacement presence in the host community. Data on the ethno-religious composition of the host

⁴⁴ Rygdren, Sofi, and Hällsten, "Interethnic Friendship, Trust, and Tolerance."

community is available at the level of Iraq's subdistricts from the ILA-II dataset, while identity of the respondent is readily available in the LS. Given that not all respondents in the LS had a complete ethno-religious categorization, we have to drop 1,239 observations, which is why this indicator is tested as a separate model.

We do not have clear *a priori* expectations on the sign of this indicator overall given the complexity of diversity concerns in Iraq. On the one hand, integration could be positively correlated with IDP representation within the host community, but on the other, this may imply a negative correlation depending on the majority/minority configurations of the host community and whether these were politically contested pre-displacement.

Indicators of the socio-economic characteristics of the host community. This set of variables consist of more structural and deep-rooted indicators on the places of displacement within the LS and the communities living therein across the following vectors: development, governance and security, social capital, and demography. We use these as they were found to be relevant in explaining social fragility in Iraq previously.⁴⁵ As they predate the ISIL conflict and ensuing displacement, these vectors are used to understand how the hosting environment functioned before the arrival of IDPs. That is, they provide a window into what IDPs displaced into on their arrival and may shape their perceptions related to integration. It is assumed that these preconditions would also have an influence on the abovementioned groups of indicators (for example, on how respondents would feel being able to provide for their basic needs, or their levels of trust vis-à-vis the host community), therefore we test them separately.

We use three different proxies for indicators of development (or, more accurately, development neglect). First, levels of human capital, measured as the percentage of the population in each subdistrict aged 30 years or more with no education certificate. Second, poverty, defined as the percentage of households below the national poverty line as set by Iraq's Central Statistical Office in 2012. Finally, endowment of public services, measured as the percentage of individuals working in key public sectors – education, health, and waste collection – over the total population of the subdistrict.

Governance indicators are included in the model through the perceived quality of local institutions, measured through residents' perceived confidence in these institutions, and perceived satisfaction with the level of local security provided. For social capital, we include social trust, measured as the percentage of residents that expressed satisfaction with levels of overall trust and acceptance in the community, and an indicator of community mobilization, proxied through the percentage of residents who had either contacted a politician, attended a political discussion, or attended a demonstration (or would do so), as opposed to those who would never participate in such actions.

Finally, the demographic dimension of the host community is approached through three different angles: internal general migration, hosting of previous waves of IDPs, and ethno-religious diversity. First, whether a subdistrict received internal migration is measured through the percentage of heads of household (or wives / husbands) that were born in a different governorate of Iraq than where they currently reside. Second, as some areas of Iraq hosted previous waves of conflict-related displacement, especially linked to the 2006-2008 sectarian conflict, we control this phenomenon through the total number of displaced families hosted in each subdistrict by 2010. The last element, ethno-religious diversity, is measured through calculating a fractionalization index for each subdistrict. This index takes into account the presence of different groups within a population and their relative size.⁴⁶ The closer to 1 the index, the more a

⁴⁵ IOM and Social Inquiry, *Reframing Social Fragility*.

⁴⁶ Alberto Alesina, "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 no. 2 (2003): 155-194.

population is fragmented (or diverse) into groups of similar size; an index of 0 signifies a completely homogeneous community.

These indicators are extracted from the IHSES and IKN datasets at the subdistrict level, with the exception of data on previous IDP caseloads in Iraq, which are obtained from IDMC,⁴⁷ and the ethno-religious composition data used for the fractionalization index, obtained from the ILA-II. Finally, we also include a geographical dummy variable to control for those subdistricts that are the administrative capital of each governorate. In general, our expectation based on the literature is that the less fragile a subdistrict, the more able it is to take in IDPs and this should facilitate integration.

Indicators on IDP household characteristics. This final set of indicators accounts for factors unique to the IDP respondent. We selected these indicators as we expect they may have an influence on IDPs' achieving integration or other durable solution. All indicators are obtained from the LS dataset.

