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# GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Comparing the experiences  
of internally displaced persons  
in urban vs. rural areas:

Findings from a longitudinal  
study in Iraq, 2015-2017

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Background paper to the main report



# Comparing the Experiences of Internally Displaced Persons in Urban vs. Rural Areas: Findings from a Longitudinal Study in Iraq, 2015-2017<sup>1</sup>

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## I. INTRODUCTION:

As part of sustainable development goals, the UN's New Urban Agenda commits to "[f]ully respect the rights of refugees, migrants and internally displaced persons regardless of their migration status."<sup>3</sup> Today, more displaced people live in urban rather than rural areas and have been found to be more vulnerable than the urban poor.<sup>4</sup> The full scope of both the challenges faced by those displaced to urban areas and the opportunities they utilize to survive and contribute to urban development is becoming more of a focus for development and aid policies and practices, but still remains largely unmapped.<sup>5</sup> More and better data and analyses of urban policies that take into consider the solutions that displaced people access will make it possible to assess if and how the rights of such groups are in fact fully respected. In seeking to contribute to such a mapping, this study nuances the understanding of "urban" displacement and relies on a new, unique longitudinal study of internal displacement in Iraq. This paper thus details the experiences of a non-camp population of IDPs through a comparison of those displaced to urban versus rural areas.

In the framing of locations of displaced populations, there is a conceptual ambiguity in the term "urban displacement." Much of the humanitarian aid framing breaks down IDPs into to "urban" versus "camp" populations. This false dichotomy, however, confounds two separate issues: whether IDPs are living in camps or not, and whether those non-camp populations are displaced to urban or rural areas. Not all non-camp IDPs are displaced to urban areas and some camps are located in (or have become with time) urban areas. While studies that compare "urban" displacement to "camp" displacement are keen to recognize that urban IDPs are harder to identify and serve,<sup>6</sup> this is true more generally to *non-camp* IDPs, regardless of the area to which they were displaced.<sup>7</sup>

By untangling the concept of "urban" displacement in this way, this paper seeks to make inroads into discussions of urban displacement studying only *non-camp* IDPs and asking how and to what extent do the

<sup>1</sup> Data and research used in this publication comes from a longitudinal study conducted by the International Organization for Migration in Iraq and Georgetown University on Iraqi IDPs' Access to Durable Solutions. All views and perspectives expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect IOM's position. Funding for this research comes from the United States Government's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

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<sup>3</sup> UN Sustainable Development Goals, 20 October 2016. *The New Urban Agenda: Key Commitments*. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/10/newurbanagenda/>

<sup>4</sup> IDMC, February 2018. *Urban Myths? Debunking Claims About Displacement in Cities*. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/expert-opinion/urban-myths-debunking-claims-about-displacement-in-cities>; see also Lauren Wyman, February 2018. *City of Challenge and Opportunity: Employment and livelihoods for internally displaced people in Maiduguri, Borno State*. IDMC. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/20180209-idmc-nigeria-case-study.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> IDMC, 11 October 2016. *Leaving No One Behind: Internal Displacement and the New Urban Agenda*. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/20161011-new-urban-agenda.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Karen Jacobsen, August 2008. *Internal Displacement to Urban Areas: the Tufts-IDMC Profiling Study. Khartoum, Sudan: Case 1*. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/200809-af-sudan-urban-displacement-khartoum-country-en.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> One consequence of semantically collapsing these two distinctions into one term is a curtailed spectrum of comparisons that can be made among different IDP subpopulations. While comparisons of non-camp, urban-displaced IDPs to camp-based IDPs yield important insights, non-camp IDPs displaced to *rural areas* are, by definition, excluded from the analysis, and as such, so too are more nuanced understandings of salient characteristics specific to non-camp IDPs displaced to *urban areas* by comparison.

needs, opportunities, challenges, and self-engineered solutions of non-camp IDPs vary between those displaced to urban versus rural areas, and what are the ensuing implications for policy interventions?

To answer this question, this paper explores the experiences of Iraqi IDPs across four key realms: livelihoods, standard of living, security, and social cohesion. In each realm, we explore how IDPs themselves make decisions about and respond to their circumstances and how host communities and authorities accommodate them. To do so, we analyze qualitative and quantitative data from the panel study *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq*, which is conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Georgetown University and tracks the experiences of the same families over time.<sup>8</sup>

We found that experiences of IDPs varied not only according to the location of displacement, but also on whether they were displaced to a city but were originally from a rural or urban area. Specifically, with respect to feelings of safety, the ability to provide for basic needs, feelings of acceptance, and rationale for staying in their current locations, the experiences of those displaced to urban areas differed based on whether they were *originally* from a rural or urban area. While we highlight salient differences between non-camp urban and rural IDPs throughout, we focus mainly on the experiences of urban IDPs. Our key data and findings are as follows:

*With respect to livelihoods:*

- Most IDPs found employment in the informal sector--which is both unreliable and temporary--and those living in urban areas do so at higher rates than those living in rural ones. In contrast, higher shares of rural IDPs were able to access public sector jobs.
- In the absence of agricultural opportunities and microfinance schemes to bolster business ventures, IDPs relied on personal resources and connections to find jobs.

*With respect to standard of living:*

- Majorities of both urban and rural IDPs reported being able to provide for their basic needs, but among those displaced to cities, those *originally from* rural areas are more able to do so than those from urban areas.
- Both urban and rural IDPs reduced types and amounts of food and other expenses and borrowed money to survive. Though upwards of 90% reported needing to borrow money, less than half of each group are able to do so.
- Access to humanitarian aid poses a significant problem. Over 90% of IDPs reported not getting regular aid, and when they do, both groups indicated it is intermittent, a finding that was more frequently reported among rural IDPs.
- Standards of living in displacement are worse than what they were prior to displacement. When asked about their current living standards in comparison to the host community, both rural and urban IDPs reported that the host community was better off. Higher shares of rural IDPs reported this than urban IDPs.

*With respect to security:*

- Almost all IDPs reported feeling safe in their host communities, but the degree of safety varies between urban and rural IDPs. Only one third of urban IDPs, compared to nearly half of rural IDPs, reported feeling completely safe. The majority of urban IDPs reported feeling moderately safe.
- In the absence of personal networks or tribal affiliations to solve problems when they arose, IDPs instead turned to state institutions. But trust in state institutions to seek justice for regular crimes was significantly lower among urban IDPs.

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<sup>8</sup> For more information on this study, please see: International Organization for Migration and Georgetown University, 2017. *Access to Durable Solutions among IDPs in Iraq: Part I*. <https://www.iom.int/news/access-durable-solutions-among-idps-iraq-un-migration-agency-georgetown-university-publish>.

*With respect to social cohesion:*

- Majorities of both urban and rural IDPs suggested they felt strongly or somewhat accepted by the host community, though strong feelings of acceptance were higher among rural IDPs. IDPs from rural areas living in urban areas reported feeling accepted at lower rates than urban-urban IDPs.
- The extent of IDP integration into host communities varied widely. Among urban IDPs, pre-existing familial ties, humanitarian gestures initiated by host community members, and the urban environment itself were commonly mentioned as factors that facilitated assimilation. Meanwhile, IDPs mentioned that legal hurdles, discrimination, and cultural and linguistic barriers impeded their integration.

Despite the long history of forced displacement in Iraq, there is limited data on non-camp IDPs in either urban or rural areas, and what does exist focuses on IDPs' economic circumstances.<sup>9</sup> This study elucidates IDPs' security situation and social cohesion as well as their economic circumstances across both urban and rural contexts. Our paper proceeds as follows: first, we explain the methodology used to gather the data for our study and the definitions we adopt for urban versus rural areas. Then, we analyze the quantitative survey data and qualitative interview excerpts to compare the experiences of urban and rural IDPs in terms of livelihoods, standard of living, security, and social cohesions, with a focus on the experiences of urban IDPs. We conclude with a summary of our findings and recommendations specific to urban versus rural IDPs.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW:

### Urban Displacement

Internal displacement to urban areas is one of the key challenges facing IDPs and host communities alike.<sup>10</sup> More displaced people live in urban rather than rural areas, urban IDPs are inherently more vulnerable than the urban poor, and that urban displacement calls for more humanitarian assistance.<sup>11</sup> IDMC has consistently found that women face unique challenges during urban displacement, including a greater risk of eviction from their households and difficulty accessing financial resources and jobs.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, one of the most common challenges of urban displacement is a pre-existing housing shortage in urban centres, which is only exacerbated by the arrival of more residents.<sup>13</sup>

The IDMC also presents a series of recommendations in order to address the challenges posed by urban displacement, as well as the phenomenon in and of itself. One of these is to pay increased attention to the impact of urban development and its potential to displace people by causing increased poverty. Furthermore, it recommends viewing IDPs as agents for urban development as opposed to a burden on the urban economy or as competition for jobs. Lastly, it calls for better data collection on IDPs living in urban centres in order that organizations can better understand and address their needs.<sup>14</sup> Our study, with its

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<sup>9</sup> For example, see REACH Initiative, October 2015. *Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment for Internally Displaced Persons Outside of Camps in Iraq*.

