A local resident, who was evicted from Vila Autódromo in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, addresses the hundreds of residents and police gathered in February 2006 for the demolition of the neighbourhood association's building. Decrying the government's actions, she says: "I am embarrassed by this country," and "my house fell, but I will never stop struggling." Photo: Megan Healy/CatComm/Rio on Watch, February 2016.

PART 3

OFF THE GRID

The world's overlooked IDPs

IDMC has to date monitored displacement associated with conflict, generalised violence and disasters brought on by rapid-onset natural hazards. As such, alarming though the scale and trends set out in part one of this report are, the global snapshot is far from complete. In addition to the data limitations explained above, the global figures do not capture many other contexts in which people are forced to flee their homes.

In recent years, we have been building up evidence on displacement associated with criminal violence, development projects and slow-onset crises related to drought and environmental change. In this part we explain why people displaced in such contexts should be recognised as IDPs, and we explore some of the challenges inherent in making their protection and assistance needs more visible. We also discuss some of the consequences of failing to do so – for those displaced, the governments responsible for them and others working in the humanitarian and development fields.

This constitutes a step toward a more comprehensive picture of internal displacement, with the aim of ensuring that all IDPs in need of protection and assistance, and those vulnerable to displacement, are not excluded from efforts to prevent and respond to the phenomenon.

Displacement associated with criminal violence, drought and development projects has not been systematically quantified and monitored, in part because of constraints on our resources, but also because of limited access to data, conceptual ambiguities about what constitutes displacement in some contexts, and methodological issues related to the various drivers of slow-onset disasters and chronic crises. Such drivers are also likely to have contributed to some of the conflict and violence that has forced people to flee their homes, and the general upward trend in global displacement.

The notion of an IDP is based on two core components: that their movement is forced, to distinguish them from economic and other voluntary migrants; and that they remain within internationally recognised state borders, to distinguish them from refugees and other people who move across them.

Differentiating forced from voluntary movement is not always straightforward, and displacement associated with slow-onset, frequently recurrent, and cyclical crises are just some of the situations in which it can be particularly difficult. As we highlight below, migration and displacement are better understood as sitting on a predominantly voluntary to predominantly forced continuum.

Raising awareness and understanding of people displaced in these contexts among policy-makers, practitioners, donors and the international community is important for three reasons.

First, it helps guide data collection as the basis of evidence for both policy and operational decision-making at all levels. Second, a broader picture means limited resources can be better prioritised and allocated, including for further data collection and research to address knowledge gaps. Third, insights into displacement as a multi-dimensional and cross-cutting issue help policy-makers identify links between agendas and objectives in areas including humanitarian action, sustainable development, peace-building, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation.

KEY FINDINGS AND MESSAGES

| **Global displacement figures do not capture many other contexts in which people are forced to flee their homes**. More comprehensive monitoring of displacement is needed to ensure that all IDPs, and people vulnerable to displacement, are included in efforts to respond to their needs and address longer-term development objectives.

Displaced by criminal violence

| Criminal violence associated with drug trafficking and gang activity had displaced at least **a million people in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico** as of December 2015.

| Studies have established **a direct link between criminal violence and migration**, but such displacement in the region tends to remain unquantified and unaddressed for reasons ranging from political to methodological.

| Conceptual and information gaps result in a lack of protection that means **people fleeing criminal violence fall through the cracks,** leaving them with little choice other than to embark on dangerous migrations, risking trafficking and murder, to neighbouring countries or the US.

Displaced by drought-related disasters

| Drought is not a direct "cause" of displacement in and of itself, but has impacts on food and livelihood insecurity, including increasing potential for conflict over scarce resources.

| Displacement might be identified as a **tipping point where abnormal movement patterns indicate the breakdown of normal coping strategies** under severely stressed conditions.

| Recognising people as internally displaced as opposed to voluntary migrants helps to identify them as people in need of particular attention from governments, humanitarians and development organisations, and who should be prioritised for protection and assistance.

Displaced by development projects

| Rather than being priority beneficiaries, **people displaced by development projects usually end up worse off**, undermining development gains. They suffer a range of human rights violations, and solutions are as elusive as for displacement associated with conflict and disasters.

| **The most frequently cited global estimate for people displaced by development projects is 15 million people a year since the mid-2000s.**

| Accumulated figures for people displaced by development projects appear only to be available for China, where the total is 80 million between 1950 and 2015, and in India, where the total is 65 million between 1947 and 2010.

| **Indigenous people and the urban poor are particularly affected** by displacement associated with development projects because they tend to live on land that is valuable in terms of natural resources or as real estate.

| The planning that goes into development projects provides an opportunity to mitigate displacement and prepare for durable solutions from the outset. If projects are undertaken with political commitment, adequate skills, sufficient financial and institutional resources, a participatory approach and respect for human rights, the **displacement they cause can result in beneficial and sustainable development**.

Displaced by CRIMINAL VIOLENCE

People flee criminal violence in a number of forms, from gang violence and drug traffickers' turf wars in Mexico and central America to clan feuds in the Philippines and armed banditry in CAR, but their migration is not systematically monitored worldwide.[97] This "unseen" flight has widespread repercussions for individuals and societies, and raises the question of where the phenomenon should fall within the displacement framework.

Data shows that there is far less information on people who flee criminal violence than on those displaced by conflict, and an even weaker response to their plight. There are probably many more people affected globally than the current data reflects.

Mexico and Central America: a million displaced by organised crime

Organised criminal violence associated with drug trafficking and gang activity has reached epidemic proportions in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in recent years.[98] As a result, there were at least a million IDPs in the region as of the end of 2015, up from 848,000 at the end of 2014, many of them driven from cities suffering the highest homicide rates in the world and levels of violence comparable with a war zone.[99, 100]

The generalised nature of the violence is well-established. Numerous articles and reports describe the phenomenon, including the scale and diversity of criminalised zones, corridors and micro-territories.[101] The perilous trafficking areas for migrants in Mexican states such as Oaxaca and Tabasco, extortion rackets in marginalised areas of El Salvador, criminal turf wars in urban Honduras and drug cartel feuds on Guatemala's borders are some of the worst sources of large-scale criminal violence.[102]

The intense nature of this generalised criminal violence has driven population movements in a variety of ways. Some people move in response to direct coercion and physical threats, others because of a general erosion of their day-to-day quality of life and livelihood opportunities.[103] Many flee after refusing to sell their land to drug traffickers and receiving death threats as a result, or to keep their children safe from gang recruitment and violence.[104] Some move in anticipation of violence in the neighbourhoods where they live or work, some as a result of its impacts. Others only flee when friends or family members have been attacked or killed.[105]

Several studies have shown a direct empirical link between criminal violence and migration in the region. A 2012 survey across 12 Mexican states established a clear association between violence – defined for the purpose of the survey as homicides, threats, extortion and a general atmosphere of violence – and a net migration rate. It established that, once the effect of socio-economic conditions normally associated with internal migration in Mexico was controlled for, the proportion of people moving from the most violent municipalities was 4.5 times higher than in those with similar conditions but lower levels of violence.[106] This study provided one of the first evidence-based indications that significant population losses in some areas of the country were directly linked to violence perpetrated by organised crime groups.