These indicators include demographic characteristics, such as the gender of the household head, the household's education levels, measured as the highest educational degree achieved by a household member, and whether the respondent belongs to a national minority group.⁴⁸ We also include here previous forced displacement experienced by the respondents' household. Additionally, while the LS survey does not account for the rural/urban origin of respondents, we attempt to control for this through a dummy variable identifying those respondents whose main pre-displacement source of income was agriculture and livestock.

To control for the household's economic situation, we coded additional variables that would be expected to have a negative role in terms of facilitating integration. These consist of indebtedness and lack of savings when displaced. Other indicators may have an unclear sign *a priori* in the coefficient, such as owning property in place of origin or having a governmental salary as the main pre-displacement income source (noting that public employees continued receiving their salary even if forcibly displaced).

Other factors included in the model consist of the more social and civil dimensions of the household. This is measured through whether the family separated during displacement, if individual civil and legal documents are in the possession of family members,⁴⁹ and the type of shelter the household resides in while displaced, coding specifically for those in critical shelter.

Finally, other control indicators considered relate to the dependent variable. For example, when measuring integration as *feelings of belonging in the area of displacement*, we include a variable controlling for feelings of belonging in the area of origin. We expect that those respondents who did not feel belonging to their places of origin are more likely to have a sense of belonging in displacement. To the contrary, when measuring integration as *feelings of influence in the area of displacement*, we account for the same feeling regarding the area of origin. We expect that those who felt they had influence pre-displacement will continue to feel this way in displacement.

IV. RESULTS

⁴⁷ IDMC, "Little New Displacement but Around 2.8 Million Iraqi Remain Internally Displaced" (IDMC / NRC: Geneva, 2010).

⁴⁸ We have coded as national minorities those respondents who identified as Turkman, Christian, Ezidi, Shabak, or Sabeen-Mandean. Kurds have not been included as national minority here given that, unlike these other groups, they represent more than 10% of Iraq's population, they have an allocated a top position (Presidency of Iraq), in the country's power-sharing mechanisms, and most Kurd IDPs from this recent conflict displaced into Kurd-majority and administered areas of Iraq.

⁴⁹ Missing documentation is problematic as replacing them is relatively difficult, but without them, IDP ability to move around and access employment and services is limited.

Here we test the likelihood of IDP respondents feeling integrated in their places of displacement, exploring both place and household factors. The two specifications of *integration* are, first, feelings of belonging in place of displacement and, second, feelings of having influence in making the host place a better place to live. The three groups of place factors described in the previous section are tested separately in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3.

Table 1 starts by showing how respondents' experiences and perceptions vis-à-vis their host communities affects their likelihood of feeling integrated. Models 1 and 2 test firstly the impact of these place factors on the two proxies for integration, with geographical controls added. Then, model 3 and 4 adds household factors into the regression to see how the initial findings hold.

Table 1. Likelihood of feeling integrated using indicators of IDPs' experiences and perceptions vis-à-vis their host communities

