1. Incremental housing

Description

Rental support grants have widely been used to assist urban IDPs and refugees, and they are an important way of addressing immediate housing needs, but the deeper problem often lies in a shortage of affordable housing stock for rent. Urban densification is a quick way to make more accommodation available, and it stimulates the housing market. It either involves the vertical expansion of existing housing units or urban in-fill, building on vacant plots in the city. Subdivision, in which a house is split into two or more units, also helps to increase stock.

The floor area ratio (FAR) or plot ratio\(^1\) determines how many floors can be built on a particular piece of land, along with regulations on density such as the number of units per building and minimum space per person. For city officials, increasing FAR facilitates vertical expansion and allows homeowners to add value. Owners tend to upgrade their homes incrementally over time as their income and needs increase. Incremental housing - or sites and services - projects, which provide land or a basic house and expect recipients to upgrade them over time, tend not to take into account the FAR concept, however, the latter shares the same underlying principles of anticipating and supporting future incremental upgrades.

When IDPs or refugees arrive in urban areas, the increased demand for housing may be temporary if they later return to their places of origin, decide to locally integrate or settle elsewhere but in many cases their displacement becomes protracted. Given that urban governance and infrastructure need to be able to absorb rapid population influxes and outflows, it is important to create flexible tools that make new housing stock available relatively quickly, and which will still be viable and put to other use if the displaced population moves on.

New housing should be built so that it also benefits host communities. It should be appropriate and affordable to them should the displaced population leave the area.\(^2\) They should also be supported in adding or finishing a new floor to their home, which increases its value and makes more property available for rent. This in turn helps ease tensions between host families and IDPs. In return for the support they receive, they agree to lease out the extra units at no cost to displaced families for a fixed period of time.

Such an approach would mean that the money spent on assisting families with rental support grants would instead be invested to increase the stock of housing for rent. Stimulating local housing markets through cash-based assistance has an economic multiplier effect, as does the construction it involves. Building or upgrading property creates local jobs and demand for materials and contractors' services.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has been experimenting with a new integrated urban housing programme. It aims to drive urban densification with the construction of multi-story buildings that benefit both urban refugees and host families. In addition to providing grants or loans to homeowners, NRC also provides legal assistance, counselling and arbitration between landlords and leaseholders. Strengthening the relationship between landlords and leaseholders through written lease agreements and dispute resolution mechanisms forms a significant part of NRC's strategy to defuse tensions and improve social cohesion between host communities and refugees.

NRC's initiative targets urban refugees rather than IDPs, and focuses on temporary rather than permanent housing, but it demonstrates the way in which humanitarians are evolving their practices and innovating in urban areas. Urban refugees and urban IDPs also face many similar challenges, though their differing legal status has implications in some areas. Refugees, for example, often face additional barriers in terms obtaining work and residency permits. The Syrian refugees in the case study do not have the legal right to work in Jordan, which means they may resort to a range of negative coping mechanisms, such as the rapid depletion of their savings, selling their valuables, foregoing expenditure on basic needs and going into debt in order to pay for their housing. IDPs may not face the same legal obstacles, but they are still often vulnerable to discrimination in terms of employment and housing.
### Case study: Integrated urban housing programme (NRC, Jordan)

**Snapshot**

**Practice** Integrated urban shelter programme (2013)

**Main actors**
- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
- Irbid, Ajloun and Jerash municipalities
- Private building owners

**Context**
- Syrians displaced by conflict to urban and peri-urban areas in Jordan
- Vulnerable Syrian refugee households outside camps live in substandard and overcrowded shelters without tenure security
- Lack of adequate and affordable rental housing stock to accommodate increased demand during the refugee crisis
- Increased risk of tensions between Jordanian households and their Syrian refugee counterparts over competition for housing, inflation of rents, access to services and employment

**Target group(s)**
- Syrian refugee households: more than 12,000 Syrian refugees in Irbid have benefited from around 4,000 new rental housing units, fulfilling 11 per cent of Syrian refugees’ estimated housing needs in the governorate; 3,900 Jordanian property-owning host families have also been assisted.

**Summary**

The practice aims to increase the availability of rental housing stock in response to the shortage created by the influx of Syrian refugees into Jordanian cities. Owners of unfinished buildings are given grants to complete the work or add extra floors or rooms. The new units are provided rent-free to Syrian refugees for between 12 to 24 months. The greater NRC's investment, the longer the rent-free period. NRC identifies tenants based on vulnerability criteria such as female-headed households, people with disabilities, households with more than ten members or with infants, homeless people, families or individuals with severe financial issues and those at risk of forced eviction or living in overcrowded and inadequate housing.

The NRC legal counselling programme provides lease agreements according to Jordanian legislation to the beneficiaries of the shelter assistance (owners and tenants) to protect tenure security. In case of disputes, legal assistance is available and facilitates access to remedies, information and legal support.

**Key challenge(s)**

- Though innovative and successful at its scale, the practice is unable to address the enormous deficit of affordable housing in Jordan.
- It has the potential to be scaled up, but in its present form it is a resource-intensive project to put adequate shelter on the market that targets the most vulnerable Syrian refugees and supports landlord-tenant relationships. This means that the programme may require significant redesign to make it cost-effective at a larger scale.
- The programme’s success is based on oversight and mediation between landlords and their refugee tenants. Sometimes one side or the other violates their tenancy agreement, and continuous education and conflict resolution are required to ensure that refugees are not displaced as a result.
- The practice may not fully take refugees’ need for flexibility as well as tenure security into account. The implications of refugee tenants deciding to move out before the end of their agreement — whether to be reunited with other family members, return to their places of origin or access livelihood opportunities in other areas — are unclear.

**Factors for potential replicability**

- Existence of partially finished buildings or other structures that could be upgraded to create additional housing units
- A functioning construction industry
- Ongoing displacement crisis in which demand rises and falls in unpredictable ways.

**Strengths (Key elements of right to adequate housing and key programmatic elements from the matrix appear in bold)**

- This practice is an innovative approach that adds new rental units quickly to existing housing stock to the benefit of both refugees and host communities.
- It focuses on the needs of vulnerable individuals, families and groups of urban refugees.
- It ensures that refugee households can enter into rental agreements for between 12 and 24 months, strengthening their tenure security.
- It ensures affordability for the duration of tenure, because refugee households do not have to pay rent.
- It ensures that the additional housing units are built according to habitation guidelines, including access to water, electricity, structural integrity and freedom from leaks.

Overview
The ongoing conflict in Syria has driven more than 3.3 million Syrians to seek refuge in neighbouring countries since 2011, primarily Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. According to UNHCR, the average monthly registration rate is in excess of 100,000. As of January 2015, there were 622,343 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, the equivalent of 10 per cent of the latter’s population. The vast majority, 84 per cent, live outside the official Za’atari and Azraq camps. Of them, around half live in substandard conditions in poor quality or temporary structures. The inter-agency shelter response plan for Syrian refugees highlights serious overcrowding, with as many as 20 people sharing two rooms.

The refugees spend an average of 58 per cent of their monthly income on rent. They pay between 100 and 350 Jordanian dinars ($140 and $500) a month, and rental prices rose by 25 per cent between 2012 and 2013. Given the difficulties they face in obtaining work permits, some households have resorted to negative coping strategies, including taking children out of school to work, early arranged marriages and survival sex. Some have depleted savings set aside for dowries and wedding costs. Focus group discussions conducted by the REACH Initiative revealed that both Syrian and Jordanian respondents had also sold valuables and aid vouchers, worked for low pay in informal sectors or were forced to meet their rising housing costs. Debt often takes the form of unpaid rent and 20 per cent of Jordanians and 77 per cent of Syrian refugees identified housing as the main cause of tension between them.

Syrian refugees spend an average of 58 per cent of their income on rent, and 20 per cent of Jordanians and 77 per cent of Syrian refugees identified housing as the main cause of tension between them.

The influx of refugees has also led to overcrowding in schools and placed added strain on healthcare facilities. Tensions could be made worse by the fact that some humanitarian agencies have been disbursing rental support grants, which, when coupled with increased demand, can have an inflationary effect on the housing market.

Many households do not enter into legal rental agreements, leaving them without tenure security and at risk of eviction and multiple displacement. Non-payment, overcrowding and rising rental costs only add to the risk. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reports that almost half of the refugee families assessed in urban areas have been forced to move three or more times in the last year in search of secure and adequate shelter. Ten per cent of Syrian refugees in northern Jordan were under imminent threat of eviction. When refugees move between governorates or districts, they have to update their government-issued identity documents to maintain their legal status and access services.

Programme design
There are currently five types of humanitarian shelter response programmes in Jordan. There are projects to upgrade refugees’ existing housing in line with Sphere Project standards; to disburse rental support grants to provide “adaptation kits” that shore up existing housing against winter conditions; to empower refugees and vulnerable families by raising awareness about tenure and housing rights under Jordanian tenancy law; and to complete the construction of unfinished buildings and adapt others to create additional housing units.

NRC has taken the latter approach. Other interventions improve the adequacy of existing stock, but NRC’s integrated approach to expanding shelter programmes provides additional value. The programme adds new rental stock and in so doing provides tangible support to host communities while meeting vulnerable Syrian refugees’ immediate shelter needs.

The organisation launched a pilot of its programme in Irbid in July 2013. In coordination with community-based organisations and municipal and regional government departments, it worked directly with Jordanian property owners to encourage them to finish their partly-built homes by adding units or additional floors. The approach not only helps to address the large gap between the supply and demand for affordable rental housing units in the province. It also promotes an alternative model of rental support that moves away from basic cash-for-rent programmes.

Selection criteria and programme conditions
Jordanian families often leave floors of their homes unfinished until extra space is needed, for example after the marriage of a son. For others the cost of finishing their buildings is prohibitive and loans are not easily accessible. NRC found that around a third of private property in peri-urban areas was unfinished, and approached property owners to see whether they were interested in receiving funds to complete their buildings in return for offering the extra space rent-free for a fixed period of time.

The organisation offers financial incentives and technical support to Jordanian property owners to bring new rental housing units onto the market, and at the same time provides vulnerable Syrian refugee families with rent-free accommodation for between 12 and 18 months. The amount of funding the property owners receive depends on the number of units they are willing to add and length of time they are prepared to offer them rent-free (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: NRC’s financial investment model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-12 month rent-free period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>housing unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 housing units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 housing units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 housing units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Property owners are chosen for the programme after a team of national NRC engineers checks the properties in question to ensure they comply with its building standards and are suitable for upgrade, and that the owners have the appropriate planning permission. Suitability is determined using Sphere standards related to water, electricity, sanitation, ventilation, access to basic services, access to markets and protection from flood risk. Minimum living space is 3.5 square metres per person, excluding kitchen and bathroom.

The organisation has also assessed more than 28,000 Syrian refugees in northern Jordan. It found more than 16,000 to be extremely vulnerable and prioritised them for its programme against standard vulnerability criteria including household size and composition, risk of eviction and current shelter conditions.

Information, counselling and legal assistance
Jordanian landlords and Syrian refugee families sign standard tenancy agreements in line with Jordanian law and are helped to understand their legal rights and obligations. Tenants receive an initial cash grant of 100 dinars ($140) a month after moving in to help them with relocation and setting-up costs. NRC outreach teams monitor implementation of the lease agreements from start to finish and help to resolve any problems that arise. The refugees are also given information about support available to them through other organisations in an effort to improve their access services and assistance.

NRC stipulates the need for a clear rental document recognised in a Jordanian court of law and which protects from arbitrary eviction and actions by either party that contravene the agreement. Under Jordan’s 1995 landlords and tenants law, any person – including a refugee – can legally enter into a contract and are both protected by and subject to its stipulations.

Dispute resolution that focuses on strengthening landlord-tenant relationships is an important component of the programme. Some refugee households contravene their rental agreements by overstaying or bringing in additional family members, and this can lead to harassment and even eviction. NRC’s information, counselling and legal assistance (ICLA) team conducts eviction monitoring through follow-up phone calls and house visits to address the concerns of both parties. Its work helps to strengthen tenants’ tenure security and is a vital factor in the overall success of the programme.

Programme expansion
After positive feedback from the pilot project, NRC decided to scale up and expand the programme into Irbid, Aljoun and Aljoun. Its staff met the leaders of both governorates, and used a smartphone app to conduct a profiling exercise among 3,864 refugee families in May 2014. Such an undertaking is vital before scaling up a project and expanding into new areas. Political, living and social conditions may be very different, and rental costs may vary, with implications for the cost of programme. Elements need to be adapted and evolved based on lessons learned from the pilot, and standards and guidelines revised. Housing market conditions can change rapidly and the programme must keep up with emerging trends in supply, demand and cost.

The amount of funding the property owners receive depends on the number of units they are willing to add and length of time they are prepared to offer them rent-free (see Table 1).

Table 2: Results of profiling exercise in Jerash and Aljoun, Jordan

| Female-headed households | 24 per cent |
| Living in Jerash because of proximity to family | 80 per cent |
| Living in Aljoun because of proximity to family | 61 per cent |
| Living in Jerash because of low rent | 13 per cent |
| Living in Aljoun because of low rent | 28 per cent |
| Houses with mould or damp issues | 47 per cent |
| Lack of basic protection from elements | 18 per cent |
| Major kitchen and bathroom repairs required to meet minimum standards | 21 per cent |
| Major water availability or quality issues | 11 per cent |
| Property owners interested in NRC programme | 76 per cent |
| Those interested because of insufficient funds to finish their properties | 58 per cent |
| Those interested in helping Syrian refugees | 42 per cent |
| Average expenditure on rent | 300-600 dinars |

Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs
March 2015 | Home sweet home
By the end of 2014, NRC had supported more than 900 property owners to bring 3,654 housing units onto the market, with a further 484 under construction. The new units provide secure shelter to more than 12,000 Syrian refugees, meeting around 11 per cent of their estimated housing needs in Irbid. More than 7,000 Syrian refugees who meet the vulnerability criteria to become beneficiaries are currently on the programme’s waiting list.

By investing nearly $10 million in the local economy, NRC has created a win-win situation for the both Jordanian host community and Syrian refugees. Investment in housing has an economic multiplier effect, with upstream linkages to construction materials and companies and downstream linkages that create new employment opportunities in the sector. In Irbid, which at 21 per cent has second highest unemployment rate of the country’s governorates, it has meant work for around 17,000 construction workers. Landlords estimate that NRC’s support meant they were able to finish the construction of their property on average 1.8 years earlier than planned.

Transfer of knowledge
In March 2014, NRC’s housing, land and property (HLP) division published a guide based on its experiences in Irbid,22 intended both to support its own programme and provide advice to others on protecting both Jordanian landlords’ and Syrian refugees’ HLP rights. IASC’s shelter sector working group in Jordan used NRC’s document to draft its own guidelines.23

NRC’s programme is now a component of the Syria regional response plan for shelter for 2014 to 2015, and could be implemented in other countries. The international NGO Medair has already begun a similar initiative, and UNHCR, IOM, CARE international and Handicap International have all signed memorandums of understanding for referrals.

NRC has set an innovative precedent and created a useful instrument for transferring its knowledge about the current HLP regime in Jordan not only other NGOs and agencies, but also to community-based organisations and housing advocacy groups. It could also be used to shape Jordan’s national response to its urban development challenges, which have been complicated by the Syrian refugee crisis.

Impact
“At least, with this project, for every Syrian family that has been assisted, there is a Jordanian family that has been supported.”21

Challenges
NRC’s programme is innovative and successful at its scale, but it cannot address the huge deficit of affordable housing in Jordan. It has the potential to be scaled up, but in its current form is a resource intensive project that puts adequate shelter on the market, targets the most vulnerable Syrian refugees and follows up the landlord-tenant relationship throughout the tenancy period. This oversight and mediation is the cornerstone of the programme’s success.

Despite the addition of extra housing units, utilities are often shared between landlord and tenants, which can be a source of tension.

Conclusion
The 4,000 housing units created represent only a fraction of the estimated 120,000 that Jordan needs, and the expansion and scaling up of the programme is a step in the right direction. Humanitarian interventions cannot, after all, be expected to plug large-scale structural gaps in the national housing sector.
2. Housing purchase certificates

Description

Housing vouchers are subsidies that may be used to help with rent and homeowners’ costs, or to buy a dwelling. If the latter, they are also sometimes referred to as housing purchase certificates, and may cover the full price of a home or a down payment on it. Beneficiaries are free to choose their dwellings on the open housing market in accordance with the terms of their purchase certificate, which is backed by funds at a credible financial institution. They become the owner of the dwelling once the transaction has closed.

Governments and international organisations have offered housing purchase certificates to IDPs living in protracted displacement in temporary shelters as a means of closing the shelters and providing them with long-term housing. In cases where IDPs have been sheltering in schools or other public buildings, such programmes also free up important community assets. Beneficiaries are given agency in choosing where they want to live, helping to facilitate their local integration.

As certificates and vouchers are specifically tied to housing, they ensure that beneficiaries use the funds for the intended purpose. A common concern is that housing purchase certificates will drive up property prices unless there is an adequate supply of housing on the market. A pilot programme can help to read the market’s ability to satisfy the housing demand it creates, and the responsiveness of buyers and sellers to the resulting prices. A pilot also helps to establish a positive impression of a programme before it is rolled out.

Case study 1: Housing purchase certificates in post-earthquake recovery programme (Armenia)

Overview

The 1988 earthquake in the Spitak region of northern Armenia internally displaced around 500,000 people. Thousands of families whose public housing was destroyed were given homes in new residential apartment buildings in development areas outside city centres between 1989 and 1991. During the initial recovery period, very few damaged but salvageable residential buildings were reinforced and renovated. Families displaced from them, however, were passed over for new housing on the basis that they would eventually be returned to their original homes.

Instead most were given temporary shelter in converted shipping containers known as domiks, where they ended up living throughout the 1990s. The containers had mains for electricity, but not all had indoor plumbing. Neither were they insulated, making them unbearably hot in the summer and cold in the winter. They were also vulnerable to vermin and leaks.

The upheaval following Armenia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 thwarted efforts to recover from the earthquake. Until 1998, successive administrations maintained a supply-side approach to shelter recovery, continuing the development of large new regions that had started under the Soviet plan. The government did not, however, have the resources to implement the plan and the country also had to absorb a huge influx of refugees from Azerbaijan. By 1998, the entire earthquake zone recovery effort had stalled and most of those housed in domiks were still living there.

There was also large-scale emigration from the country following independence, which left a significant amount of housing stock vacant or underused. This combined with the mass privatisation of state housing that took place between 1993 and 1998 created a favourable environment for housing redistribution. Those who became property-rich as a result of privatisation but were cash-poor could realise their wealth by selling their homes.

Programme design

The Urban Institute led the implementation of a housing purchase certificate programme funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). It ran a pilot in Gyumri in 1999, and rolled out the main programme from July 2001 to April 2005. It aimed both to provide permanent accommodation for households still living in temporary shelters, and to promote urban recovery by removing domiks from prime land. The programme was part of a larger earthquake recovery initiative that also provided grants for the renovation of urban and rural housing.

The programme ran in ten towns and cities - Akhuryan, Amasia, Aparan, Gugark, Gyumri, Jajur Station, Maralik, Stepanavan, Spitak and Vanadzor - chosen for their urban development potential and concentration of domiks. Beneficiaries received certificates which they could use to buy housing on the open property market, and in return they were obliged to hand over their temporary shelters for disposal or dispose of them themselves, freeing up land for redevelopment.
**Review of practices and case studies**

**Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs**

March 2015 | Home sweet home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factors for replication</strong></td>
<td>Well-developed banking and land registry system&lt;br&gt;Sufficient supply of housing in a competitive and accessible property market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td>Beneficiaries were relocated from insalubrious temporary shelters, mostly modified shipping containers known as domiks, to habitable permanent dwellings with tenure security, for the most part in familiar locations. IDPs participated in deciding where they would live. More than 40,000 domiks were disposed of, freeing up space for urban redevelopment and local use. The practice focussed on the existing surplus of vacant and under-used housing stock rather than building new homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key challenge(s)</strong></td>
<td>Many of the people who wanted to sell their housing units to those with certificates were unable to obtain the necessary documents from the cadastral survey because they had modified their homes without official permission. The lack of accurate house price data and rudimentary estate agent services made it difficult to set certificate values. High-quality new buildings for IDPs competed with the certificate programme and delayed its implementation because recipients waited first to see if they would be allocated space in the new developments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Context**

Earthquake aftermath with significant urban destruction<br>IDPs living in inadequate temporary shelter for prolonged periods<br>Transition from socialist to market-based economy

**Main actors**

The Urban Institute<sup>1</sup><br>Banks<br>Real Estate agents<br>Central government and local authorities<br>NGOs

**Target group(s)**

Displaced families living in temporary shelters and private accommodation on compensation waiting lists

**Summary**

The 1988 earthquake in the Spitak region of Armenia displaced more than 500,000 people. Residents of damaged homes were to have them rebuilt, but this never happened and they ended up living long-term in inadequate temporary shelters. The housing purchase certificate programme ran in ten towns and cities chosen for the concentration of IDPs in the area and their urban development potential. Beneficiaries were given certificates based on the size of their families, which they could use to buy housing on the open property market on the condition that programme staff inspected their chosen dwelling before the transaction was finalised. Temporary shelters were then closed and urban space recovered and redeveloped using a participatory urban planning approach. Public outreach helped to ensure that both buyers and sellers accepted the programme, and numerous measures were taken to maximise the redemption of the certificates.

**Table 1: Certificate values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1-room</th>
<th>2-room</th>
<th>3-room</th>
<th>4-room</th>
<th>5-room</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shirak</td>
<td>$2,014</td>
<td>$2,906</td>
<td>$3,620</td>
<td>$4,376</td>
<td>$4,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lori</td>
<td>$1,300</td>
<td>$1,900</td>
<td>$2,510</td>
<td>$3,400</td>
<td>$4,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the dwelling purchased cost less than the certificate value, beneficiaries were paid the difference in cash by the bank in an effort to stimulate interest and stabilise property prices. They were also entitled to buy a dwelling worth more than the certificate value by adding their own funds. All purchases were conditional on programme staff inspecting the chosen dwelling before the transaction was finalised. In return beneficiaries were given 30 days from receipt of their title deeds to vacate their domiks and a further 15 days to dispose of them. They were also barred from selling their new property for two years. The city agreed to remove one domik for each family that bought their own home.

Public outreach helped to ensure seller and buyer acceptance of the programme, which was vital to its success. Initiatives included a weekly television programme that aired for 40 weeks, public service announcements, postcards, hand-outs, direct mail, newspaper adverts and press conferences. Outreach workers also conducted neighbour meetings to introduce the programme and to solicit community support, and individual interviews with potential beneficiaries to review their documentation. Those found not to be eligible were informed of the reasons in writing.

Beneficiary selection evolved during the course of the project. People who lost housing as a result of the earthquake and living in domiks were first eligible to apply. However, in some areas, such as Vanadzor, the majority of households living in domiks had not been displaced by the earthquake and as such were not eligible for the programme. Thereafter urban households who had been displaced by the earthquake, had not been compensated and were not living in domiks were included as beneficiaries. The government’s waiting list for earthquake compensation was used for beneficiary selection.

**Impact**

Certificate holders in all ten towns and cities included in the programme were able to purchase homes. The overall rate of certificate redemption was 78 per cent, and in excess of 90 per cent in all locations except Gyumri and Akhuryan. In Shirak province, 6,104 certificates were issued and 4,977 redeemed in Lori province 1,448 were issued and 1,292 redeemed.

Ninety-five per cent of the certificates issued during the pilot programme were also redeemed, to the benefit of 302 families. The overall programme also benefitted 909 households who had not been living in domiks. Most beneficiaries bought property in the areas where they had previously been living. Those who sold property as part of the programme tended to do so for the cash, and around half moved in with relatives after the sale.<sup>4</sup>

By the end of the programme, 4,077 domiks had been removed. Given that their scrap value was in excess of $100, most households disposed of their container themselves rather than have the municipality take them away. Informal salvage businesses sprang up to process the materials. Some beneficiaries tried to keep their container so as to be able to recycle parts or to maintain a foothold in the city, forcing the municipalities concerned to apply to the courts to force them to honour their obligations. The removal of domiks freed up valuable space for redevelopment, and participatory urban planning was used for purpose, focussing on the use of the space rather than the structures themselves. Areas that had formerly been parks, kindergartens, schools, a library, a medical clinic, a theatre and a jail were restored to their previous civic function. Public spaces with fountains were created and offices and a computer lab built. In Gyumri, three development corridors were freed: the entrance to the city, Azavour square and the All Saviour’s square–Freedom square complex, all of which are important historic, religious or cultural sites.

The Urban Institute’s programme also fed $45 million into the local economy, which spurred economic growth, and...
an entrepreneurial training programme was provided for both buyers and sellers. The Shirak Competitiveness Centre, an independent non-profit organisation, was established to institutionalise and sustain the urban planning and economic development activities of the broader earthquake zone recovery programme.

**Challenges**

It came to light early on that a significant number of people prepared to sell their property were unable to do so because their apartments had not been privatised before the 31 December 1998 deadline set by the country’s housing privatisation law. The Urban Institute worked with the government to draft new legislation that was enacted in 2002 and reinstated the right to apply for privatisation for families still living in public housing in Lori and Shirak provinces. The new law also eliminated many of the official fees associated with the process.

Many would-be sellers, however, were still not able to go ahead, because they had modified their property without planning permission. This meant they were unable to obtain the necessary documentation from the cadastral survey, and there was no clear provision in the new law that would allow homeowners to work around the issue. The Urban Institute went back to work with the government and in 2003 legislation was enacted that established an affordable and understandable process of regularising illegal housing modifications.5

Determining house prices in each market with which to set the value of the certificates was also a challenge. Low sales volumes and tax regimes had created incentives for both buyers and sellers to understate prices in official documents, and at the time the programme got under way there were few if any professional estate agents tracking the market. The Urban Institute’s ability to estimate house prices improved over time, however, as it learned how to capture increasingly reliable information.