<sup>10</sup> IDMC, "Urban Internal Displacement." <http://www.internal-displacement.org/research-areas/urban-internal-displacement>

<sup>11</sup> IDMC, "Urban Myths? Debunking Claims About Displacement in Cities." February 2018. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/expert-opinion/urban-myths-debunking-claims-about-displacement-in-cities>. See also Lauren Wyman, "City of Challenge and Opportunity: Employment and livelihoods for internally displaced people in Maiduguri, Borno State." IDMC. February 2018. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/20180209-idmc-nigeria-case-study.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.; IDMC, October 2015. "Facing Eviction: Displaced Urban Women at Increased Risk." <http://www.internal-displacement.org/expert-opinion/facing-eviction-displaced-urban-women-at-increased-risk>

<sup>13</sup> Huma Gupta, "Home sweet home: Housing practices and tools that support durable solutions for urban IDPs." March 2015. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/20150325-global-home-sweet-home-en-full-report.pdf>;

IDMC, February 2014. "Still at risk: The forced eviction of displaced people in urban Afghanistan" <http://www.internal-displacement.org/expert-opinion/still-at-risk-the-forced-eviction-of-displaced-people-in-urban-afghanistan>

<sup>14</sup> IDMC, "Leaving No One Behind: Internal displacement and the New Urban Agenda." 11 October 2016. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/20161011-new-urban-agenda.pdf>

unique, longitudinal data collection, provides a window into the needs of urban IDPs and how they respond to the issues they face.

### IDPs in Iraq

Iraq provides an informative context in which to study urban displacement. In the 1940s and 1950s, massive urbanization resulted from landless rural families fleeing the repressive and poverty-inducing policies of landowners. They created temporary encampments that have transformed into thriving neighborhoods of Baghdad and Basrah.<sup>15</sup> In the 1970s and 1980s, Saddam Hussein's regime used displacement as a political tool to consolidate political control, implementing Arabization and other policies that marginalized ethnic and religious minorities, displacing over 1 million Kurdish and Shi'a Iraqis.<sup>16</sup> The 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Hussein regime did not immediately cause people to move. But the resulting instability led to sectarian violence that began in 2006 and has led to repeated waves of displacement, both internal and to outside the country.<sup>17</sup> Most recently, starting in late 2013, the violent takeover by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) of parts of northern and central Iraq (and parts of Syria) has led to yet another displacement crisis.<sup>18</sup> By July 2017, the number of IDPs stood at over 3 million, but throughout this period, there were continuous IDPs who were moving or returning if they could, totalling over 5 million people displaced by ISIS.<sup>19</sup> The recent military operations to retake Mosul and the surrounding areas from ISIS triggered further displacement but also allowed many to return. As of December 2018, the number of returnees was 4.1 million, with 1.8 million people still counted as IDPs.<sup>20</sup>

In examining the pre-existing literature on IDPs in Iraq, including those living in and out of camps, little publicly available data is published on whether IDPs came from a rural or urban area, nor do such studies discuss the details of such types of displacement in their analysis. In comparing urban and rural districts, the literature does shed a light on the economic success of IDPs. A REACH needs assessment survey from 2015 broken down by the governorate of residence shows that the number of economically inactive households was highest in three primarily rural governorates: Muthanna, Qadissiya, and Missan.<sup>21</sup> Three governorates with vibrant cities--Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Basrah--saw the lowest numbers of economically inactive households. This same study also found the incomes of IDPs residing in urban environments to be much more stable.

Increased urbanization in general is in no small part caused by the failure of the Iraqi agricultural sector, and the IDP movements to the city are unlikely to return without considered and substantial effort to restore agriculture in Iraq. The agriculture sector is the second largest contributor to GDP, and even though the sector only contributes to 5% of overall GDP, a third of Iraqis in the labour force are in the agriculture industry.<sup>22</sup> Total area of agricultural production is around 8 million hectares; however, the average area actually cropped is 3-4 million hectares due to "soil salinity, drought, shortage of irrigation water in

<sup>15</sup> Phillips, Doris. "Rural-to-Urban Migration in Iraq." *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. (July 1959).

<sup>16</sup> Sassoon, Joseph, *The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis in the Middle East*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2009, p. 9; see also Chatelard, Geraldine, "What Visibility Conceals: Re-embedding Refugee Migration from Iraq" and al-Takriti, Nabil, "There Go the Neighbourhoods: Policy Effects vis-à-vis Iraqi Forced Migration" both chapters in Dawn Chatty and Bill Finlayson (eds.), *Dispossession and Displacement: Forced Migration in the Middle East and North Africa* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

<sup>17</sup> Chatty, Dawn and Mansour, Nisrine, "Unlocking Protracted Displacement: An Iraq Case Study" *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 30, (2011): pp. 52 <http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org/content/30/4/50.full.pdf+html>; Chatelard, Geraldine, "Iraqi refugee and IDPs: From humanitarian intervention to durable solutions." *Middle East Institute and Fondation Pour La Recherche Strategique* (June 9, 2011).

<sup>18</sup> IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix-Iraq Mission. Round XXX, October 2015, [http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&id=4384:displacement-tracking-matrix-dtm-round-xxx-october-2015](http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=4384:displacement-tracking-matrix-dtm-round-xxx-october-2015), pp. 4-7.

<sup>19</sup> IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix-Iraq Mission. Round 70, April 2017, p. 1. For a snapshot of 2014-2019, see here: <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/IDPsML.aspx>.

<sup>20</sup> Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq-IOM; <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/>. Accessed 10 January 2018.

<sup>21</sup> REACH, October 2015. "Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment for Internally Displaced Persons Outside of Camps in Iraq," 17. [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gg1RUiBn\\_hUSjt9KMwi8-082vH3DybEo/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gg1RUiBn_hUSjt9KMwi8-082vH3DybEo/view)

<sup>22</sup> Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2017. *Iraq: Agricultural damage and loss needs assessment*. ReliefWeb, n/a. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IraqDamageandLoss.pdf>.

summer, following and the unstable political situation.”<sup>23</sup> More than 80% of Iraqi farms lie on less than 10 hectares of land. In 2012, agriculture comprised around 4.9% of Iraq’s labour force (half of whom are women) which decreased by 5.9% since 1997.<sup>24</sup>

Following the end of Ba’athist party rule and through the American occupation from 2004 to 2010, Iraq experienced a 90% decrease in agricultural productivity attributed to the workforce shifting toward state employment, a drought that caused less wheat production, and a lack of government support and subsidization. The takeover of rural areas by ISIS beginning in 2013 caused additional issues: Iraq lost 40% of agricultural production due to failed crops and inability to plant and harvest, displaced populations, and destroyed grain bins. Wheat and barley production decreased by 75-80%, with Nineveh suffering the most. Almost 75% of livestock was lost with some areas. Fishery production loss occurred with the high cost of fish feed and insufficient access to supplies. Selling production remains low because of lack of demand and storage.<sup>25</sup> In addition, at present, Iraq faces challenges such as reduced water availability because of inefficient irrigation systems, intermittent electricity, substandard seed quality, insufficient herbicide, insecticide, and fertilizer supply, under-mechanized production, a land tenure system preventing economies of scale, and time consuming and expensive import procedures.<sup>26</sup>

### III. METHODOLOGY

This paper relies on data collected as part of an ongoing, mixed-method study on access to durable solutions among non-camp Iraqi IDP households who were displaced between January 2014 and December 2015 by the arrival of ISIS in their places of origin. The joint project between the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Georgetown University includes four rounds of survey and interview data collection, one in 2016, two in 2017, and a fourth in fall 2018. A text-message-based system allowed the study to track participants’ changes in residence over four rounds of data collection, and households received cell-phone credits to cover the phone expenses incurred from their participation in the study. By following households as they remain displaced, integrate, relocate, or return, the study responds to a dearth of data on internal displacement globally by following IDPs through time. In addition, the study offers extensive data on IDPs living in urban centres in order that organizations can better understand and address IDPs’ needs.

The study initially included 3852 IDP households displaced to one of four governorates of displacement— Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. These IDPs originated from seven governorates —Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. The four governorates represent salient political, economic, and social differences throughout the country. Sulaymaniyah is part of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Kirkuk is governed by the central government of Iraq but is a disputed area between the KRG and the central Iraqi government and has a large Kurdish population and Kurdish military (Peshmerga) presence.<sup>27</sup> Baghdad is the smallest governorate geographically but largest in population and also has Iraq’s capital city. Basrah has the fewest IDPs but is one of the poorest governorates in Iraq.

The quantitative findings on security, livelihoods, standard of living, and social cohesion analyzed below rely on weighted survey data from Round 3 of the study (July-August 2017), and include responses from

<sup>23</sup> Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2018. *Iraq at a Glance*. FAO, Italy. <http://www.fao.org/iraq/fao-in-iraq/iraq-at-a-glance/en/>.

<sup>24</sup> Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2013. *Iraq: Country Programming Framework 2013-2017*. FAO, Iraq. <http://www.fao.org/3/a-au666e.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2017. Iraq: Agricultural damage and loss needs assessment. ReliefWeb, n/a. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IraqDamageandLoss.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Ronald P. Verdonk, 2011. Challenges in Iraq’s Agricultural Sector. Iraq-Business News, n/a. <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/02/07/challenges-in-iraqs-agriculture-sector/>.

<sup>27</sup> The Peshmerga is the military of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

the 2592 IDP households who remained in the same location throughout their time in displacement.<sup>28</sup> The data thus generalizes to the population of IDPs displaced between 2014 and 2015 from one of the seven origin governorates to the four displacement governorates and who remained in the districts to which they were displaced through August 2017. Qualitative interviews were conducted with 80 IDPs and 80 host community members in each round, with Rounds 2 and 3 IDP interviews conducted with the same families over time.

Investigating how displacement experiences vary between those displaced to urban versus rural areas necessitated first defining the location of households in displacement. Categorization of each displacement location was carried out at the sub-district level, the smallest of the three main administrative units that organize Iraq. Using 2014 data—the latest available—from the Iraqi Ministry of Planning’s Central Statistical Organization (CSO) provided by IOM, each subdistrict was determined to be either “urban” or “rural” based on the ratio of the urban to rural population: where there was a larger urban than rural population, the subdistrict was coded as urban and where there was a larger rural than urban population, the subdistrict was designated rural.<sup>29</sup>

In total, there are 45 urban subdistricts that host 59% of IDP households and 16 rural subdistricts that host the remaining 41% of households.<sup>30</sup> A list of subdistricts, their population size, and categorization for the purposes of this study appears in Appendix A. Of the 45 urban subdistricts, 16 are in Sulaymaniyah (11.9% of sampled households in urban areas), 18 were in Baghdad (42.8% of the sampled households in urban areas), 3 are in Kirkuk (2.9 % of the sampled households in urban areas), and 8 are in Basrah (1.2 % of the sampled households in urban areas).

