The Urban Displaced:
Fleeing criminal violence in
Latin American cities

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Background paper to the main report
The Urban Displaced:  
Fleeing Criminal Violence in Latin American Cities

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Individuals and families are fleeing criminal violence in cities across Latin America. From Monterrey to San Salvador to Rio de Janeiro, criminal organizations and the violence they produce force residents to move from one part of the city to another, or to leave the city altogether. Such flight has occurred for decades; indeed, residents have been fleeing violence in the city of Medellín since the 1980s.

The magnitude of forced displacement in cities due to criminal violence should come as a surprise to few. More than half of the world’s people now live in urban centres and these are the site of much of the globe’s crime and violence. Yet, such displacement has caught many off guard, with only a few notable exceptions. Chief among these exceptions is the government of Medellín, where offices have monitored displacement due to organized crime since the early 2000s and have developed innovative means to reduce the flight of city residents and address the needs of those displaced. International organizations such as the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have also acknowledged urban displacement due to criminal violence, as have several in-country organizations, such as Cristosal in El Salvador and CODHES in Colombia.

Despite the handful of advances, displacement due to criminal violence in cities is largely overlooked. Many governments and non-governmental organizations either ignore such displacement or lack the capacity (or political will) to develop programmes to monitor and address it. Academics are still further behind. Scholarship is yet to reflect that much forced migration now occurs in cities (rather than the countryside) and is provoked by criminal organizations, militias, or terrorist groups (rather than traditional armies).

Much remains to be learned, then. Concerning displacement due to criminal violence in Latin American cities, three questions remain paramount for policymakers and academics alike: Who flees? What triggers their flight? And, upon fleeing, Where do displaced persons go and what are their experiences?

To address these questions, this paper describes broad trends around Latin America and offers fine-grained insights from a particular city. The strength of such an approach is that readers see both common threads in displacement around the region and the local realities of how flight actually happens, on the ground. Such an approach lends itself to concrete, yet scalable policy recommendations to address displacement.

First, this paper offers a definition of criminal violence-induced urban displacement, describes how data was collected, and provides background on flight in Latin American cities. The three questions at hand are then addressed. For each question, regional trends are conveyed then data from Medellín, Colombia is used to provide greater depth. Before covering methodological details and concluding, the paper offers policy recommendations to mitigate flight.

The policy recommendations to mitigate displacement in cities due to criminal violence are: (i) train community mediators; (ii) develop youth-engagement programming; (iii) establish a crime hotline; (iv) increase police presence and shorten police response times; (v) strengthen well-performing government offices and develop relevant new ones; (vi) provide employment opportunities for gang members; (vii) reduce gangs’ extortion of residents; (viii) design interventions to be long-term and carried out in-neighbourhood; (ix) deploy interventions to peripheral neighbourhoods, in their entirety; and (x) monitor the tell-tale signs of displacement and prepare aid accordingly.
I. DISPLACEMENT IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES: DEFINITION, BACKGROUND, AND DATA

This paper sets aside flight provoked by civil and international wars. Instead, it considers forced displacement triggered by organized crime, in cities. Specifically, criminal violence-induced urban displacement occurs when individuals are provoked, directly or indirectly, to leave their homes in a city for another location—be it in the same city or further afar—by organized crime or other armed groups with criminal elements and/or exchanges between organized crime and state forces.9

Much of this flight occurs within the same city—from one marginal, under-served neighbourhood to another. For example, when families flee generalized violence in one neighbourhood for the relative safety of a different one. Or, when families flee gang threats or attacks in one place for another part of the city where the armed group has limited reach.1 Some flight is significantly further, however: individuals and families may also flee from a city to peri-urban areas, to another city, to the countryside, or across international borders.10

Background: Displacement in Latin American Cities

Criminal violence-induced displacement in Latin American cities is the last link in a long chain of events. Neoliberal economic policies, urbanization, and international drug trafficking are some of the most relevant long-term drivers of today’s displacement. Influenced by the “Washington Consensus,” most Latin American governments implemented neoliberal policies during the 1980s and 1990s. These policies privatized public services, reduced government spending on social safety nets, and favoured urban industries over rural farming. Even as increasing numbers of people migrated to the marginal neighbourhoods of cities, neoliberal policies limited the state from providing these same neighbourhoods with formal land titles or regularized policing and public services. The influx of people and limited state presence paved the way for drug cartels to gain a hold, from the 1990s onward. Gangs used the neighbourhoods as hideaways for the repackaging and reshipment of drugs destined for the US and Europe, and later as points of sale for local markets. Fed by drug proceeds, cartels and street-level gangs both grew in power. They wielded large sums of cash, military-grade weaponry, and residents’ loyalties to keep the state out so as to continue their illicit activities. As these broad forces came together—neoliberalism, urbanization, and drug trafficking—people filled the peripheries of large cities while the state remained largely absent from them. At the same time, cartels and gangs took hold of these neighbourhoods where they operate to this day with varying degrees of impunity.11 It is precisely in these peripheral neighbourhoods where most displacement in Latin American cities occurs.12

In short, criminal organizations force individuals and families to flee marginal neighbourhoods in pursuit of territorial control and profit. At the same time, the state’s corruption, inconsistent presence, and shared governance with organized crime over these neighbourhoods allows forced displacement to continue.

Background: Medellín, Colombia

Colombia’s second city, Medellín, has a population of approximately 2.5 million people. The local government has won international recognition for its innovative work to incorporate marginalized citizens into the city—for instance, through building gondolas (metro cable) to connect some peripheral neighbourhoods to downtown. The city has also seen a stark reduction in violence. In 1991, Medellín was arguably the most dangerous city in the world with a homicide rate of 381 per 100,000 people; today, it has a homicide rate just above 20 per 100,000, placing Medellín somewhere in the middle of Latin American

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9 Families often opt to move to a neighbourhood under the control of a rival to the gang forcing them out, as a means to increase their safety. This appears more common in Colombian cities than in cities in the Northern Triangle, however. In Central American cities, the gang in the receiving territory is more likely to threaten the newcomer, suspecting them of loyalty to the rival gang. This is especially the case if tattoos betray ties to other gangs. Additionally, in extreme cases (e.g., having witnessed a murder or collaborated with the police leading to a gang leader’s arrest), the gang may attempt to find the displaced person across the city or even in another part of the country, regardless of whether a rival is in control of the territory or not. For more, see Cantor, “The New Wave,” pg. 55.
cities, in terms of murders per capita. The economy has seen between 2-3% growth in gross domestic product in recent years, driven by telecommunications, construction, healthcare, and exports of coffee and flowers, alongside other industries.

Despite increases in state presence and reductions in violence and poverty, between five and fifteen thousand residents per year, if not more, still flee their homes due to violence. In peripheral neighbourhoods around the city—in districts (comunas) such as 1, 5, 7, 8, and 13—residents flee generalized violence, drug trafficking-related violence, forced recruitment, and extortion. Some of the city’s displacement in the 1990s and early 2000s had ties to the country’s civil war (waged between the state, paramilitaries, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] and other guerrilla groups). However, most street-level gangs expelling residents in later years (and today) have limited connections to the conflict, which officially ended in 2016. Local government offices have done much to track displacement and provide aid and shelter to the displaced, as well as intervened to prevent displacement. Nonetheless, coerced flight continues in Medellín’s marginal neighbourhoods.

Data Collection

This policy paper draws on both secondary and primary data. The broad trends in displacement across Latin America, presented below, are generally drawn from secondary data. These include academic articles, think tank reports, NGO investigations, and government documents.