Unseen and in displacement limbo

Despite this evidence, displacement associated with generalised criminal violence in the region tends to remain hidden and unquantified. People flee unseen and their subsequent protection and assistance needs go unaddressed for a number of reasons.

In some countries, there is a general lack of recognition that criminal violence causes displacement. Mexican authorities acknowledge the phenomenon at a regional level, but not within their own borders, and Guatemala is similarly reluctant.[107]

Honduras is currently the only Central American country to officially recognise the phenomenon, and in 2013 it set up a cross-institutional commis-

After entering Mexico illegally near Ciudad Hidalgo on their way to the US border, many Central and South American migrants continue their journey on the freight train known as *La Bestia,* the Beast. The train begins its journey in the town of Arriaga in Chiapas State, where migrants climb on top of the wagons, exposing themselves to the elements and extortion by criminal gangs lying in wait along their route.
Photo: IOM/Keith Dannemiller, April 2014

sion to develop policies to prevent and respond to it.[108] El Salvador has also been more responsive, as evidenced by its decision to welcome permanent delegations from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and various NGOs. Both countries, however, continue to pursue state policies that prioritise strong security measures over redress for victims.[109]

The nature and scale of the displacement involved is also a factor. That triggered by conflict and disasters tends to result in large-scale, relatively visible population movements, but people fleeing criminal violence often do so in small numbers and keep a deliberately low profile. In Honduras, individuals and families tend to leave their communities discreetly to avoid alerting the dangerous groups from whom they are fleeing.[110] Many are also reluctant to report the violence they have suffered for fear their persecutors may track them down and exact retribution.

Such cases are seldom reported in the media or elsewhere.[111] Without official records it is difficult to provide evidence of the true scope of the problem, but interviews and what little data is available suggest that displacement is a widespread and in some cases a daily occurrence.[112]

Humanitarians' focus on forced or coerced movement also often fails to capture the complex circumstances in which people flee generalised criminal violence. An attack or atrocity may lead directly to displacement, but economic costs – when sales drop because customers are afraid to go out in the street, or when criminals demand a cut of profits – and lack of hope for the future may also influence people's decision to leave.[113]

Such movements are not as explicitly forced as those triggered directly by an attack, but people who move in search of income and who would not have done so were it not for the impact of insecurity and violence on their livelihoods warrant protection as IDPs. This is on the grounds that they were or felt obliged to flee, rather than exercising a free choice to move solely to improve their economic circumstances.[114]

Piecemeal data

Vague concepts and the perception of displacement as politically inconvenient in some countries combine to mean that quantitative evidence of people fleeing criminal violence in the region is generally insufficient and inaccurate. The plight of many has likely not been documented, and the scale of the phenomenon and the protection needs of those affected underestimated.[115]

The figures that do exist point to an alarming situation. Research to quantify the scale of displacement in Mexico indicates that around two per cent of the country's population, or 1.7 million people, were forced to migrate between 2006 and 2011 because of the threat or risk of violence – an average of 330,000 people a year.[116]

The fragmented quantitative data available for El Salvador is equally telling. A relatively robust national survey in 2012 revealed that 2.1 per cent of the country's population, or around 130,000 people, changed their place of residence in that year alone as a result of threats. Almost a third of those affected had been displaced more than once.[117] There were more than 289,000 IDPs in El Salvador, a country described as the world's most deadly outside a war zone, as of the end of 2015.[118]

HONDURAS

Unearthing a hidden displacement crisis

SPOT LIGHT

Long notorious for some of the highest homicide rates in the world,[119] Honduras has recently experienced enough of an increase in displacement caused by criminal violence to bring the issue into the political limelight. To begin tackling its impacts, the government created the Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence (CIPPDV) in late 2013, and tasked it with driving "the creation of policies and the adoption of measures to prevent forced displacement caused by violence, as well as to care for, protect and find solutions for displaced people and their families".[120]

As a first step, the commission launched a research project in 2014 to reveal the country's invisible displacement crisis and determine its scope and scale. An inter-agency team was created to carry out a study, led by CIPPDV and supported by the National Statistics Institute, the Jesuit Reflection, Investigation and Communication Team, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS).[121]

The aim was to collect information on people who had changed their place of residence within Honduras between 2004 and 2014 for "specific reasons relating to violence and general crime". For the purposes of the survey, the specific reasons were "forced recruitment, extortion, murder, threats, injury, sexual violence, insecurity in the community [conflict, shootings], kidnapping, forced disappearance, torture, discrimination, arbitrary detention and dispossession of land and dwellings". People who reported having changed their place of residence because of robbery or assault were not classified as displaced.[122]

A total of 2,138 households were surveyed across 20 municipalities identified as having the highest concentrations of displaced people.[123] Based on an extrapolation of the findings it is estimated that they are home to around 174,000 IDPs, including children born in displacement.[124] Of those surveyed, 67.9 per cent said their decision to move was influenced only by violence and insecurity, and without consideration of other factors that usually determine migration, such as employment or living conditions.[125]



Source: Survey and Enumeration of Households Affected by Internal Displacement in 20 Municipalities in Honduras (Nov-Dec 2014)

Two girls play in the neighbourhood of Comunidad Bordos Llanos de Sula, San Pedro Sula, just a few blocks away from a murder scene where police found buried bodies. Photo: Oscar Leiva Marinero/ Catholic Relief Services, July 2014

A deeper examination confirms a correlation between the intensity of criminal violence and population movement. As depicted in the graph, displacement levels remained relatively stable between 2004 and 2008, but rose noticeably between 2009 and 2013.[126] This trend coincides to some extent with the rise in homicide rates, an indication of the degree of violence to which people were exposed.[127]

The dynamic is contradicted somewhat by a spike in displacement in 2014, when homicide rates fell.[128] This anomaly may in part be explained by respondents' tendency to report more recent events to a greater extent than those that happened long ago.[129] Alternatively, the surge in the number of IDPs may reflect a broader reality of people fleeing a general deterioration of their security and daily lives.