In Round 3, households were asked to self-report whether they were originally from a rural area, town, or city. Those who reported they were from a town or a city were both defined as being from urban areas for the purposes of the study. As summarized in Table 1, among the 59% of IDP households that were displaced to urban areas, approximately 59% were originally from rural areas and 41% were originally from urban areas. Where salient, the findings below highlight differences between those originally from rural areas and displaced to urban areas (hereafter rural-urban displacement) on the one hand and those originally from urban areas displaced to urban areas (hereafter urban-urban displacement) on the other.

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<sup>28</sup> In Round 3, there were 3718 households who participated in the study, including 610 returned IDPs and 275 mover IDPs—those who remained in displacement but moved districts subsequent to Round 1 data collection. These latter two groups—returnees and movers—have been excluded from the quantitative analyses.

<sup>29</sup> There were 10 sub-districts for which there was no population data available from the Iraqi Ministry of Planning’s Central Statistical Organization. These subdistricts—and the 241 households who were displaced to them—were excluded from the analysis.

<sup>30</sup> These findings are weighted. For unweighted sample characteristics, please see Appendix B.

Table 1: Non-Camp Population by Origin and Displacement Governorates*				
		DISPLACED TO:		<i>Total originally from:</i> %
		Urban Area %	Rural Area %	
ORIGINALLY FROM:	Urban Area	58.9	48.8	48.7
	Rural Area	41.1	51.2	45.3
		<i>Total</i>	100%	100%
		<i>Total displaced to:</i> %	59.0	41.0
				100%

\*Refers to the Non-Camp IDP population displaced between January 2014 and December 2015 from one of the seven governorates of origin to Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, or Sulaymaniyah.

## IV. ANALYSIS

### I. Livelihoods:

Some of the most profound effects of displacement are evident in the shifts in livelihood sources of IDPs, regardless of whether they were displaced to urban or rural areas. In tracking households over time, findings reveal both why and how IDPs overcome some obstacles and navigate their tenuous situations, often by leveraging their social or familial connections in host communities or by using specialized skills.

Three common issues emerge from the interviews detail livelihood-related challenges, including securing employment and sufficient income. First, IDPs suggested that their skills did not match with the needs of the market or job opportunities open in their areas of displacement. Second, many indicated that what was preventing them from working was needed tools, equipment, or inventories that had been left behind or destroyed. Finally, particularly for those displaced to urban areas, the dearth of job opportunities and influx of new people looking for work created a labour surplus across all four governorates.

These explanations help clarify the findings from the data that show that IDPs in both urban and rural areas relied most on jobs in one of three sectors: informal labour, the public sector, and business. Notably, almost none worked in agriculture. These trends hold regardless of the areas to which IDPs were displaced. The largest share of both urban and rural IDPs found jobs in informal commerce/daily labour, which is intermittent and unreliable. Public sector jobs, much sought after, were the second highest share for those displaced to rural areas, while higher shares of urban IDPs found work in business.



Table 2: First Most Important Source of Livelihood By Displacement to Urban vs. Rural Area		
	Displaced to Urban Area %	Displaced to Rural Area %
Public job	14.4	27.8
Agriculture	1.0	3.3
Business	19.0	13.5
Informal commerce	45.3	38.6
Pension	10.5	7.5
No source	2.6	1.6
Other*	7.2	7.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
* Includes private job, money from savings and loans, income from rent, money from family and friends, and aid from national or international institutions.		

Public-sector labour provides both continuity and stability for IDPs because of a government policy that allowed the displaced to transfer their work to other locations.<sup>31</sup> An employee of the Ministry of Defense displaced within Kirkuk reported, “I resumed my previous job as a soldier,” which he noted allowed him to provide for his parents and brothers who have not been able to find other work. Echoing the desire of many others to secure public sector employment, one IDP displaced from a rural to an urban area in Baghdad hoped to use her management and economics degree to secure a government job because “there is more stability in a government job.”

Despite the stability they offer, government jobs do not always allow IDPs to cover their households’ basic needs, particularly as IDPs bear new costs (like rent) specific to their displacement. For example, a soldier displaced to Basrah reported that his one million IQD salary (US\$840) was not enough to pay for rent, healthcare, education, and basic needs, so he picked up a second job on his days off carrying materials for a flooring store. Furthermore, government jobs are not readily available. Approximately 20% of IDPs displaced to urban areas and 23% of displaced to rural areas said they held government jobs *prior* to displacement. In 2016, while in displacement, only 14% of IDPs displaced to urban areas reported working a government job, a much smaller share than those IDPs displaced to rural areas who reported the same (27%). The rate of those in public jobs goes down for those displaced to urban areas and up for those in rural areas (although we know that there is a mix of people transferring their government jobs as well as new people getting new jobs).

Where public jobs were unavailable, small shares of urban IDPs (19%) and rural IDPs (13%) found jobs in the business sector. These numbers are not dissimilar to pre-displacement levels, where 19% of all IDPs reported working in business prior to displacement. However, for those who had small business, their ability to rebuild them in the locations they were displaced to depended on replacing or accessing equipment, goods and resources. In particular, creating income hinged on the ability either to bring or

<sup>31</sup> Iraqi Council of Ministers, 2015. *The Release of Salaries for IDP Government Employees*, 07/Jan/2015. <http://www.pmo.iq/press/7-1-2015.htm>; Iraqi Council of Ministers, 2015. *Modification of Contracts for the IDP Government Employees*, 31/Mar/2015, <http://www.pmo.iq/press2015/31-3-20151.htm>.

obtain work-essential tools, supplies, or vehicles. A father from Anbar displaced to Baghdad described how having a car changed his family's status:

*I don't have a fixed source of income, but I have been able to provide the basic needs for my family. If I did not have the necessary money, I would have diminished my expenses more and would not be able to open my house to guests, like I do now. I currently have a car (Kia) which I use for my work as a driver. It is my source of income at present. I know some people who were able to find new jobs, which is due to this area being more open and developed since it is a district centre. Some people did not find anything which suited them because they are older, which prevented them from learning a job or new skill. They are farmers and have never known anything other than agriculture.*

This IDP father's strategy transforming one of his possessions into a source of income exemplifies one way in which IDPs have addressed the problems posed by their displacement. But others who lack such resources or capital have struggled to find solutions, and their business ventures are hard pressed to rely on loans.

Microfinance is often put forward as a way to support small business creation. Iraq currently has one of the weakest microfinance sectors in all of the Middle East, and an estimated 20% of adults holding an account at a formal financial institution, compared to the average 43% for the region.<sup>32</sup> The governmental classification of microfinance institutions as NGOs and religious leaders' views on these types of loans account in part for this weakness.<sup>33</sup> Large-scale destruction and population displacement in the wake of the ISIS invasion only exacerbated already high demand for but low supply of such loans<sup>34</sup> and cost Iraq 15% of its microfinance sector.<sup>35</sup> Not surprisingly, the ensuing crises led to an increase in the number of non-repayments on loans, as well as the absence of key staff members, and some of the issues that come with less regulated practice.

Furthermore, study data bear out the final observation on agriculture made by the IDP father quoted above. Among all IDPs, 23% worked in agriculture prior to displacement, but less than 4% of each urban IDPs and rural IDPs reported working in agriculture while in displacement.<sup>36</sup> Displacement clearly unseats people from agriculture jobs and production, which has a huge impact because one third of Iraqis in the labour force work in the agriculture field<sup>37</sup> and agricultural land makes up about 27% of the total area of the country.<sup>38</sup> Under ISIS, Iraq lost 40% of agricultural production due to inability to plant, care for and harvest crops, destroyed grain storage facilities, and displaced populations.

The takeover of rural areas by ISIS beginning in 2013 exacerbated the pre-ISIS problems plaguing the farming industry, including inefficient irrigation systems, intermittent electricity, substandard seed quality, heavy reliance on insufficient supplies of herbicides, insecticides, and fertilizers, under-mechanized

<sup>32</sup> Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, Saniya Ansar, and Jake Hess, 2018. *The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution*. The World Bank.

<sup>33</sup> Microfinance institutions in Iraq are classified as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and therefore depend on grants, unable to accept deposits or raise equity. These institutions are currently under the purview of the NGO Directorate of Iraq, which might not have the expertise to manage microfinance institutions appropriately. Additionally, some religious leaders viewed microloans as *haram* [forbidden], and in response USAID held negotiations with several religious leaders in order to establish appropriate microfinance conditions. Local sheikhs were allowed the right to issue Fatwas to determine whether the transaction and markup are compliant with *shari'a* law. Please see: The World Bank, July 2015. *The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Microfinance in Iraq*, 2; USAID, November 2010. *Iraq's Experience with Al-Murabaha Islamic Microfinance*, 11-12. [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00HPHF.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00HPHF.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* Findex data from 2017 suggests that while 63.4% of Iraqis over the age of fifteen took out a loan in the past year, the majority of them (52.1%) took out loans from family or friends, and only 3.1 percent from financial institutions.