A number of obstacles delayed the issuing of certificates. Many people still held Soviet passports that had to be replaced with Armenian ones before they were able to sign an agreement with the city entitling them to take part in the programme. Many others had one or more members abroad whose powers-of-attorney were also needed. The Urban Institute worked to fast-track beneficiaries’ passport applications and provided advice, standardised forms and access to international phone and fax lines to passport applications and provided advice, standardised forms and access to international phone and fax lines to

Conclusion

Housing purchase certificates offer a flexible and efficient demand-side tool that help families to buy their own homes. Such programmes are somewhat complex to implement, but housing agencies in most countries would be capable of running them. They work better in conjunction with other related government policies and services such title registration, and when there is a competitive and accessible property market.

The Urban Institute’s programme was culturally appropriate in Armenia, given the appeal of home ownership over rental assistance as the country made the transition from a socialist to market-based economy. It also contributed to urban development following the impact of a natural hazard. The programme provided many IDPs with adequate housing, but as of 2009 some were still living in domiks.

Case study 2: Housing vouchers for IDPs living in collective centres (Urban Institute, Georgia) 3

**Practice**

Georgia housing voucher project for IDPs (2006 to 2007)

**Main actors**

The Urban Institute

Project steering committee, including the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation, Kutaisi municipality and the Abkhaz government-in-exile

Charity Humanitarian Centre Abkhazia (local NGO)

Kutaisi Information Centre (local NGO)

**Context**

Return of IDPs impossible in the absence of conflict resolution

IDPs living in protracted displacement in inadequate collective centres

Sufficiently developed property market

15 years after the privatisation of housing following the fall of Soviet Union

**Target group(s)**

IDPs in collective centres on the outskirts of Kutaisi, which were in the worst condition

**Summary**

The practice aimed to support the development and implementation of the government’s strategy on IDPs by improving housing conditions for them. Kutaisi, Georgia’s second largest city, was selected as the pilot site because of the number of IDPs living in collective centres. Voucher values were determined by family size and composition.

**Strengths**

Sixty per cent of IDPs; or 81 families in 16 collective centres, who were issued with vouchers, successfully bought housing with tenure security and vacated their temporary shelters. The majority of displaced families participating in the programme purchased housing in the same location as the previous accommodation in collective centres. The programme was culturally appropriate in that home ownership is favoured over renting in Georgia in the context of the transition from a socialist to a market-based economy. IDPs viewed their new housing as a long-term investment. Forty-five per cent of families added an average of $1,080 to the value of their voucher to increase their options. Five collective centres were vacated and returned to the government for community use.

**Key challenge(s)**

Voucher values did not always allow for the purchase of housing in good condition. As a result some beneficiaries did not receive habitable housing. There was debate about whether the vouchers distorted the property market, but data to substantiate this was not collected. Voucher values were set in US dollars, which limited beneficiaries options because the Georgian lari appreciated against the dollar over the course of the project.

**Factors for potential replicability**

Well-developed banking, property market and land registry system

IDPs in temporary inadequate shelters

Need to return temporary shelters to their original use

Adequate supply of affordable housing on the market

Overview

Conflict between Georgia and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia caused various waves of displacement in the early 1990s, and more people fled their homes in 2008 during the country’s brief war with Russia. In the intervening period the government largely neglected IDPs’ plight and pushed for their return, but with no formal settlement to the conflict only a few did so under their own steam.

The majority continued to live in temporary housing in more than 1,600 collective centres, which the government established in former public buildings such as schools, kindergartens and hospitals. Living conditions deteriorated significantly over time and IDPs had little incentive to invest. Those who could afford alternative housing moved out, but those who could not remained in insalubrious conditions for up to 20 years.

In February 2007, the government approved a new state strategy for IDPs, which marked a significant policy shift towards supporting decent living conditions for IDPs in their area.
of displacement in addition to IDP return. Such initiatives, however, did not get under way until after the 2008 war with Russia and significant advocacy from the international community.

The Urban Institute’s housing voucher programme began around 15 years after the large-scale privatisation of public housing, which meant a well-developed property market was in place.

Programme design
The Urban Institute led the implementation of a housing purchase certificate programme funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The objective was to allow IDPs living in dilapidated collective centres to purchase accommodation and contribute to the achievement of durable solutions to their displacement by facilitating a sustainable housing solution. The programme was funded by the US State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration and implemented from 2006 to 2007. The first phase ran from September 2006 to January 2007 and the second from February to October 2007. It aimed to support the state strategy on IDPs by improving their housing conditions.

The targets were in a poor state of repair, often overcrowded and located on the outskirts of town. Residents were living in substandard conditions with few job opportunities and high crime levels. They also faced significant maintenance costs, but had few means and little incentive to invest. Outside investment in the collective centres improved conditions in some centres temporarily, but was rare.

To be eligible for the programme, IDPs had to be registered at and living in a collective centre in Abkhazia; have evidence of a former address in Abkhazia; and not be registered at and living in a collective centre in Kutaisi; have not been a beneficiary of other initiatives to improve their housing conditions; have more than 70 per cent of beneficiaries bought property in Kutaisi, of whom 64 per cent did so in the same neighbourhood as their collective centre. The availability of housing in these areas turned out to be vital for the programme’s success as beneficiaries sought to preserve ties they had built up with their local communities over the years.

The redemption rate varied considerably between collective centres. Five were vacated completely and handed back to the government for community use after all their residents bought housing and moved out. Centres with fewer families resident generally had much higher redemption rates than those with many families, though that said, all four households of one centre returned their vouchers without being able to find housing to suit their needs for the amount of the voucher.

Beneficiaries viewed their new homes as long-term investments. Forty-five per cent added an average of $1,980 in new property and only a small percentage said they had planned to sell it in the future. Their willingness to invest in their own property was in contrast with their reticence to do so in their collective centre space, which was meant to be temporary accommodation.

The housing vouchers did not have a significant impact on beneficiaries’ socio-economic conditions. Twenty-three per cent said they had re-registered as IDPs living in the private sector and that their government allowance had changed accordingly, but their overall income, employment situation and ability to feed their families remained broadly the same.

Challenges
House prices in Georgia increased by 25 per cent over the two years that the programme ran, but that was not reflected in a rise in voucher values, making it more difficult for beneficiaries to find decent and affordable property. There was a belief that the pilot programme had distorted market prices, and although no study was carried out to confirm the fact, it contributed to the mechanism being replicated. The vouchers also lost purchasing power because voucher values were set in US dollars rather than Georgian lari, and the lari appreciated by six per cent against the dollar over the course of the programme.

Conclusion
As in Armenia, the programme was culturally appropriate given the appeal of home ownership over rental in the context of transition from a socialist to market-based economy. It enabled many beneficiaries to buy new homes, but as a pilot programme it could not accommodate the needs of all IDPs in collective centres. Many other IDPs were therefore left behind in dilapidated collective centres.

The overall success of the programme convinced the Georgian government to include housing vouchers as part of its action plan to implement the 2007 state strategy on IDPs along with other housing programmes.

Despite its best intentions, the housing vouchers did not lead to permanent solutions for all money coming from relatives overseas and the lari appreciation and the lari appreciation were a major problem.

Notes
1. Domik is Russian for little house
2. The Urban Institute, www.urban.org
3. The Urban Institute, www.urban.org
5. ibid
3. Social housing

Description

Social housing is intended to help people who are unable to secure adequate accommodation for themselves. It serves as a counterbalance to the market driven allocation of housing and may be needed if people on low incomes are unable to afford private rents. There is no single definition of social housing, and it varies in form from one country to another. It is generally built by government agencies or non-profit organisations and may include both privately and publicly-owned dwellings. The authorities define rules that govern the type of housing built and its allocation. Social housing units may be partially or fully subsidised, and tenants may or may not pay for utilities, services, maintenance and repairs. Where social housing stock or land for construction is available, it improves disadvantaged IDPs' access to decent and affordable accommodation.
Review of practices and case studies

Case study: Social housing in supportive environments (Armenia, Georgia, Serbia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Social housing in supportive environments (SHSE) (Serbia; 2002; Armenia; 2004 to 2008 and 2010 to 2012; Georgia; 2007 to 2012)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main actors</td>
<td>Government agency for IDPs, other ministries and municipal authorities in local social work centres; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) Housing Centre (Serbia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>The most vulnerable IDPs in protracted displacement live in inadequate temporary shelter and private accommodation. Return is not possible for IDPs in Georgia in the absence of a solution to the conflict, and not desired by some IDPs in Serbia because of insecurity. Government policy in Georgia and Serbia has shifted towards accepting local integration as a settlement option. There is a complete lack of public housing stock as a result of privatisation following the transition from the socialist system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target group</td>
<td>Vulnerable IDPs and refugees who wish to integrate locally rather than return and are in need of housing assistance, plus vulnerable members of the local population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>SDC developed the SHSE model as part of its humanitarian programme in Serbia. It aims to improve housing conditions and social inclusion for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society through non-institutional protection in an assisted living environment. Beneficiaries receive support from municipal social workers and from a “foster family”, which is at the centre of the supportive environment. Foster families are allocated an apartment in the same building based not only on need but also on the social, psychological and technical skills they can bring to their roles. The SHSE model has been replicated in Armenia and Georgia. In all three countries the buildings are owned and maintained by the municipal authorities, and families are accommodated rent-free as long as they meet the criteria for such assistance, which are reviewed each year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengths</td>
<td>The practice provides tenure security in habitable housing and social protection for IDPs and vulnerable members of the local population. It fosters social integration by facilitating interaction between IDPs, foster families, social workers, neighbours and the wider community. In Armenia it led to the demolition of temporary housing and recovery of urban landscape. IDPs in Georgia were the most critical of SHSE and would have preferred to own their own homes. They felt the potentially limited tenure in social housing was culturally inappropriate. Other housing programmes for IDPs in Georgia offered housing ownership, which left some SHSE beneficiaries feeling they were being offered a less attractive option and treated unfairly. Foster family inputs varied because their role was not always clear. There is evidence that such arrangements do not negate the need for professional social workers. Considering the high level of vulnerability of this group, it is unlikely that they will move on from the SHSE. The implication is that this programme will require long-term and continuous investment from authorities. In areas where housing stock had been recently privatised, it was difficult to generate political interest in social housing programmes and policies. Stable and sustainable financing from the municipal budget to maintain SHSE has been an issue, including for social workers’ salaries. Highly vulnerable IDPs in need of improved access to adequate housing Social housing is accepted as a culturally appropriate housing option Municipality ability and willingness to allocate land, provide infrastructure and manage social housing buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key challenge(s)</td>
<td>IDPs in Georgia were the most critical of SHSE and would have preferred to own their own homes. They felt the potentially limited tenure in social housing was culturally inappropriate. Other housing programmes for IDPs in Georgia offered housing ownership, which left some SHSE beneficiaries feeling they were being offered a less attractive option and treated unfairly. Foster family inputs varied because their role was not always clear. There is evidence that such arrangements do not negate the need for professional social workers. Considering the high level of vulnerability of this group, it is unlikely that they will move on from the SHSE. The implication is that this programme will require long-term and continuous investment from authorities. In areas where housing stock had been recently privatised, it was difficult to generate political interest in social housing programmes and policies. Stable and sustainable financing from the municipal budget to maintain SHSE has been an issue, including for social workers’ salaries. Highly vulnerable IDPs in need of improved access to adequate housing Social housing is accepted as a culturally appropriate housing option Municipality ability and willingness to allocate land, provide infrastructure and manage social housing buildings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Overview | The fall of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia led to numerous conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus that caused significant displacement. In Armenia, around 755,000 people were internally displaced as a result of its 1988-1994 conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh and an earthquake in the north in 1988. More than 350,000 refugees also arrived from Azerbaijan as a result of the conflict. In Georgia, the conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia that began in 1992 forced several hundred thousand people to flee their homes. NATO air strikes that forced the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo in 1999 and the subsequent conflict displaced people both within Kosovo and to Serbia proper. Serbia also received around 600,000 refugees from conflicts in other countries of the former Yugoslavia. Return remains impossible for most refugees and IDPs in these countries, which in addition to the conflict and displacement they experienced were also undergoing the transition from a socialist political system and planned economy to democracy and market-based economy. Displacement was one problem among many, and funds to address it were extremely scarce. Temporary shelter offered in Armenia, Georgia and Serbia gradually became long-term accommodation for IDPs unable to find decent housing on their own or return to their places of origin. In Armenia, they lived in various types of temporary shelter including converted shipping containers or domiks, while in Georgia and Serbia collective centres were set up in public buildings such as schools and hospitals. Such accommodation served its original purpose but was never intended as a long-term solution, and over time living conditions deteriorated significantly. Residents did not invest in improvements because they hoped to return or did not feel ownership of their space, and the government increasingly neglected them. Authorities in Georgia and Serbia pushed for IDPs’ return and initially had little incentive to improve living conditions in collective centres which could have facilitated their local integration. Around 130,000 people, or half of Georgia’s IDPs, have been housed in collective centres for the duration of their displacement. In Serbia, the figure was around 100,000 refugees and 15,000 IDPs. There are no clear figures for the number of people accommodated in domiks in Armenia. Those who were able to do so on their own have left their temporary shelter, but many still require assistance to secure decent housing. Public housing played a major role in the socialist system in all three countries, and the vast majority of stock was privatised and sold to sitting tenants during their economic transition. The privatisations were not, however, accompanied by plan for the development of the housing sector. No new national policies to provide affordable housing were put in place. The region has since experienced a construction boom and a rapid rise in property prices. New property is rarely affordable for low or middle-income families, and even less so for vulnerable social groups, such as IDPs, who have few options to secure decent housing. The social systems of all three countries have also been heavily burdened by their economic transition, and increasing numbers of vulnerable people have largely been left to fend for themselves in the changing environment. They include IDPs, single elderly people, single parents, disaster victims, families without breadwinners, orphans and people with disabilities. A policy shift in Serbia and Georgia towards acceptance of IDPs’ local integration - and that of refugees in the case of Serbia - opened the way for housing projects to be set up in the areas where they were living. Serbia adopted a national strategy on refugees and IDPs in 2002, which included the closure of collective centres. Five years later, Georgia adopted its state strategy on IDPs, which reflected a commitment to provide durable solutions through return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in the country. The subsequent action plan for the strategy’s implementation included measures to close some collective centres and relocate IDPs to improved housing, and to renovate and privatise others. Further housing solutions have been implemented since then. Programme design The “social housing in a supportive environment” (SHSE) model was developed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) as part of its humanitarian programme in Serbia. Its aim was to improve housing conditions and social inclusion for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society, including IDPs, through non-institutional protection in an assisted living environment. Beneficiaries receive social support from a “foster family”, a central element of the programme which has been key to its success. Foster families are allocated an apartment in the same building based not only on need, but also the social, psychological and technical skills they can bring to providing a supportive environment for the other residents. In addition to its principle aim, the model’s other objectives are to contribute to implementation of state policies on IDPs; contribute to the closure of IDPs’ tem-
Review of practices involved as well as autonomous regional and municipality programme and its funding. Relevant ministries were also for their services.

Collective centres make up 80 per cent of beneficiaries, municipalities. Refugees and IDPs who had been living in Kosovo as its main beneficiaries from 2006. By the criteria for such assistance, which is reviewed on an entity and families live there rent-free as long as they fulfil the needs of the people with disabilities. The building ground floor is barrier-free and the apartments are accessible for the disabled.

The main partners in the project were the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia, UNHCR and local Centres for Social Work. Municipalities were selected based on the number of refugees, IDPs and collective centres in their area, their interest and capacity to participate in the programme, the land available, the vulnerability of potential beneficiaries and the commissariat’s strategic plans. SDC led the programme in terms of construction until 2004 when its office closed, after which the local NGO Housing Centre, UNHCR, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Intersos and others took over.

Armenia

Following a study tour to visit the programme in Serbia, the SHSE model was first implemented in Armenia from 2004 to 2008 in the Kanaker-Zeyton district of Yerevan. It was then replicated in Goris, Syunik region from 2010 to 2013. The main partners in the project were the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees, the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure, the Adrana autonomous region’s Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, UNHCR, UNDP, the Italian Development Cooperation and the municipalities involved.

With SDC funding, during the last phase of the programme UNDP trained municipal staff in the basics of social work and the management of SHSE facilities and drafted guidelines for social housing and future agreements between beneficiaries and municipalities. SDC and UNDP also advised the government on possible amendments to national legislation on social housing. The Georgia programme also included advocacy to promote the SHSE approach among government officials. Given that the government does not provide social housing and there is only limited state funding available for the repair of IDPs’ shelters, SDC focused its efforts on pushing for a national social housing strategy and the creation of a dedicated government unit responsible for the issue.

Impact and challenges

An external review of the programmes in all three countries was conducted in 2009. For Armenia and Georgia, it concluded: ‘Continuation of the project is justified by its demonstrated effectiveness, the magnitude of remaining needs, pending achievement of the main policy goal and a generally positive outlook regarding the project’s impact and sustainability.’

For Serbia, it found: ‘Services of social protection through SHSE have provided an adequate response to the needs of extremely vulnerable refugees, internally displaced people and other socially vulnerable groups. However, the programme’s sustainability remains question marks, particularly in areas with large numbers of socially vulnerable groups.’
persons and domicile population. This form of social protection has provided a high level of beneficiaries’ social inclusion and has significantly influenced improvement of their living conditions.5

**Improved living conditions**

The SHSE approach improved living conditions and quality of life for IDPs and other vulnerable people in all three countries substantially, and the 2009 external review in Serbia found that beneficiaries gave the programme seven out of ten for satisfaction. They highlighted better housing conditions, convenient transport, healthcare facilities and post offices, and the fact that their children attended primary and secondary school regularly. Some families also invested in the installation of telephone lines and cable television, landscaping and construction of auxiliary buildings.

One beneficiary in Georgia had suffered from cancer and could not work for five years. She believes the improved living conditions the SHSE programme provided were instrumental in her going into remission. Another beneficiary in Serbia moved out because she was unable to afford to pay rent.4

The initial plan was for beneficiaries to pay their foster families for their services in proportion to their income, which was meant to engender responsibility and trust. In reality, however, it created tension and open conflict when it emerged that the municipality was paying for the foster families of less well-off beneficiaries. Some municipalities now pay all foster families in addition to offering free housing while others provide them only with free housing in lieu of their services. Foster families reportedly fulfil their role better when they are paid for their work.

In Georgia, the foster family element of the programme was cancelled shortly after the first four housing units were built in Tbilisi and other municipalities did not adopt it.

**Preference for property ownership**

The general preference for home ownership in all three countries was one of the main barriers to acceptance of the programme. Many people perceive ownership as the only means of guaranteeing tenure security, and mistrust of government institutions is widespread. Beneficiaries complained that they would neither be allowed to own their home on unlimited tenure, and some felt that social housing offered them second-best, compared with other projects that led to ownership. They were also sceptical that the programme would solve their poverty and shelter needs.

The issue was particularly salient in Georgia, where displaced families were more critical and reluctant to participate in SHSE programmes than members of the local community. Social workers reported that beneficiaries regularly asked if they could be given ownership of their housing, and expressed fear of having to move elsewhere, which they referred to as “another displacement”.

The same fear emerged strongly in Serbia during monitoring in 2006 and led to the criteria for continued eligibility for the programme and conditions for termination being revised. Concern may have dissipated since, given that most beneficiaries have remained, though some young people have moved out to pursue further education or get married.

**Dependency syndrome**

Following their experiences of war, displacement and poor living conditions, the capacity of many IDPs to adjust to their new environment is low. Instead they rely on state benefits as their main source of income. Their dependence on state assistance is also linked to their vulnerability, which is one of the key beneficiary selection criteria for social housing. In Georgia and Serbia, social workers said that unemployment was the biggest issue for beneficiaries, who asked for more financial help despite already receiving assistance with access to healthcare and utility payments. Some residents have difficulty in meeting their basic needs and paying communal services. Some beneficiaries of the Serbia programme have found employment, but many have not regained their self-reliance.

Self-reliance is not a goal of the SHSE social housing model, rather it is a solution for the most vulnerable IDPs who are unlikely to reach self-reliance.

**Law and policy**

None of the three countries had laws or policies on social housing when the programme was first implemented. A new institutional set-up was needed to ensure social housing would be integrated into the social protection system.

While the programmes ran, Serbia introduced a social housing law in 2009 and Armenia adopted a policy on the issue, including eligibility criteria, in 2010. Local governments have also increasingly recognised their responsibilities towards vulnerable people.

Georgia still has no such framework, but Tbilisi city council asked SDC for technical training that would equip it to design and build social housing independently by 2013. The municipalities of Rustavi, Bolsih, Batumi and Zugdidi later asked for the same support. This allowed SDC to undertake its planned withdrawal from SHSE activities after transferring its knowledge and technical expertise.

It also devised a set of planning and design standards for social housing,8 which the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development adopted.

SDC also cooperated with academia in the development of two papers: one on social space and urban development, and the other on social housing, social work and homelessness. Both are already being taught at the Tbilisi State, Ilia State and Georgia Technical universities.

**Municipal budgets**

Stable and sustainable municipal funding for the SHSE programme has not been an issue. Each municipality pays for building maintenance, and utility costs are highly subsidised. The programmes are not self-sustaining, but they are likely to cost the state less in the long run than caring for vulnerable people when their situations become critical, when health costs in particular would be much higher.

**Conclusion**

The SHSE approach is an innovative form of social protection for IDPs in Armenia, Georgia and Serbia. In all three countries it reinforced government policy to help IDPs integrate locally, provided them with adequate and affordable housing, and served as a way of close collective centres in a dignified way for the most vulnerable people who could not secure housing on their own. The practice was also successful in that it improved the living conditions of other vulnerable members of the local population, contributing to social cohesion.

Municipalities’ capacity needs to be developed so that they can implement their own social and affordable housing programmes effectively. Significant time and open minds will be required to allow changes to take place, everyday practices to be transformed and new knowledge and skills to be acquired. Training at the initial stages of the programme is key to involving all partners in it about their obligations. Contracts with foster families should define their role and obligations more clearly.

IDPs’ main concern about social housing, over ownership and unlimited tenure, also needs to be addressed. IDPs living in private accommodation should be eligible for social housing assistance, because their living conditions and tenure security can be worse than those in collective centres. The programmes took place in an institutional vacuum. Ideally a clear framework would be in place to define municipal budget allocations and the conditions for funding and the termination of right to use.

**Notes**

1. SHSE Pilot Projects in Armenia and Georgia, external review report, p.32
2. Housing Centre and Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Social Housing in a Supportive Environment (SHSE), 2010
3. Ibid
4. IDMC interview, October 2012
5. Housing Centre and Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Social Housing in a Supportive Environment (SHSE), 2010
6. Ibid
7. Institute of Social Studies and Analysis, Survey of Target Groups’ Attitudes and Expectations Related to Social Housing, May 2011
8. Monitoring indicators in Serbia showed “a certain percentage” of people capable of work and an increased employment rate among tenants between 2002 and 2005
9. SDC, Urban Planning and Architectural Standards for Social Housing Architectural Design
4. Transfer of public buildings to private ownership

Description

Many IDPs in the Balkans and Caucasus were housed in collective centres following their displacement, which in some cases were public buildings such as schools, kindergartens and health facilities. Some states have opted to transfer ownership to IDPs via privatisation as a means of providing those who wished to integrate locally with permanent housing. The privatisation of collective centres has been welcomed by IDPs in former Soviet countries, in part because it mirrored processes in the broader transition from a socialist to a market-based economy, under which the ownership of public housing that companies allocated to their employees was transferred to its occupants. It has allowed IDPs, who had previously been unable to benefit from the privatisation process, to become homeowners. Ownership has been a key symbol of the political and economic transition in former socialist countries such as Georgia.

Case study 1: Collective centre renovation and transfer of ownership (Georgia)

Overview

IDPs living in protracted displacement since the early 1990s were the target beneficiaries for this initiative. They originate from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, areas that have been and are still largely impossible to return to because of unresolved conflict. The government generally neglected their plight over two decades. Around half of the 260,000 IDPs were housed in collective centres, where temporary refuge became long-term residence for those who could not secure other accommodation on their own.

In a significant shift in policy, Georgia adopted a state strategy for IDPs in 2007 that embraced measures to facilitate their local integration as well as support for their return. Implementation was delayed, however, by the brief 2008 war with Russia over South Ossetia, which caused a new wave of displacement. The newly displaced were prioritised for assistance, but acknowledging that return would not be possible in the near future for any IDPs, those who fled in the early 1990s were soon included under the state strategy.

Programme design

The 2007 state strategy for IDPs had two goals, to create the conditions for their dignified and safe return, and to support their local integration. Implementation was planned in three phases, during which all IDPs in need would receive a durable housing solution that also provided opportunities for sustainable socio-economic integration. The first phase incorporated steps towards the closure of collective centres, and included the following commitment: “The state will assist IDPs, in cases when they consent, to privatize the state-owned collective centres, which are not of special importance for the state, at acceptable prices.”

In February 2009, the government initiated the voluntary transfer of ownership of collective centre units to IDPs. The Ministry of Internally Displaced People from the Occupied Territories, Refugees and Accommodation (still known by its former acronym MRA) led implementation, which included the following steps:

1. The identification of state-owned centres suitable for permanent living, or which could made suitable by cost-effective renovation, to offer to IDPs as long-term housing solutions
2. The publication of a list of the centres identified for privatisation
3. The identification and profiling of IDPs living in the centres identified
4. The measurement of living spaces to delineate the size of future apartments for private ownership
5. The making of concrete offers to eligible IDPs in which the symbolic cost of ownership transfer of one Georgian lari ($0.46) is assumed by the government
6. The return of the purchase - or privatisation - agreement to the Ministry for Economy and Sustainable Development for signing on behalf of the state
7. The registration of the beneficiary’s ownership of their living space with the National Agency of the Public Registry (NAPR), which issues deeds
8. The acquisition by the beneficiary of full rights and obligations related to the property, including the option to sell it. The owner is obliged to accommodate family members

A steering committee coordinates joint efforts by the government and international organisations to implement the action plan for the state strategy for IDPs. It is made up of representatives from MRA, the Ministry of Labour,
Key challenge(s)

By the end of 2013, more than 16,000 displaced families had been granted private ownership of the collective centre space in which they had been living, guaranteeing them tenure security. Habitatibility was improved in terms of space and living conditions. Given that beneficiaries did not have to move, they kept their longstanding relationships with their local communities. Their location needs are met and there is no disruption of their access to goods, services and livelihood opportunities. The practice is culturally appropriate because property ownership is the preferred form of tenure security in Georgia. Sustainability is ensured through the formation of condominiums, which are eligible for funding to maintain, improve and repair common space.