	Model 1 (Belonging)	Model 2 (Influence)	Model 3 (Belonging)	Model 4 (Influence)
Basic needs provided	0.356*** (0.091)	0.204** (0.091)	0.334*** (0.096)	0.492*** (0.106)
Restrictions of movement	-0.607*** (0.114)	-0.051 (0.111)	-0.631*** (0.116)	-0.080 (0.126)
Family ties in host community	-0.007 (0.096)	-0.188* (0.097)	-0.029 (0.099)	-0.148 (0.110)
Close host community friends	-0.087 (0.127)	0.423*** (0.136)	-0.105 (0.129)	0.455*** (0.146)
Close IDP friends	0.210 (0.148)	-0.206 (0.150)	0.231 (0.153)	-0.118 (0.164)
Organization membership	-0.292* (0.170)	0.780*** (0.151)	-0.302* (0.174)	0.611*** (0.172)
Safe in place of displacement	0.128 (0.100)	-0.0682 (0.100)	0.132 (0.103)	-0.056 (0.110)
Distrust of host community	-0.483*** (0.122)	-0.107 (0.127)	-0.476*** (0.124)	-0.047 (0.139)
Open practice of religion	-0.058 (0.129)	0.234* (0.130)	0.052 (0.134)	0.473*** (0.143)
Cultural compatibility	2.092*** (0.101)	0.270*** (0.097)	2.107*** (0.103)	0.401*** (0.105)
Highest education in household (ref. = No certificate)				
Primary or secondary certificate			0.256** (0.121)	0.054 (0.141)
University or higher			0.219 (0.148)	0.331** (0.165)
Female head of household			0.047 (0.125)	-0.075 (0.144)
National minority			-0.432** (0.209)	-0.567** (0.233)
Experienced previous displacement			0.176 (0.165)	0.098 (0.181)
Rural origin			-0.221** (0.112)	-0.324*** (0.122)
Indebtedness			-0.121 (0.085)	-0.305*** (0.093)
Lack of savings			-0.057 (0.091)	-0.159 (0.099)
Property ownership in Iraq			-0.342*** (0.091)	0.0039 (0.100)
Government employment			0.059 (0.106)	-0.041 (0.115)
Personal documentation (ref. = In possession)				
Lost or lacking documentation			-0.565*** (0.152)	-0.035 (0.158)
Do not know			0.110 (0.213)	0.838*** (0.202)

Living in critical shelter			−0.195 (0.151)	−0.723*** (0.184)
Household separated in displacement			0.233 (0.312)	0.134 (0.332)
Intra-district displacement			0.485** (0.202)	0.493** (0.212)
Low belonging to place of origin			0.471*** (0.145)	
High influence pre-displacement				2.456*** (0.142)
Constant	−2.218*** (0.223)	−1.637*** (0.223)	−2.211*** (0.279)	−4.241*** (0.341)
Observations	3,421	3,421	3,421	3,421

*Logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Controls for governorate of origin and of displacement are applied in all models. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Looking at the first two models, we find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between most measurements of IDPs experiences in displacement and likelihood of integration. IDPs who report being able to provide for their basic needs are more likely to feel both strong belonging and influence in their host communities, significant at the 1% level. Movement restrictions impact negatively upon feelings of belonging, though seem to be disconnected from feelings of influence. Interactions within the host environment also show mixed results. Having family ties within the host community is not significant in any model, similarly neither is having close IDP friends. However, friendship with local residents and membership into local organizations or groups is found to be positively related with IDP respondents feeling influence to make the host communities a better place. While this latter finding falls into the realm of what would be expected, it is rather surprising to find no significant relationship between family ties in displacement and integration, particularly as many IDPs report selecting their place of displacement based on this factor, second only to peace and security.⁵⁰

We also observe that the perceptions IDPs develop of the host community play a role in their feelings of integration. Lack of trust in local residents is negatively correlated with belonging and feelings of religious tolerance are positively correlated with influence. Perceptions of cultural compatibility are associated with both dependent variables – this last one probably being the most important, given the magnitude of its coefficient particularly in explaining feelings of belonging. However, the fact that IDPs feel safer in their places of displacement than in their places of origin does not seem to be related to the likelihood of integration.

Controlling for household factors (models 3 and 4) does not significantly alter the previous findings and the interpretation remains consistent. It is interesting, though, to also explore how these household characteristics are associated with the likelihood of integration. First, demographic aspects seem to be relevant across the models. Higher educational levels are generally associated with positive integration outcomes. The identity of the household is also largely relevant: respondents of rural origin as well as those belonging to a national minority are significantly less likely to have high sense of belonging and feelings of having influence in displacement. This is relevant because identity matters and takes a long time to shift.