<sup>35</sup> The World Bank Group, 2015. *The Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Assessing the Economic and Social Impact of the Syrian Conflict and ISIS*, 151. <http://documents.banquemoniale.org/curated/fr/574421468253845198/pdf/940320REVISED0000Box391428BIQ0FINAL.pdf>

<sup>36</sup> Prior to displacement, among those IDPs living in rural areas in 2016, 28.6% said they worked in agriculture prior to displacement. Among those in urban areas in 2016, 19.8% said they worked in agriculture prior to displacement.

<sup>37</sup> Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2017. *Iraq: Agricultural Damage and Loss Needs Assessment*. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IraqDamageandLoss.pdf>

<sup>38</sup> Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2018. *Iraq at a Glance*. <http://www.fao.org/iraq/fao-in-iraq/iraq-at-a-glance/en/>

production, a land tenure system preventing economies of scale, and time-consuming and expensive import procedures.<sup>39</sup>

There are few options for Iraqi farmers who are displaced, as they often cannot return to their land to continue in agriculture, the surrounding agriculture land was also taken over, and they have few or no skills that allow them to obtain a different job. Many farmers considered not returning to working agriculture on their land because the investments in labour and resources to bring their land back to a farmable state after the fighting are prohibitive. Fadel al-Zubi, FAO's Iraq representative, has stated, "If farmers are pushed to look for another way of life, all the choices will basically be bad, whether it is smuggling, turning to extremism and militancy or migration."<sup>40</sup>

Increased urbanization in general is in no small part caused by the failure of the Iraqi agricultural sector over time, with young people looking for alternative livelihoods and paths. In this specific situation, many of the IDPs who move to the city are unlikely to return or take up farming in their rural areas of displacement without considered and substantial collective or governmental effort to restore agriculture in Iraq.

In the absence of jobs in agriculture, business, or the public sector, overwhelming shares of IDPs (45% of those in urban areas and 38% of those in rural areas) relied on working daily wage jobs. Because of an influx of IDPs who lacked skills that fill market needs, there were more labourers than jobs, often forcing IDPs to go without work for periods of time. The adult son in a family displaced from a rural to an urban area within Baghdad who farmed in his origin community said, "our expenditures vary based on the labour market" because his current construction job often caused him to "[remain] without work for a period of two weeks or more."

Those having to enter the workforce for the first time—particularly women—also encountered the instability of the informal labour market, citing lack of education as a barrier to getting work. The daughter of a family from Ninewa now living in Sulaymaniyah reported, "There are people who were able to get a job because they have qualifications and experience. Currently I participate in a sewing workshop because I didn't go to school and don't have a degree."

Still, interviews demonstrate that having marketable and specialized skills helped in finding a job. An IDP displaced from rural Salah ad-Din to Baghdad related his relative's experience in finding a job, citing their "specialized professions in welding pipes and oil tanks... [which] helped them get jobs in the best oil companies in Rumaila such as Halliburton." However, a lawyer from Hawija, Kirkuk could only find part-time legal work during his displacement in Kirkuk city.

Furthermore, the challenges of employment are sometimes intertwined with local political contexts, particularly in regions like Sulaymaniyah where control is disputed between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). A former company director from Salah al-Din now living in Sulaymaniyah cited barriers in regulatory regimes that prevented people from working in their fields. For example, he reported that he knew a doctor who was an IDP in Sulaymaniyah could not find work because, "they didn't let her open a medical centre or a private clinic." The KRG has implemented a Kurdish-language requirement for doctors seeking to work in the KRI, and would like to decrease the number of non-Kurdish IDPs able to work and settle in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) area.<sup>41</sup>

In the midst of all of these challenges, IDPs, particularly those displaced to urban areas, also found new opportunities. Some have used their networking abilities and connections in their host communities to secure employment: A former supermarket owner from Anbar now working for a monthly salary at a supermarket in Sulaymaniyah stated, "I owe this favor to my friends and the people of the region, who

<sup>39</sup> Verdonk, Ronald P., 2011. *Challenges in Iraq's Agricultural Sector*. *Iraq-Business News*. <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/02/07/challenges-in-iraqs-agriculture-sector/>.

<sup>40</sup> El Dahan, Maya and Raya Jalabi, 2018. Special Report: *How Iraq's Agricultural Heartland is Dying of Thirst*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-water-nineveh-special-report/special-report-how-iraqs-agricultural-heartland-is-dying-of-thirst-idUSKBN1KF1C2>.

<sup>41</sup> Rudaw, 20 August 2016. *Kurdish Language to Become a Requirement for Foreign Doctors*. <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/190820164>.

found me this job.” Many others echoed the value of knowing people in the region for finding work and building new social relations. A father of a family from Ninewa living in urban Sulaymaniyah emphasized the nexus between social connections with the host community and the ability to obtain work, reporting that, “for those who were able to get a job, it was because of their relations with the host community.”

The story of a family from Anbar displaced to Basrah illustrates how connections can be used to create labour opportunities. When interviewed in December of 2016, a father, a former farmer and construction worker, lamented how his family’s economic situation had greatly deteriorated:

*Each of us used to live in a house and our financial situation was great. As you can see, my brother and I now live in a single house and we share the bathroom and the kitchen. The family’s problems have multiplied but it is out of our hands. [...] I have knowledge of construction, but work has currently come to a standstill because of the country’s situation. [...] There are a lot of daily needs and my work is only a limited number of days. It is not enough to cover my family’s needs. We depend upon assistance from some friends and some financial grants. At the beginning, I worked in order to cover my family’s livelihood. I didn’t send my children to school. In addition, if anyone from my family got sick, I couldn’t afford to send them to the doctor.*

When this family was interviewed 8 months later, in August 2017, the family situation had changed because of connections and work. He explained:

*My situation improved a lot in the past five months because I became known in the area for being a professional carpenter, and people started to come to me for service. This supported my family’s income. Therefore, in these times I am blessed with enough income to provide my basic needs and more. If the situation wasn’t as it is now, I would have given up everything in order to provide for my needs as I did before, when there were no new clothes, no education, and sometimes no healthcare. When we arrived here and didn’t have anything, one of the neighbors came to us after finding out we are carpenters and told us we should work with him to get more customers and make a good reputation and not just stay in the house. I told him we don’t have enough wood. He said, ‘I will give you wood and call you if there is any work!’ And then he helped us buy our own wood. I will never forget that man for that situation! He is the one who saved us from poverty and need and helped us make an income for our family.*

While for some IPDs leveraging host community connections helped gain employment, for others, employment helped gain a sense of community. As the father of a family from Baghdad living in Sulaymaniyah relayed “To be part of the community, you will need to learn their language, their tradition, and their values, but this will make a small difference. The [important] thing is to have a stable job or shop, or to have a house.” Similarly, the widowed mother of a family displaced from Anbar to Baghdad, related: “In general, I’ve begun to integrate in the community because I’ve been in this area for about three years, and I’ve begun to get used to the situation. But if I had a job or a source of income, that would increase my feelings of integration and belonging in the community.”

In fact, for several female headed households, displacement has introduced changes in women’s workforce participation. A former housewife displaced from Salah al-Din to Basrah city reported not only learning a new profession but going to work outside the home for the first time: “I learned a new skill—in fact new skills—because before I was not a supervisor of a hotel and I did not work as a cashier in a café or a waitress in a restaurant. All these professions I learned here in Basrah. I did not only learn one profession, but many others. It is possible to call it ‘the profession of dealing with others and handling their moods.’” However, her employment history was fraught with challenges that highlight the vulnerability of working IDP women; for example, she related that, after repeated sexual harassment from her boss, she was fired from her job in a cafe “because he knew he would not get anything out of me.”

Displacement to urban areas from rural homes also presented new opportunities for younger generations. A father displaced from Anbar to Baghdad reflected, “I am from a rural area, and I’m living now in a place that is a district centre, and the services here are better. That is in addition to the proximity of the schools and the hospital here. More importantly, the job opportunities for my children are greater here than the

region from which we are from.” The father’s adult son also described his experiences in September 2017 and confirmed his father’s sentiments:

*My previous work was as a farmer on my land and my family’s land, and from that I was supported and I covered my needs. In displacement I was forced to work in construction, which is a new profession for me, but it covers only our daily needs. Despite that, I also completed my studies at the teacher’s institute, so while I currently work as in construction, at the same time I am looking for work in education in one of the schools. I myself don’t really mix with others much, so I haven’t seen an IDP person succeed in a profession per se, but maybe you could consider me as an example, in that despite the bad living situation, I was still able to complete my studies.*

Urban displacement thus provides many challenges and some opportunities for IDPs as they seek new livelihoods. There were several key differences between those displaced to urban versus rural areas. While the precarious informal sector was the largest employer of IDPs overall, more urban IDP households than rural IDP households work in it, while more rural than urban IDPs hold public sector jobs. In the wake of decimated agricultural and microfinance sectors, IDPs have had to devise their own strategies and cultivate connections to cope with the mismatch between their skills and the labour market demands. IDPs who worked in the business sector, but needed to find the resources to begin again or people to assist them. At times the host community aided them in this endeavor, as has the urban setting, where women and young people in particular have found new opportunities to expand their education and career options.

## II. Standard of Living

Nearly 70% of each urban and rural IDPs in Round 3 reported that they could provide for their basic needs—defined as housing, food and water, health care, and education. But comparatively, the vast majority of IDPs in both groups asserted that they were worse off in 2017 than they were before displacement. Responses varied according to where IDPs were from and where they now reside. Among those displaced to urban areas, a slightly higher share of those originally from urban areas said their situations had deteriorated (35%) by comparison to those originally from rural areas (27%). These results may be related to perceptions of basic needs if IDPs from rural areas have a lower baseline for what constitutes providing for a basic standard of living than those from urban areas, or vice versa.