The standard of renovation was not always satisfactory, affecting the habitability of the individual units and common space. The complaint mechanism was unclear and some IDPs refused to sign their purchase agreements. Some centres were not renovated and IDPs received ownership of space that was not habitable. Around 10,000 displaced families were still waiting for their title deeds as of the end of 2014. As such, they have been unable to form condominiums and apply for infrastructure improvement schemes. IDPs lacked information or received conflicting information about the process and were not consulted in the development of the programme. The government has not addressed the needs of the most vulnerable IDPs first, focussing instead on the buildings that were the easiest to privatise.

Factors for potential replicability

Private property ownership is culturally appropriate. IDPs live in public buildings because there is not enough available housing stock to meet their needs. Political will to accept and facilitate IDPs’ local integration and settlement elsewhere is in place.

Legal framework

Despite the lack of a national housing strategy in Georgia, the existing legal and policy framework has supported privatisation and has evolved as it progresses. Important legal and documentary support include the action plan for the state strategy on IDPs for 2009 to 2012, decree no. 62 on “privatisation through direct sale of state-owned property of the Tbilisi self-governing entity” and a new law on IDPs adopted in 2014. The new law anchors the durable housing solutions provided for in the state strategy and establishes a legal remedy for IDPs should they consider themselves entitled to the durable housing schemes in place. A law on condominiums was also in place when the transfers of ownership began.

Impacts and challenges

The renovation and transfer of ownership of collective centre space to IDPs is still ongoing. As of the end of 2015, 16,828 families had signed privatisation agreements for their living space in the collective centres or other housing offered to those leaving centres that were to be closed. The figure represents around 20 per cent of the 89,000 displaced families in Georgia, not all of whom live in collective centres. The initiative improved IDPs’ tenure security and living conditions while maintaining their access to state housing assistance other than the recovery of their property in their places of origin in the event return becomes possible. Those who choose not to privatise their collective centre space are free to continue living in it, are protected from forced eviction and will be eligible for other housing solutions later in the implementation of the state strategy.

The state undertakes all of the necessary steps for the registration of ownership rights and ensures that the public registry extracts are issued to the new owners. It also pays a symbolic price for the process, and under an amendment introduced to Article 6(8) of the Tax Code of Georgia in 2005, IDPs are exempt from paying income tax on a property acquired for a symbolic price through privatisation. Property tax in Georgia is only payable by households whose income exceeds 40,000 lari (US$400).

International and local organisations have monitored the privatisation process since its inception and have conducted numerous information sharing campaigns with IDPs. They were provided with brochures on the criteria for process and a template of the purchase agreement. They were able to ask questions of the organisations involved, and had access to an MRA hotline. NRC, DRC and local NGOs conducted awareness raising and training on the formation of condominiums and the management of common property. Local NGOs also provided legal assistance and support in mobilising finance and seeking external funding to address their repair needs.

Legal framework

Despite the lack of a national housing strategy in Georgia, the existing legal and policy framework has supported privatisation and has evolved as it progresses. Important legal and documentary support include the action plan for the state strategy on IDPs for 2009 to 2012, decree no. 62 on “privatisation through direct sale of state-owned property of the Tbilisi self-governing entity” and a new law on IDPs adopted in 2014. The new law anchors the durable housing solutions provided for in the state strategy and establishes a legal remedy for IDPs should they consider themselves entitled to the durable housing schemes in place. A law on condominiums was also in place when the transfers of ownership began.

Impacts and challenges

The renovation and transfer of ownership of collective centre space to IDPs is still ongoing. As of the end of 2015, 16,828 families had signed privatisation agreements for their living space in the collective centres or other housing offered to those leaving centres that were to be closed. The figure represents around 20 per cent of the 89,000 displaced families in Georgia, not all of whom live in collective centres. The initiative improved IDPs’ tenure security and living conditions while maintaining their access to state housing assistance other than the recovery of their property in their places of origin in the event return becomes possible. Those who choose not to privatise their collective centre space are free to continue living in it, are protected from forced eviction and will be eligible for other housing solutions later in the implementation of the state strategy.

The state undertakes all of the necessary steps for the registration of ownership rights and ensures that the public registry extracts are issued to the new owners. It also pays a symbolic price for the process, and under an amendment introduced to Article 6(8) of the Tax Code of Georgia in 2005, IDPs are exempt from paying income tax on a property acquired for a symbolic price through privatisation. Property tax in Georgia is only payable by households whose income exceeds 40,000 lari (US$400).

International and local organisations have monitored the privatisation process since its inception and have conducted numerous information sharing campaigns with IDPs. They were provided with brochures on the criteria for process and a template of the purchase agreement. They were able to ask questions of the organisations involved, and had access to an MRA hotline. NRC, DRC and local NGOs conducted awareness raising and training on the formation of condominiums and the management of common property. Local NGOs also provided legal assistance and support in mobilising finance and seeking external funding to address their repair needs.
Review of practices and case studies

They should address them to.7 Those who had complaints were often unclear about who they should address them to.7

After its initiation in 2009, privatisation almost came to a halt in 2010 and 2011, which created a large backlog. With thousands of families on waiting lists, the government stepped up the process in 2012 with around 8,255 families receiving ownership in the run-up to October elections. The process was not transparent, however, making it difficult to assess its impact. There were also delays in the issuing of title deeds, which meant that the new owners were not able benefit from infrastructure improvement schemes offered by their municipality to condominiums. Around 10,000 families were still waiting for their title deeds as of the end of 2014.8

The program has also encountered many challenges. Some IDPs’ privatised space was neither big enough or in good enough condition to be considered a durable housing solution, and the renovation of sewage and solid waste management systems, gas and electricity supplies and flooded basements has not always been up to standard.6 Many IDPs in Tbilisi have taken ownership of living space that does not even meet the criteria for habitability. Those who had complaints were often unclear about who they should address them to.7

Notes
1. Government of Georgia, December 2010
2. Privatisation working group, Annual privatisation report 2009, 10 April 2010
3. Standards for Rehabilitation, Conversion or Construction Works for Durable Housing for IDPs
4. Privatisation working group, Annual privatisation report 2009, 10 April 2010
5. Privatisation working group, Annual Privatization Report January-December 2010; Transfer of Ownership of IDP Living Units, April 2013
6. UNHCR, Participatory assessment, December 2011;
7. EUMM monitoring, 2010
8. Ibid; Privatisation working group, Analysis of the transfer of ownership process, February to June 2009
9. IDMCA correspondence with MRA, 17 February 2015

5. Rental support grants

Description

Rental support grants are a form of cash-based assistance widely used as a way of supporting IDPs during humanitarian emergencies caused by natural hazards and conflict. There is an increasing tendency among humanitarians to favour cash-based interventions, particularly in urban areas, where the economy is also mostly cash-based and banking systems and markets are more dynamic. Such schemes have several advantages. They are an efficient way to cover a wide range of needs, they empower beneficiaries to prioritise their own spending and they stimulate urban markets. They also reach large numbers of beneficiaries, support existing housing options and give households more flexibility and mobility in choosing their housing options.

In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in 2005, the American Red Cross allocated more than $15 billion in cash-based assistance, including for temporary rental support.2 Urban areas such as New Orleans and Port-au-Prince, Haiti, have populations with different types of housing needs and, as such they require a more flexible range of solutions. The difference in terms of access to humanitarian assistance between land- or property owners and non-owners is vast in an urban landscape that has been ravaged by a natural hazard. The reconstruction of homes and infrastructure is an important priority, but there is now consensus that the needs of displaced tenants as a category of vulnerable residents have been long overlooked.

The rapid influx of IDPs into a city often creates a shortfall in the availability of affordable and adequate housing. Those who rented their accommodation before their displacement are likely to want to establish a similar set-up as part of their durable solution. Tenants, like property-owners, however, often suffer income losses during their displacement, which makes it harder to secure another rental property. As such, rental support grants are essentially a way to make up for lost income. Despite their straightforward nature, the organisation, monitoring and programming required for such initiatives can be complex, particularly when many conditions are placed on their disbursement.

Conclusion

The renovation and transfer of ownership of living space in collective centres is a commendable initiative that has significant potential for providing IDPs who wish integrate locally with adequate housing. It is also an example of a government accepting and facilitating local integration after a long period of insisting that return was IDPs’ only option. A combination of political will, the initiative being based on a policy framework, significant international funds and the active involvement of donors and international organisations have been key to its success in allowing IDPs to maintain the lives they had established over many years in their places of refuge.

Donors have also been hesitant in the past to hand out cash, even in the form of vouchers or debit cards, because of concerns about duplication, corruption and the overall sense that a fungible asset cannot be monitored and controlled effectively. There are often irregularities in the implementation of cash grants, but they are outweighed by the benefits and point only to the need for better safeguards. Unconditional cash grants give beneficiaries maximum freedom to set their own priorities, while conditional ones try to ensure that the money is spent on a targeted good such as education or rent.

Rental support grants address the needs of the most vulnerable populations who do not own property in land-poor urban areas. If they are implemented with basic housing safety and adequacy standards as conditions, they can also encourage providers to improve units and attract residents who are cash-rich. The inflationary effect of cash grants has been cited as a concern, but as the “keep the change” programme in Haiti illustrates, this can be mitigated by creating competition between landlords to ensure they offer competitive prices. Essentially, the programme encourages beneficiaries to negotiate their rent down with landlords by letting them keep the difference.

For programme designers, this means understanding that as subsidies, rental support programmes operate in a market with different absorption and inflation rates. As such, it is important to understand and monitor the market, in order to track and make any necessary alterations to the programme’s scale or speed.

Rental support grants are a useful method to help IDPs cover their rental costs in a time of crisis until they can take over this responsibility themselves. However rental support grants need to be associated to other measures to have a long-term effect and contribute to durable solutions. The Graduation approach described in box one below shows how cash assistance can be combined to other measures to empower IDPs and reinforce their self-reliance.

Notes
1. Government of Georgia, December 2010
2. Privatisation working group, Annual privatisation report 2009, 10 April 2010
3. Standards for Rehabilitation, Conversion or Construction Works for Durable Housing for IDPs
4. Privatisation working group, Annual privatisation report 2009, 10 April 2010
5. Privatisation working group, Annual Privatization Report January-December 2010; Transfer of Ownership of IDP Living Units, April 2013
6. UNHCR, Participatory assessment, December 2011;
7. EUMM monitoring, 2010
8. Ibid; Privatisation working group, Analysis of the transfer of ownership process, February to June 2009
9. IDMCA correspondence with MRA, 17 February 2015
Case study: Rental support grant programmes (Haiti)

A report by the Haiti shelter working group and an operational manual by the World Bank carried out a comparative review of rental support grant programmes in Haiti to generate a methodology that could be applied both in the country and elsewhere, therefore contributing to knowledge transfer, one of our selection criteria. The two reports highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of various programmes and provided guidance on the steps and elements to include in a rental cash support programme. The practice below reflects the key positive features of rental support grant programmes identified in these two reports.

### Key challenge(s)
- Lack of follow-up on the fate of households after their one-year grant expires, particularly for those at risk of renewed displacement or forced eviction. Some studies suggest that only 26% of beneficiaries renewed their rental contract. The main reason cited by the 75% who moved out was not having enough income to remain. This highlights the necessity for linked support programmes to complement rental support grants (see box on the graduation approach), although livelihood initiatives may not always be able to address structural poverty.
- Required significant oversight and monitoring to ensure rental housing stock was habitable and not in a hazard-risk area.

### Factors for potential replicability
- Availability of affordable rental housing stock
- Landowners willing to sign written rental agreements with guidelines on maintenance, safety and protection from eviction.
- Mechanisms to verify proposed rentals and determine their safety in terms of disaster risk reduction.
- Access to bank accounts and/or mobile cash-transfer technologies.

### Overview
On 12 January 2010, a devastating earthquake struck Haiti, killing more than 200,000 people and leaving 2.3 million temporarily homeless. It was a huge disaster not only because of its scale, but also because of its effect on urban areas. Almost 20 per cent of homes in the capital, Port-au-Prince, were destroyed. Across the country as a whole more than 105,000 buildings were razed and 208,000 damaged. At the height of the crisis, around 1.5 million people were living in 1,500 temporary displacement camps in the capital and surrounding areas. As of September 2014, there were still 85,432 officially recognised IDPs in 12 camps.

Port-au-Prince had undergone rapid urbanisation and unplanned growth since the 1980s, leading to the expansion of densely populated informal settlements and a shortage of adequate housing and basic services for low-income residents. Even before the earthquake, the country was short of 50,000 units, and the housing sector was worst affected by the disaster, incurring losses put at $2.3 billion and accounting for around 40 per cent of all the damage it caused.

Haiti’s political system and state institutions before the earthquake were described as “centralised, weak and self-interested” with poor capacity to delivery public goods, little legitimacy and vast inequality. Article 22 of the country’s constitution recognises the right of every citizen to “decent housing”, and the Ministry of Social Affairs has an established public agency for the promotion of housing rights. The Ministry of Social Affairs has an established public agency for the promotion of housing rights. The Ministry of Social Affairs (MAH), together with the government, IOM, UN, UNDP, UNOPS and ILO, included the government, IOM, UN, UNDP, UNOPS and ILO, among others, in an inter-agency response to the housing needs of IDPs. The government led the mass rebuilding of more than 100,000 homes in Haitian national parks and in other safe locations. However, the government failed to provide shelter for all the people who were affected by the earthquake. In many cases, the government did not provide temporary housing, and people were left to fend for themselves.

### Summary
Rental support programmes were used in Haiti to relocate people out of camps back to their neighbourhoods of origin or other areas. Based on their housing status before the earthquake, residents in camps targeted for closure were given options of transitional shelter, housing repairs, new home construction or rental support grants. All of the options except the grants, however, were steered more towards homeowners than tenants, who made up the overwhelming majority of the urban poor. Groups of 5000 per household were given, varying on the basis of family size, to cover a year’s rent with a private-sector landlord. The grants guaranteed that beneficiaries had access to safe, cost-free or highly subsidised shelter for the duration of the lease. The subsidy could also be used for repairs.

Houses rented through the programme were verified to ensure that minimum standards were respected in terms of safety and living conditions.

### Strengths
- Tenants, who tended to make up the large majority of the most vulnerable displaced families in urban areas.
- Allowed 500,000 people to leave camps.
- Focused on absorbing IDPs into existing housing stock, instead of waiting for new construction.
- Ensured short-term affordability by covering rental costs for a fixed period of time.

### Key elements of
- A host of short-term affordability by covering rental costs for a fixed period of time.
- The reports and operational manual contributed to a transfer of knowledge.

### A “keep the change” policy was adopted to encourage beneficiaries to negotiate their rent with landlords, owners, allowing them to keep the difference between the grant and the actual cost of their rent.

The practice helped to improve living conditions in rented housing. Verification ensured minimum standards were respected in terms of safety and living conditions.

### Factors for potential replicability
- Availability of affordable rental housing stock.
- Landowners willing to sign written rental agreements with guidelines on maintenance, safety and protection from eviction.
- Mechanisms to verify proposed rentals and determine their safety in terms of disaster risk reduction.
- Access to bank accounts and/or mobile cash-transfer technologies.

### Policy shifts and programme design
Rental support programmes were the most popular way of moving camp residents back to their original neighbourhoods or other areas. Other housing options were also offered, including transitional shelter, housing repair and new home construction, but all except the grants aimed were given more at homeowners. Rental support grants were defined as “a financial payment given to a family displaced by a humanitarian emergency. The financial payment is given to a family or individual on the condition that it is used to pay for a fixed-term lease in

### Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs

March 2015 | Home sweet home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key challenge(s)</th>
<th>Factors for potential replicability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of follow-up on the fate of households after their one-year grant expires, particularly for those at risk of renewed displacement or forced eviction. Some studies suggest that only 26% of beneficiaries renewed their rental contract. The main reason cited by the 75% who moved out was not having enough income to remain. This highlights the necessity for linked support programmes to complement rental support grants (see box on the graduation approach), although livelihood initiatives may not always be able to address structural poverty.</td>
<td>Availability of affordable rental housing stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required significant oversight and monitoring to ensure rental housing stock was habitable and not in a hazard-risk area.</td>
<td>Landowners willing to sign written rental agreements with guidelines on maintenance, safety and protection from eviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms to verify proposed rentals and determine their safety in terms of disaster risk reduction.</td>
<td>Access to bank accounts and/or mobile cash-transfer technologies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs

March 2015 | Home sweet home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key challenge(s)</th>
<th>Factors for potential replicability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of follow-up on the fate of households after their one-year grant expires, particularly for those at risk of renewed displacement or forced eviction. Some studies suggest that only 26% of beneficiaries renewed their rental contract. The main reason cited by the 75% who moved out was not having enough income to remain. This highlights the necessity for linked support programmes to complement rental support grants (see box on the graduation approach), although livelihood initiatives may not always be able to address structural poverty.</td>
<td>Availability of affordable rental housing stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required significant oversight and monitoring to ensure rental housing stock was habitable and not in a hazard-risk area.</td>
<td>Landowners willing to sign written rental agreements with guidelines on maintenance, safety and protection from eviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms to verify proposed rentals and determine their safety in terms of disaster risk reduction.</td>
<td>Access to bank accounts and/or mobile cash-transfer technologies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
accommodation rented from a private-sector landlord. The cash grant guarantees that the beneficiary has access to safe, cost-free or highly subsidized shelter for the duration of the lease.14

Households were allocated baseline grants of $4500 to use either as a rent subsidy,15 Given that 70 per cent of camp residents were tenants before the earthquake, the vast majority received rent subsidies. The baseline figure covered around a year’s rent, and families with more than seven members received double.

After the earthquake, engineers from the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication assessed the safety of buildings. Buildings considered safe were stamped green, those for repair yellow and those for demolition red. Grant recipients were instructed to avoid these zones at all costs.

Payment was also subject to a home verification check to establish whether recipients’ chosen property met building and safety requirements. Monitoring was an important component of the programme as a counterbalance to its “keep the change” element, which encouraged tenants to keep excess cash when supply was low for two main reasons. By June 2013, 40,000 people had secured rented accommodation in and around Port-au-Prince, meaning that the programme did not cause inflation in the rental housing market by flooding it with excess cash when supply was low for two main reasons.

Impact and challenges

There is debate about whether rental support grants can be seen as supporting durable solutions, given that they cover only relatively short fixed periods, and as such are unlikely in and of themselves to end the cycle of displacement. The World Bank’s operational manual suggests they should be just “one building block in an overall shelter assistance strategy aiming to provide durable housing solutions for displaced populations”.16 Their objective generally is to restore tenant’s living standards to those before their displacement (see Figure 3). Complementary measures that monitor beneficiaries’ ability to continue paying rent after their cash-based assistance ends or that keep track of affordable rental housing stock are not necessarily considered integral components of rental support grant programmes.

According to a 2013 external evaluation of rental support grants in Haiti, no recipients returned to their camps, but only 26 per cent renewed their leases at the end of the first year.17 Insufficient income was main reason cited for not doing so. The poorest urban residents earn less than $2 a day. As such, livelihood support is essential to durable housing programmes (see box on the graduation approach). Such support cannot address structural poverty, but it can help IDPs who have temporarily lost incomes as a result of their displacement to recover wages, gain new skills and find other sustainable livelihood opportunities. Families not eligible for grants because they did not have the required documentation received third-party help to obtain them.21

Contrary to initial concerns, the programme did not cause inflation in the rental housing market by flooding it with excess cash when supply was low for two main reasons. By June 2013, 40,000 people had secured rented accommodation in and around Port-au-Prince, meaning that a significant number of IDPs were housed in existing stock. The “keep the change” approach also helped to maintain competition between landlords, while the home verification checks ensured that the policy did not result in IDPs’ living conditions deteriorating by their choosing to rent cheaper, substandard accommodation in order to pocket more cash.

Rental support grants can be disbursed either as one-off lump sum payments or as a monthly payment which makes them easier to control but more expensive to administer. There are indications that lump sum payments in Haiti allowed some recipients to purchase land in the Canaan informal settlement rather than securing rented accommodation. As such, they could be seen as contributing to the expansion of such settlements, but in reality grant recipients made up only a fraction of those setting up home in Canaan. Its expansion is rather a symptom of the country’s huge housing shortage, which neither the government nor the international community have addressed.

Knowledge transfer

A variety of agencies worked together as part of the return working group of IASC’s Haiti E-Sheken/CCCM cluster to implement the rental support grant programme. They included Catholic Relief Services, Concern Worldwide, IFRC, IOM, the J/P Haitian Relief Organisation and World Vision International).23

Livelihoods support and overcoming barriers to work to complement cash-based assistance

Globally tested by the World Bank’s consultative group to assist the poor (CGAP) and the Ford Foundation, an adapted form of the graduation approach is currently being piloted by UNHCR through Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Cantias for 5,000 Syrian refugees in urban areas in Egypt. The approach focuses on the ultra-poor, who have no assets, are chronically food insecure. It uses a combination of cash assistance, social protection, livelihood support and microfinance to lift beneficiaries out of extreme poverty.

The most vulnerable households are selected and market analysis undertaken to determine viable livelihoods. Time-bound cash assistance is given to meet immediate needs while beneficiaries pursue business planning, legal and skills training leading to waged or self-employment. Self-employment is supported by seed capital or asset transfers.

The unique feature of this practice is its individualised approach. Each beneficiary is coached directly by a caseworker, who reviews each step taken and identifies, prevents and responds to protection issues that arise from the livelihood support. The caseworkers visit the beneficiaries’ homes or places of work at least twice a month or contact them by telephone. Such follow-up is expensive, with each caseworker taking on 100 refugees.

The pilot started in 2013 and is ongoing. Results as of at the end of 2014 were promising, with 800 beneficiaries having found employment. UNHCR plans to expand the pilot programme to rural areas, but there are no plans to include IDPs. Challenges in Egypt have included low pay and poor working conditions for waged employees and limited links between refugees and private sector entities.

The approach has not been piloted for urban IDPs, but they often face many similar challenges to urban refugees in terms of barriers to employment. Cash-based assistance and rental support are integral to addressing urban IDPs’ short-term needs, but do not, on their own, provide a sustainable solution. Once the assistance runs out, households risk returning to their previous destitute state. The graduation approach, however, complements cash assistance with livelihood and vocational training, which facilitates self-reliance once the cash assistance dries up.

The graduation approach?

Livelihoods support and overcoming barriers to work to complement cash-based assistance

Globally tested by the World Bank’s consultative group to assist the poor (CGAP) and the Ford Foundation, an adapted form of the graduation approach is currently being piloted by UNHCR through Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Cantias for 5,000 Syrian refugees in urban areas in Egypt. The approach focuses on the ultra-poor, who have no assets, are chronically food insecure. It uses a combination of cash assistance, social protection, livelihood support and microfinance to lift beneficiaries out of extreme poverty.

The most vulnerable households are selected and market analysis undertaken to determine viable livelihoods. Time-bound cash assistance is given to meet immediate needs while beneficiaries pursue business planning, legal and skills training leading to waged or self-employment. Self-employment is supported by seed capital or asset transfers.

The unique feature of this practice is its individualised approach. Each beneficiary is coached directly by a caseworker, who reviews each step taken and identifies, prevents and responds to protection issues that arise from the livelihood support. The caseworkers visit the beneficiaries’ homes or places of work at least twice a month or contact them by telephone. Such follow-up is expensive, with each caseworker taking on 100 refugees.

The pilot started in 2013 and is ongoing. Results as of at the end of 2014 were promising, with 800 beneficiar
Each agency employed slightly different methodologies with varying degrees of success, and the working group’s experiences were encapsulated in its 2012 Toolkit of Best Practices and Lessons Learned, which sought to transfer country-specific knowledge to global shelter practices. Two years later, the World Bank hired the toolkit’s author, Emmet Fitzgerald, to write an operational manual on rental support grants – a knowledge transfer of humanitarian shelter experiences to an international development organisation that created a broad methodology with a specific focus on governments’ role in devising rental support grant policies and programmes.

The Haiti programme was eventually integrated into the government’s broader reconstruction and displacement policy agenda. If the approach had been further institutionalised, the grants could have been channelled through a government body rather than via various agencies.

UCLBP’s 16/6 programme, which was developed in coordination with UN agencies, donors and international NGOs, suggested that rental support grants would be a short-term initiative to close six camps. The broader strategy focused on longer-term development activities, such as the repair and reconstruction of neighbourhood housing; the rehabilitation of neighbourhood infrastructure; disaster risk reduction activities focused on mapping environmental risks; the creation of “community platforms” to decide how funds should be spent in their neighbourhoods; livelihood programmes to reinvigorate the local economy; and professional training programmes for local residents.

The success of Haiti’s rental support grant programmes lies not so much in the closure of camps, but in the knowledge transfer from the return working group’s practical experiences to an institutional norm in the government’s strategic framework for disaster response, and to a general methodology for such interventions in other contexts. The World Bank manual outlines the project cycle; the grievance and appeals process; protection, health and psychosocial support; and data management. The project cycle consists of eight steps, which cover registration, communication, property inspections, payment, relocation, dismantling tents, camp closure and a verification visit after six to eight weeks.

The manual also envisages the use of innovative data collection and monitoring tools such as smartphone applications to register camp residents, and strategies to circumvent forgeries and illegitimate claims for grants.

**Impact**

Rental support grants in Haiti helped to clear some of the camps targeted for closure. Some were forcibly evicted by landowners, and others left because of the threat of natural hazards and disease. Many owner-occupiers left because they were eligible for transitional shelter, reconstruction assistance or new homes.

The rental support grant programme also encouraged private sector reconstruction and repair by increasing demand for affordable rental housing. As such, it had economic benefits for the wider affected community and the neighbourhoods people returned to.