Second, economic variables have a mixed performance. While indebtedness has the expected negative sign, its coefficient is comparatively smaller than the rest of the binary variables. Owning property elsewhere in Iraq is also negatively correlated with belonging, a fact that may be related to a higher

⁵⁰ The coefficient is almost significant at the 10% level in model 2. What may account for the overall lack of significance is that the question does not explicitly ask if the respondent has family ties in their place of displacement, but rather the respondent is asked to choose the most important reason for coming to their current location.

propensity to return to one's place of origin rather than seek integration. Lack of savings and having government salary are not statistically significant in any model. Regarding the social and civil situation of IDP respondent households, we observe that the lack of personal documentation and living in critical shelter is negatively associated with belonging and influence, respectively. Finally, as would be expected, the individual controls linked to the dependent variable (low sense of belonging to the area of origin and high feelings of having influence pre-displacement) as well as the dummy variable controlling for intra-district displacement are all statistically significant with a positive sign.

We shift now to explore more particularly the role of ethno-religious similarity between IDPs and their host communities. Previous models found that belonging to a national minority is negatively correlated to integration. In line with this, Table 2 shows that an IDP who belongs to an ethno-religious group that is present within the subdistrict's host community, but is not the majority, is less likely to feel integrated, compared to an IDP who is a member of the largest (or only) group in the community. This is statistically significant across the four models. At the same time, an IDP who belongs to an ethno-religious group that was not present within the host community pre-conflict, is also found to have less feeling of belonging, but the relationship is relatively weak. When controlling for household factors, the statistical significance of this latter finding almost disappears when taking belonging as the dependent variable. Thus, in general, while forming part of a "new" ethno-religious group in the host community appears disconnected from explaining the likelihood of integration, being a minority (or non-majority) seems to play a relevant and negative role. This will be further discussed in the next section, particularly in light of findings from Table 3.

Table 2. Likelihood of feeling integrated using indicators on ethno-religious similarity between IDPs and host community

	Model 5 (Belonging)	Model 6 (Influence)	Model 7 (Belonging)	Model 8 (Influence)
Ethno-religious similarity (ref. = Belongs to HC majority)				
Belongs to HC minority	−0.609*** (0.186)	−0.554*** (0.203)	−0.568*** (0.195)	−0.427* (0.232)
Belongs to no HC group	−0.657*** (0.177)	−0.039 (0.203)	−0.362* (0.204)	−0.009 (0.254)
Highest education in household (ref. = No certificate)				
Primary or secondary certificate			0.425*** (0.144)	0.180 (0.188)
University or higher			0.262 (0.171)	0.700*** (0.214)
Female head of household			0.101 (0.159)	−0.062 (0.214)
National minority			−0.537** (0.257)	−0.746** (0.318)
Experienced previous displacement			−0.010 (0.187)	0.063 (0.238)
Rural origin			−0.358*** (0.127)	−0.261* (0.155)
Indebtedness			−0.109 (0.096)	−0.345*** (0.118)
Lack of savings			−0.342*** (0.105)	−0.081 (0.122)
Property ownership in Iraq			−0.224**	0.069

	(0.105)	(0.130)		
Government employment	0.029	−0.007		
	(0.123)	(0.148)		
Personal documentation (ref. = In possession)				
Lost or lacking documentation	−0.441**	0.291		
	(0.173)	(0.191)		
Do not know	−0.477*	−0.013		
	(0.247)	(0.264)		
Living in critical shelter	−0.094	−0.676***		
	(0.156)	(0.222)		
Household separated in displacement	0.116	0.025		
	(0.415)	(0.489)		
Intra-district displacement	0.826***	0.567*		
	(0.300)	(0.319)		
Low belonging to place of origin	0.402**			
	(0.171)			
High influence pre-displacement		2.536***		
		(0.188)		
Constant	−1.139***	−1.276***	−1.074***	−3.586***
	(0.226)	(0.255)	(0.300)	(0.416)
Observations	2,182	2,182	2,182	2,182

*Logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Controls for governorate of origin and of displacement are applied in all models. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Hence, Table 3 tests the likelihood of integration using more structural indicators of the place of displacement and the communities living there – it does not involve the perception or the identity of IDPs as the models in the previous two tables. As described in the previous section, these variables cover different pre-conflict aspects of the hosting communities, including development, social capital, governance, and demographic history. Many of the variables operate as would be expected. In this sense, higher human capital is significantly correlated with a higher likelihood of integration, similar to greater community engagement. Results also highlight that IDPs living in areas with a higher percentage of immigration are more likely to feel strong belonging, while areas that experienced previous waves of displacement are correlated with a higher likelihood of IDPs reporting to have influence. Higher endowment of public services is, however, not significant in any model.