	Displaced to Urban Area From:		ALL displaced to Urban %	ALL displaced to Rural %
	Urban Origin %	Rural Origin %		
<b>Provide for basic needs?</b>				
<b>Yes</b>	65.2	72.8	68.3	67.4
<b>No</b>	34.8	27.2	31.7	32.6
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%

Area of origin mattered less in reported perceptions of IDPs’ own standard of living in comparison to the host community. Still, there are significant differences between those displaced to urban versus rural areas. The majority (53%) of IDPs in urban areas believed their standards of living were the same as the host community’s, while the majority (56%) of IDPs in rural areas believed they were worse off than the host community. Less than 3% of IDPs in either rural or urban areas claimed to be better off than the host community. Several factors may account for such findings. First, urban settings may be more varied socioeconomically, such that IDPs in urban areas self-select neighborhoods commensurate with their

economic conditions. Second, urban areas may have more work opportunities, even if the work is in the informal sector, such that its intermittent nature is mitigated by the number of opportunities available.

But while urban IDPs may have been better able to find neighborhoods where host community members belong to similar socioeconomic circles—thereby affecting the way urban IDPs *perceive* themselves in comparison to their hosts—urban areas still posed more housing-related challenges. Specifically, the new cost of rent was frequently higher in urban areas than rural ones. While many IDPs owned houses or land in their rural homes, in displacement they paid a significant portion of their income every month to rent (and often to live in lower quality homes or in shared homes). Displaced to Kirkuk city, one man who used to live in a single-family house in his origin community reported spending 60% of his 250,000 IQD (US\$210) monthly salary to rent a three-room apartment he shared with his family and his brother in displacement. Another IDP displaced to Basrah city reported spending 250,000 IQD (US\$210) per month (25% of his salary) on a two-room house, compared to the two-story house he owned in his origin community. IDPs also cited rent prices as a reason for moving from the community in which they were originally displaced. One IDP moved from Sulaymaniyah to Kirkuk because of the “low rents” in Kirkuk. Another moved from Zakho in Kirkuk to Sulaymaniyah because her family “couldn’t afford” the rent in Kirkuk.

Unlike housing, displacement affected households’ consumption patterns, regardless of the area to which they were displaced. Nearly 30% of both urban and rural IDPs reported cutting back on food and other expenses in order to meet their living standard. One IDP displaced to Sulaymaniyah from Baghdad “gave up on buying expensive foods like meat and fish,” and another IDP who lived in a tent in Kirkuk had to further cut back her living expenses “to daily needs only, and reduce the purchases of meat, specific types of fruits, vegetables, and luxury items.”

Such difficult circumstances resulted in IDPs having to prioritize their various basic needs, and healthcare and education were often affected. Healthcare complicated achieving an adequate standard of living because it created new costs to bear while simultaneously impeding the ability to work. One IDP told the story of her daughter who had a tumor. The doctor initially told her the procedure to remove it would cost 700,000 IQD (US\$585), but the procedure cost an additional 275,000 IQD (US\$230) for admittance to the hospital and tests on the tumor. She raised money with help from friends and family. Overall, while state-provided health care and education are no- or low-cost, there are costs associated with them that poor and displaced people do not have the ability to pay. The IDP above who spent 25% of his salary every month on rent also spent 65,000 IQD (US\$55) every month on treatment for his father’s failing health, in addition to paying 135,000 IQD (US\$115) for his children’s education.

Not many IDPs reported pulling young children out of school, but other IDPs reported on the sacrifices made by older children to improve the families’ standards of living. One IDP in Basrah reported that his son left school in order to find a job. With the salary from his job, he “pays for the school expenses for his brothers so they can continue their education.” In addition to cost, language barriers are also an impediment to education. The IDP who moved from his initial host community in Sulaymaniyah to Kirkuk for housing-cost reasons also mentioned education as a secondary reason for the move: “the schools [in Sulaymaniyah] were in Kurdish.” While familial networks or host community members sometimes help IDPs meet their basic needs, many resort to making trade-offs—or even relocating—to be able to do so.

Where prioritizing housing, food, and water over other basic needs like healthcare and education did not suffice to make ends meet, IDPs reported borrowing money. Those displaced to both urban and rural areas listed borrowing or receiving money as their most common strategy to help provide for basic needs, though the share was slightly higher among those displaced to urban areas. Urban IDPs also report receiving money with no expectation of repayment at a greater rate than rural IDPs. Both groups borrow with the expectation of repayment at approximately the same rate.

<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Displaced to Urban Area %</b>	<b>Displaced to Rural Area %</b>
<b>Borrow/ receive money</b>	55.1	48.2
<b>Use savings</b>	5.3	10.4
<b>Share house</b>	6.3	6.8
<b>Reduce food and other expenses</b>	28.4	29.6
<b>Other*</b>	4.9	5.0
* Includes employing children under 16, stop sending children to school, limiting medical care, and selling assets and/or properties		

Yet the ability to borrow money to provide for basic necessities was not commensurate with the need. While over 90% of each urban and rural IDPs *needed* to borrow money, just over half of those in each group were able to do so. Here, IDPs' origin appears to have a relationship with the ability to access needed funds. Those displaced from rural areas were more frequently reported having access to borrowed funds. One IDP from Salah al-Din now living in Basrah city discussed the burdens of debt, exclaiming, "I can't keep up! [...] I borrow the money I need, and start paying it back gradually and before I am even finished paying it all back I borrow another amount, which adds another burden on me."

While IDPs continue to create coping mechanisms for their displacement as it becomes prolonged, their struggles are magnified by decreasing amounts of humanitarian assistance. Nearly 90% of IDPs displaced to urban and rural areas reported not receiving aid. Of the few who reported receiving aid, food and water were the most common types of aid received. A plurality displaced to urban areas and a majority displaced to rural areas reported that it came from organizations as opposed to governments or religious groups. But the majority from both groups reported receiving this aid irregularly (82% of urban IDPs and 74% of rural IDPs).

A number of interviews indicated that while there was aid provided during the early years of the displacement crisis, it had slowed to a trickle in 2016. For example, the father of a family displaced to Sulaymaniyah reported that he used to receive aid, including food items from the World Food Program and REACH, but that the aid had stopped three months previously. Similarly, the head of household of family originally from Falluja, Anbar, displaced to Kirkuk, and then moved to Sulaymaniyah, observed, "The aid was good for us because it reduced our expenses and covered part of our needs. But now all the aid goes to the camps and the government does not have any assistance programs."

In 2017, the total funding requirements in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Iraq was US \$984.7 million, of which US\$891.9 million (90.6%) was funded.<sup>42</sup> Aid, however, faces problems in the rate of disbursement and their distribution. First, much of countries' total funding is distributed toward military assistance rather than humanitarian aid. According to USAID, the U.S. disbursed \$3.1 billion to Iraq in 2017, and of this \$2.7 billion was allocated to military assistance while \$3.8 million was allocated toward economic and humanitarian aid.<sup>43</sup> Second, funds are not being disbursed at the same rate that funds are needed to address crises. Problems such as explosive hazard contamination, lack of clean drinking water,

<sup>42</sup> OHCA, 2017. *Global Humanitarian Overview 2017: Humanitarian Funding Update*.

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Humanitarian%20Funding%20Update\\_GHO\\_31DEC2017.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Humanitarian%20Funding%20Update_GHO_31DEC2017.pdf)

<sup>43</sup> USAID, 2018. *Foreign Aid Explorer*. <https://explorer.usaid.gov/#2018>.

forced displacement, poor water system infrastructures, food insecurity, violence, and lack of education have only increased. Examples of such issues include the recording of more than 130 explosive hazard incidents at the end of 2017; more than 50,000 cases of gastrointestinal illness from drinking water; and an 11% decrease in the projected harvest for 2018.<sup>44</sup>

The study data evidences that funds are not getting to intended recipients in a timely or regular fashion. IDPs displaced to urban areas often reported this irregularity in aid. One delivery man displaced to Kirkuk city mentions that he had received aid twice: once he received a food basket from al-Ghofran mosque and another time he received an air conditioner from the Ministry of Migration and Displacement. He indicated that it was “useful for a limited time” and remarked upon his “fairly positive” experience with humanitarian aid organizations.

IDPs themselves suggested solutions to problems of aid distribution, primarily by positing that there be a shift in types of assistance towards interventions that would help IDPs self-sustain in the future. The mother of a family from Salah al-Din displaced to Basrah who dreams of one day owning her own women’s salon made an important observation about aid distribution. She recommended that international organizations provide “financial grants, because most of the time they give things IDPs already own. For example, I don’t think there is an IDP now who doesn’t have a stove. Instead of giving us stoves again, if they have allocated a financial amount, it would have been much better.”

### III. Security

Generally, non-camp urban and rural IDPs felt safe in their host communities, with over 90% of each group reporting they felt moderately or completely safe. However, when compared to their rural counterparts, a significantly larger share of IDPs displaced to urban areas reported feeling moderately safe, instead of completely safe. Even among urban IDPs, there is significant variation in level of safety when the type of community--urban or rural--from which they come is factored into the analysis. A higher share of rural-urban IDPs responded they felt completely safe compared to urban-urban IDPs. This may be an indication that rural areas from which people fled were more dangerous than urban ones. If IDPs used the safety in their origin community as a benchmark for safety in their host community, the difference between rural-urban IDPs and urban-urban IDPs may be explained by a difference in the safety of rural origin communities compared to urban origin communities. It may also be that rural-urban IDPs felt that they stood out more in urban areas because of dress or way of speaking.

Degree of Safety	Displaced to Urban Area		ALL displaced to Urban Area %	ALL displaced to Rural Area %
	Urban Origin %	Rural Origin %		
Completely safe	26.9	40.6	32.5	50.9
Moderately safe	66.4	58.5	63.1	43.4
Completely or moderately unsafe	2.0	0.5	1.4	0.1
Neither safe nor unsafe	4.7	0.4	2.9	5.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>44</sup> USAID, 2018. *Iraq - Complex Emergency*.