**Conclusion**

If they are to contribute to durable solutions, rental support grants need to be combined with longer-term complementary programmes. The most sustainable impact of Haiti’s initiative is its inclusion in UCLBP’s programme and the government’s disaster response strategy. It has also influenced the thinking of both humanitarian and development advocates for the use of such programmes elsewhere.

Cash-based assistance is by no means unique to Haiti. It has been used for decades in many other parts of the world. The lessons learned from Haiti are valuable, but it is unclear whether there has been enough institutional reflection and longitudinal studies on the history of such support.

**Notes**


5. Helping Families, Closing Camps, UCLBP and Government of Haiti


8. Some fled undamaged buildings out of fear, so were able to return quickly.


10. Amnesty International, Ten Facts about Haiti’s Housing Crisis, 12 January 2015, last accessed 15 January 2015

11. “In 1997, a study by the GOH reported that 67 per cent of the Port-au-Prince population lived on 25 per cent of the city’s inhabited area,” in Priscilla Phelps, “Analyzing the Haiti Post-Earthquake Shelter Response and Housing Recovery: Results and Lessons Learned in the First Two Years.” The World Bank, 2013, p.2

12. NORAD, Guidance Note: Reconstruction and Long-term Capacity Development in Haiti, October 2010


15. UCLBP, Helping Families, Closing Camps


17. Fitzgerald, p.49

18. Ibid, family or by camp

19. Ibid, p.42


23. Wolfgroup Performance Consultants, External evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haiti, January 2013, p.23


25. Ibid, p.22

26. Ibid, p.32

27. Ibid, p.40

March 2015 | Home sweet home

Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs
6. Incremental tenure

Description

Incremental tenure is a practice that acknowledges the fact that tenure is a process and not a fixed system. It acknowledges that both formal and informal land rights are fraught with challenges for the urban poor. Critics of the blanket approach of establishing formal land rights for all are not necessarily against ownership in itself. Rather they disagree with the imposition of a homogenous ownership or titling model that fails to acknowledge the costs and disadvantages that ownership can entail, such as taxation, service charges and the temptation to sell land as an area becomes gentrified and return to a prior state of tenure insecurity. Critics are sympathetic to a tenure security approach, with general objectives as follows:

- Focus on blanket settlement rights first, instead of individual rights
- Try to provide administrative and legal protection against eviction
- Advocate for the implicit recognition of informal settlements, including service provision, service bills, electoral rolls, registers, site plans, street and shack numbering and the issuing of identity cards
- Apply an incremental approach to tenure, under which initial requirements are simple and affordable, but can be upgraded later
- Give communities the opportunity to consolidate settlements and clarify internal disputes through community processes, which may have more social legitimacy
- Give individual households time to become gradually more secure in their tenure and invest incrementally in upgrading their housing
- Give governments time to develop technical capacities to institutionalise new approaches to tenure, land registration, settlement upgrades and infrastructure provision
- Gradually make social processes and transactions more transparent
- Make the land market work better for the most vulnerable urban residents

Incremental tenure approaches work within the continuum of tenure security to increase it in accordance with the context. Urban Land Mark, a South African research organisation, has outlined one potential model of incremental tenure as follows:

1. Administrative recognition
   a. Survey of physical site (topography, environmental factors, geology)
   b. Survey of planning aspects (land zoning, land use, compliance with spatial development framework)
   c. Survey of legal issues (existing land ownership, deeds office search, misc. legal constraints)
   d. Survey of infrastructure (available services, connections and capacity required)
   e. Survey of demographic and social data (resident demographics, economic status, origins, employment, tenant arrangements, prior commitments)
   f. Survey of existing tenure and property transaction norms (perceptions of ownership, how informal transactions are conducted, what is transacted, the impact of previous transactions)
   g. Insertion of settlement name into municipal land information system
   h. Preparation of a base map or site plan (could be based on satellite or aerial photography)
   i. Register structures and households with community consultation and participation
   j. Acknowledge household occupation through register
   k. Ensuring provision of emergency services (water standpipes, basic sanitation, refuse removal, some grading of roadways, water channelling)

2. Legal recognition
   a. Government and municipality will incorporate the settlement into the broader municipal or urban development plan. This could mean rezoning it (but not applying zoning or land use laws internally yet) as an informal or less formal settlement or equivalent
   i. Allows municipalities to begin developmental regulation or area
   ii. Legal recognition decriminalises residents, their structures and activities
   iii. Integral step towards establishing the settlement as a township or district

3. Developmental recognition
   a. Preparing basic layout or more detailed plan of the site (with community consultation)
   b. Conducting a participatory mapping or enumeration exercise to identify individual plot boundaries
   c. Providing a higher level of infrastructure and services (electricity provision)
   d. Consulting the community on multiple forms of tenure currently recognised
   e. Introducing a pro-poor and participatory land administration system
   f. Creating addresses for residents, which can be indicated on maps, leases, permits and service bills
   g. Introduce land use management in the form of a “mini” town planning scheme
   h. Forms of tenure acceptable at this stage:
      i. A lease (short or long-term, registered or unregistered)
      ii. A servitude of use (this is similar to an unregistered “contract” between the municipality and designated plot holder)
Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs

March 2015

Review of practices and case studies

Improving urban IDPs tenure security in Bosaso (Somalia)

The incremental tenure model is not specifically designed for urban IDPs, but given that many end up living either in separate or integrated informal settlements, their housing rights and needs must be addressed as part of a larger urban land management issue, particularly in cases of protracted displacement. The incremental model has the potential to increase urban IDPs' tenure security, protect them from forced eviction and improve housing and living conditions in a gradual and sustainable way.

Table 4: Incremental tenure and settlement model (Urban Land Mark, South Africa)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure mechanism</th>
<th>Administrative recognition</th>
<th>Legal recognition</th>
<th>Township establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plot identification</td>
<td>Basic site plan – no individual plot boundaries, perhaps neighbourhood blocks, main roads. Based on aerial photographs and community verification</td>
<td>Detailed layout plan: individual plot boundaries, all roads, sites for facilities and plots identified</td>
<td>Approved layout plan with pegged sites which informs the General Plan that gets approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recording of occupants</td>
<td>List (database) of occupants, linked to a shack number with or without a single GPS point reference</td>
<td>Full register of all occupants linked to a property description, tenant relationships, next of kin</td>
<td>A township register as per the Deeds Registry Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure evidence</td>
<td>Letter of occupation certificate/card acknowledging occupation</td>
<td>Simple lease with municipality/province</td>
<td>Title deed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simple servitude of use A municipal bill could serve as a contract</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Long lease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use management</td>
<td>Basic health and safety rules Can be indicated on letter of occupation</td>
<td>Through the Amendment Scheme, rezoning or DFA, rules or conditions for managing land use in the settlement</td>
<td>Town Planning Scheme zoning and title deed conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services provision</td>
<td>Basic services – communal level of services (LOS 1)</td>
<td>Planned, upgraded services, individual connections (LOS 2 - 3)</td>
<td>Highest level of services as per township establishment conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first case study from Bosaso is not an exact replica of Urban Land Mark’s model. It was a scheme implemented by UN-Habitat which evolved from local land considerations and constraints. When IDPs arrived in Bosaso, they settled in informal peri-urban settlements most of whose inhabitants had been displaced. They received humanitarian assistance, but as their displacement became protracted, a more integrated approach towards housing as a key element of durable solutions was increasingly called for. UN-Habitat combined improving tenure security in the short term with the introduction of incremental tenure through the establishment of new sites recognised and managed by municipal authorities.

The second case study from Bosaso contributed to upgrading IDPs’ settlements and strengthening their tenure security via the introduction of lease agreements.
Case study 1: Resettlement of urban IDPs and incremental tenure in Bosaso East

### Snapshot

**Practice**

Incremental tenure model (15 years to full ownership) in Bosaso East, Somalia. Resettlement programme for IDPs in urban and peri-urban areas, 2005 to 2008

**Main actors**

- 1. UN-Habitat
- 2. Municipality of Bosaso and other local authorities
- 3. UNHCR
- 4. OCHA
- 5. Danish Refugee Council

**Context**

1. Successive waves of displacement driven by conflict and environmental factors
2. Unsafe conditions, including high fire risk, in IDPs' settlements
3. Unclear ownership of land on which settlements were established
4. Existence of a joint UN-UNHCR strategy for IDPs in Somalia, and introduction in 2006 of an IASC shelter cluster approach to upgrade settlements to reduce fire risk and improve tenure security and access to services

**Target group**

1. IDPs living in informal settlements in urban and peri-urban areas of Bosaso

**Summary**

The practice consisted in the identification and allocation of land plots with secure tenure to urban IDPs in Bosaso. The new settlement was located in the proximity of where IDPs were displaced therefore facilitating the preservation of their social networks and livelihood opportunities.

- Taking the lead on the tenure security element of the shelter cluster approach, UN-Habitat worked with the municipality to identify areas where settlements could be upgraded and where IDPs could settle permanently. Based on consultations that included IDPs, a proposal was made to redirect urban growth to the east as means of making development more compact and taking in IDPs' settlements.
- A campaign was launched in which landowners were encouraged to donate land to the municipality for the purpose. In return, their land was included into urban development plans as land to be connected to services, therefore increasing its value and compensating for the land they had given up. The municipality then set up a team to survey the sites and develop neighbourhood plans for the new sites.
- When IDPs resettled there, they entered into rent-free incremental tenure contracts with the municipality, under which beneficiaries were not able to sell, rent, transfer, mortgage or donate their land until they have lived on it continuously for 15 years, at which point full ownership would be transferred to them. In the event of death, lawful dependents were to inherit the right to occupy the land. If IDPs left their property before the end of the 15-year period, the land was to revert back to municipal ownership to be reallocated to another displaced beneficiary.
- Where IDPs resettled there, they entered into rent-free incremental tenure contracts with the municipality, under which beneficiaries were not able to sell, rent, transfer, mortgage or donate their land until they have lived on it continuously for 15 years, at which point full ownership would be transferred to them. In the event of death, lawful dependents were to inherit the right to occupy the land. If IDPs left their property before the end of the 15-year period, the land was to revert back to municipal ownership to be reallocated to another displaced beneficiary.

**Strengths**

1. The practice was centred on IDPs within wider urban development objectives.
2. It contributed to tenure security and uses an innovative incremental tenure approach that starts with a free and legally protected rental contract and culminates in full private ownership.
3. It involved collaboration between UN-Habitat and the municipality in establishing a resettlement plan of IDPs and the broader direction of urban growth, which benefited the wider community. It also led to positive shifts in institutional norms and knowledge transfer, particularly by familiarising people with the concept of formal rental contracts.
4. The practice made affordable housing available to IDPs and the urban poor in locations close to where they have sustainable access to livelihoods contributed to durable solutions by providing urban IDPs with secure tenure on plots designated by the municipality in areas close to their informal settlements, which allowed them to maintain their livelihoods and social networks.
5. Both the design of the settlements and the choice of building materials improved habitability, access to services and protection from fire risk. With national and international support, IDPs have invested incrementally in improving their property over the years, adding extra rooms, pavements and water tanks, and planting trees.

**Key challenge(s)**

1. Lack of public land available and shortage of donated private land, leaving many IDPs on the waiting list to become a beneficiary. Some chose to buy their own land privately rather than wait for a donation.
2. IDPs' capacity to invest in and improve their property was limited without adequate access to credit.

**Factors for potential replicability**

1. Landowners' interest in donating land to the municipality
2. Municipality's willingness to cooperate with external organisations to devise a new urban growth management plan

**Overview**

Since the state of Puntland proclaimed itself an autonomous region of Somalia in 1998, Bosaso - its largest city and commercial centre - has attracted thousands of IDPs fleeing conflict and drought over the past 15 years. As a port, it is an important transit point that connects the economy of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, to the Gulf of Aden. Its rapid economic growth is the result of its strategic geographical location, recent population increases and the export and import of goods, both legal and otherwise. It is also a hub for the trafficking of Somali and Ethiopian migrants to the Gulf States.

As of January 2015, there were around 150,000 IDPs in Puntland, according to UNHCR. Bosaso's municipal authorities estimate the population of the city to be between 500,000 and 700,000 people, compared with 15,000 to 25,000 before the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. It also estimates that the city's population includes around 100,000 IDPs living in its urban and peri-urban areas. The figures, however, may not be reliable, given the constant movement of persons in Somalia, including return movements, new displacements, multiple displacements, a number of 'invisible' IDPs, and lack of access to some parts of the country.

The proposal was ultimately rejected because it would have led to an unsustainable increase in transport, food and water costs for families who would no longer have access to local markets, and to their social segregation. Experience in other cities, such as Burao, had also shown that IDPs in remote relocation areas would gradually move back to informal settlements sites in town, drawn by the livelihood opportunities on offer there. Following criticism from several NGOs in the form of building materials and cash for labour.

### Coordination and process

Following the rejection of the first resettlement plan, two complimentary approaches to meeting IDPs' needs emerged. A joint initiative by the UN and international NGOs led to the development of a strategy on IDPs for Somalia in 2005, and the IASC shelter cluster approach was introduced in 2006. One of the main interventions to come out of the cluster approach was to upgrade existing settlements to reduce fire risk, increase access to services and improve IDPs' tenure security. The initiative was based on the recognition that more IDPs would continue to arrive, and that short-term durable solutions were not feasible. By 2008, five settlements had been upgraded.
The process involved:
1. Re-planning the settlement to allow enough living space for families, roads, firebreaks, basic services and infrastructure
2. Distributing improved and less flammable temporary shelter kits
3. Conducting basic training on settlement planning and fire prevention
4. Negotiating with local authorities and landowners to improve IDPs’ tenure security

UN-Habitat took the lead on the fourth element by trying to institutionalise the use of tri-partite leasehold agreements.

The first track of the joint strategy on IDPs sought to improve their conditions in informal settlements. The second focused on providing durable solutions, combining interventions centred on IDPs with a wider urban development approach. At the time, the city was expanding rapidly along the main road leading into town from the port, slowly stifling mobility. In conjunction with Bosa-so municipality, UN-Habitat used the pursuit of durable solutions for IDPs as an entry point for engagement in a debate on more sustainable urban growth strategies, with a view to establishing an integrated approach.

A rapid urban profile including a rudimentary strategic urban development plan for the city was developed that integrated IDPs’ large-scale resettlement. As part of the planning phase, UN-Habitat ran a three-day consultation meeting in March 2005, it included representatives of central and local authorities, NGOs, traditional and religious leaders, displaced communities, media, the business sector, and the project committee. The inclusion of three representatives from displaced communities was important in emphasising that IDPs’ housing and durable solution needs should be a central consideration in the development of any urban strategy.

The first step was to identify the existing informal settlements and those of IDPs (see Figure 2).

The basic proposition was to redirect urban growth to the east to create more compact development around a new bypass to the port that linked up with existing roads leading to the centre of town. It was suggested that the development of resettlement sites would be accompanied by investment in infrastructure to service them, which would at the same time lay the foundation of the Strategic Urban Development plan (see Figure 3).

Given that the vast majority of the land targeted was controlled by the local elite, land donations were sought for the first resettlement sites (see Figure 4), based on the argument that the overall plan would increase land values, resolve major urban problems and facilitate the city’s sustainable economic growth. The municipality then set up a planning team to survey the sites, develop neighbourhood plans and outline capacity development support for East Bosaso. Resettled IDPs entered into incremental tenure contracts.

Figure 3: Proposed expansion of the city of Bosaso (2008)

Figure 4: Map of donated settlement land and implemented resettlement sites
Incremental tenure model: Resettlement to East Bosaso

Given that no public land was available and it was unclear who controlled what, a campaign to encourage land donations was launched. It appealed to religious sentiments of charity and offered owners the incentive that their land would benefit from new roads and basic services if they donated a portion of it.

In absence of a functioning land administration system, the ownership of land donated for resettlement was transferred to the Bosaso municipality. Once donated, land was then entered into incremental tenure agreements with beneficiaries that were certified by the sharia court. This type of arrangement is particular suitable for IDPs trying to integrate locally.

Beneficiaries would not be able to sell, rent, transfer, mortgage or donate their land until they have lived on it continuously for 15 years. In the event of death, the lawful dependent(s) would inherit the right to occupy the land. After 15 years, full ownership is transferred. If a beneficiary leaves their land before the 15-year period is up, it reverts back to the municipality for reallocation. Disputes are heard by the city’s district court.

Today, IDPs have started purchasing individual plots, registering them with the municipality, paying registration fees and approaching the international community for support in upgrading their property.

Selection criteria

The current eligibility criteria for housing support as part of permanent resettlement, including the incremental tenure scheme, are as follows:

1. Must have lived in Bosaso for at least five years
   a. This targets those living in protracted displacement
2. Must not own other property in Bosaso
   a. This targets those who are vulnerable and most in need
3. Must be willing to contribute resources and participate in the housing construction programme
   a. This targets those willing to invest in their pursuit of long term integration
4. Should be living on the land as “visible IDPs”
   a. This avoids attracting those who want to hold land as an investment
5. Must provide proof of ownership transfer and register it with the municipality

Preference is given to IDPs who have already made some investment on their land, such as building a toilet or shed, erecting fences or creating a underground rainwater reservoir or berkad.

a. This ensures the success of long-term investment and integration. In incremental shelter models, a toilet is the most expensive element. Investment in a toilet can indicate that IDPs intend to settle.

Eligibility criteria for land eligible for housing support are as follows:

1. Should be located within IDPs’ settlements or not far from town limits
   a. This is meant to avoid proposals such as the 2005 resettlement scheme that would have placed prohibitive transport, food and service costs on IDPs and reduced their livelihood opportunities.
2. Should be free of disputes
   a. This means that prior to transfer, landowners and the municipality should settle any existing disputes or multiple claims on the plot.
3. Preference is given to a cluster of ten plots that meet the above criteria
   a. This is to avoid urban sprawl and ensure that settlements grow with a level of population and housing density that would justify the cost of providing infrastructure and basic services.

During the initial phase, demand for resettlement plots was far greater than supply, so a lottery system was used to select beneficiaries from among eligible households. A long list was established based on criteria to prioritise beneficiaries, and supported by an external complaint mechanism to provide a check on the selection committee.

There was, however, a wave of individual purchases of land following initial resettlement, which may indicate that people did not wait for further land donations and took matters into their own hands.

Incremental housing process

The initial East Bosaso scheme included the extension of the municipal water mains to the resettlement site. Access roads were traced and local construction companies were hired to build boundary walls that defined the public space, the foundations of the individual plot boundaries, latrines and shower units. It is up to beneficiaries to make improvements and add extensions themselves, with local NGOs providing support in the form of building materials and cash-for-labour schemes.

In incremental housing models, it is generally better for IDPs to have a core room built on site so they can move in immediately. Given that they have to contribute some of their own time and resources to their new home, they should not be put in a position of having to maintain their previous site or pay rent on it while working on their new one. In East Bosaso, improved tents from the temporary settlements were used to facilitate the transition.

After the beneficiaries moved in, humanitarian agencies contributed to improving site by planting trees and building a mosque and school. Beneficiaries invested incrementally in their property by adding pavements, water tanks, trees and extra rooms. Given their land was part of a resettlement scheme, they received it free, but are subject to municipal laws such as local taxation and planning procedures.

As such they have to obtain building permits from the local authorities if they want to build new structures on their land. It is not clear, however, to what extent the municipality enforces the use of permits, the application of building regulations or land use zoning. It may be that they choose to "look the other way" when it comes to the incremental upgrading of homes. As a settlement grows and becomes more formalised, authorities can begin to be more stringent in applying local regulations and collecting revenue through taxes and permits.

Impact and conclusion

Incremental tenure resettlement schemes cannot be evaluated effectively in the short term. They take decades to evolve into formal settlements that are fully integrated into the urban development framework of a city. The East Bosaso scheme is a work in progress, and it is not without stumbling blocks. The lack of affordable and serviced land remains an issue, and this often requires state-led land redistribution and sharing schemes.

In some countries, the government purchases plots from private landowners to meet existing and projected future demand. Corruption and land grabbing, however, can make the process complicated. Many governments may simply not be able to afford to buy land for IDPs’ resettlement, though international could support such purchases.

Without an on-site evaluation in East Bosaso is hard to tell to what extent IDPs, who may have limited access to credit and capital, have been able to incrementally upgrade their homes. The smaller auxiliary programmes that exist to provide credit, capital and materials should be scaled up. It is also unclear whether the dispute resolution mechanisms in place have been affordable and effective.

Local elites used to refuse to sell land to IDPs. Following the first successful resettlements, however, and acknowledgement of the benefits for the host community, individual and collective transfers began to take place.

As of August 2014, 11,022 beneficiaries, or nearly 1,700 households, had purchased land in existing settlements for IDPs or in the broader urban periphery.

The East Bosaso scheme seems to have increased momentum towards employing a durable solutions framework into Puntland’s policies. Article 5A, section 8 of its transitional constitution states that the regional government will be responsible for “planning for the resettlement of the refugees and displaced persons”. The statement, however, needed further clarification, so in 2012, the Puntland policy guidelines on displacement were adopted, integrating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the state’s obligations under the Kampala Convention and the IASC durable solutions framework. They also recognise IDPs’ participatory rights.

The guidelines represent an important shift in Puntland’s legal framework for the promotion of IDPs’ durable solutions and their non-discriminatory access to all services, including adequate housing. They will hopefully create opportunities to expand the use of the incremental tenure model in the growing informal settlements and those of IDPs in and around Bosaso.
Case study 2: Upgrading IDPs’ settlements and strengthening tenure through rental agreements

**Settlement upgrade**

This practice focused on upgrading existing settlements rather than permanent relocation. A series of negotiations were conducted with private landlords - who may or may not have been the title deed holders - of the land on which IDPs had informally settled. UN-Habitat proposed a temporary tenure model, a tri-partite leasehold agreement between the landlords, the IDPs residing on the land and the municipality. Under the agreement, landlords had to comply with minimum humanitarian standards to reduce the population density of the settlements and ensure space for effective firebreaks and communal services. Landlords kept their right to develop the site as long as sufficient notice was given. The approach improved tenure security, living conditions and access to services.

To ensure access to basic utilities during the upgrades, UN-Habitat and the municipality negotiated an agreement with GUMco, the local water provider, to install water taps on the main streets of the settlements at a maximum distance of 250 metres from each household. The taps were managed by members of the displaced community members in direct cooperation with GUMco. Landlords were not allowed to intervene, act as gatekeepers to services or charge extra fees. The upgrades also allocated space for community centres, mosques, temporary schools and sand storage for firefighting.

The main streets were later widened to six metres to act as firebreaks and ensure quick access for fire-fighting vehicles. A committee representing the community was tasked with keeping the roads clear and free of obstructions. Secondary access lanes between housing rows were made four metres wide. The new settlement layout, awareness raising with the local community and training of both community members and local authorities led to a 50 per cent fall in the number of families affected by outbreaks of fire in 2008 compared with 2007. Women’s safety and security was also a recurring issue, particularly when using latrines at night, so the upgrades included separate pit latrines for men and women, at a minimum ratio of one toilet per 20 people and installed at strategic points.

Landowners tended to favour five-year leases, on the basis that the additional public investment and development would increase the value of their land value and attract private investors. Such agreements were also a pragmatic option for IDPs not seeking to integrate locally and unable to purchase property themselves.

It guaranteed tenants protection from eviction for five years, and thereafter landlords were obliged to give 90 days’ notice if they wanted to repossess their land for developments or other purposes, in accordance with the UN basic principles and guidelines on development-based evictions and displacement. The temporary tenure model relied on traditional and informal dispute resolution mechanisms. The rental agreements stipulated that disputes should be settled “through dialogue by the concerned parties”, but was not clear what recourse IDPs had beyond appealing to the local authorities or their landlords. In 2010, the Ministry of Interior took over the mayor’s responsibility for witnessing and overseeing the agreements on the basis that “if an agreement between a landowner and a tenant is signed by the Ministry of Interior, the Mayor and the Islamic court, then it is stronger.”

At the outset of the programme, UN-Habitat launched a radio and television campaign to discuss the minimum standards IDPs might expect and be able to demand from the local authorities and landlords. The debate mobilised local authorities and religious and community leaders to discuss IDPs’ rights and economic contribution, and brought the issues of fire prevention and hygiene to light.

Despite the obligation established for landlords to give 90 days’ notice of their intention to evict tenants after five years of occupancy, many people agreed to 60-day notice periods agreement. The rental agreements could also have been clearer about tenants’ obligations to maintain the land, latrine construction and other developments, rent payments, right to purchase, ownership of shelter materials and inheritance and sub-letting rights. IDPs needed to be the documented owners of their shelter materials so that, in the event of eviction they could relocate to another site and quickly rebuild their homes. For landlords not receiving rent from their tenants, the municipality might have been better to reassure them “that they will not be forced to pay tax on lands used by IDPs from which they derive no income”.

Such a guarantee might make them more willing to provide land for IDPs’ settlements.

The radio and television campaign that accompanied the start of the programme succeeded in raising awareness of IDPs’ and tenants’ rights, a fact that is perhaps its crowning achievement. Displaced households have been empowered as tenants who can exercise leverage with landlords unwilling to sign a tenancy agreement that guarantees a 90-day eviction notice and basic provision and maintenance of services.

**Notes**

1. The incremental tenure model discussed in this section is based on the work of the Pretoria-based research organisation Urban Land Mark, which focuses on how to make urban land markets work better for the poor. This information was reproduced from Dan Smit and Gemey Abrahams, Incrementally Securing Tenure: An Approach for Informal Settlement Upgrading in South Africa. Urban Land Mark, April 2010, http://sapos.org/cmsAUN, last accessed on 1 January 2015.