In addition, several sections of this policy paper present novel details about displacement in a particular Latin American city, Medellín, Colombia. These sections draw on primary data from a survey carried out in three peripheral neighbourhoods of that city, in mid-2017. Such data allow for systematic, quantitative comparisons between displaced and non-displaced persons, providing insights into forced flight not available through other research methodologies. Approximately 620 respondents were surveyed, nearly 160 of them were urban displaced persons, while the rest were either residents of these neighbourhoods who remained in place despite violence (e.g., non-displaced persons) or rural-in-origin displaced persons. Respondents were randomly selected using maps and survey points generated by ArcGIS; households were then located and surveys administered using ArcGIS and Qualtrics apps on enumerators’ cell phones. Extensive measures were taken to protect the safety of respondents and to mitigate their possible retraumatization. Protocols were also put in place to protect the safety and mental health of enumerators. Among the urban displaced persons included, most fled violence in Medellín in recent months or years (although some fled as far back as 20 or more years). Either they fled from a different neighbourhood in the city to one of the three surveyed; or they fled one of the three surveyed neighbourhoods, stayed in another part of the city temporarily, then returned. Yet other respondents (a minority) fled violence in other cities and resettled in Medellín. Displaced respondents were asked questions about the time period around their displacement; non-displaced persons were asked about their neighbourhoods during a violent time in the city’s past (when displacement rates were high).

II. FLIGHT DUE TO CRIMINAL VIOLENCE: WHO FLEES? FROM WHERE IN THE CITY?

Those displaced by criminal violence are generally among the most marginalized in Latin American cities. Such individuals and families disproportionately live below the poverty line and have completed relatively few years of schooling; they may also be sexual or ethnic minorities. Most flight is from neighbourhoods where state services are precarious and organized crime has a hold. Precisely because displaced persons lack financial resources, they are unable to move to other neighbourhoods where they might be safer and receive more regularized, formal services. These marginal neighbourhoods—known as favelas or barrios populares—are ubiquitous around many Latin American cities and are home to sizeable portions of these cities’ residents.

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1 See the penultimate section on methodology for more details on how the Colombian Civil War relates to displacement in Medellín and how this may affect the generalizability of findings.
While low-income residents are disproportionately affected by displacement, they are not alone. The movement of middle-class and elite households away from violence towards safety—elsewhere in the city or abroad—may also be considered forced displacement. However, rather than flee immediate threats, the better-off in Latin America often plan their relocation with some foresight. In part, this is possible because they have other means of protection, such as hiring security or building walls around their middle- or upper-class neighbourhoods.

An entire block of households may flee at the same time. Or, more commonly, individual families may leave, one by one, while their neighbours remain. Finally, in some cases, a family may only send away one member, particularly if he or she alone is threatened by the gang.

**Medellin: Who Flees Criminal Violence? Where in the City Is such Violence Taking Place?**

The peripheral neighbourhoods of Medellin have seen the displacement of tens of thousands of people over the last decades. Both men and women flee from one neighbourhood to another—sometimes with a family, sometimes alone. People of all ethnicities are affected. And in particular, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons are targeted and take flight.

Compared to those who stay in their homes and neighbourhoods despite threats and violence, individuals and families that flee tend to have several qualities in common. Among survey respondents in Medellin, on average, those who flee are younger, have more children, and have more money saved up (even if very little), compared to those who stay. The individuals and families who flee, on average, lived in homes made of lower quality materials (e.g., found items, tarps, and wood) with fewer hook-ups to state services (e.g., water, electricity) before taking flight, when compared to their non-displaced counterparts. And people who flee are less likely to have possessed some type of documentation to their homes, even if informal paperwork. People who flee are also more likely to have been active in their communities before leaving than those who remain behind, all else equal.

A slight majority (51%) of the urban displaced persons surveyed had lived in their house more than ten years before fleeing, and 5% of them had lived in their house thirty or more years before leaving. On the other hand, about one-fifth of urban displaced persons had been in their houses four or fewer years before taking flight.

The general perception is that residents of cities readily move because they lack strong grounding in their homes and communities. However, it is clear from this survey that many respondents participated in their communities and had lived in their homes more than ten years before fleeing. As such, some urban displaced persons appear to take flight despite deep roots.

Where is such flight taking place? Nearly all of Medellin’s violence-induced displacement occurs in the city’s peripheral neighbourhoods. But these neighbourhoods are heterogenous. While all are underserved and marginal (compared to other parts of the city), some are more developed than others. This is evidenced by the quality of roads, housing materials, and presence of shops with basic necessities, among other indicators. And even within the same neighbourhood, some parts are relatively better-off than others. Such heterogeneity—between and within neighbourhoods—is relevant to displacement for two reasons.

First, a third of respondents fled from the least developed neighbourhoods in the city. These are neighbourhoods up the furthest reaches of the city’s hillsides where, for instance, shops to buy even basic foodstuffs are not present (a proxy for development). Meanwhile, the remaining two-thirds of respondents fled slightly more developed, though still marginal, neighbourhoods. Access to these areas is through higher quality roads and paths, basic foodstuffs can be purchased there, and other indicators of development are slightly higher in these neighbourhoods.

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81 In some cases, this may be because they were targeted precisely for their participation in local groups, such as the Community Action Assembly (Junta de Acción Comunal, or local Residents’ Association). For more details, including the logistic and linear probability models supporting the correlations in the above paragraph, see Marston, “Resisting Displacement.”
Second, the displaced persons surveyed lived in all parts of these peripheral neighbourhoods before fleeing. Indeed, residents lived in the centre (e.g., where there may be shops, even if run from someone’s home, and bus stops); the periphery (e.g., where there are no shops, and residences abut a forest or another neighbourhood); and between the centre and periphery of these neighbourhoods. This is shown in Figure 1.

To address displacement, policymakers and practitioners must first know where flight is taking place. The common conception is that urban displacement occurs only in the most marginalized neighbourhoods, where the state is most absent (e.g., difficult-to-reach neighbourhoods, recently founded at the heights of hillsides). And another conception is that displacement occurs primarily at the furthest reaches of neighbourhoods, where development and social cohesion are most absent (e.g., where residences are made of low-quality materials, inhabitants are recent migrants, and there are few shops or community spaces). Sometimes these conceptions hold. But, as demonstrated, some displacement also occurs in the slightly more accessible and developed—though still peripheral—neighbourhoods of the city. And flight occurs in the centre of neighbourhoods, too, not just in the furthest reaches.

III. THE TRIGGERS OF CONFLICT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES

In the peripheral neighbourhoods of many Latin American cities, the actions of organized crime trigger residents to flee. Such displacement may be broken down into two types: targeted and generalized. Recognizing the difference between these forms of displacement is key for designing effective policy solutions.

In the case of targeted displacement, the gang threatens specific residents to leave or face death, often over (perceived) grievances, such as having collaborated with a rival gang or having called the police. Gangs may also target rights activists or sexual minorities, because they are seen as posing a challenge to traditional neighbourhood values. Having violated community rules and norms is also reason for expulsion. Examples of such violations include robbing within the neighbourhood, breaking the “law of silence” (e.g., telling others what you have seen or heard), committing spousal abuse, or consuming drugs in front of children. Gangs’ efforts to turn a profit and gain or shore up territory also illicit targeted flight.

Despite potential sampling biases from surveying people with residences in three purposively sampled neighbourhoods (rather than, say, including homeless people who are more likely to flee the most marginal neighbourhoods), these results still show that at least some displacement occurs in slightly more developed, though still marginal, neighbourhoods. Acknowledging that displacement occurs not just in the furthest reaches of the least developed parts of cities (no matter the exact percentage), is a step forward in addressing forced flight.