Be that as it may, the progressive increase in the number of people displaced accentuates the Honduran authorities' need to create a clear and shared conceptual framework within which to understand why and at what point people flee areas plagued by criminal violence. The need is reiterated in one of the study's main recommendations, "to establish a definition of who may be considered a victim of forced displacement, in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, with the aim of identifying the range of people who may receive the State's attention".[130]

The UN special rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs stressed the point further during his official visit to Honduras in November 2015.[131] He welcomed the government's recognition of internal displacement, and highlighted the need for concerted action to tackle its causes and protect IDPs' rights. He urged the government "to strengthen its efforts to stop an internal displacement epidemic" caused by organised and gang-related crime and violence.

Findings from interviews conducted across the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras indicate that internal displacement has become so prevalent that it could be considered a "household phenomenon".[132] A 2012 survey asked respondents in the three countries whether they had ever felt the need to change neighbourhood for fear of violence, to which 13.5 per cent answered "yes".

The figure does not reflect the incidents of actual displacement, but it does give a general sense of the insecurity people perceive. It translates to around four million people, roughly the entire population of Puerto Rico, living with a need or desire to move their families because of the threat they feel from criminal violence.

Falling through the cracks: data gaps and their consequences

The conceptual and information gaps on displacement in the region described above reflect a reality in which people fleeing the effects of criminal violence fall through the cracks. National responses to date have focused almost entirely on combatting criminal behaviour through the justice and security sectors, leaving families who flee the violence with little recourse.[133]

Scant and anecdotal information reveals significant vulnerability across the region. The aforementioned 2012 study in Mexico confirmed that IDPs faced three major problems compared with the local resident population: less access to the labour market, education and adequate housing.[134] A more recent profiling of IDPs in Honduras also confirmed that displaced households were in more precarious positions than their counterparts in the general population in terms of access to housing and social services.[135]

This lack of protection leaves people with little choice other than to embark on dangerous migrations, risking trafficking and murder, to neighbouring countries or onwards to the US.[136] There was a major spike in unaccompanied minors entering the US through its southern borders in 2014, the majority fleeing poor and violent towns in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. There was also a resurgence in the number of children and their families arriving in the US in search of safety in the second half of 2015, reflecting the ongoing danger in these countries.[137]

The media reported regularly on their plight during the first half of the year, and the US president, Barack Obama, spoke of an urgent humanitarian situation.[138] Some analysts went further, describing the surge as "only the tip of the iceberg of a deeper new humanitarian crisis in the region".[139]

This stresses the urgency of engaging in a more holistic and evidence-based humanitarian approach to migration through Mexico and Central America and displacement across the region. This should be based on reliable data and clear concepts, using new and broad interpretations of the Guiding Principles and other legal frameworks of what constitutes internal displacement associated with criminal violence.

This woman used to have 200 goats and sheep and ten camels, which were her means of income. Most of the livestock died as a result of pasture and water shortages. She now lives in the Hariso displacement centre in the Siti region of Ethiopia, with only one camel and ten goats and sheep. She says: "We live by water, our cattle live by water. Without water we are no more."
Photo: Abiy Getahun/ Oxfam, December 2015

Displaced by DROUGHT-RELATED DISASTERS

The dynamics and impacts of displacement associated with slow-onset disasters, including those where drought plays a part, are relatively poorly understood and reported on. The estimation methodology used to generate the global figures for displacement related to disasters triggered by rapid-onset hazards is not well suited to assess that associated with drought and its complex, multi-causal and often delayed impacts.

Were estimates to include drought-related crises, the number of people displaced by the impacts of weather hazards would be even higher. This knowledge gap creates an important blind spot in the recognition of displacement associated with slow-onset disasters, and in the development of policy and operational responses to address the needs of some of the world's most vulnerable populations and solutions to their plight.

Complex causality under drought conditions

The scale of displacement associated with drought, as for other types of hazards, is largely determined by the underlying vulnerability of people to shocks and stresses that compel them to leave their homes and livelihoods. As such, drought's role has to be understood in combination with other social, demographic, political and economic drivers of displacement and disaster risk.[140]

The combined and complex impacts of these factors take time to manifest themselves, meaning people may be displaced months after the onset of drought.[141]

Hazard events such as floods and earthquakes create direct physical threats and immediate impacts that trigger displacement. Drought contributes more indirectly to displacement risk, largely through the erosion of food and livelihood security among vulnerable populations to the point where fleeing their homes becomes a survival strategy, often of last resort.

DEFINING DROUGHT

The nature of drought makes estimating its severity and impacts challenging. It is a relative rather than absolute condition that occurs in both high and low rainfall areas, and its characteristics vary significantly from one region to another. Its point of onset and end are difficult to determine, and its effects accumulate slowly over long periods of time. They also tend to be more diffuse and spread over a wider geographical area than those of other hazard types.

Common definitions of drought, as described below, put the emphasis on its climatic causes – meteorological drought – which are directly related to precipitation levels. Like other "natural" hazards, however, it has both natural and social dimensions, and its impacts on individuals, households and communities can only be understood in relation to demographic, socio-economic and political factors that increase the exposure and vulnerability of people.

Other definitions, including agricultural and hydrological drought, highlight the interaction of natural conditions with human and social factors such as the management of water supplies and changes in land use and land cover.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, some parts of the world have experienced more intense and longer droughts since the 1950s.[142] These are likely to intensify in the 21st century in some seasons and areas, with the potential for adverse impacts on many sectors.[143]

Meteorological drought

A precipitation deficit over a pre-determined period of time that varies by location according to user needs or applications. It is commonly measured according to a threshold of lower than normal or expected levels of rainfall.

Agricultural drought

Insufficient soil moisture to support crops, forage growth and pasture. The infiltration of precipitation into the soil is often not direct, and depends on slope, soil type and other factors. It can take several weeks or months before shortfalls begin to produce soil moisture deficiencies and lead to stress on crops, pastures and rangeland.

Hydrological drought

Below-average water levels in lakes, reservoirs, rivers, streams and groundwater affect non-agricultural activities such as tourism, urban water consumption, hydro-electric power production and ecosystem conservation. As with agricultural drought there is no direct relationship with precipitation levels and there may be a considerable time lag before effects are observed in the hydrologic system.[144]

Environmental drought

A combination of the above

The most significant factors that drive displacement are those that leave exposed and vulnerable communities unable to manage severe or recurrent drought impacts. Drought is a particular concern for communities whose food and livelihoods depend on rain-fed agriculture, pasture and rangeland, and whose basic survival is put under increasing stress when conditions overwhelm their normal coping strategies.