This being said, the performance of the remaining variables is rather counter-intuitive and signify a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between fragility and IDP integration than what would be expected. This is seen through three key indicators. First, the coefficient for poverty is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level across all models, indicating that IDPs in poorer and less developed areas are more likely to feel integrated, controlling for all other individual and structural factors. Second, lower levels of social trust as well as a lower quality of local institutions are also both significantly associated with a higher likelihood of integration, although only manifested here through the belonging indicator. A final discussion point refers to ethno-religious diversity, which is captured through the fractionalization index in this table. The more fractionalized the subdistrict is (that is, the more divided into smaller ethno-religious groups is), the less likely it is for IDPs to feel a strong sense of belonging.

Table 3. Likelihood of feeling integrated using indicators of the socio-economic characteristics of the host community

	Model 9 (Belonging)	Model 10 (Influence)	Model 11 (Belonging)	Model 12 (Influence)
Human capital	2.534*** (0.597)	2.885*** (0.639)	2.559*** (0.611)	2.789*** (0.686)
Poverty	5.708*** (1.462)	5.864*** (1.693)	5.785*** (1.501)	4.879*** (1.808)
Endowment of public services	7.411 (5.364)	−4.254 (5.625)	7.329 (5.547)	−3.020 (5.982)
Intra-community trust	−2.606*** (0.769)	1.276 (0.820)	−2.680*** (0.791)	0.533 (0.892)
Community mobilization	1.109*** (0.417)	1.108** (0.454)	1.285*** (0.426)	0.967** (0.488)
Quality of institutions	−0.415*** (0.115)	0.199 (0.127)	−0.447*** (0.119)	−0.038 (0.135)
Local insecurity	−3.720*** (0.780)	1.227 (0.887)	−3.709*** (0.802)	0.106 (0.947)
Internal migration	1.320** (0.607)	−0.183 (0.653)	1.277** (0.620)	0.552 (0.700)
Previous IDPs hosted	−0.002 (0.002)	0.010*** (0.003)	−0.002 (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Fractionalization	−1.307*** (0.338)	0.307 (0.387)	−1.440*** (0.346)	0.208 (0.412)
Capital of governorate	0.147 (0.126)	−0.072 (0.139)	0.192 (0.131)	0.026 (0.155)
Female head of household			0.178 (0.111)	−0.112 (0.141)
Highest education in household (ref. = No certificate)				
Primary or secondary certificate			0.321*** (0.111)	0.135 (0.139)
University or higher			0.298** (0.135)	0.445*** (0.163)
National minority			−0.619*** (0.191)	−0.580** (0.229)
Experienced previous displacement			0.250* (0.146)	0.137 (0.176)
Rural origin			−0.228** (0.103)	−0.232* (0.121)
Indebtedness			−0.160** (0.077)	−0.335*** (0.091)
Lack of savings			−0.121 (0.080)	−0.175* (0.093)
Property ownership in Iraq			−0.291*** (0.081)	0.0300 (0.097)
Government employment			0.057 (0.096)	−0.013 (0.113)
Personal documentation (ref. = In possession)				
Lost or lacking documentation			−0.454*** (0.141)	−0.001 (0.156)

Do not know			−0.174 (0.190)	0.448** (0.193)
Living in critical shelter			−0.213 (0.135)	−0.690*** (0.183)
Household separated in displacement			−0.063 (0.275)	0.045 (0.323)
Intra-district displacement			0.407** (0.193)	0.577** (0.227)
Low belonging to place of origin			0.285** (0.129)	
High influence pre-displacement				2.310*** (0.140)
Constant	1.428 (1.297)	−7.703*** (1.454)	1.656 (1.347)	−7.070*** (1.555)
Observations	3,421	3,421	3,421	3,421

*Logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Controls for governorate of origin and of displacement are applied in all models. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$,*

V. DISCUSSION

Our main interest in this paper was to explore the role of place factors in explaining the likelihood of IDPs integrating in their areas of displacement. This complements the more conventional narrative on household-centred studies of IDP integration, linked to rights acquisition. We tested multiple place factors and our findings indicate that they do matter in explaining IDP integration in urban areas, in terms of belonging and influence. This highlights the need to put on the map the differing realities that IDPs find in their places of displacement and the people they encounter there when discussing local integration and durable solutions in general.