Displacement is complex. Where the state’s presence is cursory, the gang is often judge and jury—and an appreciated one at that. Many community residents consider it a social good that gangs force out husbands who have abused their wives or expel residents who rob in the neighbourhood. In the case of drug sales, many street-level gangs derive a majority of their profits from
Indeed, families loyal to rivals may be expelled, and households may be evicted in order to loot and rent the residence out to newcomers. In some neighbourhoods, gangs ask residents to store arms or drugs, pay a “tax” for protection (colaborarles para que cuiden el barrio), or to join the gang, often starting as an errand boy (carrito). Sexual violence also produces flight in these neighbourhoods.

**Generalized displacement.** on the other hand, occurs when residents flee due to indiscriminate violence in an area produced by organized crime (and state security forces). For instance, shootouts between gangs for control over a neighbourhood or drug points-of-sale and routes (plazas de vicio) may provoke residents’ flight. A gang may also grow excessively violent towards neighbourhood residents as a whole, provoking general exodus. This is most common when the gang is a newcomer to an area, when it has bucked the control of a higher-up criminal structure, or when the gang goes through a leadership struggle. Police or military forces may also enter neighbourhoods committing indiscriminate violence and, thus, produce flight. Or shootouts between gangs and state security forces may produce displacement.

**Targeted displacement** occurs when an armed group goes after a particular individual or family for a perceived grievance or characteristic (including political leanings or ethnicity). This type of displacement is often individual in nature, meaning one household at a time flees, or a family sends only one member to stay with relatives (often a son or daughter). Meanwhile, generalized displacement is not directed towards particular individuals for their characteristics or actions, but rather is an excess generally suffered by the community as a whole. This type of displacement is more likely to occur en masse, meaning entire blocks fleeing as one.

Highlighting the differences between these two types of displacement, one Medellín resident, a 32-year-old stay-at-home mom, says:

> Back then, the [armed group] came and there were a lot of clashes over territory...We did not leave under threat or in the wrong. Just that the neighbourhood heated up and for our safety we left.

This quote exemplifies generalized flight. The family was not targeted for breaking a community norm or having betrayed the gang in power, but rather they fled because indiscriminate violence in their neighbourhood shot up.

Whether targeted or generalized flight, street-level gangs are most often the criminal organizations responsible for producing displacement in Latin American cities. These are the clíkas of Central America; combos and los muchachos del barrio of Colombia; the bandas of Venezuela; and the milícias and local gangs of Brazil. They are generally in control of the day-to-day operations of the neighbourhood, including the provision of services, doling out punishments, localized drug sales, and monitoring who comes and goes from the area.

Some displacement is provoked by other groups, however. Street gangs are often allegiant to higher-level criminal structures, which may sometimes be the organization to actually order the expulsion of residents. Such structures include the cártellos in Mexico, the maras in Central America, and the oficinas and bandas criminales (BACRIM) in Colombia. Urban displacement in Colombia, particularly in the past, was also provoked by guerrilla groups and paramilitary and paramilitary successor groups. And, in Mexico, autodefensas (vigilante groups) have also forced residents to flee cities. Finally, violent police incursions into peripheral neighbourhoods (including arbitrary harassment) and police-gang shootouts produce displacement in several Latin American cities.

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the sale of these substances in the neighbourhoods they operate in (called microtráfico or narcomenudeo) and, thus, have incentives to increase sales and clientele. However, many gangs still regulate drug use among neighbourhood residents and prevent use in front of children, as a service to the community. For more on such complexities of displacement, see Marston, “Resisting Displacement,” and Cantor, “The New Wave,” pg. 41.
What Triggers Displacement in Medellín?

This section demonstrates that, in Medellín, the reasons for fleeing are myriad, repeat displacement is more common than might be expected, and street-level gangs (combos) are the organization primarily responsible for coerced flight.

In the three marginal neighbourhoods surveyed, the most common reasons reported for having fled were: generalized violence/fear of being caught in shootouts; the attempted recruitment of a child or family member into the gang; having received a threat for (suspected) collaboration with a rival gang; extortion; and the murder of a family member, either by the gang or an unknown attacker. Receiving threats after witnessing a crime or murder and calling the police are also mentioned. As Figure 2 shows, survey respondents further report receiving threats after falling behind on rent and having been displaced so that the gang could take control of their residence.

Generalized violence is one of the primary triggers of displacement in the peripheral neighbourhoods of Medellín. Individuals who feared neighbourhood violence and being caught in shootouts describe it as follows. Respondents are a 57-year-old man; a 27-year-old woman; and a 46-year-old woman, respectively.

I lived in --, we lived in a rented house, with my wife and my son, but it was a very violent time, they killed people for practically anything, just like that, in front of everyone in the street, and we were so afraid, the neighbours and I, that when we were going to leave for work we had to peek out the window to see if there was anyone [out there], and if there wasn’t, go out running and catch any bus going downtown, and the same at night. And the neighbours, we almost never saw each other. So, I didn’t want that life anymore for my son and my wife and we decided to leave there because there was so much fear.
We stayed shut in the house and we hid under the bed because there were lots of shootouts, crying and waiting for our mom to get home with some food.

We slept all of us in the common room and put the mattresses against the door and walls because, in the back part of the house, bullets entered a couple of times.

As noted, generalized violence often results from confrontations between gangs. Consider the following quotation from one survey respondent, a mid-40s construction worker, who fled the area in 2010 and returned later:

*The violence has always been tough and every day it got worse but then it really got tough when there were three armed groups here.*

Other common drivers of displacement are forced recruitment and families refusing to store items (e.g., drugs, weapons, money) for the gang. In more detail, a 23-year-old woman and a 52-year-old woman, respectively, state:

...my brother who was seventeen years old, they kept beating him up, because they wanted him to join the group there and he didn’t want to, so my mom decided to leave, a friend found us this house here...my mom sold the house there.

I lived in --, district [comuna] --, in Medellín, they threatened them because my son didn’t want to join the gang there and because my daughter didn’t store weapons in the house.

The arrival of a new gang may also spark displacement. A beauty shop owner, who had lived in her neighbourhood for 12 years before fleeing, said she would have stayed if:

...that other group hadn’t come into the neighbourhood. Well, before I paid the extortion [vacuna] normally that I had always paid but now this group wanted me to pay more and I didn’t have it, and they were more dangerous than the [old] gang [los muchachos]. They knew everything about everyone and that’s why they went direct to charge you the extortion [vacuna] supposedly for the security of the neighbourhood.

A resident may be threatened for the same reason, again and again over time. More than 20% of displaced survey respondents report having been threatened over the span of months or even years, always for the same thing, before fleeing.40 Reasons for being threatened repeatedly include crossing into enemy territory, collaborating with a rival, keeping their children from joining the gang, or not paying “taxes” (vacunas) to the gang. Often, respondents say that a particularly serious threat led them to finally pick up and leave.40 Two middle-aged female survey respondents who had fled violence in peripheral neighbourhoods discuss receiving multiple threats as follows:

*Well, the other times had been like indirect threats, they always sent guys or neighbours to tell us, but my husband and I didn’t pay any attention to that, we didn’t owe anything either and we didn’t have anywhere to go.*

*Yea, they had threatened my son before. But this last time, it was serious [ya la cosa era en serio]. Nothing, after a death threat, there’s nothing left for one to do but leave.*

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40 Details in the appendix.
This section now turns to repeat displacement. One-fifth of survey respondents fled within Medellín (or another city) more than once, as shown in Figure 3. In fact, some residents fled within the city three times, and a couple report fleeing on even more occasions.\textsuperscript{vii}

![Figure 3](image)

Some of these residents report being targeted for the same reason on each occasion they fled, others fled for different reasons each time, and some fled due to upticks in generalized violence. A 34-year-old woman who works odd jobs and a 48-year-old man who works in construction, respectively, say:

\textit{The two displacements were similar, they kicked us out by threat for problems with the neighbours.}

\textit{We had to leave because we could no longer bear so much violence and so many things that happened and we decided to go, two times we left. The first was in 1997 and later in 2010 but we came back because we weren’t able to afford rent in that other part.}\textsuperscript{viii}

Considering the frequency of repeat displacement, having fled in the past may be a predictor of flight in the present. For one, in fleeing violence, families often lose income, rupture social ties, endure trauma, and lose resiliency to withstand future setbacks. Their increased vulnerability may make these families more likely to flee another time.\textsuperscript{41} A second possibility is that past displacement shows individuals and families that flight can be a viable survival strategy and provides them the know-how to safely flee again.