Around 84 per cent of the damage and losses drought causes worldwide are to agriculture, particularly livestock and crop production. Other sectors including health, nutrition and water and sanitation are also affected.[145] Agricultural drought reduces crop yields and livestock headcount. It may lead to a fall in wages and employment among farmers and labourers, while inflating food prices as commodities become scarce in local markets.

These pressures reduce households' purchasing capacity and access to food, deplete their savings and may force the sale of vital productive assets. Over time, they reduce the quantity and quality of their food consumption, and food insecurity and malnutrition increase, particularly among the most vulnerable households.[146]

Our research in parts of northern Kenya, southern Ethiopia and southern Somalia highlights a range of human factors that combine with drought to contribute to the displacement of pastoralists – not from a sedentary home but from their traditional and primary source of livelihood.[147]

Driving factors include the amount of grazing land available, pastoralists' ability to access it, herd size and composition, livestock marketing strategies, remittance flows, market prices and the scale and type of humanitarian interventions.[148] Other underlying factors include high fertility rates and the growth in pastoralist populations, which increase exposure levels.

Linkages to other hazards

Drought also contributes to the likelihood of other types of environmental hazards occurring. In combination with high temperatures, it can increase the risk of wildfires and the displacement of people whose homes are exposed to them. Drought periods that precede heavy rainfall may also increase the risk of flooding because desiccated land is less absorbent.

Recurrent drought may also contribute to longer-term processes of environmental degradation such as increased soil erosion, the deterioration of rangeland, deforestation and biodiversity loss. As seen among pastoralist communities in the Horn of Africa, this in turn may ultimately force them to seek alternative livelihoods and places to live.[149]

In many countries, drought and other natural hazards also become intertwined with the impacts of conflict, driving insecurity that is both a cause and a consequence of displacement. In Somalia, prolonged drought between 2010 and 2012 on top of political instability, conflict and widespread poverty precipitated a complex emergency and famine that led to huge displacement both internally and across the country's borders.

The UN system applies the term famine only to the worst cases when certain mortality, malnutrition and hunger thresholds are exceeded.[150] May to October 2011 was such a period in Somalia, and more than 265,500 people were displaced during it. This "distress migration of whole families" was mostly from the agro-pastoral and pastoral livelihood areas of the country where drought was the predominant driver.[151]

The voluntary to forced migration continuum

The distinction between displacement and voluntary migration is often unclear, particularly when population movements are associated with slow-onset disasters or gradual environmental change. In practice, displacement sits on a continuum ranging from predominantly forced to predominantly voluntary movements, where the former emphasises push factors to leave and the latter pull factors at the intended destination.[152]

Population movements associated with rainfall variability and environmental change take different forms across the displacement-migration continuum, and the patterns reflect the diverse coping strategies that households and communities employ. In slow-onset crises, population movements are more likely to be dispersed, with individuals and households leaving over extended periods of time rather than in large groups over short timeframes. This is another important factor that makes the displacement they cause more difficult to identify.

Wayuu children in Colombia's desert region of La Guajira spend most of their day looking for water in dried up, saline or otherwise contaminated wells. Most of what they draw up is brownish sludge unfit for human consumption.
Photo: C. George/ECHO, December 2015, https://flic.kr/p/FaA1hz

Displacement might be identified as a tipping point where abnormal movement patterns indicate the breakdown of normal coping strategies under severely stressed conditions. Following low rainfall and failed harvests in Niger in 2010, many poor households anticipated that normal migration strategies to meet seasonal food shortages would not be sufficient and moved their households to search for work in urban areas.[153]

Field research in Bangladesh, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Peru, Tanzania, Thailand and Vietnam conducted for the Where the Rain Falls project found that household members highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture and with few local options and resources to diversify their livelihoods were most directly affected by rainfall variability and drought, and were forced to migrate in search of food or work to support their families.[154]

Such people might be considered as being at the displacement end of the continuum. Less clearly displaced, but still trapped in vulnerable situations, are those with more labour migration options to cope with seasonal hunger, though still without being able to escape cycles of deprivation.[155]

Making distinctions between IDPs and migrants in slowly evolving crises may be both arbitrary and impractical in operational terms. That said, recognising people as internally displaced as opposed to voluntary migrants helps to identify them as people in need of particular attention from governments, humanitarians and development organisations, and who should be prioritised for protection and assistance.

Using the language of displacement can signal the severity of people's vulnerability and the urgency of their needs. In the case of repeated displacement, it may highlight populations in need of solutions to reduce chronic disaster risk. Identifying people as displaced can also alert authorities and humanitarians to the potential existence of equally or even more vulnerable people from the same disaster-hit areas who have been unable to leave and are in need of protection.[156]

In the context of slow-onset disasters and gradual environmental change, the evidence points to the usefulness of an integrated framework for analysis based on the voluntary-to-forced continuum of population movements, within which the identification of people as displaced from situations of severe distress or crisis remains important.

Improving data collection

The collection of reliable data on displacement and other population movements, and the needs of people in gradually deteriorating conditions, is vital to timely and well targeted operational and policy responses. A preliminary review of reporting on drought-related disasters in 2015 revealed, however, that little such information is being shared. One exception is discussed in the spotlight on Ethiopia.

Data on population movements and IDPs' needs has many uses. The identification of unusual or intensified migration patterns can serve as an indicator within early warning systems of the need for action that may pre-empt or at least mitigate a crisis. Displacement data is also useful in formulating social impact indicators within early warning and information systems, and in guiding the development of plans and policies on drought prevention and preparedness.

This is recognised in legal frameworks such as the Kampala Convention, which refers in article 4.2 to the establishment and implementation of early warning systems, disaster risk reduction strategies and disaster preparedness and management measures as ways of preventing and preparing for displacement.[157]

Governments also need such data to monitor and report on progress against disaster risk reduction and development objectives at the national and international level, including targets under the 2015 Sendai framework and the Sustainable Development Goals.[158] Parallel processes to develop indicator frameworks for both policy agendas were underway at the time of writing, with specific indicators for measuring displacement associated with disasters on the table.[159]

Our experience shows the importance of monitoring displacement situations regularly over time, particularly IDPs' protection risks and evolving vulnerabilities during prolonged, recurrent or protracted displacement.[160] As seen in some east African countries and Yemen in 2015, unresolved displacement also makes food insecurity worse because planting and harvesting are disrupted while farmers are absent from their land.[161] This in turn increases the risk of further displacement. Improved monitoring and reporting of displacement associated with drought-related crises would also enable better understanding and preparation for its short and long-term impacts on food insecurity.