2. Ibid, p.19

3. May require community consultations and background research on community conflicts and leadership structures.


5. *Bosaso municipality figures: A 2010 Forced Migration Review article estimated the city’s population as 150,000 with 35,000 IDPs.*


8. Filiep Decorte and Ombretta Tempra, *Improving living conditions in Bosaso, Somalia*, in Forced Migration Review no. 34, ISSN 1060-9819, February 2010, p.16


13. Ibid

7. Neighbourhood upgrades

Description

Neighbourhood upgrades generally shift the focus from IDPs specifically to area-based interventions integrated into broader urban and development plans. They are distinct from individual or beneficiary-based approaches, and as such help to overcome one of the main challenges faced by humanitarian organisations working in urban - how to reach dispersed IDPs who are largely invisible in broader communities that include other vulnerable people such as migrants, marginalised groups and the urban poor. In some cases, however, such as the Roma Mahalla in Kosovo, the upgrade was part of a return project specifically conceived as a durable solution for IDPs living in protracted displacement in lead-contaminated camps in second case study below). Better use of space to create more housing can also be achieved via North Mitrovicë/a (see first case study).

Neighbourhood upgrades include support for municipalities in improving associated infrastructure and services to an area, and more efficient use of space to increase the number of affordable rental properties available. This is often done by encouraging property owners to build additional rooms to accommodate IDPs' local integration, as was the case in Katye in Haiti.

The third case study describes how the Transitional Solutions Initiative involved community members in Colombia in identifying their priorities and then simultaneously addressing their humanitarian and development needs in the regularisation of their informal settlement.

The neighbourhood approach

*Practitioners define the Neighbourhood Approach as an area-based intervention that responds to multi-sectorial needs and is informed by community-based decision-making reflective of the social, economic, and physical features of the delineated area.

The approach is shelter-led but settlement-focussed: it shifts the attention from conventional *four walls and a roof* efforts centred on households, towards a more synergistic and complementary focus on the entire community in defined spatial contexts. The process requires understanding of available local resources, emergent opportunities, and potential constraints regarding the sheltering of people, the recovery of affected economies, and the reduction of risks associated with vulnerability to natural hazards*.

Source: "The Neighbourhood approach" Improving the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Urban Areas." USAID/DCHQ/OFDA, no date
Case study 1: Katye neighbourhood improvement programme in Ravine Pintade (Haiti)

**Snapshot**

**Practice**
Katye neighbourhood improvement programme in Ravine Pintade

**Main actors**
CHF International (now Global Communities)
Project Concern International

**Content**
Ninety per cent of Ravine Pintade residents, or around 2,000 people, were displaced by the 2010 earthquake

**Target group(s)**
The construction and infrastructure programme benefitted 574 families living in Ravine Pintade but other aspects such as medical consultations in a health centre benefitted another 1,400 families living outside of Ravine Pintade.

**Summary**
The practice combined humanitarian assistance with a longer-term development approach that emphasised recovery and settlement upgrade. It supported IDPs’ early return to their original neighbourhoods as part of their durable solutions, and contributed to an overall improvement in residents’ access to adequate housing in Ravine Pintade. The project took a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach, including the provision of transitional shelter that could be upgraded, disaster risk reduction measures, rubble removal, and initiatives in the areas of water and sanitation, health, livelihoods and the protection of vulnerable groups.

**Strengths**
The practice involved the community from an early stage, and its participation engendered a feeling of community ownership over the project. Enumeration and mapping exercises were used to identify different forms of land rights, tenure claims and ownership, and a risk mapping exercise was also conducted. A profiling exercise helped to identify the community’s priorities and needs early on in terms of housing, settlement planning and infrastructure.

**Key challenge(s)**
Inaccessibility of the site complicated and slowed down implementation and raised costs.

**Factors for potential replicability**
The programme helped only a small fraction of the 2.3 million people left temporarily homeless by the earthquake, but it also influenced several other projects through the dissemination of information on its methodology, best practices and costs.

**Background**
In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, many neighbourhoods or kattyés were severely damaged and their residents displaced. One such area was the Ravine Pintade informal settlement situated between Port-au-Prince and Petionville, which was home to nearly 3,000 families. The settlement spans 16 acres and is built on a steep slope with precarious housing that suffered severe damage during the earthquake. Ninety per cent of the residents were displaced. Damaged roads and rubble made the settlement inaccessible.

Even before the earthquake and the displacement it caused, Ravine Pintade had problems, such as poor planning and construction practices, vulnerability to floods and landslides, and a lack of public infrastructure including water and sanitation. Even if IDPs were to return, without disaster risk reduction measures they would be vulnerable to renewed displacement in the event of another natural hazard.

**Overview**
To facilitate return to Ravine Pintade, it was determined that the settlement would have to be rebuilt and upgraded. CHF International (now Global Communities) and Project Concern International (PCI) developed a Katye improvement programme that combined humanitarian assistance with a longer-term development approach emphasising recovery and the upgrading of the settlement. In effect, the programme not only supported IDPs’ prompt return to Ravine Pintade. It also contributed to an overall improvement in residents’ access to adequate housing.

The project took a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach to settlement improvement, including the provision of transitional shelter that could be upgraded; disaster risk reduction initiatives; rubble clearance; water, sanitation, health and livelihoods programmes; and the protection of vulnerable groups.

Community enumeration and profiling exercises identified different forms of land rights, tenure claims and ownership in the settlement. The enumeration exercise also helped to identify the community’s priorities and needs regarding housing, settlement planning and infrastructure; CHF and PCI conducted a risk mapping exercise with the community and then proposed solutions based on their findings. The entire process of programme design, including the enumeration and profiling exercises, aimed to build consensus around the objectives and implementation of the initiative.

In an effort to improve living standards, two-storey housing units were proposed to make up for the small plot sizes in the settlement. In some cases, an extra floor was built on the condition that the beneficiary would offer it rent-free to a homeless or displaced person. The initiative led to a moderate increase in rental housing stock in Ravine Pintade (similar to the incremental housing approach in Jodoïdo). A profiling exercise helped to identify the community’s priorities and needs early on in terms of disaster risk reduction.

Community participation played a significant part in the success of the project, not only identifying needs that the programme could address, but also by engendering a sense of ownership of the project, building trust and resolving problems that arose during implementation. These included dealing with threats from within and outside the community; and negotiating land concessions to incorporate disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures such as retaining walls, installation of drainage infrastructure, and widening footpaths. Technical experts helped residents to implement the measures.

The programme helped only a small fraction of the 2.3 million people left temporarily homeless by the earthquake, but it also influenced several other projects through the dissemination of information on its methodology, best practices and costs.

**Impact**
Almost 2,000 people benefited from the programme.

Beneficiaries included 574 families who had previously lived in the settlement and others on the south side of the ravine and surrounding areas, showing that some effort had been made to target the wider community.

CHF and PCI employed community members to clear rubble, providing short-term livelihood opportunities for returning IDPs who had lost income as result of their displacement. The programme also tried to address neglected tenants’ needs. Many early recovery and housing upgrade or reconstruction schemes favour property owners over tenants, who tend to be side lined. As such, the help provided to returning families in upgrading their homes and building extra floors to provide rent-free housing for homeless people and IDPs were important elements of the initiative.

**Challenges and lessons learned**
The community’s participation and sense of ownership were the main strengths in the programme, which was founded on trust. Among other things, it meant that beneficiaries waiting for housing upgrades were able to rely on the community for temporary solutions by making arrangements with friends or family, which added no additional cost to the programme.

The cash-for-work initiative was helpful, but payment by the hour rather than based on productivity was inappropriate. CHF and PCI also considered reusing the rubble for building, but it was deemed unsuitable to do so. The programme would have benefited from more livelihood interventions, including vocational training and access to small business loans. It could also have conducted more outreach to surrounding areas to make it more inclusive, and more training on building maintenance, vertical or horizontal expansion and the recycling of materials should have been included. DRR activities benefited from the presence of technical experts.

The programme helped only a small fraction of the 2.3 million people left temporarily homeless by the earthquake, but it also influenced several other projects through the dissemination of information on its methodology, best practices and costs.

IFRC, the American Red Cross, the World Bank and UN- OPHS among others acknowledged that it had guided the development of their own programmes.

This was a new project implemented at a relatively small scale, but it could be developed and scaled up as part of future recovery programmes. One key factor to consider, however, is how cost-effective this multi-sectoral, community-based approach would be at different scales.

It touches on the perennial question of whether it is better to assist many people with relatively little, or to help a few with high-level assistance. This is hardly a realistic
tic portrayal of the cost-efficiency trade-offs involved in programme design, but it does reflect that the fact that humanitarians and their counterparts in the development sector often have to pit quantity against quality.

Given that the focus of this report is on employing a rights-based approach to durable solutions, it is important to ask whether programmes such as the one in Ravine Pintade could be mainstreamed in a more cost-effective and time-effective way.

**Conclusion**

Despite the fact that this was a small and isolated programme, it provides a powerful example of how IDPs’ short and longer-term needs can be addressed in a complementary way by combining humanitarians and development approaches.

**Case study 2: Return to Roma Mahalla (Kosovo)**

**Overview**

Roma Mahalla is a neighbourhood on the south bank of the river Ibar/Bar in the city of Mitrovica/a in northern Kosovo. Before the 1999 armed conflict, it had around 150 homes on at least 13.5 hectares of land and as many as 8,000 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) residents,9 the largest community of its kind in the former Yugoslavia.8 The entire population of Roma Mahalla was displaced as a result of the armed conflict that pitted the Kosovo Liberation Army against Yugoslav government forces and Serbian paramilitary units, the subsequent NATO bombing and the wave of retaliatory violence by ethnic Albanians. Roma Mahalla residents were targeted by Albanian Kosovars, who looted the neighbourhood and burned it down because they believed the RAE had collaborated with the Serbs7.

RAE who had the resources fled elsewhere in Europe, but the poorest, many of whom had previously been informal settlers, sought refuge in displacement camps near north Mitrovica/a or fled to Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. The camps were only intended to provide temporary shelter for a few months, but IDPs ended up living there for up to 13 years. Roma Mahalla, had not been integrated into the Mitrovica/a municipality’s urban development plan. The land in Roma Mahalla was divided into three categories, each of which required different types of solution. It had private land, much of it owned by people living in western Europe and unwilling to return and jeopardise their asylum claims; municipal land, on the majority of IDPs had been informally settled and land administered by the Kosovo Trust Agency, on which very few IDPs had been settled. Informal RAE settlers, tenants and those living with others tend not to have properly documents. Some had never registered their property with the cadastral office, or did not record inheritance or sale transactions. To complicate matters further, Mitrovica/a’s cadastral records had been taken to Serbia during the conflict. The UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) requested and received the cadastral records, and updated vector coordinates and urban plans for Roma Mahalla to ensure that the locations of all previous plots and buildings were properly recorded before the rubble was cleared and reconstruction began. The information was essential in getting the project off the ground.

Mitrovica/a is a highly politicised environment. In the aftermath of inter-ethnic conflict, it was particularly difficult to get land allocated for displaced minorities. The city also underwent significant urbanisation after the conflict. Its population is said to have doubled with the arrival of IDPs from other parts of Kosovo who wanted to integrate locally rather than return to areas where they would be part of a minority.

Roma Mahalla sits on prime land in the city centre and the municipality had many other potential uses for it. RAEs’ return to the neighbourhood was in line with the national preference for IDPs to go back to the home areas, but it took a directive from the prime minister’s office before the municipality would agree to allocate land for the process.8

**Camp conditions**

An estimated 1,500 IDPs from Roma Mahalla and elsewhere were accommodated in four camps in Cezmin Lug, Zilkovac, Kablare and Leposavic. Shelter consisted of makeshift tents, huts and metal containers with cardboard insulation, outdoor plumbing and intermittent electricity. Initially meant to be temporary, the camps were managed by UNHCR from 1999 to 2001, UNMIK from 2001 to 2008 and the Ministry of Communities and Returns from 2008 until their closure. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) managed Cezmin Lug and Osterode, another camp set up in 2007, on UNMIK’s behalf. The Cezmin Lug, Zilkovac and Kablare camps were established on land near the Trepca lead mine and smelter that was contaminated with heavy metals. The contamination affected all local residents, but the health risks to RAE in the camps were significantly lower than for the rest of the population. Many RAEs in informal lead smelting to earn an income, and their lead-painted

---

**Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs**

**Practice**

Return to Roma Mahalla (2004 to 2013)

**Main actors**

- UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
- Municipality of Mitrovica/a
- Norwegian Church Aid
- Danish Refugee Council
- UNHCR, OSCE, Mercy Corps

**Context**

Around 8,000 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) people fled the Roma Mahalla neighbourhood in the city of Mitrovica/a in northern Kosovo during the 1999 conflict. The poorest settled in informal camps where they lived for up to 13 years, during which time it emerged that they were lead-contaminated.

Markovic’s bid for independence meant it came under EU scrutiny. Mitrovica/a is a divided city. The northern part is in effect controlled by Serbia and the southern part by Kosovo.

**Significant urbanisation has taken place in Mitrovica/a since the conflict, and the Roma Mahalla is prime land in the town centre.**

**Target group**

Displaced RAE families, particularly those living in lead-contaminated camps

Mitrovica/a residents and municipal authorities

**Summary**

After lengthy negotiations, the Return to Roma Mahalla agreement was reached by the International Stakeholders Group for the Mitrovica/a Region and the Mitrovica/a municipality, and was signed on 18 April 2005 by the Municipal Assembly President, UNMIK’s Regional Representative, and representatives of OSCE, UNHCR and UNMIK. It outlined the rights of all former residents of the neighbourhood to return and the terms under which the move was to take place. Between 2005 and 2012, the project involved temporary resettlement, soil and blood testing for lead contamination, training of public health workers, identity registration, the verification of property rights, rubble removal, infrastructure and housing construction, educational and livelihoods initiatives and strengthening the capacity of Mitrovica/a municipal authorities. Housing units were assigned according to family size, and former homeowners had their properties rebuilt. Those who were given new housing units signed a 99-year lease, improving their tenure security compared to their residence in the Roma Mahalla informal settlement before the conflict. Beneficiaries did not pay rent, but were responsible for all utility bills and building maintenance costs. The project helped to overcome the sense of abandonment that the IDPs felt after years of languishing in lead-contaminated camps with few if any effective initiatives to help them.

**Key challenge(s)**

Considerable advocacy was required regarding the urgent need to close the lead-contaminated camps and resettle the IDPs. The RAE project beneficiaries were highly vocal about some issues, but their participation in planning and implementation was limited.

It was not always clear who the legitimate community leaders were, a fact which continues to create confusion for local and international interlocutors.

Dealing with the effects of lead contamination, particularly in children and young people. Overcoming IDPs’ mistrust of the local and international community and their fears about the possible security issues involved in returning to Roma Mahalla.

Absence or inaccuracy of land registries.

Some beneficiaries sold their housing in violation of their tenancy agreement, which the municipality considered illegal but approached with flexibility to keep the peace.

There were not enough livelihood opportunities for beneficiaries to become self-reliant, which in turn reduced the habitability of their housing over time.

**Factors for potential replicability**

1. A strong legal and policy framework on durable solutions at the national, regional and municipal level
2. Stability and security after the cessation of violence and hostilities
3. Effective coordination mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities
4. Municipal agreement to allow returnees to resettle on public land

---

4. March 2015 | Home sweet home

5. Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs
doors and windows, substandard living conditions, poor diet and hygiene practices, and infrequent medical visits only served to make their health risks worse.

A 2004 World Health Organisation (WHO) study found elevated blood lead levels among RAE in the camps. Further studies by WHO and the Mitrovica’s public health institute conducted each of the next four years showed similar results and led to calls for the camps to be closed. RAE, human rights organisations and UN special procedures and treaty bodies issued parallel statements about the dangerous health and living conditions in the camps and pressed UNMIK to address the issue.

Five years of neglecting the lead contamination problem were followed by years of haphazard efforts to resolve the issue. RAE living in the camps were resettled to Osterode until returns to Roma Mahalla began in 2007. After more than a decade living in lead-contaminated camps, the RAE community developed significant mistrust of the international community.

Policy shifts in favour of IDPs’ return

Several national, regional and local legal and policy frameworks were applied or invoked in implementing the return of the RAE community to Roma Mahalla. The key legal document, the Return to Roma Mahalla Agreement, was signed on 18 April 2005.

It outlined the terms of the right of return of all former Roma Mahalla residents. The decision would rest with individual families and be entirely voluntary. Private property in the neighbourhood would not be affected except for changes caused by the upgrading of infrastructure, in which case the municipality would compensate owners. Those who had previously lived on municipal land would be returned to municipal land in the same or adjacent areas. Those who had not previously owned land but had lived in the neighbourhood would be given 99-year leases on new apartments in small low-rise buildings with a maximum of 12 units and varying floor plans.

A revised manual for sustainable returns published in July 2006 outlines the principles and procedures for implementing a rights-based approach to resettlement. It covers the economic and social sustainability of returns, incorporates gender and age-related factors of displacement, and establishes a grassroots participatory model that integrates displaced communities. It entitles each family to a relocation package that included food, hygiene and household items, electrical appliances, firewood and an income grant for income generation aligned to beneficiaries’ needs and skills.

At the regional level, Kosovo signed the Vienna Declaration on Informal Settlements in South Eastern Europe in March 2005. The goal of regularising informal settlements and closing displacement camps was reinforced in December 2005 by the European partnership plan for Kosovo, which determines that the state must “find sustainable solutions for accommodation and integration of Roma communities, living in hazardous conditions in camps and of displaced persons/groups in informal settlements”.

Kosovo’s strategy for the integration of RAE communities for 2005 to 2015 sets out the state’s duty to take steps to provide them with legal tenure security, integrate their settlements into municipal urban development plans and improve their access to housing and other public services. In May 2011, the need to allocate land for return was further reinforced by the European Commission and Kosovo’s Ministry of European Integration in their proposals to advance the integration of RAE communities. 1

Kosovo’s legal framework does not specify the term “social housing” and the only legislation that regulates such programmes is the 2010 law on housing financing specific programmes (Law No. 03/L-164), which aims to create “possibilities for a sustainable housing for the families or individuals that are not in such economically state to endure the offers of free market of dwelling”. Article four stipulates eligibility for such programmes. It includes families that do not own an “apartment or house”, who are “homeless as a result of house destruction during the last conflict in Kosovo” and whose current accommodation does not comply with “housing standards defined for social and economical category”.

Coordination mechanisms and IDPs’ participation

After the signing of the Return to Roma Mahalla Agreement in 2005, a project management steering group was established. It was co-chaired by the Mitrovica’s municipality and UNMIK’s minority rights adviser who served as executive officer. It included units on legal and protection issues, community development and technical implementation, which were co-chaired by the municipality and UNHCR, OSCE and UNDP respectively. RAE representatives were not formally included. Interpretation was provided at all meetings, and minutes were published in English, Albanian and Serbian.

The steering group and implementing agencies made several efforts to foster a participatory process for return to Roma Mahalla. They conducted regular informal and group consultations with beneficiaries and separate tripartite agreements to beneficiaries in their respective languages before they signed.

First, the RAE community had developed significant mistrust of the international community more than a decade of unmet promises while living in lead-contaminated camps. Second, and very much related, community participation was low in activities such as the Roma Mahalla task force, community meetings and tripartite agreements with implementing agencies and the municipality.

Third, communication was made more difficult by RAE speaking mainly Albanian or Serbian. Mercy Corps hired an external legal firm to explain the content of the tripartite agreements to beneficiaries in their respective languages before they signed.

Fourth, it was not always clear who the legitimate RAE leaders were. Over the years, different people have claimed to lead the Roma Mahalla community, which created confusion for local and international interlocutors. In an effort to better understand the situation, the municipality hired a Roma woman who had returned from lead-contaminated camps to be their representative in the neighbourhood.

Fifth, power relations were unequal when negotiations took place between community leaders and national or international agencies. The steering group executive officer, Laurie Wiseberg, described the situation on 14 March 2005 during talks between the municipality and RAE residents on the urban plan for Roma Mahalla:

“On one side of the table were the Roma leaders, including representatives from Serbia – largely uneducated, with little knowledge of national or international law, in shabby second-hand clothes and nervous; on the other side were the municipal officials and professionals (an urban planner, a lawyer, an architect, a political leader) in suits, well-versed in negotiations, and at ease.”

That said, RAE representatives were still able to make themselves heard. They were, for example, vehemently opposed to living in apartments, because the vast majority had only ever lived in individual family homes with a yard. The steering group tried to address the fact that...
apartment buildings were not considered culturally appropriate by making modifications to their design. They limited each building to 12 apartments and included measures to accommodate RAE traditions. Each apartment was designed to include storage space, a wood stove for cooking and a balcony. Residents who moved in during the first phase of the project were given apartments, but the steering group redesigned the accommodation for the second phase to provide terraced housing.

While Roma Mahalla was being reconstructed, UNMIK’s civil affairs department and the UN secretary general’s special representative for Kosovo proposed relocating IDPs in the lead contaminated camps to vacant army barracks. The RAE community, however, was emphatically opposed. Its sentiments were captured by one camp leader, Shender Gusani, who said: “International organisations are not doing a good job … people only want to return to the same houses as they had before … the camps do not want another temporary relocation as they do not want to be forgotten.” Camp residents were still offered the relocation and though not all chose to accept it, most eventually did.

When UNMIK and NCA left Kosovo in 2009, Mercy Corps took on a more prominent role in the reconstruction of Roma Mahalla, and in April 2010 it entered into a bilateral memorandum of understanding with the municipality.

The agreement set out the duties and responsibilities of each party, and regular meetings were held with the municipality, the Ministry of Communities and Return, UNHCR, DRC, OSCE, the Kosovo police, NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFSO). The meetings helped to coordinate the closure and demolition of the camps, resettlement procedures, and the addressing of education and protection concerns.

Mercy Corps was not able to sign a memorandum with RAE community leaders, because of their mistrust of external organisations and their feeling that their resettlement requests were not being met. It did, however, that “they were more comfortable signing limited and specific agreements such as the list of beneficiaries or the terms of the food resettlement packages”. This was ultimately viewed as a more productive way to engage community leaders in implementing resettlement, rather than a symbolic memorandum demonstrating general support for the project.

Programme design

After brokering lengthy consensus building, negotiations and coordination, the Return to Roma Mahalla initiative was established as a series of projects across various sectors implemented by international organisations and funded by international donors and, to a lesser extent, the Ministry of Communities and Return. Between 2005 and 2012, it consisted of temporary resettlement, soil and blood testing for lead contamination, training of public health workers, identity registration, property rights verification, rubble removal, infrastructure and housing construction, and provision of educational and livelihood assistance and efforts to strengthen the capacity of the municipal authorities.

The municipality agreed to donate 10 hectares of land to RAE residents under a 99-year lease. The concept of land donation was reinforced in April 2010, when the prime minister issued a letter advising all municipalities to allocate land for resettlement and return as a show of support of the Kosovo operational plan for displacement.14

The leasehold agreement stipulates that no rent shall be paid, but beneficiaries are “responsible for paying all utilities and for the maintenance including repairs to water pipes, windows and roofs. Beneficiaries had to pay a nominal fee of €1 to enter into the agreement.

The Return to Roma Mahalla Agreement stipulated that 20 per cent of the labour force would come from the RAE community. Most materials were also bought from local vendors in Kosovo, although they were manufactured elsewhere. As such, the project contributed to the local economy and provided livelihood opportunities for IDPs and host community members. As the beneficiaries registered with DRC, they “were more comfortable signing limited and specific agreements such as the list of beneficiaries or the terms of the food resettlement packages”. This was ultimately viewed as a more productive way to engage community leaders in implementing resettlement, rather than a symbolic memorandum demonstrating general support for the project.

The municipality agreed to donate 10 hectares of land to RAE residents under a 99-year lease. The concept of land donation was reinforced in April 2010, when the prime minister issued a letter advising all municipalities to allocate land for resettlement and return as a show of support of the Kosovo operational plan for displacement.14

Apartments and housing units were distributed according to family size. The minimum space allocated was 35 square metres per person. The houses built during the second phase took the needs of disabled returnees into account, and families with disabled members were entitled to an additional private room for them and, in some cases, additional housing options. The apartment buildings had various floor plans, such as ground floor plus two storeys (P+2) or ground floor plus three (P+3). The P+3 buildings had commercial or social space on the ground floor, which was intended to help generate income to pay for the maintenance of common infrastructure and areas. The second phase houses were built using clay bricks, a concrete façade and polystyrene insulation for external walls. The roofs were clay tiled and attics were also insulated. As lead contamination is an issue throughout the region, the land was ploughed deeply before the building work began to minimise lead content in the soil. Wood-burning stoves and portable electric heaters were also provided.

In an effort to avoid friction between returnees and the receiving community, social integration activities were run before, during and after the process. These included "cultural and religious events, as well as multi-ethnic it involved the training of public health workers, identity registration, property rights verification, rubble removal, infrastructure and housing construction, and provision of education, health, and livelihood assistance and efforts to strengthen the capacity of the municipal authorities."

The municipality agreed to donate 10 hectares of land to RAE residents under a 99-year lease. The concept of land donation was reinforced in April 2010, when the prime minister issued a letter advising all municipalities to allocate land for resettlement and return as a show of support of the Kosovo operational plan for displacement.14

The leasehold agreement stipulates that no rent shall be paid, but beneficiaries are “responsible for paying all utilities and for the maintenance including repairs to water pipes, windows and roofs. Beneficiaries had to pay a nominal fee of €1 to enter into the agreement.

The Return to Roma Mahalla Agreement stipulated that 20 per cent of the labour force would come from the RAE community. Most materials were also bought from local vendors in Kosovo, although they were manufactured elsewhere. As such, the project contributed to the local economy and provided livelihood opportunities for IDPs and host community members. As the beneficiaries registered with DRC, they “were more comfortable signing limited and specific agreements such as the list of beneficiaries or the terms of the food resettlement packages”. This was ultimately viewed as a more productive way to engage community leaders in implementing resettlement, rather than a symbolic memorandum demonstrating general support for the project.

The municipality agreed to donate 10 hectares of land to RAE residents under a 99-year lease. The concept of land donation was reinforced in April 2010, when the prime minister issued a letter advising all municipalities to allocate land for resettlement and return as a show of support of the Kosovo operational plan for displacement.14

The leasehold agreement stipulates that no rent shall be paid, but beneficiaries are “responsible for paying all utilities and for the maintenance including repairs to water pipes, windows and roofs. Beneficiaries had to pay a nominal fee of €1 to enter into the agreement.