Finally, who or what provokes such flight? In Medellín, street-level neighbourhood gangs are most commonly reported as having provoked respondents’ flight (73%).\textsuperscript{42} A minority of survey respondents (8%) say that a paramilitary or paramilitary successor group expelled them, and several respondents (4%) mention urban militias. The remaining individuals say that the government, neighbours, or family members forced them out.\textsuperscript{x} Meanwhile, a slight majority (60%) say they recognized or knew the person (e.g., armed group member) who made them flee (as shown in Figure 4). This could range from recognizing them when walking down the street to being relatives.

\textsuperscript{vii} Breakdowns in the numbers can be found in the appendix.

\textsuperscript{viii} As this quotation demonstrates, rent in safer neighbourhoods is typically more expensive. Since they cannot afford to live in a safer neighbourhood, some families have no choice but to return to the neighbourhood they originally fled (or one like it), increasing the likelihood they flee again in the future.

\textsuperscript{x} See the appendix for a full breakdown.
IV. DESTINATIONS AND EXPERIENCES AFTER FLEEING URBAN VIOLENCE

The individuals and families who flee urban violence may resettle in another neighbourhood of the same city, in another city, the countryside, or across international borders. Family ties, safety, economic opportunity, and whether pursued by an armed group (and its reach), alongside other factors, determine where the individuals and families eventually resettle. After taking flight, some families move repeatedly across several destinations—within the same city, other cities, or internationally—if safety cannot be found in the first or second place.44

The United States is a common international destination for those fleeing urban violence, but families also flee Central American cities to resettle in an adjacent country, or in Mexico. Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil are also recipients of large numbers of fleeing Venezuelans, reported at over two million (and leaving due to myriad factors, not only violence). Those individuals and families who flee criminal violence then cross international borders often enter the new country by seeking asylum, applying for work visas, or clandestinely. Many then begin new lives in the receiving country. Others, however, are caught in violence along the migration route or are detained in holding, unable to restart their lives. Still others are returned to their countries of origin. Reports show that some of the individuals repatriated by Mexico and the United States to Central American countries have been killed, upon their return, by the very gangs they fled.

Fleeing violence in the city then resettling in the countryside, or in small towns, is also a course some take. However, from the little available evidence, this route appears to be uncommon, due to the relatively limited economic and educational opportunities outside cities. The exceptions are those people with family members in the countryside, ties to rural indigenous groups, or who have skillsets needed for rural work.

In the case of intra-city displacement, families flee violence in one area for another neighbourhood in the same city, hoping the new community will prove safer. Intra-city displacement is unique in that some displaced persons may manage to keep their job (assuming they were employed) and social contacts, unlike families who flee further distances. The new neighbourhood may be a couple kilometres away from the old one, or on the other side of the city.

Generally speaking, displaced persons resettle in a place like their old one—in terms of socio-economic indicators—or one that is worse-off, due to financial losses from fleeing. Regardless of whether they flee within a city or across international borders, some migrants spend time sleeping in the streets or in NGO- and government-run shelters before arriving in their destination. These tend to be the displaced persons with the least financial resources, those pursued by an armed group, or those who fled in a split-second with little time to make plans.

If the family owns the residence left behind, they generally attempt to sell it or rent it out. While this may be possible for some families, such options often prove less-than-ideal or impossible for many. For one,
the same violence that forced out the family often means a drop in home values in the area, making it nearly impossible to recoup enough money from a sale to purchase a place elsewhere. Second, gangs often take over a residence after the owners leave, making it impossible for the family to rent out. Indeed, the gang may have forced the family to flee precisely so that it could rent the residence out to new-comers or use it as a point-of-sale for drugs. The lack of formal titles in peripheral neighbourhoods mean the gang can use, sell off, or rent out the residence (all at a large profit), and the family is left with little recourse.

Despite these challenges, some displaced persons eventually move back to their community, sometimes even to the same residence. Their return may be possible if a new gang takes control of the area, if the reason for their flight has been resolved (e.g., a debt paid back), or if the generalized violence subsides.

Regardless of where they resettle, individuals and families who flee urban violence suffer many difficulties in the following months and years. Financial hardship is common, since families often leave valuables behind when fleeing for their lives, loose income while unable to work during the move, and/or have trouble finding work again upon resettling (particularly if moving through areas where unemployment is high, as in much of Latin America). Moreover, families that flee violence often endure the loss of services at least temporarily, such as education or healthcare, and they endure the psychological trauma of uprooting.

Medellin: What Are Urban Displaced Persons’ Experiences in the Years after Fleeing?

In Medellin, much of the displacement is intra-city, meaning people fleeing violence in one neighbourhood for the relative safety of another neighbourhood in the same city. Among the respondents surveyed in Medellin, along several socio-economic indicators, people who had fled violence in the past were worse off in the present than their counterparts who had not fled threats or violence. Along other such indicators, however, there was some parity.

First, a significant percentage of people who fled urban violence in the past now suffer food insecurity. In this survey, nearly 30% of people who had fled urban violence at some point in the past were unable to afford three meals a day in the week before the survey. In comparison, among those respondents who had never fled violence, 15% were unable to afford three meals a day, as shown in Figure 5.

*The survey gauged the present conditions of displaced persons who fled somewhere between a couple months to a decade (or more) before the survey date. The numbers and figures presented below are averaged experiences for all displaced persons, regardless of how far back they fled. That said, results are relatively consistent no matter the number of years ago the flight took place—e.g., rates of food insecurity remain roughly the same whether considering only respondents who fled 5 or fewer years ago, 10 or fewer years ago, or looking at all respondents who fled urban violence in the sample (what is done here).*
One displaced survey respondent, an out-of-work early-20s construction assistant, says:

> Well, in both [displacements] I had to go to the streets downtown to live...in my house [now] we endure a lot of hunger [aguantamos mucha hambre], no one works and we almost don’t have anything to eat. My mom is sick and she is a much older lady. No one helps us.

On the other hand, while both groups have relatively low levels of savings—roughly 23% and 17%, respectively—respondents who had at some point fled urban violence were more likely to have money saved (even if very little) than those who have never fled. Taken together, these observations show the nuanced experiences of urban displaced persons in the years after fleeing—some had trouble eating that week, while others had money saved (even if only a little).