Good data is also important for understanding past and future displacement trends and their many underlying drivers, and as a basis for investing effectively in measures to avert disasters, mitigate their effects and support sustainable recovery. Our research in the Horn of Africa found that the ability to understand such trends was hampered by the paucity of historical and current data on drought impacts. Even where data is collected, as in Somalia and Ethiopia, the multidimensional nature of people's displacement is rarely captured, which also limits understanding of IDPs' needs and potential solutions.

DROUGHT-RELATED DISASTERS IN 2015/2016

Drought risk was amplified in 2015/2016 by the effects of the El Niño weather phenomenon on rainfall patterns, which brought drier-than-normal conditions to many regions of the world (see El Niño spotlight). Its impacts were felt most strongly in eastern and southern Africa, south and south-east Asia, areas of the Pacific, Central America and the Caribbean and highland areas of South America.

Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly susceptible to drought-related disasters, which affect the food security, nutrition and health of vulnerable people. More than 60 per cent of the region's population lives in rural areas. The agriculture sector employs 60 per cent of the workforce and accounts for 25 per cent of GDP, rising to 50 per cent when the agribusiness sector is included.[162] It has experienced a high number of increasingly frequent droughts.

From May 2015 to early 2016, delayed onset and lack of rainfall in eastern Africa led to drought. There was a significant increase in the number of people affected by food insecurity and high malnutrition levels across Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and other areas where people were already suffering the cumulative impacts of recurrent poor growing seasons.[163]

As of December 2015, around 18.5 million people were estimated to be food insecure across the region, a 64 per cent increase on August estimates.[164] Displacement in this context, along with water shortages, poor sanitation and hygiene conditions and high malnutrition levels added to the risk of water and vector-borne diseases. The resurgence of Rift Valley fever in Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania was of particular concern (see Ethiopia spotlight).[165]

El Niño also made pre-existing drought and poor harvests worse in southern Africa, where many regions recorded the lowest rainfall in at least 35 years between October and December 2015.[166] Around 28 million people were food insecure by early 2016, according to the Southern African Development Community (SADC).[167] The effects of the severe 2015 drought will affect harvests significantly and have a devastating impact on food security over the year to come.

In south and south-east Asia, El Niño affected agriculture, water resources and food security, causing a weak monsoon season and associated drought in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

Lack of rainfall also had a severe impact on agriculture and food security in the Pacific, particularly parts of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. The Marshall Islands became the first country to declare a state of emergency in early February 2016 as a result of a severe shortage of fresh water on many atolls, caused by persistent drought.[168]

In parts of Central America, the Caribbean and highland areas of South America, insufficient and erratic rainfall from March 2015 led to drought conditions and deepening food insecurity. In Central America, El Niño contributed to another year of drought, one of the most severe in the region's history.

Countries in the northern part of Central America have faced chronic drought and dry spells and crop failures for three consecutive years, and communities in the region's "dry corridor" of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua are experiencing one of the worst droughts in decades, with an estimated 3.5 million people food insecure.

SPOT LIGHT

ETHIOPIA

Extreme conditions, extreme measures

Ethiopia suffered one of its worst meteorological droughts for 50 years in 2015, following the failure of two consecutive rainy seasons.[169] More than 80 per cent of the country's agricultural yield and the employment of 85 per cent of the workforce depend on adequate rainfall.[170] The drought contributed to the lowest soil moisture levels in at least 30 years, crop failure, below-average vegetation cover and severe water shortages in pastoral and arable farming areas.

Devastated livelihoods and high inflation have combined to increase food insecurity and malnutrition rates, particularly in central and eastern areas, forcing many people to leave their homes in search of food, water or work.

Recurrent and severe drought has also contributed to competition and clashes between communities under highly stressed conditions over access to scarce water and pasture.[171] Communal land tenure systems grant pastoralists equal rights to exploit resources, but in practice the use of grazing areas is regulated between and within tribes. When drought pushes a tribe to migrate into another's area, tensions between pastoralists or between pastoralists and settled farmers can arise.[172]

Drought and other climate-related hazards do not act alone in driving disaster and displacement risk. Their impacts are determined in large part by structural issues that drive vulnerability and exposure such as poverty, demographic trends, weak institutions and environmental degradation. Despite rapid economic growth, the reduction of extreme poverty, slowing population growth and improved social safety nets over the past decade, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world.[173]

Its population is still set to double in less than 30 years, putting further pressure on livelihoods and natural resources through deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion, desertification and poor farm management practices. Development is unevenly distributed, leaving vulnerable people and emerging regions disadvantaged and at higher risk of displacement.[174]

Climate trends across decades and extreme variability in rainfall from season to season play an important role in aggravating the drivers of disaster and displacement risk. Food insecurity is verging on chronic as farming areas that receive sufficient rain have shrunk over the past 20 years.[175] Most food is consumed by the families who produce it.[176]

The livelihoods of around seven million pastoralists have been jeopardised by the cumulative impacts of more frequent drought on livestock losses, rising cereal prices and lower returns when they sell or trade their animals.[177] Natural cycles such as El Niño will continue to contribute to extreme precipitation patterns, and most global climate models project an increase in the occurrence of both drought and floods in Ethiopia over the coming decades.[178]

Displacement in 2015 and early 2016

Drought contributed to the internal displacement of more than 280,000 people between August 2015 and February 2016, according to IOM. The figure includes at least 147,996 people displaced by severe food insecurity in the drought-affected and predominantly pastoralist regions of Afar and Somali.