The Return to Roma Mahalla Agreement stipulated that 20 per cent of the labour force would come from the RAE community. Most materials were also bought from local vendors in Kosovo, although they were manufactured elsewhere. As such, the project contributed to the local economy and provided livelihood opportunities for IDPs and host community members. As the beneficiaries registered with DRC, they “were more comfortable signing limited and specific agreements such as the list of beneficiaries or the terms of the food resettlement packages”. This was ultimately viewed as a more productive way to engage community leaders in implementing resettlement, rather than a symbolic memorandum demonstrating general support for the project.

The municipality agreed to donate 10 hectares of land to RAE residents under a 99-year lease. The concept of land donation was reinforced in April 2010, when the prime minister issued a letter advising all municipalities to allocate land for resettlement and return as a show of support of the Kosovo operational plan for displacement.14

The leasehold agreement stipulates that no rent shall be paid, but beneficiaries are “responsible for paying all utilities and for the maintenance including repairs to water pipes, windows and roofs. Beneficiaries had to pay a nominal fee of €1 to enter into the agreement.

The Return to Roma Mahalla Agreement stipulated that 20 per cent of the labour force would come from the RAE community. Most materials were also bought from local vendors in Kosovo, although they were manufactured elsewhere. As such, the project contributed to the local economy and provided livelihood opportunities for IDPs and host community members. As the beneficiaries registered with DRC, they “were more comfortable signing limited and specific agreements such as the list of beneficiaries or the terms of the food resettlement packages”. This was ultimately viewed as a more productive way to engage community leaders in implementing resettlement, rather than a symbolic memorandum demonstrating general support for the project.

The municipality agreed to donate 10 hectares of land to RAE residents under a 99-year lease. The concept of land donation was reinforced in April 2010, when the prime minister issued a letter advising all municipalities to allocate land for resettlement and return as a show of support of the Kosovo operational plan for displacement.14

The leasehold agreement stipulates that no rent shall be paid, but beneficiaries are “responsible for paying all utilities and for the maintenance including repairs to water pipes, windows and roofs. Beneficiaries had to pay a nominal fee of €1 to enter into the agreement.

The Return to Roma Mahalla Agreement stipulated that 20 per cent of the labour force would come from the RAE community. Most materials were also bought from local vendors in Kosovo, although they were manufactured elsewhere. As such, the project contributed to the local economy and provided livelihood opportunities for IDPs and host community members. As the beneficiaries registered with DRC, they “were more comfortable signing limited and specific agreements such as the list of beneficiaries or the terms of the food resettlement packages”. This was ultimately viewed as a more productive way to engage community leaders in implementing resettlement, rather than a symbolic memorandum demonstrating general support for the project.

The municipality agreed to donate 10 hectares of land to RAE residents under a 99-year lease. The concept of land donation was reinforced in April 2010, when the prime minister issued a letter advising all municipalities to allocate land for resettlement and return as a show of support of the Kosovo operational plan for displacement.14

The leasehold agreement stipulates that no rent shall be paid, but beneficiaries are “responsible for paying all utilities and for the maintenance including repairs to water pipes, windows and roofs. Beneficiaries had to pay a nominal fee of €1 to enter into the agreement.

The Return to Roma Mahalla Agreement stipulated that 20 per cent of the labour force would come from the RAE community. Most materials were also bought from local vendors in Kosovo, although they were manufactured elsewhere. As such, the project contributed to the local economy and provided livelihood opportunities for IDPs and host community members. As the beneficiaries registered with DRC, they “were more comfortable signing limited and specific agreements such as the list of beneficiaries or the terms of the food resettlement packages”. This was ultimately viewed as a more productive way to engage community leaders in implementing resettlement, rather than a symbolic memorandum demonstrating general support for the project.
the occupancy of the terraced houses; it built, and as of August 2014, 25 of the 182 units were unoccupied and 15 had been sold, for €10,000 ($11,000).

The municipality is aware of these transactions, and considers them illegal. The terms of the leases do not permit them, but the authorities have not abrogated them, opting rather for leniency to keep the peace. The wording of the leases on the terraced houses built during the second phase of the project was changed to forbid their sale after it emerged that earlier returnees had sold their apartments.

Some instances of dump were reported in the first terraced houses to be built. The dump was treated and the housing design revised to include exterior wall insulation and improved heating and ventilation systems.19

Roma Mahalla residents have not always paid their utility bills. As of the end of 2014, the neighbourhood owed water companies around €70,000 and electricity firms €100,000, and power had been cut off.20 OSCE liaised with utility companies to have the electricity reconnected. There was also a huge pile of rubbish at one end of the neighbourhood, because residents had not paid for waste disposal.

Few people frequent the laundry, hair salon and kiosks established on the ground floor of the apartment buildings, and some customers keep debts with shopkeepers. The outdoor market space currently serves as a car park.

As of the end of 2014, the sustainability of most returnees’ livelihoods remained questionable. Those without full-time jobs survive on income earned through collecting plastics and other recyclables, odd jobs such as cutting wood, moving furniture and cleaning, and social assistance. Two families continue to smelt lead from batteries. Some returnees work in north Mitrovica/a where there are more jobs, but many wish to emigrate as a result of their bleak economic outlook.21

Many returnees in terraced housing have erected fences around their yards to increase privacy and built sheds to store scrap, recyclables and other items RAE typically collect. They did so without planning permission and at their own expense. Municipal officials carried out an inspection in 2014, leaving many worried that their sheds would be demolished despite their insistence that their leases do not forbid such constructions. Concerned residents are preparing a petition to hand to the mayor of Mitrovica/a during discussions aimed at finding a compromise.

Conclusion
The Return to Roma Mahalla project is a good example of a rights-based, inclusive approach to the provision of land and housing for the return of a minority community, most of whose members had not previously owned their own homes or land. The public outcry over the lead-contaminated camps and Kosovo’s bid for independence, which meant it was under EU scrutiny, were instrumental in pushing the initiative forward.

The project also shows that persistent attempts to foster IDPs’ participation, however challenging, can lead to important modifications or the reformulation of national and international plans and priorities for their return. It also shows that access to livelihoods and establishing self-reliance can be a major challenge for IDPs in protracted displacement, particularly for marginalised groups such as the Roma, and that over time it reduces the habitability of their housing.

Case study 3: Transitional Solutions Initiative (Colombia)

Programme design
Colombia is a pilot country for the Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI), an international project involving the World Bank, UNHCR and UNDP that was launched in 2010 with the aim of achieving durable solutions for people living in protracted displacement. In Colombia, the initiative is run by UNHCR and UNDP with the support of national and local authorities, and focuses on IDPs in 17 communities. Since its inception in 2012, it has set a precedent in terms of UNHCR and UNDP co-leading programmes aimed at the achievement of durable solutions in Colombia.

TSI has three components: the improvement of living conditions – access to land, housing, basic services and local economic development; institutional and organisational strengthening; and the protection of victims’ and their communities’ rights. It employs a community-focused participatory approach that simultaneously engages communities, authorities and institutions. It aims to strengthen communities’ leadership, giving them agency to identify their own solutions on the assumption that stronger communities require less external support.

Regularisation of informal settlements
TSI’s living conditions component includes the regularisation of informal urban settlements, where most IDPs live, either as a temporary solution or as a permanent option. The settlements have expanded significantly over the past five decades of conflict and some make up a large part of the cities in which they were established. That said, they tend not to be officially connected to water and electricity supplies or sanitation services, and residents are at risk of eviction. The settlements have become an increasingly serious issue, which authorities acknowledge needs to be resolved.

Regularisation is a highly complex legal process in Colombia, and competing claims over land make it more complicated still. TSI has succeeded in identifying a legal pathway towards regularisation, but each settlement has its own history shaped by different factors, and as such has to be treated separately and without assumptions. Municipal authorities have different reasons for agreeing to regularisation, though most acknowledge that the sheer scale of their informal settlements warrants intervention. Private landowners also have mixed interests, but some have realised that residents are there to stay and that it would be more straightforward and lucrative to sell their land rather than trying to reclaim it.

Implementation and monitoring is still going on, but as of mid-2014, 13 communities were in the process of regularising their land and one had finalised it. A profiling exercise with focus groups, participatory assessments and household surveys was conducted to review progress made in 2014 and the results are due for publication. JIPS provided technical expertise in developing TSI’s set of indicators, based on a range of variables and UNDP’s and UNHCR’s existing monitoring tools. JIPS has also helped to establish a broader monitoring and evaluation process for multi-sectoral approaches to durable solutions, helping to bridge the humanitarian and development divide between the two agencies.

Challenges and strengths
Continuing violence and armed conflict, a lack of technical capacity and political will and the prohibitive cost of studies to determine the feasibility of legalising settlements in areas prone to natural hazards all constitute obstacles to the regularisation process. That said, the TSI programme has numerous strengths. It goes beyond the narrow approach of targeting individuals and households, and establishes the community as a whole as the beneficiary of housing and economic development activities that are planned and reviewed by the public and private sector through local leadership committees. It also goes beyond housing to support livelihoods and protection initiatives, and the strengthening of institutional capacity. It is an example of fruitful coordination and cooperation at the community level between UNHCR and UNDP and their respective partners.

Colombia’s political context offers a good foundation for the implementation of TSI. The government endorsed the Victims’ Law in June 2011, and began peace talks with the country’s largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2012. It has also taken numerous measures in recent years to make the transition from humanitarian aid to pursuing durable solutions for IDPs. TSI reinforces and continues this work.
8. Supporting municipalities

**Description**

When large numbers of IDPs arrive in an urban area, a sudden increase in housing demand is only one of a complex set of strains the influx places on a city, its municipalities and other governance institutions. Longer-term shelter strategies such as NRC’s integrated urban housing programme in Jordan, which stimulate the housing market and add extra units, also require municipalities and commercial providers to make their services more widely available.

As such, working towards durable solutions for urban IDPs living in protracted displacement means supporting not only the host community, but also the host municipality as a partner whose resources and capacities need to be strengthened. Local governance institutions play a key regulatory role, and they have resources and decision-making powers that can multiply the efforts of international agencies and NGOs.

If urban governance and infrastructure are to be more resilient and able to absorb rapid fluctuations in population, flexible municipal support tools are needed that can make quick assessments and provide financial and other resources to maintain adequate water, electricity, transport and waste management services. Supporting municipalities is an indirect but more sustainable way of supporting IDPs, and it strengthens local ownership and accountability.

Many IDPs move into districts that are poorly planned and under-serviced by municipalities that are either strapped for cash, staff and resources, or do not have the authority under a centralised government to set their own budgets and development plans. Water, electricity and waste management infrastructure may not have been adequate in the first place, meaning that a population influx has the potential to create social tensions over access to overburdened services. The more rapid the expansion of informal settlements, the harder it is for municipalities to keep up with demand. As such, it is important to think about how to link short-term approaches centred on households to medium and long-term development interventions for displaced and host communities as a whole.

The following case study is of a project that targets urban refugees, but it could be adapted to apply to IDPs. It demonstrates how the development sector is evolving and innovating practices for urban areas that deal with large population inflows.

---

**Case study: Host community support platform (Jordan)**

**Overview**

Jordan has a history of poor planning and urban sprawl, made worse by previous influxes of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. The arrival of more than 650,000 Syrian refugees since 2011 has only served to complicate matters further. It has been estimated that in addition to the expense of running camps, it will cost Jordan $168 billion to cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.\(^\text{2}\)

Given that more than 80 per cent of the new arrivals are thought to live outside camps,\(^\text{3}\) governorates such as Irbid, Mafraq, Amman and Zarqa are experiencing rapid informal growth in both urban and rural areas. The population of Mafraq has increased by 638 per cent since the arrival of Syrian refugees.\(^\text{4}\) Many municipalities in all four governorates were already struggling to meet service demand and in some, refugees have begun to outnumber local residents.\(^\text{5}\)

Solid waste management is the most acute challenge for those hosting large populations of Syrian refugees.\(^\text{6}\)

Across the country as a whole, the influx has created around 340 tonnes of extra solid waste a day.\(^\text{1}\) Such an increase requires a major overhaul of handling, compaction, treatment and landfilling, and significant investment.

Jordan’s national resilience plan for 2010 to 2016 identified the a series of shortcomings in the country’s existing municipal services:

- Limited attention to service delivery performance, standards and outcomes
- Out-dated equipment and logistical means of ensuring the delivery and maintenance of services and assets
- Insufficient capacities underpinned by a freeze on public procurement and a patronage-based system of other recruitment
- Lack of planned urban growth, resulting in burgeoning informal settlements
- Limited participation of the population, especially in local development planning
- Out-dated financial management practices and system, leading to limited revenue generation and an unsustainable debt and salary burden
- De facto authority rests with mayors, with few checks and balances
- Inadequate civic engagement
- Steady decline in approval ratings

Given the vast structural and systemic issues in local governance institutions, a flexible and responsive model of cooperation between Jordanian authorities and international agencies that can align along different spheres...
Review of practices and case studies

Practice

Host community support platform (HCSP) 2013; now the Jordan response platform to the Syria Crisis (JRPSC)

Main actors

UNDP
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)
Various municipalities

Content

Displacement of Syrian refugees to Jordan driven by conflict
Small municipalities with insufficient financial, material and human resources to provide services for a rapidly growing population

Target group(s)

Small municipalities in poor regions that have received a rapid influx of refugees

Summary

The practice established a coordination mechanism for ministries, local authorities, donors, UN agencies and international NGOs to help address the water, sanitation, education, health and livelihood needs of both the refugees and their host communities. The large influx of Syrian refugees put extra pressure on urban infrastructure and waste management services that were already struggling to cope, and the coordination mechanism supported municipalities by providing resources and capacity building.

UNDP set up the first coordinating body, HCSP, in 2013 and identified municipalities’ priorities through a national assessment review. In 2014 under MOPIC’s initiative HCSP was converted into JRPSC, emphasising national ownership. Its mandate was also expanded from five to 11 task forces, each chaired by a line ministry, in the areas of education, energy, environment, health, justice, livelihoods and food security, local governance and municipal services, shelter, social protection, transport and water, hygiene and sanitation (WASH). JRPSC updated the national assessment review and built on the 2014 national resilience plan to produce the Jordan response plan for the Syria crisis.

Municipalities hosting large refugee populations identified their most acute need as solid waste management. Loading JRPSC to respond in the short term by providing compactors, fogging machines, pesticides and training, and in the longer term by contributing to structural changes that prepared the ground for the Ministry of Municipal Affairs to develop its solid waste management plan at the local level in 2015. Its planning was a direct consequence of the advocacy and thinking in the 2014 national resilience plan and UNDP’s national assessment review.

Strengths

HCSP and JRPSC are holistic strategic bodies that try to address both short-term needs at the household and community level, and the medium and longer-term development needs of municipalities and other institutions.

The practice is an effective, flexible and responsive model of cooperation and coordination between the Jordanian authorities and international agencies that can be aligned in different areas of intervention.

It led to the transfer of knowledge between agencies and changes in institutional norms. It benefited both refugees and the wider community. It included an effective needs profiling exercise, which led to plans being based on priorities the municipalities themselves identified.

Key challenges

During the first phase of the project, some of the municipalities’ needs were addressed. It was unclear whether this was because those involved in the response were unable to do so, or because they adopted a pick-and-choose approach.

For organisations keen to count the number of beneficiaries served, it may prove difficult to quantify the impact at the individual or household level of supporting municipalities.

Municipalities’ needs do not necessarily dovetail with those of displaced households, which were not clearly established by UNDP’s needs assessment. It was not clear, for example, how an external organisation would deal with a municipality’s failure to prioritise the expansion of the water and electricity supply to meet increased demand.

Further analysis would have been needed to determine the best way of supporting municipalities that used commercial providers to deliver services. The majority of municipalities identified the same issue as their top priority, which made it easier to determine how to respond. Disparities between different municipalities would require a broader array of resources and support with which to address the task forces. Both HCSP and JRPSC were set up as holistic strategic bodies that aim to address both the short-term, household-centred needs of refugees and host communities, along with the medium and longer-term development needs of municipalities and governance institutions.

This case study focuses on HCSP’s intervention in solid waste management as their main challenge, a list of priorities and recommendations identified above in the national response plan, UNDP’s task forces were reorganised and their number increased. HCSP had five task forces covering education; health; water and sanitation; municipal services; and livelihoods and employment. JRPSC has its covering education; energy; the environment; health; justice; livelihoods and food security; local governance and municipal services; shelter; social protection; transport; and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH).

The line ministries responsible for each sector chair the task force, which have representatives from the UN system, the donor community and national and international NGOs. One of the UN bodies acts as the task force secretariat and a representative of the donor community serves as a focal point. JRPSC has subsequently updated the national assessment review and built on the work of the national resilience plan to produce the Jordan response plan for the Syria crisis.

The assessment, resilience and response plans constitute an effort to identify and plan investment responses across all the sectors in mitigation of the task forces. Both HCSP and JRPSC were set up as holistic strategic bodies that aim to address both the short-term, household-centred needs of refugees and host communities, along with the medium and longer-term development needs of municipalities and governance institutions.

Municipal needs assessment

The municipal services task force under HCSP (see Table 1) was funded by the World Bank and made up of representatives from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, UNDP and ACTED. UNDP allocated $32.4 million to improve municipal and social service delivery as part of its 2014 budget request for Jordan of $32.4 million. In 2014, it carried out a municipal needs assessment to examine the main challenges facing 30 municipalities in Irbid and Mafraq and national and local authorities. In addition to the wider structural issues identified above in the national response plan, UNDP’s assessment focussed on tangible goods and resources.

Of the 33 of municipalities surveyed identified solid waste management as their main challenge, a list of priority interventions was drafted (see Table 3). Across the two challenges faced by municipalities, the influx of Syrian refugees has created an average of 60 tonnes of solid waste a day, on top of the 90 tonnes created each day by the local population – far in excess of the municipalities’ capacity to collect and process. The assessment identified priority interventions for both international organisations and the government. They included a longer-term redesign of the entire solid waste management system, from collection, processing, transfer and landfills to recycling and re-use.

It is important to point out that the priorities in Table 1 were set by surveys measuring municipal and national perceptions of the problem as opposed to assumptions imposed by outsiders. Each municipality not only framed its own problems and determined its priorities, but also provided a wish-list of terms in vehicles and equipment. This is the most appropriate way to design a municipal support programme that requires revision and adaptation from one year to the next as needs change and the impacts of previous interventions are factored in.

Impact

The UNDP programme to support municipalities in Jordan is still evolving, but preliminary results suggest that approaching municipalities directly, learning about their needs and limitations and providing tangible goods is a positive approach in mitigating the impacts of unplanned population increases. In addition to supplying 18 solid compactors, 46 fogging machines and 9,500 litres of insecticide to the municipalities, the programme also trained staff in nine municipalities.

Its most significant work, however, has targeted the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, which intends to develop a solid waste management plan at the municipal level in 2015. This is a direct result of advocacy, the thinking behind the national response plan and UNDP’s municipal needs assessment. The plan will focus on the entire solid waste management cycle, and the ministry is currently redesigning its financial administration system to provide funds to...
municipalities more efficiently. It will also fund labour-intensive recycling programmes and make improvements to the main Alakader dump.

**Challenges**

Only some of the municipalities’ needs were addressed during the first phase of the project. This may be because aid organisations were unable to fulfil all of the requirements, or because they have adopted a pick-and-choose approach to their interventions. There may also be differences between municipalities’ requests and the types of services displaced households need, but this was not made clear in UNDP’s needs assessment. If, for example, a municipality or commercial provider does not improve or expand its services to meet increasing demand, how should external organisations deal with the disparity between IDPs’ and the municipality’s priorities?

The majority of municipalities identified the same issue (i.e. solid waste management) as their top priority, which allowed for a narrower focus in terms of what to provide. How the programme would cope with a wide range of different priorities is unclear, but a broader array of requirements, or because they have adopted a pick-and-choose approach to their interventions. There may also be other differences between municipalities’ requests and the types of services displaced households need, but this was not made clear in UNDP’s needs assessment. If, for example, a municipality or commercial provider does not improve or expand its services to meet increasing demand, how should external organisations deal with the disparity between IDPs’ and the municipality’s priorities?

Helping municipalities to provide better services to a growing population is effective, but for organisations that focus on counting the number of beneficiaries served, it may be difficult to quantify the impact of such an approach. If it is to be replicated, further analysis of how to support municipalities that contract commercial providers to deliver services is also needed.

**Conclusion**

UNDP’s solid waste management programme and the HCSP coordination mechanism were able to help translate municipal needs into longer-term policy shifts, which should help municipalities to provide better services to both Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities. The approach is also proactive in terms of social cohesion. Service delivery failures are not only the result of existing institutional flaws and make them worse. Rather than authorities and host communities blaming the new arrivals, it would be better to use the accompanying hike in international aid to address structural and systemic issues in ways that lead to better services for all.

Municipal issues had already been flagged up in 2013 when HCSP was established, and they were reiterated in national response plan in May 2014. The mobilisation, however, of support for municipalities and its gradual realisation will take several years. If such an approach had been adopted at the outset of the Syrian refugee crisis and established as a priority by a coordination body for national and international responders, the situation may not have become as acute as it became. The establishment of HCSP/URPSC and UNDP’s programme set an important precedent for a more integrated approach to servicing vulnerable refugee populations that addresses both short-term humanitarian and longer-term development needs. The lessons from this evolving practice should improve knowledge about how best to support urban municipalities in dealing with large populations of displaced people.
9. Community development bank

Description

Community development banks (CDBs) aim to generate economic development in low to middle-income areas. They have been widely used in the US, where they have long been institutionalised and the Treasury Department has a fund to support them. The best known example, however, is Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which was founded by the Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus and popularised the use of microfinance in the developing world. CDBs can be for-profit or non-profit and take many forms. The case study below highlights a unique model established in Brazil which is managed by the community it serves.

Case study: Banco Palmas (Brazil)

In 1973, municipal redevelopment initiatives in Brazil’s fifth largest city of Fortaleza, in the north-east of the country, displaced around 2,000 families from its coastal areas to a peripheral inland district called Conjunto Palmeira. Displacement to the area continued in the following years, contributing to its impoverishment, high unemployment rates and lack of services. The situation led to the establishment in 1998 of Banco Palmas, a unique community development bank, to provide credit to residents, create jobs and stimulate local development as part of the solidarity economy movement.

Principles of a solidarity economy

Given that the IDPs originally relied on fishing for their livelihoods, they became increasingly impoverished in their new inland and under-serviced area. In response, they came together in 1981 to set up the Conjunto Palmeira residents’ association (Associação dos Moradores do Conjunto Palmeira, ASMOCONP). Over the following years, they instituted a range of community initiatives to build homes and sewage systems, pave roads and install water and electricity supplies in what was gradually becoming a favela or slum. By 1997, the residents and their community organisations had successfully urbanised the area.1

Their vision of economic and social development was based on the principles of a solidarity economy, which encourages local production and consumption networks and job creation, and community investment in educational, cultural and social institutions.2 In 1997, ASMOCONP began to organise community meetings, in all, where members discussed the fact that 80 per cent of families spent all of their money outside the community, giving traction to the notion of producing, selling and buying locally.

The social entrepreneur Joaquim de Melo Neto Segundo is a key figure behind Banco Palmas and its innovations. A Fortaleza resident and long-term community mobiliser, he recognised the importance of community-driven finance institutions in the late 1990s. Community members secured a 2,000 real (US$615) loan from the local NGO Cearah Periferia and set the bank up in 1998.3 Over the next seven years, it relied on funding from international agencies, NGOs and aid organisations such as the German development agency GTZ, Oxfam, the Ecumenical Service Coordination (CESE) and the Dutch development organisation Cordaid. PRORENDA, a German foreign aid programme that focuses on upgrading slums and “urban management by the poor,” provided some of the start-up funding for ASMOCONP.4

This illustrates how international NGOs and bilateral aid organisations can play an instrumental role in financing community development banks that become sustainable and outlive the initial programme. In 2003, ASMOCONP went on to establish Instituto Palmas, a non-profit umbrella organisation that serves as the bank’s parent company.

Banco Palmas offers three types of microcredit for production, commerce and services, and it is a unique and innovative venture in many ways. Similar to Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which was founded by the Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus and popularised the use of microfinance in the developing world, it does not demand good credit history, extensive requirements for registration, proof of income or assets as collateral for loans. Instead, neighbours vouch for applicants and social ties are used to both evaluate and enforce the loans.

IDPs in countries where microfinance opportunities are available often still find themselves at a disadvantage because they do not have the same established social ties as the local community. In Conjunto Palmeiras, however, people displaced from the coast make up much of the district’s population and the social ties they brought with them helped to engender two-way trust between the bank and its potential clients, and enable it to provide IDPs with access to credit.

Banco Palmas is not a static institution, but has learned and evolved from its experiences. Two years after its foundation, it launched another experiment when it stopped issuing loans in Brazilian reals and set up a new community or local currency called the “palma” instead. Its value was set at parity with the real to eliminate exchange costs and fluctuations, making both currencies equally attractive to use. Parity also meant local businesses were more willing to accept the palma, strengthening relationships between local merchants, consumers and producers.
Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs

Review of practices

Banco Palmas, 1998 to present

**Key challenge(s)**

Highly committed and engaged neighbourhood organisations and civil society groups

Donors that are flexible when funding the initial phase, understanding that development impacts can only be measured in the long term

National government’s eventual recognition of the concept of community development banks and the use of an alternative local currency

**Factors that could influence potential for replicability**

Highly committed and engaged neighbourhood organisations and civil society groups

Donors that are flexible when funding the initial phase, understanding that development impacts can only be measured in the long term

National government’s eventual recognition of the concept of community development banks and the use of an alternative local currency

**Summary**

Instituto Palmas, a non-profit organisation that serves as the umbrella organization that includes seven years of its existence, the bank received funding from international NGOs and bilateral aid organisations such as GTZ, Oxfam, the Ecumenical Service Coordination (CESE) and the Dutch development organisation Cordaid. In the absence of basic services and livelihood opportunities for former fishermen, Conjunto Palmeira residents developed a series of community initiatives to improve their living conditions and basic infrastructure. Over the decades since their displacement, they have built homes, water and sewage systems and electricity networks.