Moreover, in the neighbourhoods surveyed, people who had fled violence in the past now live in homes made of comparable materials (e.g., wood or cinderblocks) and with comparable levels of public service hook-ups (e.g., water and electricity) as people who had not fled violence. All of the residents surveyed live in some of Medellín’s poorest and most marginalized neighbourhoods, but within these neighbourhoods, urban displaced persons now live in similar residences as their peers who had not fled violence. (Note: there are also formerly displaced persons living in the streets and formerly displaced persons living in middle-income neighbourhoods, but such formerly displaced persons were not included in this survey. Their inclusion might have changed these results). xi

Finally, in the present, people who have fled urban violence are less active in their communities than their peers who live in the same neighbourhoods but have not fled violence. In this survey, being active in the community includes anyone in the household attending community events or meetings, being a member of a local group, or playing on a local sports team, among other activities (see Figure 6). xii

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xi A word of caution is necessary here. The survey was conducted in three peripheral neighbourhoods. While poor and marginalized compared to other neighbourhoods in the city, people surveyed lived in a residence. Some people displaced by violence live in the streets and were, thus, not captured in this survey. As such, while urban displaced persons, in this survey, live in similar conditions as non-displaced peers in the years after taking flight, there are likely urban displaced persons in poorer conditions elsewhere in the city. That said, there are also poor non-forcibly displaced persons living in the streets, too. Unlike my findings, in their study on displacement in Santa Marta, Colombia (“Internal Displacement to Urban Areas”), Jacobsen and Howe find “that IDPs [internally displaced persons] fare worse on almost all indicators of wellbeing than non-IDPs: levels of education, contracted work, housing material, household size, number of disabled in the house, and a wide range of household difficulties.” Their study includes intra-urban displaced persons.

xii Among survey respondents, in the present, a higher percentage of people who have not fled violence (i.e., non-displaced persons) report community activity than do urban displaced persons. This may be the result of any one of many factors. Three are discussed. First, it may simply be because non-displaced people have lived in the neighbourhoods longer and are, thus, more involved in local goings-on. While this is possible, even the respondents who fled urban violence around ten (or more) years ago and resettled are still less likely to be active than their peers who have never fled violence but lived in the neighbourhood around the same number of years. Second, since some displaced persons were targeted precisely for their community or political involvement, they may be more reticent to participate actively in their host communities (even in activities that are not overtly political). Finally, the change in participation rates may have more to do with non-displaced persons than displaced persons. Non-displaced persons report little community activity in the past (during a time of high violence in their neighbourhood, specifically 19% report being active), compared to the present (when 36% report being active). Meanwhile, roughly the same percentage of urban displaced persons report being active in their community before and after fleeing (about 24%). This shift across time, among the non-displaced, may be due to the reduction of violence in Medellín over the years, or other factors. So, it may not be that displaced persons become less engaged after fleeing, but rather that the discrepancy is because non-displaced persons have become disproportionately more active in their communities in recent years.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO LIMIT URBAN FLIGHT DUE TO CRIMINAL VIOLENCE

Many people want to stay in their homes and communities. But gang-related violence leaves them little choice other than to flee. This section lays out policy recommendations to mitigate urban displacement due to criminal violence in Latin American cities. Recommendations focus on mitigating targeted displacement (e.g., individuals threatened due to a characteristic or action), rather than generalized displacement provoked by indiscriminate violence (e.g., inter-gang shoot-outs). Before developing each one in detail below, the ten policy recommendations are enumerated here:

- Train community mediators
- Develop youth-engagement programming
- Establish a civil society-run crime tip line
- Increase police presence and quicken police response time to displacement-prone areas
- Seek out and strengthen well-performing government programs and offices, and develop others
- Provide employment opportunities for gang members
- Reduce gangs’ extortion of residents through collaboration between government offices
- Design interventions to be long-term, fine-grained, and carried out in-neighborhood
- Deploy interventions to peripheral neighbourhoods that are at several levels of development (not just the most marginal); deploy interventions to neighbourhoods in their entirety (not just the most accessible parts)
- Monitor the tell-tale signs of generalized displacement and prepare aid accordingly (for those fleeing)

Background: Policy Recommendations

Violence associated with organized crime forces residents to flee their homes in cities around Latin America. But many families want to stay in their homes and communities, rather than leave behind everything they know. Academics and practitioners, then, must identify mechanisms to aid people—who want to do so—to remain in place. In tandem, lawmakers and NGOs should roll out these new mechanisms and strengthen those already in place.

Naturally, so too must mechanisms be strengthened and newly developed to aid people—who want to do so—to leave. Some urban residents are trapped by scant resources, gang control, and other obstacles, but
want to move elsewhere. Efforts to ensure they make it out safely, find shelter along their journey, and receive assistance resettling are crucial. However, the focus here is on aiding residents to remain.

This paper offers two sets of policy recommendations to aid residents who want to stay in their homes and communities. Both sets draw on data from a survey carried out in Medellín, Colombia, and supporting academic and policy materials.

The first set of policy recommendations are based on displaced persons’ responses to several survey questions about what could have helped them remain in their homes and communities. Relying on the voices of people who have fled urban violence to develop policies has several benefits: first, urban displaced persons unquestionably have on-the-ground knowledge that policymakers, academics, and practitioners lack; second, leveraging such knowledge—of what would and would not work—likely means better designed policies with higher success rates; finally, people deserve a say in the formation of policies that affect them.

The second set of policy recommendations are based on careful statistical analyses of survey data. Such analyses, of data from displacement-prone neighbourhoods, consider displacement patterns and interpersonal connections, as well as a comparison between the characteristics of people who have fled urban violence and those who have not.

A fundamental step in mitigating forced displacement is separating generalized displacement from targeted displacement. While the two types of displacement may share several long-term drivers, they generally have different short-term triggers. As such, different policy recommendations are necessary to address each.

Generalized displacement is provoked by indiscriminate violence, such as that from shoot-outs between gangs (and the police), or gangs that are indiscriminately abusive towards residents in their territory (as laid out in the “triggers” section above). This type of displacement has myriad long-term drivers, such as poverty, lack of opportunity, availability of fire arms, and drug trafficking. It also has several short-term triggers, such as a new criminal group taking control of a neighbourhood or the moment a shoot-out begins. Past policies meant to reduce indiscriminate violence have included encouraging gang truces, singling out particularly violent and abusive gangs, increasing state presence in a territory, developing community policing, and limiting corruption. Increasing job opportunities, improving education, and reducing poverty have also been employed in attempts to reduce such violence. Generalized displacement (and its potential remedies) are not the thrust of this section, however. Instead, the focus here is on targeted displacement.

Targeted displacement is provoked when a gang threatens a particular individual or family based on their actions or characteristics. Examples include an armed group expelling particular residents for their (suspected) collaboration with a rival, or for having broken a community norm (e.g., the law of silence), as well as for refusal to pay “taxes,” being a sexual minority, or because household members refuse to join the gang.

With the exception of one, policy recommendations below focus on mitigating targeted displacement. Additionally, this paper emphasizes concrete, short- and medium-term policy recommendations to reduce flight. That said, broad and long-term efforts, such as reducing poverty and violence, would undoubtedly go a long way in addressing urban displacement due to criminal violence (but despite likely efficacy, they are not the focus here).

Displaced Person-Driven Policy Recommendations

This section lets urban displaced persons speak for themselves. Here, they detail what might have helped them avoid targeted displacement and remain in their home and community. This paper shares responses to the open-ended survey questions, “What could have helped you stay in the neighbourhood?” and “What comments or suggestions do you have for local aid organizations?” Selected responses are presented here. They are organized into groups and, after each, a concrete policy recommendation is offered.
Policies to Strengthen Civil Society

The following policy recommendations propose mechanisms to strengthen civil society as a means to reduce targeted displacement.

To begin, several residents offer community-based suggestions as to what might have helped them remain in their homes and communities. A 65-year-old grandmother, a woman in her early 20s whose family had lived in their home five years before fleeing, and a 26-year-old unemployed woman say:

*That there was someone to negotiate with.*

*If in that moment things had been clarified, we wouldn’t have had to leave.*

*The biggest problem...that neighbours get into fights over everything.*

These responses suggest that community mediators could help mitigate flight. Building up law enforcement capacity to quickly respond to and resolve inter-family disputes is not always a viable option. As such, programs to build skills among community members may be necessary, in particular dispute resolution and conflict management abilities. Many NGOs across Latin American cities already have community leader training programs. Mitigating targeted displacement then, may be partially achieved by increasing funding to such organizations and helping them to build their capacities and expand their models.