The government and its humanitarian partners have also noted displacement caused by communal conflict in these areas, related to the effects of drought on competition for pasture and water.[179] The overall figure also includes around 67,800 people displaced by communal conflict associated with the drought in Oromia and Somali over the same period.[180]

The figures do not, however, capture displacement associated with drought among all affected populations, such as those in the East and West Hararge districts, because data collection is limited to specific areas by the resources available.[181] Further tracking of household mobility strategies, such as men migrating without their

families in search of work, in some cases possibly crossing borders, would be of great benefit. It would help to inform immediate and long-term protection and assistance interventions to save lives, reduce morbidity, protect and restore pastoralist and arable livelihoods, and prepare for and reduce the impact of further shocks and displacement.[182]

As of mid-December 2015, around 72,700 people categorised as "drought displaced" were staying in makeshift shelters at 24 sites in the Siti area of northern Somali.[183] Most of the sites were spontaneous collective settlements or centres, generally organised along ethnic or family lines, and a third were scattered individual shelters. Most of the IDPs were from pastoralist communities in Siti who had remained in the area while moving between districts and villages, often with their remaining livestock.[184]

The main reason given at all sites for not being able to return home was lack of food, and most if not all IDPs also said they had lost livestock. Reasons not captured are likely to include lack of access to water points, grazing land, veterinary services, livestock markets, cash and credit.[185] IDPs at all sites bar one had been displaced for the first time, which further emphasises the severity of the situation in 2015.[186]

Eighty-five per cent of the IDPs had characteristics that added to their assistance and protection needs. The disaggregated data reveals that 72 per cent were under the age of 18, including around 16,000 infants under the age of four. It also showed nearly 200 people suffering from chronic disease or serious medical conditions, and nearly 300 with physical or mental disabilities. There were more than 3,200 people aged 60 or over, nearly 2,500 pregnant or breast-feeding women and nearly 1,000 households headed by one person, most often a woman.[187]

In the severely drought-affected regions of Afar, Somali and Oromia, as of the end of the year there were a variety of groups of IDPs displaced at different times and for various reasons. In the Kilibati area of Afar, more than 14,500 people fleeing "drought" joined 5,700 people displaced by the effects of a volcanic eruption in Eritrea, of whom 1,800 had been living in displacement since 2010.[188] In Siti, around 71,200 people "displaced by drought" joined more than 5,600 people displaced by communal conflict a month earlier, and another 7,600 displaced by communal conflict up to two and a half years earlier.[189]

The most acute effects of the 2015 drought continue to be felt, with the potential for hundreds of thousands more people to become displaced in 2016 if early and adequate humanitarian assistance is not mobilised.[190] Between 50 and 90 per cent of crops and livestock have been lost in some areas.[191]

The government and its humanitarian partners have also highlighted the vital importance of ensuring access to safe drinking water, without which the potential for large-scale displacements of whole communities would be high.[192] Other likely impacts of displacement on pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in remote areas include the disruption of their children's education, psychosocial and mental health issues, and less access to health and nutrition services.[193]

The 2016 humanitarian funding appeal for $1.4 billion, including food aid for 10.2 million people, was only 37 per cent met as of the end of January.[194] The government is prioritising vulnerable segments of the population including people displaced by the effects of drought and woman and child-headed households.[195] Better data collection and monitoring of displacement and the needs of people affected by drought would go a long way to ensuring that the government and its operational partners and donors have the information to make this a reality.

Both humanitarian and development organisations also need to make concerted efforts to facilitate longer-term recovery and development solutions. The coordinator of the UN's response in Ethiopia has said the government's leadership and integration of the humanitarian response into its national development systems provides a good basis for the long-term efforts needed to strengthen people's resilience to future shocks.[196]

Without a sustained focus, however, on improving livelihood security for people already displaced and those who may become so, the risk of the current crisis becoming prolonged and repeated is likely to increase.

Displaced by DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Displacement associated with development projects is not currently covered in global displacement data. That said, such projects have historically forced large numbers of people off their land "in the public interest" across the world, as states exercise their power to further development through compulsory acquisition based on the legal principle of eminent domain.

The movement of people whose land is acquired for a development project is forced, because they are not given the choice to remain in their home areas. Even if their rights are fully respected in the process of acquisition and resettlement, a person removed to make way for a development project qualifies as an IDP.[197, 198]

Dispossession and displacement associated with development projects is often a slow process that begins long before people physically move. Some leave when the project is announced in an attempt to mitigate their losses, while living conditions for those who remain deteriorate as investments and the provision of services in the area diminish.[199]

In some cases, people receive notice of less than a day, making it a brutally sudden process. This in addition to a lack of, or conflicting information, inadequate compensation, asymmetric resettlement negotiations and the dismantling of their communities that put those affected under significant psychological stress.[200]

People displaced by development projects suffer a range of human rights violations. The coerced and involuntary removal of people from their homes is a violation of the right to adequate housing. Those affected also lose access to land and natural resources, which leads to a breach of other human rights including access to food, livelihoods, education, water and healthcare. Their physical security is at risk if they resist displacement, or when force is used during the eviction process. Other impacts include increased morbidity, restricted mobility and the loss of social support networks.[201] Decades of study have shown that displacement associated with development projects leads to impoverishment and disempowerment.[202]

There is a widespread assumption that those displaced are immediately resettled. This, however, rarely happens and many are left to search for improvised options on their own. A 2011 study conducted across ten Indian states found that only 17 per cent of people displaced by development projects had been resettled.[203]

When resettlement is provided, those affected are rarely included in the design, planning and management of their move. Displacement tends to weaken their tenure security, because inadequate or non-existent compensation and income mean they are unable to buy or rent housing or land. They face going into debt to make up the difference or accepting sites unsuitable for relocation, which makes them vulnerable to further upheaval.[204] Indigenous people, women, children and elderly people are more exposed and endure the adverse effects of this type of displacement disproportionately.[205]

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS THAT DISPLACE PEOPLE

The table below shows the kind of development projects that displace people. Their aims tend to be economic gain, infrastructure renewal or conservation, and they may be led, financed and implemented by governments, the private sector, development finance institutions or a combination thereof.

The developer is responsible for ensuring human rights are respected throughout the project period, and the state must ultimately protect against abuses by the public and private sector, including businesses and their contractors.[206] Displacement should be followed by resettlement to a new location where those affected are helped to improve, or at least restore, their lives.

Some features of displacement are common across all sectors, but many characteristics are more particular. For example, mining and dams usually both displace large numbers of people, but the effects and economic options for IDPs' solutions are significantly different. Solutions to displacement must be tailored to the specifics of each sector.

Project type	Examples
Water supply	Irrigation dams, reservoirs
Transport	Roads, railways, canals, airports, ports
Energy	Hydropower dams, thermal power plants, exploitation of oil and gas
Mining	Metals, gemstones and non-renewable resources
Environmental protection	Nature parks, forest reserves, wildlife sanctuaries, embankment fortification
Urban renewal	Public transport, housing projects, parks, markets, new townships, city beautification, sewage systems
Infrastructure for social services	Hospitals, public health centres, schools, colleges
Commercial infrastructure	Special economic zones, info-technology parks
Mega-events	Olympic Games, World Cup, Eurovision Song Contest
Industrial construction	Steel, cement and aluminium factories
Agriculture and forestry	Biofuels, food production, logging, cattle raising
Climate mitigation	Reforestation, carbon sequestration

Overlooked and unprotected

Over the past three decades there has been growing acknowledgement that people displaced by development projects suffer adverse consequences and require protection. In 1980 the World Bank adopted its first formal policy on projects that involve involuntary resettlement, and today every major multilateral development bank has established minimum guidelines to oversee displacement associated with their projects. Complaint mechanisms have also been instituted.