In line with accepted data and theory, displaced people tend to value the capacity to provide for their basic needs as well as the absence of conflict for integration. At the same time, positive interactions with host community help in this regard. Traditional measures of household vulnerability have mixed results: indebtedness, possession of civil documentation, and type of shelter matters, but we find no connection between integration and gender of head of household nor whether households have savings or not.

When testing more structural factors linked to the specific urban location IDPs find themselves, we find a somewhat counterintuitive narrative. Namely that locations with higher fragility tend to have higher likelihood of IDP integration. In other words, it is harder for IDPs to fit into more stable and better functioning host environments. We see this when analysing the role of development, quality of institutions, and social capital of the place of displacement pre-conflict. IDPs are more likely to feel integrated in poorer locations. This may be due to the fact that these locations tend to be more transient (and are correlated with more internal migration generally), making it easier to access for newly arriving populations. These locations are also usually the first or only location IDPs can go immediately after fleeing their places of origin. This argument also helps to explain why lower quality of institutions is more conducive for IDP integration. While IDPs tend to value adequate public service provision and security as provided by local institutions, weak institutional capacity may better enable IDPs to absorb into the host community with less restriction and oversight. The same rationale applies for why locations with tighter intra-community cohesion and trust tend to be more difficult for IDPs to integrate into. Looser social ties may allow for the inclusion of greater differences between residents, including newcomers. One caveat to these findings is that the data used here is collected from an IDP population that at the time was displaced for approximately 1.5 years, a relatively early displacement stage. Their feelings may change over time with living in a fragile urban setting – perhaps mirroring the frustrations the host community may also have with these places.

There are some findings that seem to indicate that ethno-religious diversity works against feelings of integration. This is also somewhat counterintuitive as more diverse places are associated with more elastic social cohesion. We observe, however, that the IDP identity matters in that IDPs belonging to a non-majority group found in the host community are less likely to integrate. This is particularly telling, given that for IDPs who belong to “new” groups not found in the host community, this negative link is weaker. Furthermore, indices of ethno-religious fractionalization are negatively correlated with integration as is belonging to an identified national minority group. Rather, IDPs who express high cultural compatibility with the host community are more likely to feel integrated. One interpretation of these findings relates to the context and history of Iraq. There seems to be a tendency among the current conflict-affected population to view diversity with misgivings, and to see it, at least initially, as synonymous with conflict.⁵¹ This is a consequence of decades of identity-based conflict, competition, and moral populism.⁵² This wariness regarding diversity may be compounded by the fact that the conflict and violence IDPs were fleeing was based on identity-driven fault lines, further exploited by ISIL. A similar caveat to the previous one applies here: that this data is from an earlier displacement stage and that IDP perception of diversity may change through greater exposure over time.⁵³ Additionally, it would be interesting to see how these findings would change if controlling for whether or not IDPs come from homogenous places, for which data is not readily available.

Taken together, these findings highlight a seemingly inherent tension: what is initially best for IDPs may not be a status quo that is favourable to the host community. From a research perspective, this means better understanding the connections between fragility and integration, further incorporating the host community into the equation beyond what their feelings are of IDPs. In terms of intervention linked to integration, a shift of thinking is required that puts displacement within, rather than separate from, the continuum of urban dynamics. A new such approach must have at its centre the rights of all people, the inclusion of all people, and the alleviation of poverty of all people. Thus, it is critical not only to improve conditions for all in fragile urban areas where IDPs reside, but in making more stable environments more inclusive to prevent pockets of self-reinforcing fragility.