This paper turns from mediators to the next policy recommendation: youth activities. Several respondents identify a link between teenagers getting involved in organized crime and the family’s eventual displacement. An empanada vendor and a 19-year-old man, both displaced persons, report that what could have helped them remain in their neighbourhood was:

*That my son hadn’t gotten himself into trouble.*

*That I hadn’t gotten mixed up with all of that. I even told my mom that it wasn’t necessary for us to leave, that I’d stay out of trouble and that I was going to improve my behaviour and pick better friends.*

And when asked what the community would like to see from local non-profits, a woman in her mid-40s who has lived in the neighbourhood more than twenty years and a 43-year-old father of two, respectively, say:

*That they bring programs for the kids of the neighbourhood, activities that complement school.*

*That they bring to the sector recreational activities for children, or workshops or other activities so that kids keep themselves busy.*

The suggested policy recommendation, then, is youth engagement programming. Extracurricular activities that keep kids occupied and encourage their learning—while parents work long hours—may prevent kids from joining gangs. Starting at a young age, kids often join a gang by first running errands, such as buying sodas at the shop or sending messages between gang members. If these same kids were instead busy with an activity they enjoy, the hope is that they would not be available to run errands for the gang. And while not always the case, avoiding first contact with the gang may reduce the chances of full recruitment or later requests from the gang to store drugs or arms (both common reasons cited for fleeing a neighbourhood). Moreover, many survey respondents who managed to remain in their neighbourhoods despite violence

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A word of caution is necessary here. Since community leaders, rights activists, and political organizers are often targeted for their activities, such policy interventions may do well to focus purely on skills building, rather than leader formation or political consciousness raising.
report that they told their children to never say hello to gang members and to avoid them whenever possible.

Other respondents refer to how dangerous it is to speak with the police, leading to the third policy recommendation. The gang-imposed “law of silence” requires that residents in peripheral neighbourhoods not share what they see or hear with anyone. Indeed, gangs force residents out precisely because they are suspected of having told an outsider or the police about something that happened in the neighbourhood. To wit, a 56-year-old Afro-Colombian reports:

Those people [the gang] were very bad and one had to keep quiet or they’d cut out your tongue.

Meanwhile, a 42-year-old woman says that what could have helped her avoid fleeing and remain in the neighbourhood is:

Having communicated with the police so that they would respond...but not from up here.

In this case, the woman is referring to how the police might have been able to help her, but that calling them from up in the marginal neighbourhoods (where she was surveyed) is dangerous. These quotations, then, suggest the need for a mechanism to protect the anonymity of people reporting crimes or threats that may lead to flight (e.g., extortion or the attempted recruitment of children into the gang). Specifically, the policy recommendation is to establish a civil society-run crime tip line. While the police are supposed to protect the identity of individuals who report crimes, this is not always the case in practice. Local organizations in cities such as Rio de Janeiro have developed crime hotlines (called Disque Denúncia, in this case) for residents to anonymously pass on information to the authorities. Since the police do not know who reported the crime, they cannot tell the gang, so the criminal organization lacks the details necessary to forcibly expel the individual who informed. This is a model that could be replicated elsewhere. While witness protection programs must also be strengthened and police corruption reduced, a crime hotline may be an effective medium-term measure to reduce displacement.

Policies to Strengthen the Rule of Law and State Capacity

Next, survey respondents comment on police presence, corruption, and the efficacy of particular city departments. From them, policies to strengthen state capacity and the rule of law are derived. First, several displaced persons say that what could have helped them stay in place is:

That the authorities’ presence was more constant and if they did what they had to do as the authorities.

Maybe if there were more law and presence of the police and government.

That the police had arrived during that moment maybe that way they would have been able to capture the wretched man that beat my son, but no, nothing.

Meanwhile, a mid-20s female warehouse worker denounces corruption:

...supposedly the law is the police but, look, they are so corrupt and the ones that end up paying are us, the family.

Moreover, two respondents share how they were helped, after fleeing:

We filed the complaint [denuncia] in the district attorney’s office [fiscalía] and they accompanied us [nos hicieron el acompañamiento].

xiv A 29-year-old man, a late-40s male construction worker, and an early-40s female medical assistant, respectively.

xv An early-40s out-of-work woman and a 42-year-old woman, respectively.
...[the gang] told me they wanted my son to work for them as an errand boy [carrito] and that if I didn’t let him I had to go...I left and declared [what happened to officials] and they gave me aid [ayudas] three times and now they don’t give me more.

These quotations suggest policies to expand the reach of the rule of law—specifically, to increase police presence and police response time. Yet, police corruption is a perennial problem in many Latin American cities. Simply expanding police presence is not the solution. Rather, a means of addressing such corruption, as the quotations suggest, is to seek out and strengthen well-performing, non-corrupt offices and programmes. Then, when funds are pumped into these programs, an arm of the state is expanded without respective increases in corruption. NGOs can aid in this process by running capacity building and skills transfer workshops for bureaucrats in offices that show promise. Such policies may not only reduce targeted displacement, but also generalized displacement (e.g., increased police presence and response time may reduce the number and duration of shoot-outs).

In addition, displacement may be mitigated through the development and building up of offices and programmes with specific mandates. Among others, public notaries and government offices in charge of registering titles may merit strengthening. Residents with any paperwork showing ownership of their residence are less likely to flee than their peers without such paperwork (at least in the sample reported above). This includes even paperwork that shows no official ownership, but rather unofficially shows that a family bought the residence from the last owner (or purchased the floor above another residence to build upwards). Strengthening the capacities of these offices, then, may encourage residents to stay in place (when combined with other efforts to promote their safety).

Relatedly, Medellín may serve as a springboard for other local governments. Indeed, the city developed several innovative programmes in response to forced displacement which may be worth modelling—both to prevent flight and to aid displaced persons after fleeing. Among other activities and programmes, government offices in Medellín monitor displacement rates, including collecting statistics; research root causes; offer youth programming; maintain an early warning system, mobile units, and field officers; and liaise with police to protect individuals and families at risk of flight. In cases where flight could not be prevented, offices register displaced persons; provide some with shelter and humanitarian aid, as well as legal and psychological services; and if appropriate, the offices ensure displaced persons’ abandoned belongings and residences are protected and subsequently aid in their return or resettlement.

Policies to Reduce Gang Activity

The subsequent policy recommendation concerns reducing gang activity. Some Medellín survey respondents mention the neighbourhood gang directly and suggest interventions to curb gang membership. Indeed, a 29-year-old man, a 46-year-old woman, and a 52-year-old woman report the following:

Give more opportunities to the guys [los muchachos] that hang out in the street corners helping out and watching over the neighbourhood [a reference to gang members].

That the gang members [los muchachos del barrio] are put to work...Well, I think that if they find something to do and if they were given jobs, they wouldn’t be around here doing things.

I think it is the unemployment because truthfully the situation is really bad for a lot of families and it’s really hard to put food on the table, find money to pay for services and things for the house.

The policy recommendation, then, is to reduce gang activity by providing employment opportunities for gang members. Street-level gangs are generally the criminal organization responsible for provoking displacement. If their members leave the gang for other work—perhaps assisted through a church or other programme—then displacement is likely to decline, simply because there are fewer gang members to expel neighbourhood residents. But this is a medium- to long-term fix, which relies on the creation of
employment opportunities able to rival drug sales—in prestige and remuneration. Providing employment opportunities for gang members may also reduce generalized displacement (e.g., as fewer gang members in a community would mean fewer shoot-outs).

Expert Policy Recommendations

This paper turns now to policy recommendations based on the analysis of broader displacement patterns, and the systematic comparison between the characteristics of survey respondents who have fled urban violence and those who have not.