More than 80 private banks and financial institutions have adopted the Equator principles, a framework to manage social and environmental risks associated with development projects. Responsible business conduct is framed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s guidelines for multinational enterprises, the International Labour Organization (ILO)'s tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy, and the UN Global Compact, a worldwide initiative that aims to help companies operate responsibly and support society.

The Great Lakes Pact and the Kampala Convention also provide for the protection of people displaced by public and private development projects.[207] Domestic laws and policies on internal displacement such as those in Peru, Kenya and Nepal have been adopted with provisions devoted to development projects, as have land acquisition laws in China, India and Mozambique that improve protection for the dispossessed.[208] Such legal frameworks, however, are often overridden by superseding legislation or executive powers, undermining the protections they offer, or they are simply ignored.

At the UN, the 1998 Guiding Principles, the 2007 Basic Principles on Development-Based Evictions and the 2011 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights all aim to protect people displaced by development projects. The UN Development Programme has also advised the Indian government on resettlement practices.[209]

Despite these laws, policies and guidelines, the displaced have few options when it comes to holding developers to account for the negative impacts they experience. Some have taken their cases to court with the help of human rights advocates. One was brought in Kenya with data collected using the Habitat International Coalition's housing and land rights network's eviction impact assessment tool.[210] Information on the number and outcomes of such cases, however, has not been collated. Remedies and assistance received is often due to the efforts of local civil society and the displaced themselves.

Those who resist displacement or call for better protection have been threatened, intimidated, verbally and physically assaulted, sexually harassed, arrested and even killed.[211] Neither the World Bank nor the International Finance Corporation have responded meaningfully to such abuses associated with projects they have financed.[212] Some 758 complaints have been filed against 11 development banks since 1994, and displacement was an issue in 35 per cent of them.[213] However, as finance institutions are largely immune from prosecution in national courts,[214] complaints procedures may still improve claimants' situations since they are otherwise rarely recognised or provided adequate remedy for the harm done.

International humanitarian organisations have considerable experience in responding to internal displacement, but they are not on the front lines assisting people forced to flee their homes by development projects. This may be due to lack of awareness, limited resources, restricted access and a wish to avoid jeopardising their relations with the authorities.[215] International development agencies and private companies are reluctant to monitor and assist IDPs after their projects are completed.

Startling estimates despite incomplete data

Several types of data source exist on people displaced by development projects. The developer's and financier's documents contain resettlement figures, and in rare cases official gazette notifications and local land records may reveal the amount of private land acquired for a project. Rough estimates can be achieved by multiplying the area of acquired land with its average population density. Local media articles and people with community knowledge may also provide figures based on their own surveys, monitoring and memory. Satellite imagery, when available, can corroborate other data.

A global figure calculated by collating these sources would still, however, be an under-

Residents of the Baprolla resettlement site in Delhi with staff members from the Housing and Land Rights Network. They are among 500 families living on the site following their eviction from slums in the Indian capital in 2015. The site is on the edge of the city, far from schools, health care facilities and job opportunities. Its isolation and poor lighting make it a dangerous place for women and girls after dark. In theory the residents have a ten-year lease, but it is unclear what their tenure status will be beyond that. Photo: IDMC, March 2016

estimate. Project documents of governments, corporations and multilateral finance institutions are not always readily made available, or do not report figures routinely or with consistent terminology. Those that are reported may be underestimates to increase the chances of the project being approved and funded. The actual number of people displaced is rarely reported once a project is completed.[216]

Those who use land with informal tenure or under customary law may be excluded, because resettlement figures in some cases only take in those with individual land titles, and gazette notifications and local land records do not reveal the land acquired from those without such deeds. People living beyond the development site but displaced by the indirect effects of a project, and those living in displacement years after its completion are also unlikely to be fully captured.[217]

A review of public World Bank documents for 969 projects citing possible resettlement between 2004 and 2013 is revealing. Only 43 per cent forecast a number of people to be affected.[218] Terms such as "physically displaced", "economically displaced", "resettled" and "affected people" are used interchangeably and may not indicate actual displacement. Some completion reports include the number of people the project displaced, but such figures are inconsistently quoted as households, families, people or cases, which does not allow credible estimates to be compiled.

The World Bank itself reported in 2012 that most completion reports did not provide substantive information about resettlement outcomes.[219] Such information for projects implemented by other multi-lateral financial institutions, private companies and governments is also not available. In the absence of data on the number of people a project displaced, where they went and their new situations, it is not possible to evaluate how project implementors have upheld their human rights obligations or the outstanding protection and assistance needs of the displaced.[220]

The most frequently cited global estimate for people displaced by development projects is 15 million people a year since the mid-2000s.[221] This number, provided by Michael Cernea, the lead author of the World Bank's study of displacement associated with projects it supports and a global expert on displacement and resettlement caused by development, was born out of a previous estimate of 10 million people displaced annually by dams, urban and transport development projects

published in 1996.[222] The estimate was increased to 15 million to account for mining and other sectors and the general proliferation of development projects worldwide. It is still, however, considered conservative.

Accumulated figures for people displaced by development projects appear only to be available for China and India. In China, the total is 80 million between 1950 and 2015,[223] and in India 65 million between 1947 and 2010.[224] These are considered under-estimates because, among other things the figure for India does not cover all states, and the figure for China omits the impact of extractive industries. Reports of the number of people displaced differ widely, documents are not always public and those that are published are not always reliable.[225]

The two countries are also the only ones for which protracted displacement figures are available, and only then for certain types of projects. Two decades after their resettlement, at least 46 per cent of the 10 million people resettled to make way for reservoirs in China were still living in "extreme poverty",[226] while in India 75 per cent of those displaced by dams were still impoverished.[227]

In the absence of data for all development sectors, dam and reservoir construction appears to displace most people worldwide.[228] A report published in 2000 estimated that such projects had forced between 40 and 80 million people to flee their homes since 1950. Anecdotal evidence suggests fewer people are displaced by mining than by dam construction and urban renewal.[229]

Displacement undermines development gains

Rather than being priority beneficiaries on account of their losses, the displaced usually pay the price for development projects and end up worse off. Displacement deepens inequality, decimates communities and undermines development gains by making the very poverty that such projects purportedly seek to alleviate worse. Impoverishing and disempowering people in the name of development also allows human rights abuses to continue unchallenged and demonstrates the failure of states to ensure the rights of IDPs.