[https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/iraq\\_ce\\_fs09\\_07-20-2018.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/iraq_ce_fs09_07-20-2018.pdf).



More than 90% of IDPs in all groups reported they had not faced a security threat in the past six months. Those displaced to urban areas who did face these threats most often cited petty crime or theft while those displaced to rural areas cited discrimination.

IDPs in urban and rural areas mentioned different reasons for this relative security. In urban areas, the share of IDPs reporting the presence of security forces as the most important factor contributing to safety was nearly twice as high as the share citing this reason among IDPs displaced to rural areas, among whom the majority (77%) pointed to a peaceful area and welcoming host community as the primary reason for feeling secure.

One prominent theme that emerged was the change in the ways that IDPs addressed concerns relating to their safety or security or to problems more generally. Displacement interrupted access to both the formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms to which people were accustomed in their places of origin. In their absence, IDPs either looked to themselves or to the state to address concerns. A former law student displaced from a rural area to an urban area within Kirkuk noted,

Before ISIS, when a problem occurred, we used to solve it among ourselves without resorting to law or courts. This was done through tribal meetings. But now, the situation changed and the way to solve the problem depends on the root of the problem. For example, we solve the simple problems among ourselves. For the big problems, we resort to law and the court, and in my opinion, this is the best way.

The mother of a family displaced to Sikak, Kirkuk from a rural area near Daquq, Kirkuk echoed this observation but had a different opinion on its effectiveness:

*Previously, before displacement, the problems in our village were resolved tribally, in the presence of the tribal elders, mayor, and tribe members. But now, here, the problems are resolved by the authorities by resorting to the police departments and the court, and in my opinion, the tribal solutions are more successful than solving the problems through the police and courts.*

IDPs reported that turning to official institutions of the state was their most common solution to problems. While less than two percent of each group said they would rely on tribal leaders for solutions while in displacement, a majority of those displaced to rural areas and a plurality of those displaced to urban ones would turn to the courts to help achieve justice for regular crimes. Sizeable shares of both groups also suggested they would turn to the police, though this finding was more pronounced among urban IDPs.

<b>Table 7: Justice for Regular Crimes</b>		
<b>By Displacement to Urban vs. Rural Area</b>		
<b>Degree of Acceptance</b>	<b>Displaced to Urban Area</b>	<b>Displaced to Rural Area</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Courts</b>	42.6	55.5
<b>Police</b>	39.8	31.3
<b>International Community</b>	15.4	7.0
<b>Other*</b>	2.2	6.2
<b>Total</b>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
*Includes elected officials, administrative officials, religious leaders, tribal leaders, or other unlisted answers individual specified by respondents.		

But turning to state institutions to seek justice in the absence of extended networks could simply be out of necessity, as data suggest it is not synonymous with trust in those institutions. IDPs displaced to rural areas tended to trust governmental institutions much more than their urban counterparts: 47% of rural IDPs mostly or completely trust the parliament, compared to only 16% of urban IDPs. Similarly, the shares of rural IDPs who suggested they trusted the courts and the local government reached 87% and 57%, respectively, in comparison with only 42% of urban IDPs who trusted the courts and 34% who trusted local government. Interestingly, these results do not vary based on whether IDPs were *originally* from urban or rural areas, suggesting that these feelings are a function of the displacement location itself rather than a reflection of the comparative historical experiences.

Despite the fact that high shares reported feeling safe and low shares report encountering security threats, perceptions of IDPs as a vulnerable group persist within the IDP community. One father from Anbar province originally displaced to Kirkuk but now residing in Sulaymaniyah blamed “political, sectarian, religious, and ethnic problems” in the rest of Iraq for his perception that IDPs in other areas do not feel safe, while another father from the Baghdad countryside displaced to Sulaymaniyah asserted, “cities in the middle and western provinces became safe havens for terrorism.”

These perceptions notwithstanding, IDPs across governorates identified safety as the primary thing they will miss about the host community if they were to return or move, and others cited safety as the reason they prefer to pursue integration as opposed to return. An IDP from Salah al-Din displaced to Sulaymaniyah preferred living in Sulaymaniyah “because of the lack of security and the continued spread of elements of ISIS” in his community of origin. This was a common sentiment among many Arabic-speaking Arab IDPs displaced to Iraqi Kurdistan in the study. On the other hand, the minority of IDPs who do not feel safe in displacement cited security as a necessary precondition for integration. One electrician displaced to Kirkuk who described his displacement situation “as if [he was] in a prison,” listed safety as the first priority to full integration.

A plurality of IDPs in urban areas offered security as the primary reason for remaining in their host communities. Rural-urban IDPs blamed continued threats from ISIS, occupations by militias, tribal conflict, and remnants of war for the continued security threats in their origin communities. A father who was displaced from Salah ad-Din to Basrah indicated that even though in 2017 his “village has been liberated, the other side is still under the control of ISIS and they continued their attacks on the village every once in a while.” One IDP displaced to Sulaymaniyah from Baghdad said he would return and live in a tent if his origin community had a stable security situation, but he was stuck in displacement because Shi’a militias had taken over his hometown. The man asserted that ISIS never entered his village, but it was because these militias accuse Sunni Muslims in the Baghdad belt of sympathizing with ISIS that the militias took over their areas, and he is thus prevented from returning home. Another IDP displaced to Baghdad from Anbar felt unsafe returning because of tribal associations with ISIS. Her husband’s tribe was seen as sympathetic with ISIS. When her husband tried to break with the tribe, they killed him. Other groups have tried to break with the tribe as well and she fears if she returns her son will become trapped in this tribal conflict.

<b>Factors</b>	<b>Displaced to Urban Area</b> %	<b>Displaced to Rural Area</b> %
<b>Peaceful area, welcoming host community</b>	48.7	77.0
<b>Security forces in control</b>	49.1	20.5
<b>House, job, or family</b>	2.2	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

Security also entails safety from unexploded ordinances. An IDP from Kirkuk said he could not return to his farm because of the “presence of mines and booby traps.” For farmers, clearing these remnants of war is especially important because they need their land to be safe before they can plow, set up irrigation systems, and plant their seeds. Iraqi security forces have prevented returns for this reason, citing the need for checking for booby trapped buildings as well as mines.

While there are many causes of insecurity in origin communities, IDPs often hold the central government responsible for providing security and permitting their return. One IDP, who has been forbidden from returning by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs) and militias,<sup>45</sup> asserted that local governments “cannot do anything” and liberating his area from militias “is all in the hands of the [central] government.”

Some rural-urban IDPs articulated their desire for the international community to play a role in securing Iraq. One IDP displaced inside of Baghdad argued that the international coalition “has the responsibility to protect Iraq’s borders.” Going a step further, another from Salah ad-Din in Sulaymaniyah saw “the international community as the main solution because [...] other countries can stop terrorism.” When asked about transitional justice specifically, 74% of rural-urban IDPs and 82% of urban-urban IDPs said they felt “very comfortable” or “somewhat comfortable” with international organizations playing a role in transitional justice. IDPs have a certain level of trust in international organizations and want them to play some role in solving the security problems facing Iraq.

#### IV. Social Cohesion

Non-camp IDPs’ social relations with host communities vary tremendously, not only across governorates in Iraq, but also within the groups of those displaced to rural areas and those displaced to urban ones. This variation seems to depend on a range of factors including location, access to livelihoods, shelter, other basic services, and feelings of security. Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of experiences, several trends emerge, particularly as they relate to urban IDPs. With four out of five urban IDP households reporting they feel moderately accepted by their host communities, three factors appear to contribute towards feelings of acceptance while three factors hinder it. The factors that contribute toward acceptance were pre-existing connections to the urban area of displacement or the presence of other IDPs there; humanitarian gestures initiated by host community members; and finally, the urban environment itself, which affords IDPs new education and economic opportunities. These were common themes in interviews with those reporting positive integration experiences. In contrast, those who reported having difficulty assimilating mentioned legal or administrative hurdles, isolation or discrimination, and language barriers.

Degree of Belonging	Displaced to Urban Area %	Displaced to Rural Area %
Strongly feel we belong	13.2	14.7
Somewhat feel we belong	68.6	66.4
Somewhat or strongly feel we don’t belong	6.4	3.6
Neither belong nor don’t belong	11.7	15.2
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

<sup>45</sup> Hamdi Malik, “The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2017. <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73186>

IDPs' degree of social cohesion is in part measurable by levels of social trust and the extent to which IDPs feel they belong and are accepted by the host community. While higher shares of rural IDPs (88%) than urban IDPs (69%) report moderately or completely trusting their neighbors, nearly equal shares of each group (approximately 81%) report feeling like they strongly or somewhat belong in the areas to which they were displaced.

IDPs' assessments of host communities' perception, however, are more varied between those displaced to urban versus rural areas. Though majorities of both urban and rural IDPs suggested they felt strongly or somewhat accepted by the host community, *strong* feelings of acceptance were higher among rural IDPs (29%) than urban IDPs (11%). Furthermore, this difference also varies by IDPs' origins. Among those displaced to urban areas, a lower share of those originally from a rural area (75%) than those originally from an urban area (85%) reported feeling somewhat accepted by the host community.