**Reduce extortion** to reduce displacement. Extortion is a common impetus for flight, as seen in quotations and figure 2 above. Some gangs expel residents who do not have the money to pay “taxes” for community security, or who refuse to do so. If gangs made fewer demands for extortion, then there would be fewer opportunities for an argument over money (between the gang and family) to go south, or for families to be expelled simply for not having money to stay. Cities may push gangs to avoid extorting residents by increasing punishments for doing so and putting more resources into investigating such crimes. In addition, many cities already have offices dedicated to monitoring and reducing extortion. There may be opportunities for collaboration, then, between these offices and other government agencies or NGOs looking to prevent displacement.

Next, interventions must be designed that are long-term, carried out in-neighbourhood, and sufficiently fine-grained to navigate and intervene in interpersonal relationships among community members. As shown, rather than gangs swooping in and forcing out any and everyone, much displacement is targeted, meaning the gang knows the individual or family they are threatening to “get out, or else.” Indeed, many of the displaced persons surveyed report having known the gang member who made them flee, which may range from saying hello in passing to being family members (shown in the “triggers” section above). Moreover, many respondents had also lived in their homes for more than ten years before fleeing violence or threats, and a significant minority of respondents participated in their communities before taking flight (discussed in the “who flees criminal violence” section). Clearly, in displacement-prone neighbourhoods, nearly everyone knows everyone and interpersonal ties matter. As such, an intervention to mitigate flight is more likely to succeed—regardless if it is community mediators, youth programming, or another project—if it takes into account interpersonal relationships in the community and is permanent enough to generate trust.

Interventions must be developed in all types of peripheral neighbourhoods, not just the least developed. As shown, urban residents who flee violence generally flee underserved, peripheral neighbourhoods. But policy interventions must take into account the heterogeneity of these peripheral neighbourhoods and, rather than deploy only in the most marginal of them, also work in those peripheral neighbourhoods that are slightly more developed. Doing so is necessary, because individuals and families are fleeing peripheral neighbourhoods that, while all marginal, reach several levels of socio-economic development.

Similarly, policy interventions must encompass marginal neighbourhoods in their entirety. Interventions in only the most accessible parts of neighbourhoods (where there may be a church or community space convenient for the intervention), or only in the furthest reaches of neighbourhoods (where it is incorrectly thought most displacement takes place) are unlikely to succeed. To meaningfully reduce displacement rates, the neighbourhood in its entirety must receive the intervention, since residents flee from all parts of these neighbourhoods (as shown in the “who flees? from where in the city?” section).

While not the focus of this section, the final policy recommendation concerns generalized displacement and offers a mechanism to aid those who flee. Specifically, local governments and NGOs can monitor the tell-tale signs of generalized displacement and prepare humanitarian aid (for those fleeing) accordingly. The timing of indiscriminate violence is difficult to predict—indeed, how can someone know when a gang will start a shoot-out or deploy violence seemingly at random against a community? There are several tell-tale signs, however. The signs are three-fold (as discussed in the “triggers” section above). They are a new gang taking over a territory, a gang bucking the control of a higher-up criminal structure, and leadership struggles in the gang. Such knowledge—which local newspapers and government security observatories
often possess—can help humanitarian organizations plan for times of increased work and provision of aid. NGO aid deployment (to help those fleeing) might consist of opening more beds in shelters, having additional food at the ready, and activating networks to assist with resettlement, among other programmes. And because generalized displacement is more likely to involve the flight of many families (or even blocks of households), preparation and quick response are particularly crucial.

**Urban Resettlement Assistance in the Face of Violence and Insecurity**

Displaced persons who resettle in cities in the Global South are likely to face some degree of insecurity, violence, or organized crime. For these families to remain safely in their new homes and communities, NGOs and governments should consider building some of the above policy recommendations into urban resettlement assistance programmes.

Concretely, cities are growing in size and number; more and more displaced persons are resettling in them (rather than staying in camps) through either assistance programmes or their own agency; and urban centres are increasingly faced with violence, organized crime, and the unequal provision of security. Since urban violence is all but certain to remain a concern, governments and NGOs may help displaced persons to remain where they first resettle by incorporating some of the interventions laid out here into their relevant planning and policies. Relevant for those resettling in cities too, the policy recommendations in this paper are meant to aid urban residents—who want to do so—to stay in their homes and communities despite insecurity.

**VI. METHODOLOGICAL NOTES**

As with all studies, this policy paper has limitations. Three are discussed here: namely, the shortcomings of a survey conducted in a limited number of neighbourhoods, the drawbacks of correlational (rather than causal) methods of data collection and analysis, and the disadvantages of focusing on one particular case (Medellín).

First, the survey results presented above reliably detail the lives of displaced persons in three neighbourhoods of Medellín. And these results are corroborated by other sources—academic, government, and policy—where possible. Such detail is useful in understanding how displacement actually happens, on the ground. However, because the survey was conducted in only three purposively selected neighbourhoods of one city, results may not be generalizable to other parts of the city or to other cities. In other words, these survey results are meant to provide a reliable understanding of displacement in three neighbourhoods of Medellín, as well as a sense of trends in displacement in other cities—but these trends will not hold in all Latin American cities.

Second, the survey results are correlational, not causal, so must be interpreted with care. Concerning, post-displacement outcomes, for instance, many urban displaced persons are worse-off by socio-economic indicators than their non-displaced peers. However, because the methods employed do not produce causal results, it cannot be said that having fled caused food insecurity (for example). Instead, respondents who have fled urban violence tend to be more food insecure than their non-displaced peers. Food insecurity may, in fact, be the result of something other than having fled urban violence; indeed, something in the person’s profile may make them more likely to both be food insecure (for example) and to flee violence.

Finally, Medellín has two important dynamics that may make displacement there unique, thus limiting the generalizability of findings to other cities. First, Medellín likely has more public investment and state capacity than many other cities where rates of displacement are high. In other words, in the peripheral neighbourhoods of Medellín, corruption and inconsistent state presence certainly exist, but perhaps to a lesser degree than in other Latin American cities. Second, some of Medellín’s displacement is provoked by actors with ties to the country’s decades-long armed conflict, such as paramilitary successor groups. Since the same cannot be said for many cities outside Colombia where displacement occurs, Medellín may again be unique. That said, most of the displacement in Medellín—especially in recent years—is provoked by low-level street gangs that have only tenuous ties to the civil war, if any. Moreover, these street-level gangs are largely motivated by profit. As such, gangs in Medellín may have much in common with criminal
organizations elsewhere in Latin America. Both dynamics are worth keeping in mind when interpreting findings.

Despite these limitations—namely, correlative data collected from a limited number of neighborhoods and a focus on one city—this policy paper has several strengths. Among others, findings laid out here provide a valuable and fine-grained look at displacement and include displaced persons’ voices in the development of policy recommendations. In addition, data from outside Medellín and from research methodologies other than the survey are incorporated where possible.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Individuals and families who want to move from one place to another have the fundamental human right to do so. Freedom of movement and residence are enshrined in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, some people want to remain in place, yet are driven away by organized crime and violence. As documented throughout this paper, fleeing criminal violence in Latin American cities is all too common. The policy recommendations laid out above are meant to aid people who want to stay in their homes and communities.

The magnitude of urban flight is not matched by research on the topic. Concerning criminal violence-induced displacement in cities, many questions remain to be explored. For one, when is an individual no longer considered a displaced person (or refugee), when it comes to fleeing within or from a city? In other words, when is resettlement (or return) considered durable? And, how long does it take for urban displaced persons to recoup their former living conditions, community participation, and human capacities (if ever)? Second, other than criminal violence, what security and safety obstacles are preventing durable resettlement (or return), in cities? And, how might they be best surmounted? Finally, why precisely are individuals and families that have already fled violence once (whether in a city or the countryside) more likely to flee again? And, are certain interventions better suited to preventing repeat urban displacement (rather than first-time displacement)?