In addition to the fact that those displaced get left behind, there is an inflated sense of progress, because indicators that track development such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the upcoming New Urban Agenda capture gains but not setbacks.

The high cost of poorly handled displacement and resettlement extends well beyond those directly affected. In Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines and Sudan, resistance, tensions and conflict have erupted as a result of mismanagement, corruption and the unequal distribution of benefits.[230] There is also the risk of communal violence in resettlement areas between local communities and those newly displaced, and of human rights abuses as people attempt to claim their rights. This may lead to further displacement.

Large, carbon-intensive energy sector projects such as oil extraction, coal mining and biofuel plantations also generate greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global warming, increasing the risk of disasters and future displacement.

The planning that goes into development projects provides an opportunity to mitigate dispossession and displacement and prepare for durable solutions from the outset. Though few in number, examples of good practice do exist. Those displaced in Indonesia developed aquaculture and fisheries in new reservoirs, in Senegal they gained access to irrigated land and in Norway they received a percentage of revenue from electricity sales.

Projects should be undertaken with political commitment, adequate skills, sufficient financial and institutional resources, a participatory approach and respect for human rights. They should have in-built resettlement and rehabilitation programmes in line with international standards, as well as mechanisms for monitoring progress towards durable solutions. This would help to ensure that the displacement they cause results in beneficial and sustainable development for all.[231]

BRAZIL

Olympic Games preparations displace thousands in Rio de Janeiro

SPOT LIGHT

Sports mega-events such as the Olympic Games commonly displace people, both to make way for venues, accommodation, tourism-related infrastructure and transport, and also to improve the international image of the host city by eliminating unsightly slums from areas exposed to visitors and television audiences. [232] [233]

In Rio de Janeiro, around 6,600 families were evicted or under threat of eviction in 2015 to make way for the 2016 Olympic Games.[234] The vast majority of those affected were living in *favelas* or informal settlements, and were relocated from their homes in central areas of the city to distant suburbs. Given that 60 per cent of the Rio 2016 Olympic Park area will be condominium developments sold on the open market after the Games,[235] return is not an option for those displaced.

The evictions process began in 2009 when the city won the bid for the Games and was intertwined with preparations for the 2014 World Cup. Residents under threat have been unable to access official information about the urbanisation projects or the process of their removal. Options offered by the city have not been publicised and residents were neither consulted on nor participated in discussions on possible alternatives to evictions. Together with two Rio universities, some residents of Vila Autódromo, one of the largest *favelas* to be demolished, presented an alternative to their eviction to the city authorities, but their proposal was rejected.[236]

Nor have many families received adequate notice of their eviction. There was a surge in "flash evictions" across various *favelas* in 2015, in which municipal guards arrived to demolish homes or businesses with no warning to residents and their belongings still inside.[237] Residents who remained feared leaving their homes and also saw the value of their property and due compensation decrease as the demolitions progressed. Some were also left without access to water and electricity.[238]

The amounts paid in compensation have varied between communities, and between households within the same communities, as a result of weak and individualised procedures.[239] Some Vila Autódromo residents have received supposed market rate compensation[240] as a result of well-organised resistance,[241] while others within and outside the *favela* struggled to secure their promised payment.[242] In almost all cases, the compensation does not cover the cost of an adequate home and the accompanying new expenses, leaving those affected in debt.

Many people under threat of eviction have fought to ensure their rights are respected. Resistance has led to confrontations with officials, humiliation and mistreatment, physical injuries during municipal guard assaults and death threats.[243] People who resisted eviction longest came under most pressure, and some settlements had a constant municipal guard presence that residents deemed oppressive.[244] The pressure to get Rio ready for the Olympics did not allow time for institutions and procedures to be reformed. On the contrary, it has enabled abuses to occur.

As a result, communities have been forced to relocate to low-income housing projects on the poorer outskirts of the city, where there is little or no urban infrastructure.[245] The commute to the city centre from some relocation areas is more than two hours by public transport, demonstrating that rather than benefit from urban improvements, those displaced suffer their impacts. Despite legislation known as the *Lei Orgânica*, which prohibits moving urban dwellers more than seven kilometres from their original homes, many housing complexes are around 50 kilometres away.[246]

Surveys of the displaced in two relocation areas and anecdotal evidence shows a deterioration in their access to livelihoods. Distance is an obstacle to maintaining their current jobs, and there are no means of subsistence, few employment opportunities and little access to markets in the new areas.

Given that communities were not resettled as a whole, social networks were also broken up. Some women resettled alone, sometimes with children, because their partners did not want to

A girl watches as the Vila Autódromo neighborhood association building is demolished soon after dawn. Photo: Megan Healy / CatComm / RioOnWatch, February 2015

do so. With little or no support, their opportunities to work and socialise outside the home are limited, leading to isolation and mental health issues.[247] Schools and health centres have also been difficult to access in some cases, either because they are remote or because provision is tied to place of residence.[248]

Access to the resettled communities is difficult because some have been overtaken by organised criminal groups, which tax residents and put families at risk of violence.[249] Some have been forced out of their new homes as a result of intimidation and threats.[250] Removed from communal ties, and given that many moved from areas where such groups were less active, the displaced lack the networks and strategies to protect themselves.

The urban poor have suffered the most direct impacts of the evictions.[251] The majority took place in areas with great potential for increases in land value, and as such the process has made economic and social inequalities worse by reinforcing discrimination. Already living in a precarious situation, the displaced have been pushed further into deprivation. With no monitoring of, or response to their needs resulting from their displacement, further impoverishment and marginalisation is likely to result.

Evictions in Rio go beyond the Olympic Games. The city has a long history of removing low-income communities from desirable areas.[252] The city government has used its hosting of a series of high profile events over the past decade to justify the relocation of the urban poor from prime locations for middle and upper class housing.[253] The Olympics and others have contributed to property speculation and gentrification, a pattern seen in many cities that host mega-events.[254]

Recurring patterns of human rights abuses linked to such events can be prevented. They should be planned and staged with a more comprehensive and consistent approach to managing social risks and adverse human rights impacts.[255] Bidding documentation should set better terms for development strategies to avoid evictions, and where that is not possible, to minimise them and ensure they are carried out in line with international standards and respect for human dignity.