In 1981, they set up ASMOCON to promote the concept of a solidarity economy, which encourages the creation of local networks of production, consumption and job creation, and community investment in educational, cultural and social institutions. No such investment was possible, however, without access to credit.

**Strengths**

Instituto Palmas has launched two other innovative programmes. Its bolsa público programme. It works towards women’s social and economic inclusion by offering microcredit loans, professional training and establishing small business incubators for them. As Banco Palmas has expanded its activities, it has also raised national awareness of the community development bank model, leading to creation of at least 104 such institutions in Brazil as of 2013. Paul Singer, the national secretary of the solidarity economy within the Ministry of Labour, has recognised their importance, and has asked Banco Palmas to replicate its model in other municipalities.

**Target group(s)**

2000 families displaced from coastal areas to Conjunto Palmeira

Residents of coastal areas of the city of Fortaleza were displaced by development projects to the impoverished inland district of Conjunto Palmeira in the 1970s.

**Context**

The IDPs struggled to re-establish social networks lost as a result of their plight, but given the length of time Conjunto Palmeira residents had been displaced such ties were in place.

The bank also introduced the “palma”, a local currency that is exchanged with the Brazilian real at a rate of one-to-one and has an economic multiplier effect.

**Main actors**

Associação dos Moradores do Conjunto Palmeira (ASMOCON) Funders: Local NGO Ceará Periferia, German Development Agency (GIZ/GTZ), Oxfam, the Ecumenical Service Coordination (CESE) and the Dutch development organisation Cordaid

**Practice**

Banco Palmas, 1998 to present

**Target group(s)**

2000 families displaced from coastal areas to Conjunto Palmeira

Residents of coastal areas of the city of Fortaleza were displaced by development projects to the impoverished inland district of Conjunto Palmeira in the 1970s.

In the absence of basic services and livelihood opportunities for former fishermen, Conjunto Palmeira residents developed a series of community initiatives to improve their living conditions and basic infrastructure. Over the decades since their displacement, they have built homes, water and sewage systems and electricity networks.

In 1981, they set up ASMOCON to promote the concept of a solidarity economy, which encourages the creation of local networks of production, consumption and job creation, and community investment in educational, cultural and social institutions. No such investment was possible, however, without access to credit.

Banco Palmas offered low interest loans to local people, including those originally displaced to the area. It offered three types of microcredit for production, commerce and services. For the first seven years of its existence, the bank received funding from international NGOs and bilateral aid organisations such as GTZ, Oxfam, CESE and Cordaid, but in 2003 it was transformed into Instituto Palmas, a non-profit organisation that serves as the umbrella organization that includes Banco Palmas and other community ventures.

The practice shows how international NGOs and bilateral aid organisations can play an instrumental role in financing initiatives such as community development banks that become sustainable in their own right and outline the initial programme.

**Strengths**

Banco Palmas is a successful example of a community-driven development initiative that incorporates residents’ meaningful participation. The community created an innovative and effective finance mechanism to transform the shape and future of the neighbourhood. Brazil’s government has slowly recognised the bank’s success and has facilitated similar schemes in other areas, which constitutes a transfer of knowledge and a change in institutional norms.

**Factors that could influence potential for replicability**

Highly committed and engaged neighbourhood organisations and civil society groups

Donors that are flexible when funding the initial phase, understanding that development impacts can only be measured in the long term

National government’s eventual recognition of the concept of community development banks and the use of an alternative local currency

IDPs living in protracted displacement for long enough to establish social ties

**Conclusion**

This case study tracks the trajectory of a community of coastal residents displaced in the early 1970s by redevelopment initiatives. International NGOs, bilateral aid organisations and national financial agencies have made a number of efforts to assist the Conjunto Palmeira community, but the success of Banco Palmas has largely been a local one.

International development experts cannot simply replicate successful community-driven initiatives. They emerge from a complex, sustained and evolving process of building solidarity in a community, undertaking campaigns to establish basic services, and introducing the principles of a solidarity economy. Forty years have seen the slow but steady growth of a community born out of the experience of forced displacement that has relied predominately on internal organisation rather than external resources to create a finance model that has transformed the shape and future of their neighbourhood.

**Summary**

ASMOCON established Banco Palmas in 1998 as a community-driven financial institution to fund the development of their neighbourhood based on principles of a solidarity economy. The bank adopted credit requirements adapted to its poor clients. No credit history was required, nor were income or assets demanded as collateral for loans. Instead, neighbours vouched for applicants, and social ties were used both to evaluate the loans and enforce their terms. Most IDPs struggle to re-establish social networks lost as a result of their plight, but given the length of time Conjunto Palmeira residents had been displaced such ties were in place.

Banco Palmas offered low interest loans to local people, including those originally displaced to the area. It offered three types of microcredit for production, commerce and services. For the first seven years of its existence, the bank received funding from international NGOs and bilateral aid organisations such as GTZ, Oxfam, CESE and Cordaid, but in 2003 it was transformed into Instituto Palmas, a non-profit organisation that serves as the umbrella organization that includes Banco Palmas and other community ventures.

The bank also introduced the “palma”, a local currency that is exchanged with the Brazilian real at a rate of one-to-one and has an economic multiplier effect.

Banco Palmas is a success example of a community-driven development initiative that incorporates residents’ meaningful participation. The community created an innovative and effective finance mechanism to transform the shape and future of the neighbourhood. Brazil’s government has slowly recognised the bank’s success and has facilitated similar schemes in other areas, which constitutes a transfer of knowledge and a change in institutional norms.

The practice shows how international NGOs and bilateral aid organisations can play an instrumental role in financing initiatives such as community development banks that become sustainable in their own right and outline the initial programme.

**Conclusion**

This case study tracks the trajectory of a community of coastal residents displaced in the early 1970s by redevelopment initiatives. International NGOs, bilateral aid organisations and national financial agencies have made a number of efforts to assist the Conjunto Palmeira community, but the success of Banco Palmas has largely been a local one.

International development experts cannot simply replicate successful community-driven initiatives. They emerge from a complex, sustained and evolving process of building solidarity in a community, undertaking campaigns to establish basic services, and introducing the principles of a solidarity economy. Forty years have seen the slow but steady growth of a community born out of the experience of forced displacement that has relied predominately on internal organisation rather than external resources to create a finance model that has transformed the shape and future of their neighbourhood.

**Conclusion**

This case study tracks the trajectory of a community of coastal residents displaced in the early 1970s by redevelopment initiatives. International NGOs, bilateral aid organisations and national financial agencies have made a number of efforts to assist the Conjunto Palmeira community, but the success of Banco Palmas has largely been a local one.

International development experts cannot simply replicate successful community-driven initiatives. They emerge from a complex, sustained and evolving process of building solidarity in a community, undertaking campaigns to establish basic services, and introducing the principles of a solidarity economy. Forty years have seen the slow but steady growth of a community born out of the experience of forced displacement that has relied predominately on internal organisation rather than external resources to create a finance model that has transformed the shape and future of their neighbourhood.
### 1. Profiling of urban IDP situations

#### Description

The general lack of information about IDPs is a major challenge for those advocating for the fulfilment of their rights. Tools such as the urban profiling exercise developed by JIPS are useful ways of collecting baseline demographic data on displaced communities. Given that urban IDPs tend to be dispersed and are difficult to distinguish from the urban poor more generally, the JIPS methodology gathers comparative data on both IDPs and their counterparts in the general population in the same neighbourhood. Since the experiences of different groups can vary, there is a need to better understand the realities of different groups who reside in the same area (e.g., IDPs, refugees, economic migrants and urban poor with different backgrounds).

Profiling provides a comprehensive picture of the target populations, including demographics, indicators of strengths and vulnerabilities, their preferences in terms of settlement options and their degree of local integration. As such, it forms a solid basis from which to determine policies on durable solutions and the development of other strategies addressing problems identified during the profiling exercise. Profiling combines quantitative and qualitative methods at the individual, household or community levels to provide data disaggregated by location, sex, age and diversity. The analysis can be enriched with key informant interviews and a review of secondary data, leading to an extensive profile of urban populations affected by displacement and the local infrastructure and policy environment they face.

Profiling is not, however, limited to data collection. It is a sequence of interlinked steps that begins by building a consensus around the need for the exercise, and ends with the validation of its findings by the profiling partners and target populations themselves and the dissemination of results. It is a collaborative and ethical process based on the principles of transparency, and actively promotes the buy-in of partner organisations and governments at all stages.

By bringing central and local authorities and their humanitarian and development partners together to collect information on demographics, migration patterns, and factors related to the process of attaining durable solutions, including housing, land and property issues, profiling by design aims to ensure that the data obtained is widely accepted and used. It helps to ensure that those working in the same urban setting share a common understanding of the displacement situation, and reduces the need for parallel surveys by different organisations and the costs they involve.

IDPs often face specific challenges in securing housing and livelihoods, ensuring community support and building social networks. In many urban areas affected by displacement, however, the local population live in similar conditions and face similar issues. Profiling aims to understand both the crossover and the divergence between the different communities’ realities, which in turn allows policymakers and practitioners to incorporate them into the development of targeted responses. Profiling works towards durable solutions by creating an evidence base for decision making.

Displaced people, like all migrants, bring with them particular skills and experiences that can benefit their host families and communities, and which, if tapped into, form the foundation for durable solutions. Profiling sheds light on such positive attributes and those of IDPs’ counterparts in the local population (host families and other non-displaced neighbours) as well as their vulnerabilities. By looking at future aspirations, plans and decision-making criteria it forms the basis of a forward-looking response, even in volatile contexts.

#### Methodology and process

JIPS was established in 2009 to provide technical support and coordination for governments and their humanitarian and development partners in conducting collaborative profiling exercises. Given the rapid rate of urbanisation worldwide, the ever increasing numbers of IDPs who flee to towns and cities, and the distinct challenges of data collection in urban areas, JIPS has produced a specific profiling methodology for them. JIPS also specialises in profiling to inform strategies for durable solutions, and advocates for the operationalization of the criteria for durable solutions set out in the IASC’s framework on the issue as the starting point for planning an exercise.

Each profiling exercise uses a methodology tailored to the specific information needs of those who will use the data, and established via jointly agreed objectives. A mixed methods approach tends to be used to capture different types of data and triangulate findings. Consultation with national entities responsible for compiling statistics ensures that the methodology is compatible with existing population data sources such as censuses.

When possible, profiling aims to provide statistically representative information of the target populations acquired through an anonymous sample-based household survey. The surveys may also include individual-level questions for each household member. The quantitative data is
complemented with focus group discussions and key informant interviews. The anonymity of the process is important on a number of levels. It has ethical and protection implications, particularly when dealing with sensitive topics, and it helps to guarantee more reliable data by clearly disassociating responses from eligibility for assistance.

Given the consultative and time-consuming nature of profiling exercises, they generally take several months to complete. Findings are validated and disseminated among the partners in the exercise, wider groups of stakeholders and the target populations.

Using profiling to improve housing policies and programmes

Urban profiling can support more effective and sustainable housing policies and programmes for IDPs in a number of important ways. In Afghanistan, JIPS supported NRC in conducting a protection study of IDPs that identified a series of housing, land and property (HLP) issues and the need to improve the humanitarian response to them. The findings led to greater investment in an existing HLP taskforce that enhanced its expertise and reach. The study also played a significant role in bringing about official recognition of urban IDPs and the inclusion of area-based approaches in a national policy on displacement. Both the survey and the policy highlight the importance of urban IDPs and those with similar vulnerabilities via an area-based approach.

The survey was carried by Samuel Hall for NRC and IDMC with support from JIPS, and was completed in 2012. It helped to confirm the significance of urban displacement and the particular vulnerability of urban IDPs from rural areas. Its findings were presented at a workshop hosted by the ministry in charge of developing policy on displacement, during which it worked with national and humanitarian actors to formulate recommendations for Afghanistan's national policy on IDPs, which was being drafted at the time. The participatory process made the recommendations effective.

The recommendations highlighted the need to use the definition of an IDP set out in the Guiding Principles to shape the government’s response, and to assist other people with similar needs living in the same areas. The recommendation corresponded to the finding that differentiating between various groups in urban areas, including IDPs, could be highly complex and sometimes unnecessary.

Halls’s survey underlined the need to facilitate all three options for durable solutions rather than focussing on return, and emphasised that addressing displacement was as much a development challenge as a humanitarian one. The study also highlighted the need for a comprehensive profiling exercise to gather countrywide data to support the design and implementation of the national policy on IDPs.

In Afghanistan’s most recent displacement crisis began in 2001. There are currently around 805,000 IDPs in the country, of whom 174,000 were newly displaced in 2014. Many have fled from rural to urban areas, where around 40 per cent of the displaced population now live. Many urban IDPs are unable to afford adequate housing. Instead they rent or squat in precarious conditions in informal settlements, where they are often threatened with forced evictions - a key obstacle to their achievement of durable solutions.

Informal settlements make up between 60 and 70 per cent of Afghanistan’s urban areas, a consequence of rapid unplanned growth. Kabul’s population grew from two million to 4.5 million between 2001 and 2010, a rate well above the average for Asia. Given the difficulties authorities face in delivering adequate housing and basic services in rapidly growing cities, there has been political reluctance to recognise urban IDPs or to support their local integration despite doing so being their preferred settlement option. Authorities also fear that the regularization of informal settlements where IDPs live would drive further migration from rural to urban areas.

Survey

No country-wide profiling of IDPs has been carried out in Afghanistan, but a broad survey of the demographic data and protection needs of 1,000 households in five regions of the country affected by displacement helped bring about authorities’ recognition of the need to assist urban IDPs and those with similar vulnerabilities via an area-based approach.

The survey was carried by Samuel Hall for NRC and IDMC with support from JIPS, and was completed in 2012. It helped to confirm the significance of urban displacement and the particular vulnerability of urban IDPs from rural areas. Its findings were presented at a workshop hosted by the ministry in charge of developing policy on displacement, during which it worked with national and humanitarian actors to formulate recommendations for Afghanistan’s national policy on IDPs, which was being drafted at the time. The participatory process made the recommendations effective.

The recommendations highlighted the need to use the definition of an IDP set out in the Guiding Principles to shape the government’s response, and to assist other people with similar needs living in the same areas. The recommendation corresponded to the finding that differentiating between various groups in urban areas, including IDPs, could be highly complex and sometimes unnecessary.

Halls’s survey underlined the need to facilitate all three options for durable solutions rather than focussing on return, and emphasised that addressing displacement was as much a development challenge as a humanitarian one. The study also highlighted the need for a comprehensive profiling exercise to gather countrywide data to support the design and implementation of the national policy on IDPs.

National policy on IDPs

Afghanistan’s national policy on IDPs was finally adopted in November 2013, and reflects a number of the points mentioned above. It recalls the primary responsibility of authorities to assist IDPs irrespective of whether those internally displaced are in settlements or living with host families, are in rural or in urban settings, in their provinces of origin or elsewhere in the country. It also recommends an area-based approach, “a response without differentiating between groups who live there and will benefit such as IDPs, returning refugees and urban poor”.

In terms of IDPs’ registration, it states that “it is not necessary in the case of area-based responses to internal displacement [notably in urban areas] which do not require the explicit identification of individual IDPs”. It also recognises profiling as a tool to design response. “In such cases, general profiling will be sufficient for purposes of planning and implementing such response”.

Notes

1. JIPS, Guidance for Profiling Urban Displacement Situations: Challenges and Solutions, June 2014
2. Ministry of State, Ministry of Planning and Development, the National Statistics Office (INS) and UNHCR (forthcoming): ‘Profilage des personnes déplacées internes, retournees et rapatriées de Côte d’Ivoire’
3. UNHCR Afghanistan, Monthly IDP update, 1-31 December 2014
4. OCHA, Afghanistan 2015 Humanitarian Needs Overview, p.11
5. IDMC, Still at risk: security of tenure and the forced eviction of IDPs and refugee returnees in urban Afghanistan, February 2014, pp.5-6
6. OD, Sanctuary in the city: urban displacement and vulnerability, 23 June 2013, pp.6-7
7. IDMC, February 2014, op. cit, p18
8. Ibid
2. Eviction impact assessment

Description

An eviction impact assessment is a quantitative, human rights-based tool. It was developed by Habitat International Coalition (HIC)'s housing and land rights network, and is used to quantify the “losses, costs and damages incurred by those affected by violations of forced eviction, dispossession, destruction and privatization of habitat resources.” It also helps as an advocacy tool to convert human rights violations into quantifiable economic language. Data alone cannot express the emotional toll of forced displacement nor the physical impoverishment it often causes, but it improves a community’s bargaining position with state and private entities involved in responding to its needs.

The tool has been used mainly to quantify the impact of displacement caused by development projects, but given that many urban IDPs displaced by conflict or disasters also face the risk of forced eviction it can be applied to such cases too. Those who squat public or private land or live in informal settlements or areas prone to hazards are particularly at risk and exposed to the prospect of renewed displacement.

Eviction impact assessments can help to bolster housing rights and the achievement of durable solutions by preventing forced evictions and other displacement from taking place in the first place and facilitating compensation when they do. They can be used to persuade courts to put evictions on hold, and to inform those intent on carrying them out about the compensation they will have to pay and the issues to be addressed in minimising the social and economic cost of relocation. Communities and courts can also use the assessments to estimate and demand compensation after the event, as was the case in Kandhamal in India.

Displaced communities, grassroots organisations, local researchers and advocates for housing and land rights advocates have used eviction impact assessments successfully in a number of countries as part of their broader efforts to support IDPs in their pursuit of durable housing solutions. They can also be used by IDPs themselves in public interest litigation and judicial activism more generally.

Methodology

The methodology for eviction impact assessments is based on the UN basic principles and guidelines on development-induced displacement, International Criminal Court standards of evidence and the UN reparations framework. They constitute a comprehensive tool that tries to capture both material and non-material losses and costs during all phases of displacement. They are not prescriptive, however, in that they can be adapted to specific contexts.

The matrix for eviction impact assessments contains the following components:

1. **Baseline study of pre-eviction assets and expenditure**
   - Economic assets (household level): qualitative and quantitative assessments of personal belongings, investments, inheritance prospects, livestock, dwellings, trees and crops, livelihoods, wells and water sources
   - Expenditure (household level): qualitative and quantitative assessments monthly outgoings on food, education, health care, mortgages and other debt payments, rent, utilities, transport and bureaucratic, legal and advocacy costs
   - Social assets (household level): qualitative and quantitative assessments of the value of shared community spaces, community membership and investments, creches, cultural heritage sites, family, health and psychological wellbeing, identity and social and institutional capital
   - Civic assets (non-material): qualitative and quantitative assessments of crime patterns, political legitimacy and participation, social cohesion and integration and public health
   - Public/state expenditure: bureaucracy, administration, equipment, services, security and policing costs

2. **Assessment of losses as a result of eviction notice**
   - Economic costs/losses (household level)
   - Regular expenditure/costs/losses (household level)
   - Social assets/costs/losses (household level)
   - Civic assets/costs/losses (non-material)
   - Public/state costs

3. **Assessment of losses at time of and during eviction**
   - Economic costs/losses (household level)
   - Regular expenditure/costs/losses (household level)
c. Social assets/costs/losses (household level)
d. Civic assets/costs/losses (non-material)
e. Public/state costs

4. Assessment of losses following eviction, sub-divided as applicable into the following categories: transits camps or temporary shelter, resettlement site, no resettlement and reparation

a. Economic costs/losses (household level)
b. Regular expenditure/costs/losses (household level)
c. Social assets/costs/losses (household level)
d. Civic assets/costs/losses (non-material)
e. Public/state costs

The complete matrix can be downloaded here: [http://goo.gl/w1A31f](http://goo.gl/w1A31f)

Depending on the size of the target community and the resources available, either the entire affected population or a representative sample is surveyed by a team of expert enumerators who use their qualitative notes and estimates of assets and expenditure in combination with households’ self-assessments to arrive at sample figures. These are then used to determine average household assets and expenditure, social assets, the impacts of duration and relocation of changes in monthly income and outgoings, to arrive at a final average cost of relocation per household that includes any new and recurring expenditure.

Case study: Muthurwa estate (Kenya)

The Mazingira Institute, a Kenyan NGO, carried out an eviction impact assessment (EvIA) in 2012 as part of an ongoing legal battle over the rights of residents of Nairobi’s Muthurwa estate, who faced and still face forced eviction at the hands of the Kenya Railways Corporation. Starting in 2010, a series of petitions were presented to the High Court to procure temporary staying orders. The EvIA’s inclusion in the process presented quantitative evidence of the financial costs and losses to the community and helped convince the court to make its final ruling in favour of Muthurwa residents in August 2015.

Overview

The East African Railways and Harbours Corporation (EARHC) built the 72-acre Muthurwa estate in the early twentieth century to house its workers in single-storey, terraced houses also referred to as tinsheds. The estate is made up of 1,234 housing units in 66 blocks, though not all are fully occupied. The 2009 population and housing census put the number of resident households at 1,034.4

In 1978, EARHC was transferred to the Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC), and in 2006 Rift Valley Railways (RVR) purchased KRC. Despite selling to Rift Valley, however, KRC was still liable for its employees’ pensions, and in order to raise money for the scheme, it began to liquidate its assets in 2010. One such asset was the Muthurwa estate, which the company estimated was worth between three and five billion Kenyan shillings ($33 million and $54 million).

On 1 July 2010, all Muthurwa estate residents received an eviction notice. They were told to vacate their homes within 90 days, despite the fact that some families had lived there for generations, and with little regard for the specific needs of elderly, disabled, child and female residents.

The estate is a prime location in Nairobi’s central business district but, given the changes in its ownership and management, residency was no longer linked to employment. Average rent is 2,500 shillings ($27) a month, with the revenue helping to pay the money due to around 9,000 KRC pensioners.

To administer the eviction, KRC transferred management of the estate to the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme (KRSRB5), but doing so positioned residents’ interests against those of the KRC pensioners. After the evictions, the plan was for the estate to be sold and developed with shopping malls, petrol stations, luxury apartments and office buildings.

Petitioning the High Court

The demolition of homes and public toilets began within two weeks of the eviction notice, and the water supply and street lighting were disconnected. Some residents left, but others remained and protested. The standoff continued and escalated over several months, leading to large-scale demolitions using bulldozers in October 2010.

In an effort to stop the evictions, ten residents worked with the constitutional scholar Yash Ghar and the executive director of the legal advice centre Kituo Che Sheko, Piscilla Phelps, to file a petition with the High Court. Kituo Che Sheka was founded in 1970s. It uses the national census to collect basic demographic data.

The enumerators were all graduates, though secondary education would have been sufficient for the purpose of the survey.

Petitioning the High Court

The Mazingira Institute, a Kenyan NGO, carried out an eviction impact assessment (EvIA) in February 2012. They selected 117 households as a representative sample to survey, and enumerators from both organisations carried out the assessment based on an adapted version of the EvIA matrix. The Mazingira Institute trained the enumerators to use a short questionnaire similar to the one used for the national census to collect basic demographic data. The enumerators were all graduates, though secondary education would have been sufficient for the purpose of the survey.

Based on the data collected - only 100 households provided complete information - they analysed demographic trends, such as household size and composition, age distribution, marital status, length of residence, education level and employment. They also analysed the general housing conditions and amenities, including the type of cooking fuel and energy source for lighting used.

In accordance with EvIA guidelines, they also assessed the value of household assets and found them to be an average of 1,355,826 shillings ($14,200) per household member.7 The enumerators invited 40 heads of households to the Mazingira institute for a day-long session to gather the information, during which they worked one-on-one to collect in-depth economic data. Given that the respondents were at the institute, the team was able to input the data directly into its software, reducing the amount of time usually required for fieldwork, transcription and input.

The next stage was to assess each household’s one-off relocation costs, based on three assumptions; that average rent would continue to be 2,500 shillings a month, and that residents would not change their employment or the course of their education. Respondents said, however, that they would have to move to neighbouring areas as far as 20 kilometres away to find homes of equal quality and cost. To do so, the average time required to move would be 12 hours, which would result in a loss of income. The average one-off relocation cost was also exceptionally high, working out at 11,265 shillings or ($123) per household.

At one point, KRSRB5 offered some Muthurwa residents the option of relocating to another estate it owned in Makongeni, around seven kilometres to the east, on the basis that they could keep their corrugated iron sheets, timber and other building materials. A few whose homes were bulldozed took up the option. The offer, however, was never presented in a systematic way through consultation with the community. Rather, coercive methods and the threat of forced eviction caused increased resentment and resistance among residents who may initially have been open to considering a relocation package. It is unclear why KRSRB5 did not make a proper proposal for relocation to Makongeni, but in retrospect it seems like a tremendous missed opportunity.

The next stage of the EvIA evaluated the anticipated increase in overall household expenditure as a result of relocation, based on a survey of 40 households. They estimated that transport costs per household would increase by 17,751 shillings ($189) a month.8 If households were to work an additional 13 hours, which would result in the event of forced eviction. Considering Muthurwa residents’ vulnerable economic status, relocation would be extremely expensive and mean that ‘households will worsen their well-being’, which would ‘aggravate the urban poverty situation’ in Nairobi.9 The information was then added to the petition presented to the High Court.

The objective of the EvIA was not merely to present empirical data. Rather it painted a picture of how the violation of housing rights affect households’ lives in economic terms. It strengthened the Muthurwa residents’ bargaining position and helped win the High Court’s ruling in their favour in August 2013.
The court was forced to abide by the fact that the constitutional right to adequate housing was “aspirational and merely speculative,” but rather had to be realised “as a substantive right to adequate housing” in order to prevent eviction and to procure a more equitable health facilities.

The Muthurwa estate case shows how the invocation of the constitutional right to adequate housing was “aspirational and merely speculative,” but rather had to be realised “as a substantive right to adequate housing” in order to prevent eviction and to procure a more equitable health facilities.