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⁵¹ Forthcoming research in northern Iraq highlights that national minorities particularly feel ethno-religious diversity does more harm than good. Among non-minority ethno-religious groups, people are divided in this regard, which still signifies a large proportion of people who view diversity negatively. USIP and Social Inquiry, “Data and Conflict Indicators from Advancing the Role of Iraqi Minorities in Stabilisation and Governance,” forthcoming.

⁵² Toby Dodge et al., *Iraq Synthesis Paper: Understanding the Drivers of Conflict in Iraq* (London: LSE Middle East Centre, 2018).

⁵³ See second quotation in introduction.

Annex 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis

Group	Variable	Definition	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variables	Belonging	1 = Respondent reports low levels of belonging in place of displacement; 0 = Respondent reports high levels of belonging in place of displacement	0.495	0.500	0	1
	Influence	1 = Respondent reports high levels of influence in making this community (of displacement) a better place to be; 0 = Respondent reports low levels of influence in making this community (of displacement) a better place to be	0.234	0.424	0	1
Indicators on IDPs' experiences and perceptions vis-à-vis their host community	Basic needs provided	1 = Respondent able to provide for their basic needs (understood as access to housing, health care, education, food, and water) over the past 3 months; 0 = Respondent not been able to provide for their basic needs	0.507	0.500	0	1
	Restrictions of movement	1 = Restrictions on freedom of movement experienced; 0 = No restrictions experienced	0.177	0.382	0	1
	Family ties in HC	1 = Respondent chose the location of displacement because of the presence of extended family/friends; 0 = Respondent chose the location of displacement for any other reason	0.321	0.467	0	1
	Close HC friends	1 = Respondent has 5 or more close friends among the IDP community in place of displacement; 0 = Respondent has 0 to 4 close friends among the IDP community in place of displacement	0.857	0.350	0	1
	Close IDP friends	1 = Respondent has 5 or more close friends among the host community in place of displacement; 0 = Respondent has 0 to 4 close friends among the host community in place of displacement	0.887	0.316	0	1
	Organization membership	1 = Respondent belongs to at least one group, network or association; 0 = Respondent does not belong to any group	0.070	0.254	0	1
	Safe in place of displacement	1 = Respondent felt unsafe in place of origin but felt safe in place of displacement; 0 = Respondent provided any other combination	0.315	0.465	0	1
	Distrust of HC	1 = Respondent disagreed or strongly disagreed with the sentence "if you drop your wallet in the street in this community, someone will see it and return it to you"; 0 = Respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the sentence	0.158	0.365	0	1

	Open practice of religion	1 = Respondent felt completely free to practice his/her religion openly in this community; 0 = Respondent felt either he/she can practice his/her religion but with discretion, or cannot openly practice his/her religion, or cannot at all practice his/her religion in this community	0.830	0.376	0	1
	Cultural compatibility	1 = Respondent felt that the cultural values and practices in this community are compatible completely or a lot with his/hers; 0 = Respondent felt that the cultural values and practices in this community are compatible moderately, a little or not at all with his/hers.	0.674	0.469	0	1
Indicator on ethno-religious similarity between IDPs and host community	Ethno-religious similarity	1 = The ethno-religious group to which the respondent belongs is the largest (or the only) group in the host community; 2 = The ethno-religious group to which the respondent belongs is a minor group in the host community; 3 = The ethno-religious group to which the respondent belongs does not exist within the host community	2.242	0.786	1	3
Indicators on the socio-economic characteristics of the host community	Human capital	Percentage of people born between 1960 and 1990 in the subdistrict with at least basic education certificate	0.729	0.109	0.434	1.000
	Poverty	Percentage of families in the subdistrict falling under the poverty line	0.090	0.079	0.000	0.300
	Endowment of public services	Percentage of individuals working on public services (health, education, or waste collection) over the total population in the subdistrict	0.023	0.010	0.000	0.080
	Intra-community trust	Percentage of adult individuals in the subdistrict that express being satisfied or very satisfied with the trust/acceptance felt in the community/neighborhood	0.883	0.089	0.460	1.000
	Community mobilization	Percentage of respondents in the subdistrict that had either contacted a politician, attended a political discussion, or attended a demonstration (or would have done it)	0.507	0.173	0.122	0.738
	Quality of institutions	Average confidence score (0 = no confidence, 10 = full confidence) in local government and tribal leaders	6.300	0.690	4.847	7.975
	Local insecurity	Percentage of adult individuals in the subdistrict that express being unsatisfied or not at all satisfied with the level of local security	0.110	0.120	0.000	0.636
	Internal migration	Percentage of heads of household (or wives/husbands) in the subdistrict that were born in a different governorate	0.128	0.089	0.000	0.694
	Previous IDPs hosted	Number of IDPs hosted by the district in 2010 from the 2003-2010 period (in thousands)	31.8	37.5	0.0	171.4