VIII. APPENDIX

Had the Threat, Action, etc., that Lead the Respondent to Flee this Time also Happened to Them (or a Family Member) Before?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When did the Threat, Action, etc. that Led to Flight this Time Happen in the Past?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The week before</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The month before</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The year before</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1 and 5 years before</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 years before</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having Answered “Yes” to the Question “Have You Fled Before in/from a City,” How Many Times?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Threatened for the Same Reason over Time (Not Including Generalized Violence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>82.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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### Primary Actor that Made Respondent Flee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood gang</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>73.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary (successor group)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban militias</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police/government</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family member</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one made respondent leave</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Neighborhood Fled Had a Commercial Zone Where Basic Products Could Be Purchased

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
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### Years Lived in the House before Fleeing

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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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1 For helpful comments and insights, I thank Rebecca Bell-Martin, Elizabeth Fussell, Jon Gordon, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Cadence Wills, participants in the Migration Working Group (PSTC, Brown University), and IDMC researchers and experts. All errors remain my own.


8 The exceptions include the scholars cited throughout this paper.

9 This definition draws heavily on Steele’s work on wartime displacement. I build on her definition by explicitly referring to cities and allowing for violence and conflicts outside of traditional war. For more, see Abbey Steele, Democracy and Displacement in Colombia’s Civil War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), pg. 15.


209; Sánchez Mojica, “A Silenced Exodus.” For more on overall homicide reduction despite the persistence of violent criminal organizations, see Doyle, “Explaining Patterns of Urban Violence in Medellín, Colombia.” More details on Medellín’s reduction in poverty over the last decade can be found in Medellín Cómo Vamos, Informe de Calidad de Vida de Medellín, 2017, Pobreza, Desigualdad y Demografía, pg. 6, 19-20, available at: https://www.medellincomovamos.org/download/informe-de-indicadores-objetivos-sobre-como-vamos-en-pobreza-desigualdad-y-demografia/


17 Much of this work is a success. And resource shortfalls are a perennial problem. Such efforts are run by La Fiscalía (District Attorney’s Office) and La Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integradas a las Víctimas (Unit for Attention and Comprehensive Reparation for Victims), among other offices. For more, see Sánchez Mojica, “A Silenced Exodus,” pg. 105-107.

18 For more details on the survey, sampling procedures, and safety measures taken, see Marston, “Resisting Displacement.”

19 IDMC, An Atomised Crisis, pg. 29; Personería de Medellín, Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en la Ciudad de Medellín.


21 For more on the well-off fleeing violence in Mexico, see Díaz Leal, “Internal Displacement in Mexico,” pg. 49-50; and for the same in Mexico and Central America, see Cantor, “The New Wave,” pg. 55-57; and IDMC, An Atomised Crisis, pg. 29-32.

22 For more on the voluntary choice (albeit a reluctant one) of middle-class households to move away from urban crime in Brazil, see Muggah, “The Invisible Displaced,” pg. 224. For strategies to cope with violence among the well off, see Ana Villarreal, “Fear and Spectacular Drug Violence in Monterrey,” in Violence at the Urban Margins, eds. Javier Auyero, Phillippe Bourgois, and Nancy Schepers-Hughes (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).

23 Sánchez Mojica, “A Silenced Exodus,” pg. 97-99; Díaz Leal, “Internal Displacement in Mexico,” pg. 52-53. For more on the residents that remain behind despite threats and violence, see Marston, “Resisting Displacement.”


27 Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Aniquilar la Diferencia; and Personería, Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en la Ciudad de Medellín, pg. 211-213.

28 In Colombia, see Marston, “Resisting Displacement.” In Brazilian cities, see Muggah, “The Invisible Displaced,” pg. 225. For Central America and Mexico, see and Cantor, “The New Wave,” pg. 48-49 and IDMC, An Atomised Response, pg. 25.


31 Karen Jacobsen and Kimberly Howe, Internal Displacement to Urban Areas.

32 For more on displacement due to chronic violence and armed group confrontations in Brazilian cities, see Muggah, “The Invisible Displaced,” pg. 226. For more on inter-gang disputes and gangs forcing out residents with ties to the losing opponent in Central America, see Cantor, “The New Wave,” pg. 50.
34 Sánchez Mojica, “A Silenced Exodus,” pg. 98-99; Personería, Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en la Ciudad de Medellín, pg. 213-214. For more on types of displacement, see Marston, “Resisting Displacement”; Cantor, “The New Wave”; and Steele, Democracy and Displacement in Colombia’s Civil War.
40 Cantor, “The New Wave,” pg. 41, mentions that in his interviews with displaced persons some mentioned a particular trigger; see Marston also, “Resisting Displacement.”
42 See also Personería, Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en la Ciudad de Medellín, pg. 213; and Marston, “Resisting Displacement.”
44 Bada and Feldmann, “How Insecurity Is Transforming Migration Patterns in the North American Corridor,” pg. 69; IDMC, An Atomised Crisis, pgs. 32-34; Cantor, “Gang Violence as a Cause of Forced Migration in the Northern Triangle of Central America,” pg. 39; and Díaz Leal and Pérez Vázquez, “Desplazados por Violencia.”
47 IDMC, An Atomised Crisis, pgs. 36-37.
48 Cantor, “The New Wave,” pg. 54; IDMC, An Atomised Crisis, pg. 31.
49 IDMC, An Atomised Crisis, pg. 31.
50 Cantor, “The New Wave,” pg. 54; Marston, “Resisting Displacement.”
52 Knox, “Factors Influencing Decision Making by People Fleeing Central America”; IDMC, An Atomised Crisis, pg. 31.
Ibid.  
56 Díaz Leal, “Internal Displacement in Mexico,” pgs. 49-50; IDMC, An Atomised Crisis, pg. 39; Millard and Lara-Florian, Cause or Consequence?, pgs. 24, 27.  
57 For instance, according to the following study, the decision of many migrants from Honduras and El Salvador to leave their countries is primarily one of safety, rather than one driven by economic opportunities. Jonathan T. Hiskey, Abby Córdova, Mary Fran Malone, and Diana M. Orcés, “Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization, US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in Central America,” Latin American Research Review 53, no. 3 (2018): 429-2447. Furthermore, in the IDMC publication Cause or Consequence? Millard and Lara-Florian write: “People generally prefer to remain in their home communities and make substantial efforts to mitigate factors such as violence in an effort to avoid having to leave,” pg. 6.  
58 Ibid.  
59 These include programs run by La Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (the Unit for Attention and Comprehensive Reparation for Victims) and La Fiscalía (the District Attorney’s Office), among others. For more details, see the following: http://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/sede/medellin; “Informe de Riesgo 001-2012 Para Las Comunas 3 Manrique, 8 Villa Hermosa, 16 Belén y el Corregimiento de San Antonio de Prado del Municipio de Medellín,” Unidad Móvil de Gestión y Prevención del Riesgo de Violaciones de Derechos Humanos y de Infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario (Diciembre 2012); “Análisis del Contexto y la Dinámica del Desplazamiento Forzado Intraurbano en la Ciudad de Medellín,” Unidad de Análisis y Evaluación de Política Pública, Secretaría de Bienestar Social (Julio, 2010).  
61 Doyle, “Explaining Patterns of Urban Violence in Medellín, Colombia,” pg. 7; Jorge Giraldo Ramírez, Andrés Julián Rendón Cardona, and Gustavo Duncan Cruz, Nuevas Modalidades de Captación de Rentas Illegales en Medellín (Medellín, Colombia: Universidad EAFIT, 2014).