Degree of Acceptance	Displaced to Urban Area		ALL displaced to Urban Area %	ALL Displaced to Rural Area %
	Rural Origin %	Urban Origin %		
Strongly accepted	15.5	8.5	11.4	29.3
Somewhat accepted	75.4	85.1	81.1	54.3
Somewhat or strongly rejected	0.4	0.8	0.7	1.5
Neither accepted nor rejected	8.69	5.59	6.9	14.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

One factor contributing to feelings of acceptance among urban IDPs is having family in the host community or being among a large community of other IDPs. The mother of a family displaced to Sikak, Kirkuk from a rural area near Daquq, Kirkuk, explained:

*Here, we currently feel that we are part of this society in which we live, and we succeeded in integrating because we have familial relations with neighbors and members of the host community, and we have relatives and acquaintances from the members of this community from Kirkuk City. The difference [between our current community and that of our origin village] lies only in the environment in which we used to live, as we used to live in a rural area, but now, here, we live in a city. Most of our customs and traditions are the same as those of the people in the city of Kirkuk.*

For some, the presence of family in areas of displacement helped IDP integration by providing continuity of norms and traditions. For others, displacement creates a new, non-primordial identity and community among the displaced who share familiar experiences and relatable obstacles. For many, the presence of other IDPs in their area of displacement was important for combating social isolation in displacement. An IDP from Salah al-Din now living in Bazyan, Sulaymaniyah, recounted, "What made it easier is that these events were happening to a lot of people. The displacement happened to us collectively, and we did not leave anyone behind. We all went through the same circumstances, which is what helped us stick together."

Where old or new in-group ties were unavailable or insufficient, humanitarian gestures initiated by host community members greatly shaped the nature of social interactions. As the father of a family displaced from Salah al-Din to Basrah suggested, "Not all assistance is financial or material [...] Charity can include good conversation and communication, and making a person feel that someone is constantly asking about their well-being, or even an entity that wants to know their whereabouts. It can have a strong effect."

Several interviewees reported developing close, family-like relationships with members of the host community who helped them during difficult times. The father of a family from a village in Anbar now living in Basrah City Centre said, “The neighbors here and in the area have permanently become my brothers and my family.” Similarly, after recounting the harrowing story of her husband’s death, the widowed mother of a family displaced from Al-Qa’im, Anbar, to Sadr City, Baghdad, declared:

*I’ve made strong relationships with strangers here, more so than my ties with my relatives, even though they’re my own flesh and blood. Just the opposite -- displacement showed me my relatives’ true colors and removed the masks that they used to wear when I had money and possessions. After displacement and the death of my husband and ISIS’s occupation of al-Qa’im, they cut me off and didn’t help me in my time of need.*

Such expressions of host community members’ support and kindness are bolstered by a number of powerful stories about crucial assistance to IDPs provided by host communities. Exchange of food was a major theme. “People here are good, and they like us and send us food when they cook something special,” reported the father of a family displaced from Ba’quba, Diyala, now living in Bakrajo, Sulaymaniyah. The father of a family from a village in Anbar recounted his encounter with the owner of a nearby shop when he first arrived to Basrah City Centre: “[He] asked me if I needed help and where I was from. I answered that I was an IDP from Anbar and told him our story. The next day, people started showing up to comfort us and provide us with much assistance, food, and blankets.”

This same father, who also served as a soldier in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, also related a story of how community members provided other forms of material support:

*One day, I went back on duty with one of my neighbors who worked with me and another soldier. At the checkpoint, I told that that I was going to sleep, as I didn’t sleep because my air conditioner was broken. [...] I told them, jokingly, that I would sell my kidney to buy an air conditioner. Later, I left and called my wife, and she told me that my friends had come to install the new air conditioner. I was bewildered and asked her, ‘What friends?’ She said that our neighbor’s son came with his friends, replaced the air conditioner and took the old one. [...] How can I go home when I have such friends here? Treating others well is a characteristic of this community.*

Another soldier displaced to Daquq, Kirkuk, from one of the surrounding villages, recalled the help he received when his family bought and developed a piece of agricultural land to relieve them of rent costs. “When I decided to buy the land and started building it, many of my friends helped us and lent us money for construction. Their attitude was wonderful.”

While some focused discussions of their experiences on personal interactions with their hosts, others identified positive aspects of urban life. When asked what he would miss most about the host community, the son of a rural family displaced to urban Baghdad, cited the conveniences of city life, saying, “I will miss the services and their nearness to the main roads...and how easy it is to go to work.” Life in the city also represented opportunities for others, especially women. The daughter of a family displaced from a rural to an urban area in Baghdad detailed these opportunities:

*Upon our displacement to Baghdad and my mixing with the people of Baghdad, I started to think about the intellectual and scientific side of things, which motivated me to complete my studies. And with this, I was able to make my own future and find work opportunities. If I had stayed in Yusifiyah, [my place of origin], women working there is incompatible with their morals. But here, work opportunities are somewhat equal between genders, despite the challenges that working women face in general.*

Individual feelings and actions toward others may be characteristic of how people cope with difficult situations because they may not be able to make situations much better. Higher shares of urban IDPs (64%) than rural IDPs (51%) reported having not a lot or no influence in making their communities a better place to live. Still, neither urban nor rural IDPs perceived that the degree of their influence was much different from that of host community members. A minority share of both groups of IDPs suggested that the host community members had a lot or some influence.

Table 9				
<i>How much influence do you think people like yourself and host community members have in making this community a better place to live?</i>				
By Displacement to Urban vs. Rural Area				
	People like yourself		Host community members	
	Displaced to Urban Area %	Displaced to Rural Area %	Displaced to Urban Area %	Displaced to Rural Area %
A lot or some	32.8	44.5	32.5	40.5
Not a lot or none	64.2	51.3	54.5	51.3
Do not know	3.1	4.1	13.0	8.1
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

This reported lack of self-efficacy combines with three other factors that urban IDPs suggest hinder their abilities in integrate into their host communities: legal or administrative hurdles, isolation or discrimination, and language barriers.

As previously mentioned in the discussion on livelihoods, displacement experiences are shaped by the political contexts in the areas to which IDPs are displaced. For example, in Sulaymaniyah--in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq--and in Kirkuk--in Iraq proper but with large parts under the control of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces--IDPs identified the *kafala* (sponsorship) system, whereby IDPs entering the governorates must have a local sponsor before they can live there, as a major barrier to feeling like they belong to the host community. When asked how the government could improve the situation for IDPs in Iraq, the son of a family displaced from a rural to an urban area in Kirkuk suggested: "To make life easier for IDPs, cancel the sponsorship because we are not strangers to Kirkuk and most importantly, we are from the same country." Similarly, an IDP from Salah al-Din living in Bazyan, Sulaymaniyah, expressed that, "to be part of the community is to have the same treatment and rights and responsibilities. For example, it is normal for us not to be a part of the community because [the KRG] requires that every IDP have a *kafeel* (sponsor) and other security procedures and discrimination, which I see as a normal thing, but we have not gotten used to it. That is why we cannot feel socially integrated here."

But barriers need not have been legal or administrative for IDPs to report the same lack of integration. Many reported a decrease in the type and amount of social interaction with others in their new places of residence on account of both lacking familial ties or having different customs. An IDP from Ba'quba, Diyala, now living in Bakrajo, Sulaymaniyah observed, "We have lost the sense of community integration because people here do not mix a lot. But in our areas, we were like one family with the neighbors and relatives. Here the traditions are different, and there are no social connections." Multiple others echoed this view. Another IDP in Sulaymaniyah, from Baji, Salah al-Din, noted that social interaction in the host community took place at the mosque, not through social visits like he was used to in his place of origin. "There is pressure here, or a feeling of alienation because of the difference in customs and traditions in addition to the language. [...] It led to a lack of relationships with the community compared to our lives before displacement," he remarked. Even when IDPs initiated attempts to integrate, some pointed to the limitation of their efforts: "The people of this region and our neighbors do not make us feel that we are not a part of the community, but when we participate in events that are specific to the people of the region, we feel that we are strangers," indicated the head of a family displaced to Sikak, Kirkuk, from a rural area in Baghdad.

Some IDPs specifically suggest that such changes relate to being displaced from rural areas to urban ones. The father of a family displaced to Basrah lamented, "I miss the social communication in the village [in Salah

al-Din where I am from]. We used to constantly communicate and there was the *diwan* (guest room) in which we gathered periodically to share each other's news. Here, more of the people are isolated from one another." The father of a family displaced within Kirkuk added, "We miss the simple rural life that we are used to and our meetings with the elder *sheikhs* of the tribe."

These changes in social interaction patterns often led to feelings of isolation and discrimination. Some interviewees observed that their status as an IDP made them feel like outsiders in the host community. "We are here in a strange place and limited in our lives. Previously, the children used to go out to the streets and play. There used to be freedom of movement, but here we are constrained. We cannot go where we want because of the language and also because we do not know the community. This has affected us negatively," reported the father of a family displaced from Al-Musayab, Babylon, now living in Bazyan, Sulaymaniyah

Along with curtailed familial support networks and differing traditions, language barriers were frequently mentioned as ones that needed to be overcome. Interviewees who fled from Arabic-speaking areas to governorates where Kurdish is widely spoken often reported either learning Kurdish in displacement or the need to do so and a key to integration with the host community. For example, the father of a family displaced from Ba'quba, Diyala, now living in Bakrajo, Sulaymaniyah, said, "We have to learn the Kurdish language and master it, so we can integrate more." Similarly, the father of a family from Baghdad also now living in Bakrajo, Sulaymaniyah, described his family's experience: "I tried to voluntarily learn some simple words [in Kurdish]. However, my kids learned the Kurdish language fluently. It was an amazing experience, and if I ever need any translation, my children help me." The father of a family from rural Baghdad, now living in Bakrajo, Sulaymaniyah, bemoaned the language barrier as an obstacle to integration: "I learned the language in its simplest form. This continues to be one of the obstacles between the IDP community and the host community. If the IDP learns and speaks the language fluently, there are so many more benefits in terms of gaining values and behaviors from the host community."