	Fractionalization	Fractionalization index for the subdistrict's ethno-religious composition	0.245	0.252	0.000	0.608
	Capital of governorate	1 = Location where the respondent is located is in the governorate capital subdistrict; 0 = Any other location	0.468	0.499	0	1
Indicators on IDP household characteristics	Female head of household	1 = Head of household is a woman; 0 = Head of household is a man	0.149	0.356	0	1
	Highest education in household	1 = No adult member (age >= 15) of the respondent's household has an education degree completed; 2 = The highest education degree completed by an adult member of the household is either primary or secondary school; 3 = The highest education degree completed by an adult member of the household is either diploma, university, or post-grade studies	2.063	0.607	1	3
	National minority	1 = Respondent is either Turkman, Christian, Ezidi, Shabak, or Sabeian-Mandean; 0 = Respondent is Arab or Kurd	0.072	0.259	0	1
	Previous experience of displacement	1 = The respondent or his/her family has migrated or displaced to a location inside Iraq before January 2014; 0 = The respondent or his/her family has never migrated or displaced to a location inside Iraq before January 2014	0.087	0.283	0	1
	Rural origin	1 = The pre-conflict income source of the respondent's household was agriculture, farming or herd animal raising; 1 = The pre-conflict income source of the respondent's household was any other source	0.248	0.432	0	1
	Indebtedness	1 = The respondent is currently indebted; 0 = The respondent is not indebted (either never got loans or has been able to pay them back)	0.472	0.499	0	1
	Lack of savings	1 = Respondent did not have savings available when displaced; 0 = Respondent had savings available when displaced	0.505	0.500	0	1
	Property ownership in Iraq	1 = Respondent owns property in Iraq; 0 = Respondent does not own property in Iraq	0.624	0.485	0	1
	Government employment	1 = The pre-conflict income source of the respondent's household was government employment or pensions; 0 = The pre-conflict income source of the respondent's household was any other source	0.280	0.449	0	1
	Personal documentation	1 = No member of respondent's household has lost personal documentation because of displacement; 2 = At least a member of respondent's household has lost personal documentation because of	1.176	0.483	1	3

	displacement; 3 = Respondent does not know if any member of his/her household has lost personal documentation					
Living in critical shelter	1 = Respondent's household lives in a critical shelter (unfinished building, tent or caravan, religious building, school, informal camp, hotel)	0.110	0.313	0	1	
Household separated in displacement	1 = Respondent's household is currently separated as a cause of displacement; 0 = Respondent's household is currently reunited or never separated	0.022	0.146	0	1	
Intra-district displacement	1 = Respondent is displaced within his/her district of origin; 0 = Respondent is displaced into a different district from his/her district of origin	0.059	0.235	0	1	
Low belonging to place of origin	1 = Respondent reports low levels of belonging in place of origin; 0 = Respondent reports high levels of belonging in place of origin	0.100	0.300	0	1	
High influence pre-displacement	1 = Respondent reports high levels of influence in making his/her community of origin a better place to be; 0 = Respondent reports low levels of influence in making his/her community of origin a better place to be	0.616	0.486	0	1	