Where there was not a language barrier, some IDPs reported picking up the accent of the area where they sought refuge. The head of a family displaced from Salah al-Din living in Basrah said, "I have started to speaking in the same accent because of our mixing with the host community, and even my children are beginning to master the Basrawi accent." A returnee to Mosul, Ninewa, who had previously been an IDP in Basrah said what he missed most about the host community in Basrah was "their unique accent."

Social cohesion is built on a number of community-defined factors, including social relations, assistance, and what results (positive or negative) from people's interactions with each other. In general, most IDPs miss their communities from their places of origin and the socializing and support that was part of their lives. Living in displacement has meant cultivating new relationships which some IDPs either see or make happen while others remain isolated, either because of different language and culture or because of fears. But host community initiatives to reach out to IDPs is one key marker of IDP perceptions of their new communities and social cohesion.

## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### *Temporary Solutions to Persistent Issues with Livelihoods and Expenses*

The study reveals that IDPs are finding temporary solutions to livelihood problems and are not finding permanent work in large numbers. With inconsistent labour, it becomes harder for IDPs to plan and to overcome unexpected expenses. Over the years, they thus remain in a situation of constant struggle to make ends meet and in debt to those family and friends from whom they borrow money or goods. There were not large differences between rural and urban IDPs in this regard, although urban IDPs worked more in informal labour, perhaps because it was available. To lower expenses, IDPs regularly reduce food consumption, in both type and amount.

### *Increase Consistency and Types of Humanitarian Aid; Transition to Development Aid*

While emergency aid has been successful in preventing starvation and other issues, now is the time to shift to sustained development aid. IDPs proposed providing opportunities for new business development loans/grants, housing projects, and employment projects that help them rebuild the destroyed areas. In urban areas, development projects that build businesses will assist with urban integration and help generate more income. Those who do not have specific labour skills and/or live in poverty will benefit from development projects that target multiple socio-economic population groups as well as ones that target development of manufacturing, given how much labour is available and the low level of activity in local manufacturing sectors in Iraq.

### *Agriculture*

IDPs who worked in agriculture cannot return and rebuild their farming and animal husbandry businesses without considerable assistance to make the land safe again, which includes de-mining and unexploded ordinance removal. Only 20% of farmers have access to irrigation, compared to 65% before the crisis as ISIS destroyed over 90% of the pipes. Due to lack of access to spare parts for generators, financial constraints with higher prices of equipment, and damaged machinery, the rebuilding process is slow.<sup>46</sup>

Addressing the agricultural sector, however, needs to be part of a larger Iraqi government plan to invest in and make thrive agriculture as an industry in all of Iraq.<sup>47</sup> Without these types of visions and solutions to the issues in Iraq's agricultural sector, urbanization (in terms of population and building on agricultural land) and migration to urban areas will continue to increase. IDPs will thus stay in urban areas because there are few options for them if they return to their rural homes.

### *Security and Social Cohesion:*

Surprisingly, perhaps, for those who do not know Iraq well, the vast majority of IDPs in rural and urban areas report feelings of moderate or complete safety where they live. They also report high levels of feeling accepted by their host community. IDPs from rural areas living in urban areas reported feeling accepted at lower rates than urban-urban IDPs, which reflects perhaps how urban residents look down on rural folk in many parts of the world.

Iraqis have not always had such feelings of safety, and this was particularly acute in in the post 2003 period when the country was under U.S. occupation and then consumed in civil strife. These feelings of safety, security, and acceptance offer an excellent opportunity to build new civil society and community institutions, ones that used to be under the exclusive control of the Ba'ath party. Such institutions could be community centres that serve as a locus of civil society activities, and IDPs and the urban poor can be hired to work on building such centres. Or these institutions could be organizations that represent the interests of a group, or youth clubs, or religious groups, or otherwise.

At the same time that they feel safe, IDPs feel the absence of familiar social structures to navigate legal and social issues. In the absence of personal networks or tribal affiliations to solve problems that arise, IDPs instead turn to state institutions. However, trust in state institutions to seek justice for regular crimes was significantly lower among urban IDPs. At the same time, urban IDPs relied on pre-existing familial ties, host

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<sup>46</sup> Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2017. Iraq: Agricultural Damage and Loss Needs Assessment. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) lists three priority areas: agricultural sector and food security policy development, building up the investment projects portfolio for agricultural development, and technical assistance, normative work, and guidance on subsector and cross cutting themes and issues. This includes action such as the creation of a policy and strategy support unit that focuses on training programs, development of private-public partnerships within the UN to increase agricultural growth, support for local governments from the FAO, and the provision of substantive advice on specific technical fields and comparative advantage build on best practices at a global level.

<sup>47</sup> El Dahan, Maha and Raya Jalabi, 2018. *Special Report: How Iraq's Agricultural Heartland is Dying of Thirst*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-water-nineveh-special-report/special-report-how-iraqs-agricultural-heartland-is-dying-of-thirst-idUSKBN1KF1C2>.



community members' assistance, and the urban environment itself to navigate life in displacement. IDPs also mentioned that legal hurdles, discrimination, and cultural and linguistic barriers impeded their integration.

#### *Supporting Iraqi Government Initiatives to Assist IDPs*

Unlike many IDP situations, Iraqi IDPs generally are not at odds with their government. While there are issues with government-sponsored militias, for the most part, both the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoMD) and other Iraqi ministries have devoted time and resources to assisting those displaced by ISIS. These include international support and agreements, such as with the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has focused on civil infrastructure such as bridges and roads to reconnect the city, building clinics, and providing special machinery for the maintenance and sanitation of water. Moving forward, the Bank hopes to improve education services by repairing schools and re-training teachers, improve irrigation and agriculture by serving 35,000 people in rural areas, reinstate public transport services, and restore culture sites.<sup>48</sup>

Iraqi governmental institutions -- national and local -- are known to Iraqis, and they are Iraqis' access to services and Iraqis often turn to them for help. Ensuring the development of accountability, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and international awareness of and pressure on Iraqi government bodies will aid all those at the margins.

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<sup>48</sup> The World Bank, 2018. The World Bank in Iraq. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview#3>.

## V. APPENDIX A: LIST OF SUBDISTRICT CODING AND POPULATION SIZE

<b>BAGHDAD</b>			<b>KIRKUK</b>		
<b>Subdistrict</b>	<b>Coding</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Subdistrict</b>	<b>Coding</b>	<b>Population</b>
Al-Jisr	Rural	156,220	Altun kupri	Urban	40,037
Al-Karrada	Urban	312,317	Laylan	Rural	18,600
Al-Mansour	Urban	58,877	Markaz Abu al Khaseeb	Urban	209,921
Al-Nasir Walsalam	Rural	157,500	Markaz Dabes	Rural	48,721
Al-Rashdia	Rural	41,126	Markaz Kirkuk	Urban	900,262
Al-Rasheed	Urban	78,860	Schwan	Rural	11,370
Al-Taji Al-Jadeed	Rural	161,712	Yaychi	Rural	27,662
Al-Wihda	Urban	200,608			
Al-Yousifya	Rural	128,987	<b>SULAYMANIYAH</b>		
Al-Zehoor	Urban	205,772	<b>Subdistrict</b>	<b>Coding</b>	<b>Population</b>
Markaz Abu Ghraib	Urban	146,928	Bakrajo	Urban	99,172
Markaz Al Adhamia	Urban	280,382	Bazyan	Urban	41,890
Markaz Al-Mada'in	Urban	76,227	Chwarqurna	Urban	50,516
Markaz Al-Resafa	Urban	115,685	Khurmali	Urban	20,301
Markaz Daquq	Rural	64,851	Markaz Chamchamal	Urban	63,938
Markaz Karkh	Urban	111,156	Markaz Darbandihkan	Urban	46,547
Markaz Mahmudiya	Urban	151,722	Markaz Dokan	Urban	13,162
Markz Al Kadhimia	Urban	412,647	Markaz Halabja	Urban	63,829
Sadir (2)	Urban	42,257	Markaz Kalar	Urban	142,161
			Markaz Pshdar	Urban	73,799
<b>BASRAH</b>			Markaz Saidaadiq	Urban	78,308
<b>Subdistrict</b>	<b>Coding</b>	<b>Population</b>	Markaz Sulaymaniya	Urban	642,661
Al-Dair	Rural	102,710	Pyramaqrun	Urban	31,802
Al-Hartha	Urban	154,157	Rizgari	Urban	36,624
Al-Nashwa	Rural	32,262	Shorsh	Urban	50,638
Eaz Al Din Selem	Urban	65,714	Sirwan	Urban	11,673
Markaz Al-Basrah	Urban	1,193,071	Sytak	Rural	3,775
Markaz Al-Fao	Urban	39,803	Tanjaro	Rural	47,407
Markaz Al-Midaina	Rural	75,580			
Markaz Al-Qurna	Urban	133,530			
Markaz Al-Zubair	Urban	372,535			

Markaz Shat Al-Arab	Urban	132,551			
Safwan	Rural	54,862			
Um Qasr	Urban	56,871			

#### Appendix B: Sample Composition by Origin and Displacement Governorates

The information on the distribution of urban and rural IDPs provided in the methodology section and summarized in Table 1 of the article presents weighted findings that generalize to the population of non-camp Iraqi IDPs displaced between January 2014 and December 2015 to Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, or Sulaymaniyah. Table A below presents the *unweighted* characteristics of the survey sample.

		DISPLACED TO:		
		Urban Area % (n)	Rural Area % (n)	<i>Total originally from:</i> % (n)
ORIGINALLY FROM:	Urban Area	53.0 (880)	40.9 (382)	48.7 (1262)
	Rural Area	47.0 (779)	59.1 (551)	51.3 (1330)
	<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	
	<i>Total displaced to:</i> % (n)	64 (1659)	36 (933)	100% (2592)