The Muthurwa estate case shows how the invocation of the constitutional right to adequate housing was “aspirational and merely speculative,” but rather had to be realised “as a substantive right to adequate housing” in order to prevent eviction and to procure a more equitable health facilities.

The court was forced to abide by the fact that the constitutional right to adequate housing was “aspirational and merely speculative,” but rather had to be realised “as a substantive right to adequate housing” in order to prevent eviction and to procure a more equitable health facilities.

The Muthurwa estate case shows how the invocation of the constitutional right to adequate housing was “aspirational and merely speculative,” but rather had to be realised “as a substantive right to adequate housing” in order to prevent eviction and to procure a more equitable health facilities.

The court was forced to abide by the fact that the constitutional right to adequate housing was “aspirational and merely speculative,” but rather had to be realised “as a substantive right to adequate housing” in order to prevent eviction and to procure a more equitable health facilities.

The Muthurwa estate case shows how the invocation of the constitutional right to adequate housing was “aspirational and merely speculative,” but rather had to be realised “as a substantive right to adequate housing” in order to prevent eviction and to procure a more equitable health facilities.

The court was forced to abide by the fact that the constitutional right to adequate housing was “aspirational and merely speculative,” but rather had to be realised “as a substantive right to adequate housing” in order to prevent eviction and to procure a more equitable health facilities.
standard of housing and services provided and arbitrarily deciding to evict residents, whether to make way for higher paying tenants or other reasons.

Poorer urban refugees tend to be disempowered, having to dig into their savings for shelter and security. Even with financial assistance in the form of rental support grants, they often still face unfavourable terms and substandard conditions. NRC works to ensure that refugees in urban areas have proper lease agreements in keeping with national legislation, which on the one hand improves their tenure security and protection from eviction, and on the other is a precondition for their ability to re-register with the Ministry of Interior in the place of their residence.

In Lebanon, which hosts large populations of both Palestinian and Syrian refugees, the challenges are different. Despite refugees not requiring valid documentation or legal residency to enter into a written or verbal lease agreement under Lebanese law, they rarely do so — either because they do not understand the benefits or because they feel too insecure to approach their landlord, particularly those living in informal settlements.5

The ICLA team ran a pilot project in the Bekaa valley to promote the use of written lease agreements, intended to protect the rights and responsibilities of both tenants and landlords. Given that tenants were often found to violate tenancy agreements, for example by not maintaining the property, leases aim to manage and balance expectations and responsibilities between all parties.

Conclusion

Legal aid organisations and the assistance they provide are vital to any effective rights-based approach to supporting urban IDPs’ durable solutions. Multiple legal and tenure regimes are common in cities, and they affect the marginalised and poor disproportionately. IDPs and refugees need clear and timely information about their legal rights and entitlements in terms of housing, tenure and protection issues in their areas of refuge.

Notes

1. The Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator Checklist of Housing, Land and Property Rights and Broader Land Issues Throughout the Displacement Timeline from Emergency to Recovery is an important resource for humanitarian organisations. Available at: http://bit.ly/DisPLT.

2. Other thematic areas of focus the ICLA programme are legal identity, including obtaining civil documentation; citizenship and statelessness issues related to displacement; procedures for refugee status determination; registration procedures for IDPs when access to rights and services is dependent on it; NRC, Programme policy, 2012

3. UNHCR, Syria Refugee Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, last accessed 9 February 2015


5. NRC, Increasing Security of Tenure through Relationship Building and Written Lease Agreements: An Assessment of NRC’s Housing, Land and Property Rights Pilot Project in Lebanon, August 2014, p.8

4. Community participation approaches

Community participation is an essential component of good programming, because it ensures that assistance is better adjusted to the skills and needs the beneficiaries themselves prioritise. It gives communities a sense of ownership of the programme, and engages members in skills development, consensus building and demanding authorities’ accountability. Community participation can take different forms, some of which are more time-consuming and in-depth than others, depending on the level of emergency and responders’ culture and methods. Community enumeration and mapping, and the social tenure domain model are particularly useful in urban areas to clarify unclear tenure.

4.1 Community enumeration and mapping

Description

Community enumeration involves members in designing a method of data collection and using it to gather information about themselves and identify and prioritise their needs. They then develop an action plan as the basis for interventions by authorities, national and international organisations and the community itself. Provided vulnerable groups are included and power imbalances within the community are managed well, community enumeration can be a powerful tool in creating transparent processes, building trust and empowering community members to take decisions about their lives. It also kick-starts community negotiations with local authorities about the recognition and formalisation of multiple tenure arrangements.

The process

The project began with a community enumeration exercise consisting of the following phases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building a team</td>
<td>A local enumeration team is selected via engagement with community representatives, community-based organisations and camp committees. The team includes members of the target community, local authorities, academics and support professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rough mapping</td>
<td>The team meets local community leaders and city officials to ‘rough map’ the settlement, identifying toilets, water taps, public services and transport systems. The exercise provides a general sense of issues to be addressed by the enumeration process, and informs the preparation of a questionnaire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Community members improve their skills and capacities to formulate the questionnaire and carry out the survey via a trial run in a sample section of the settlement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Case study: Community enumeration in Simon Pelé (Haiti)

Overview

Habitat for Humanity Haiti used community enumeration and mapping to empower the inhabitants of Simon Pelé, a densely populated informal settlement of 50,000 people of low incomes, to identify and prioritise their needs in terms of housing, infrastructure, health and livelihoods.

Based on the community action plan that emerged from the consultations, Habitat for Humanity developed a wide range of interventions including damage assessment, street naming, house numbering, reconstruction and retrofitting of homes, infrastructure projects, vocational training, health programmes and support for community governance. The project was part of a wider programme implementing the same methodology across a number of informal neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince.

It also coordinated with the subsequent census and mapping activities conducted by the government with IOM and UN-Habitat support. The methodology and tools used were based on the experiences of Slum Dwellers International, the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights and other organisations.

The process

The project began with a community enumeration exercise consisting of the following phases:
The enumeration exercise is launched at a public ceremony. Ministers, mayors and local leaders attend to add political credibility. A survey of each household is carried out, and staff members begin to assess and compile data. A verification process enables community members to identify and mediate areas of disagreement. The support organisation prepares detailed documentation, including graphs, charts and narratives, to give to the community, city officials and other stakeholders. The community then uses the data in future negotiations over resources.

Community mapping sessions build on the initial rough mappings of the neighbourhood done by the enumerators. The focus remains on the bigger-picture level of the community. A verification process enables community members to identify and mediate areas of disagreement. The community undertakes to implement an agreed development project according to mutually established processes and funding arrangements. In essence, the community is the contractor and the funding agency the client. The funding agency also trains community members in specifying a development project, selecting the community council and understanding the various phases of the process.

Once the development initiative is defined, the funding agency finances it and community members recruited for the project implement it, monitored by the community council.

Elements of the household and cadastral surveys are combined with the community mapping in order to provide a more in-depth and comprehensive view of the neighbourhood. Based on the three elements, the community makes informed decisions about what members need and desire, what to prioritise and what to sacrifice or delay until further resources are available. Further community workshops incorporate the information into a physical and spatial master plan.

As part of the enumeration and mapping process, Habitat for Humanity and the Simon Pelé community did the following:

- Trained 30 engineers to conduct damage assessments
- Conducted 265 damage assessments to guide families on repairs
- Hired 40 enumerators from the community, 65 per cent of whom were women
- Conducted more than 6,500 household surveys
- Mapped 2,700 houses and land boundaries
- Established a community database with linked maps
- Created 36 detailed maps of the community covering topics including security risks for men and women, community capacities, critical infrastructure, flooding risks and fire risks
- Established a community action plan
- Set up community contracts to address the main issues identified, including street lighting, a health clinic and water kiosk improvements

Lessons learned
Habitat for Humanity Haiti identified the following lessons learned:

- Community enumeration and mapping can be a time-consuming process in earlier phases, but leads towards a longer-term strategy where the process can be simplified and accelerated.
- The creation of a Habitat resource centre in the heart of the neighbourhood was key to catalysing community participation. It serves as the focal point for community consultation, training and the organisation of home and latrine construction, retrofits and large-scale infrastructure projects.
- Community contracts have been put in place to implement the action plan. Such contracts are a procurement tool that empowers communities by ensuring they have an executive role in the identification, planning and implementation of development initiatives. They are an agreement between the funding agency, in this case Habitat, and a community council representing residents.
- The community undertakes to implement an agreed development project according to mutually established processes and funding arrangements. In essence, the community is the contractor and the funding agency the client. The funding agency also trains community members in specifying a development project, selecting the community council and understanding the various phases of the process.
- Once the development initiative is defined, the funding agency finances it and community members recruited for the project implement it, monitored by the community council.

As part of the enumeration and mapping process, Habitat for Humanity and the Simon Pelé community did the following:

- Trained 30 engineers to conduct damage assessments
- Conducted 265 damage assessments to guide families on repairs
- Hired 40 enumerators from the community, 65 per cent of whom were women
- Conducted more than 6,500 household surveys
- Mapped 2,700 houses and land boundaries
- Established a community database with linked maps
- Created 36 detailed maps of the community covering topics including security risks for men and women, community capacities, critical infrastructure, flooding risks and fire risks
- Established a community action plan
- Set up community contracts to address the main issues identified, including street lighting, a health clinic and water kiosk improvements

The International Federation of Surveyors, the Global Land Tool Network and UN-Habitat have created a land administration system (LAS) that works with various forms of tenure recorded through on-the-ground observation and consultation with local communities, and which promotes the concept of a continuum. Tenure data generated by a partnership between professional surveyors and the people affected yields more sophisticated maps and in turn a better land administration system that can address IDPs’ specific needs and vulnerabilities and support their achievement of durable solutions.

A major challenge in surveying lies in reconciling different levels of accuracy and labelling practices. Traditional land surveys are extremely time-consuming and expensive, so the creators of the social tenure domain model advocate the use of satellite images and handheld GPS devices to conduct boundary surveys in conjunction with traditional land surveys. Such approaches are not cheap either, and there is the question of who a community will trust to apply them. Only after a boundary survey is complete, however, and the information has been compiled with topographic and GPS data co-ordinated into maps, can policymakers address land tenure, use and development issues by designing better policies.

The social tenure domain model could also help community leaders, civil society organisations and governments to improve their monitoring and prevention of illegal land grabs, which become more common during conflict or in the aftermath of disasters when institutions and the rule of law are weakened.

Methodology

Figure 4A screen grab of prototype software for the social tenure domain model. Drawn boundaries are vectorised to closed polygons, which in turn can be related to people via social tenure relationships.

The creators of the social tenure domain model aim to pioneer a new way of maintaining land records, using free open-source software that enables individuals with minimal training to collect, record, analyse and disseminate data. The tool is not only a data management tool, but also a way to engage communities and catalyse land-related political processes.
tionships between land, its users and public institutions. The software allows for the linking of individuals or “land users” with specific plots of land or “spatial units” (see Figure 1) using different social tenure options. The individual is identified by their photograph, fingerprint and signature to ensure the validity of the record. But before inputting data, however, the land must be surveyed. The different sequences of the model are:

1. First the data needs to be acquired. Communities, villages, cooperatives, slum dwellers’ organisations or NGOs can organise this, but they need tools to do so.

2. On-site tests of the potential use of high-resolution satellite images were performed to establish parcel index maps in selected cities or villages. After printing the images on paper on a 1:2,000 scale, the boundaries of spatial units were determined in the field using a pencil.

3. Data collection in the field was performed in the presence of land rights holders and local officials.

4. Apart from the boundaries, administrative data such as village names were collected. The understanding of the paper prints on a 1:2,000 scale was high, which makes the process very participatory.

a. Additional supporting documents such as photographs, maps and images can also be uploaded using the software.

5. After field data acquisition, the images with drawn boundaries on them were scanned and interposed on top of the original image.

a. Drawing can also be done using digital pens, which are immediately read and geo-referenced by a computer and do not require scanning.

6. The drawn boundaries were vectorised and given identifiers. During field data collection preliminary identifiers may be used.

7. The spatial data can then be linked to the person’s data using a spatial tenure relationship.

8. Then the data has to be brought to local communities for public inspection, by the projection of images and boundaries on a screen if electricity is available. Local people are invited to check the data.

9. It should be possible to edit the data, for example to change a social tenure relationship from “informal” to “occupation” and later to “freehold”, 7

10. A to-do list for government officials could then be generated on how to strengthen tenure arrangements on a case-by-case basis. This is contingent on officials’ political will to strengthen tenure.

11. Women’s access to land can be improved by registering shares of land using the social tenure domain model.

12. The data can also help design better urban and community development plans.

Conclusion

The social tenure domain model can help urban IDPs and the wider community to understand and map their land and tenure claims. It can be used to determine who rents, owns or has claims to property, and it facilitates the clarification of tenure, on which eligibility for housing assistance programmes and social benefits often rides. It is also useful in resolving tenure disputes and can help protect from evictions if informal tenure claims are recognised and recorded as part of a legitimate land administration system.

The model not only feeds community-driven advocacy for tenure and housing rights, including access to basic services. It can also help municipalities and other urban governance institutions to provide services for population influxes. Additional supporting documents such as photographs and documents can also be uploaded using the software.

Case study: Social tenure domain model pilot project in Mbale (Uganda)

Background

Seventy-two per cent of Kampala’s population live in tenures that do not cover only 2 per cent of the city’s land area. In order to begin tackling the high population density and poor service delivery, more accurate profiles of the settlements are needed to better inform urban planning, growth management and infrastructure development policies.

Overview

The National Slum Dwellers Federation of Uganda (NSDFU) and the municipality of Mbale, a city in eastern Uganda, piloted a community enumeration exercise together using the social tenure domain model (STDM) tool. The project was supported by the local NGO ACTtogether, which is affiliated to Slum Dwellers International, and the Ministry of Land and Housing and Urban Development. Many of the community members who were trained in using the tool and led the enumeration exercise were active NSDFU members, which ensured meaningful community participation. Sensitisation and awareness raising activities made sure it was conducted with respect for local principles of cultural adequacy.

The tool was adapted to the local context, with the methodology and questionnaire determined through a process of consensus building between community members and stakeholders. The necessary reference maps were produced using satellite imagery, which helped to digitalise existing structures to guide the enumeration process.

With the help of the maps, enumerators used handheld GPS units to number and record existing structures with a unique code. They administered the questionnaires and collected supporting material such as photographs and documents, validated the data to increase its legitimacy and entered it into the STDM software.

Some of the NSDFU leaders were trained to use the software to update information as changes occurred or new data became available. They were also able to use it to generate quick reports and analyse data in spatial and quantitative terms.

Impact

The pilot project and the data it yielded led to the production of a settlement map, on which structures, roads and water points were digitalised. The STDM software also includes a tenure instrument that combines the information gathered with the map to indicate tenure and land claims. Once authorities decide to regularise Mbale’s settlement, they will be able to use the feature to produce “certificates of residency”. The STDM software is not yet a legally recognised instrument of tenure security, but the certificates may help to clarify tenure claims.

The house numbers generated create a physical address system, which has the potential to improve residents’ access to services. The tool also allows authorities and slum communities to use a common set of information to discuss future urban planning that is more inclusive and ensures better access to public infrastructure and services.

Challenges and lessons learned

Initiatives were taken to mobilise and sensitise the community, but the pilot could have done more in this direction. Some technical staff were apprehensive about the pilot project, which was supported by the local NGO ACTtogether, which is affiliated to Slum Dwellers International, and the Ministry of Land and Housing and Urban Development. Many of the community members who were trained in using the tool and led the enumeration exercise were active NSDFU members, which ensured meaningful community participation. Sensitisation and awareness raising activities made sure it was conducted with respect for local principles of cultural adequacy.

The STDM tool also needs to be scaled-up to address more structural issues in national and local land administration systems and cadastral mapping. Given that it has been piloted in other countries such as Colombia, their experiences could help to inform the development of a sustainable method to scale the tool up across municipalities and city planning departments.

Conclusion

The pilot project demonstrated that the STDM tool can be used in conjunction with other pro-poor land tools to better reflect the realities on the ground, which in turn can lead to better urban growth management, settlement and infrastructure planning.

Notes

1. Additional resources on this approach: Count me in by UN-Habitat, 2010; Slum Dwellers International’s website: http://www.scdnet.org. Why enumeration counts: documenting the undocumented, Sheela Patel on IIE. The article provides links to community enumerations conducted in urban informal settlements of Ghana, Kenya, India, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda and Zimbabwe.


3. Habitat for Humanity, Mike Meaney, Urban Neighbourhood Approach: Community-based Enumeration and Community Contracting, Port-au-Prince case study, November 2012.


5. Ibid, p 8

6. Ibid, p 15

7. Ibid, p 14

8. The Haitian government has further developed and institutionalised participatory enumeration methodologies under the leadership of the inter-ministerial committee for regional development (CIAT).


5. Satellite imagery

Description

The UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) provides geospatial information such as geographic information system (GIS) data and satellite images to support UN agencies' needs. It has been particularly active in the areas of crisis and situational mapping and monitoring human rights violations. Satellite imagery has also become increasingly available to international NGOs, civil society groups and human rights workers. UNOSAT often provides critical data on the movement of displaced people, as it has done on Syrian refugees on the country's border with Turkey. It has helped to determine population densities in displacement camps, and to monitor mass evictions, demolitions and the destruction of property caused by conflict or disasters.

Satellite imagery can help prevent displacement and facilitate durable solutions by providing data that informs the following areas:

- Urban land planning, restricting construction in areas prone to hazards or improving resilience via building regulations
- Preventing and lobbying against forced evictions
- Land use and vacancy rates
- Camp and informal settlement management
- Identifying reconstruction needs
- Community mapping

Disaster risk management

Satellite imagery has been used to make quick assessments of the damage caused by a disaster, particularly in its immediate aftermath when access may be restricted; and to create zoning risk maps that highlight areas vulnerable to future hazards. In both cases it has helped to reduce the impact of disasters in urban areas. After tropical storm Washi struck the Philippines in 2011, for example, UNOSAT provided satellite images of the destruction it caused, which assisted humanitarian organisations in developing response and recovery strategies. Satellite imagery is also an important tool in the creation of flood hazard maps that help to ensure that IDPs do not return to and resettle in vulnerable areas, which would put them at risk of future displacement.

Forced eviction monitoring

In 2005, the Zimbabwean government began Operation Murambatsvina. Also known as Operation Drive out Rubbish and Operation Restore Order in Zimbabwe, it was a programme of mass slum clearances and forced evictions that affected around 700,000 people, and during which 92,460 homes were demolished. The volatile situation on the ground meant the international community had only limited access to the affected areas, but satellite imagery enabled quick assessments to be made of the extent of the demolitions, and the scale and pattern of the population movements they caused.

Camp and informal settlement management

UNOSAT has provided satellite images that show the growth of the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, which was established following an influx of Syrian refugees and which has since evolved into something more akin to a self-contained urban neighbourhood with an improvised street network, commercial and residential areas and basic infrastructure. Used in conjunction with observation and enumeration on the ground, the images are a useful tool for improving the management of camps as informal neighbourhoods with changing needs over time.

Land surveys

Satellite imagery facilitates community-based land and tenure mapping and enumeration exercises, as was the case with the social tenure domain model. It is easier for community members to participate in drawing land plots on readily accessible satellite maps that show precise topographic data, housing units and natural features than it would be if they had to rely on the often out-dated maps held by municipalities and land management offices.

Challenges and conclusion

Satellite imagery has much to offer, but also much to be cautious about. It gives the illusion of precision, but can be misleading if the information gleaned is not confirmed with observations on the ground. Archives of older images may not be readily available, which makes comparisons over time difficult and inconsistent. Not all geographical areas are commercially attractive for satellite image providers, and forest and cloud cover reduce the amount of information that can be interpreted. Even given the best available images, it takes training and experience to be able to interpret them accurately. Well-meaning volunteers may make basic misinterpretations such as mistaking cars for tents.

As with all information, satellite imagery is not neutral. It is subject to power asymmetries and dynamics and manipulation. As such, it is important to ask a number of questions:

- Who produced the images and for whom?
- Who analysed the images and what additional data sets have they used to produce GIS maps?
- Why were the images produced?
- Who has access to the maps?
- Are the maps being used to advance a particular agenda?
- If so, are there any alternative interpretations that could challenge that agenda?
- What do the images not show?
- What are the biases of the producers and interpreters?

In situations of heightened police and military presence, anyone seen with satellite imagery may be perceived as a security threat. In such circumstances caution and awareness of one's audience is required before displaying it.
Comparative matrix

The following table is based on our review of the practices and case studies for this report. It identifies strengths, challenges and factors that may influence the potential for replication based on the evaluation criteria set out in the methodology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of matrix addressed (Right to adequate housing and programmatic elements)</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Factors influencing replication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRACTICES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Incremental housing (Jordan)</td>
<td>1. Tenure security</td>
<td>1. Scale - addresses only a small fraction of the housing demand for refugees in Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Affordability</td>
<td>2. Requires monitoring and follow-up to mediate between tenants and landlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Habitability</td>
<td>3. Needs to consider what happens to tenants after their rental agreements expire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Cultural adequacy</td>
<td>4. Needs to consider what happens if beneficiaries chose to move out before the end of their tenancy period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Access to remedy, information and legal support</td>
<td>1. Availability of unfinished buildings and other structures for expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Livelihoods support</td>
<td>2. Functioning local construction industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Target beneficiaries include wider host community</td>
<td>3. Ongoing refugee crisis in which demand for housing may rise and fall exponentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Effective and innovative finance model used</td>
<td>4. Costs of scaling up require further study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Potentially a quick and cost-effective way of adding more rental housing stock while long-term affordable housing developments are planned and implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Requires knowledge of local building, zoning and municipal regulations and their implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Availability and use of legal counselling as a key auxiliary component of shelter activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Housing purchase certificates (Armenia, Georgia)</td>
<td>1. Procuring documents for those who wanted to sell their recently privatised housing units</td>
<td>1. Strong political will and international pressure to close collective centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Affordability</td>
<td>2. Well-developed banking sector, property market and land administration system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Habitability</td>
<td>3. Private house ownership is culturally appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Access to public goods and services</td>
<td>4. Availability of housing units for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Cultural adequacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Transfer of knowledge and change in institutional norms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 13. Community Enumeration (Haiti, Uganda)
- **1. Tenure security**
- **2. Education and empowerment**
- **3. Meaningful participation**

1. Can be a time-consuming process, particularly in early phases.
2. Navigating multiple agendas in a community requires social and political acumen.
3. Elite capture can be a persistent threat. Need to include more vulnerable and marginalized voices.

1. Cooperation from community members.
2. Cooperation from national authorities, which must be willing to enter into a dialogue with communities.
3. Being embedded in the community is key.
4. External organisations act as facilitators rather than aid providers and build more sustainable relationships.

### 14. Satellite imagery
**1. Effective and innovative data collection tools or profiling exercises**

1. May not be available to all users.
2. Easy to misread imagery and draw false conclusions.
3. Satellite images are not neutral pieces of data.
4. Police and military may view possession of satellite imagery as suspect.
5. Forest and cloud coverage can interfere with quality of information gleaned.

1. Access to free or affordable satellite imagery.
2. Training in interpretation of images.
3. Identification of datasets used and actors producing images.

1. May not be available to all marginalized voices.
2. Elite capture can be a persistent threat. Need to include more vulnerable and marginalized voices.

### Appendix

#### List of Illustrative Indicators on the right to adequate housing (*MDG indicators*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of indicator</th>
<th>Habitability</th>
<th>Accessibility to services</th>
<th>Housing affordability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International human rights instruments, relevant to the right to adequate housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of entry into force and coverage of the right to adequate housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of entry into force and coverage of domestic laws relevant to adequate housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of registered/operational civil society organizations involved in the right to adequate housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time frame and coverage of national housing policy statement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time frame and coverage of the progressive implementation of measures for the right to housing at different levels of Government, as applicable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time frame and coverage of national policy on rehabilitation and rehoming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Process**         |              |                           |                       |
|---------------------|--------------|---------------------------|                       |
| Proportions of habitation (cities, towns and villages) covered under provisions of building codes and bylaws | | | |
| Share of public development budget spent on social/community housing | | | |
| Increase in habitable area affected through reclamations, including of hazardous sites, and change in land use pattern | | | |
| Addition to habitable area earmarked for social/community housing during the reporting period | | | |
| Proportion of household budget spent on access to utilities, including water supply, sanitation, electricity and garbage disposal | | | |
| Proportion of vulnerable households dependent on private sources for water supply | | | |
| Share of public development budget spent on provision and maintenance of sanitation, water supply, electricity and physical connectivity of habitation | | | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Type of indicator</strong></th>
<th>Habitability</th>
<th>Accessibility to services</th>
<th>Housing affordability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing affordability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The right to adequate housing provides a critical lens of analysis through which to determine whether a given practice truly empowers the people and communities concerned and facilitates their pursuit of durable solutions. It is a key entry point for the realisation of all the other economic, social and cultural rights, as is evidenced by the range of elements in the matrix. The fulfilment of the right to adequate housing is subject to progressive realisation, which suggests true success requires a long-term involvement and commitment by all stakeholders and practitioners involved. It may also mean shifting emphasis to engaging with local stakeholders and communities that will continue the work after the departure of humanitarian or development entities.

The durable solutions framework is also a gradual and complex process that progressively reduces needs and issues specific to displacement. It addresses challenges in the areas of human rights, humanitarian and development action, reconstruction and peacebuilding. Such complexity requires coordination between all of those responding to internal displacement so as to build on experience and ensure coherence and continuity of action over time.

Because it is often difficult to identify urban IDPs who disperse among the local population, the traditional humanitarian approach of focusing on them as beneficiaries needs to be combined with more inclusive area-based initiatives that also address the needs of others who share similar circumstances. At the same time, some IDPs’ needs specific to their displacement will still need to be addressed, and they may require targeted and tailor-made support to achieve durable solutions, particularly in protracted situations.

The practices included in this report are presented with the aim of providing tools and programme elements that can address such issues in different contexts, and which
### Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tools</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Community development bank (Brazil)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Meaningful participation</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Effective and innovative finance model used</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Requires sustained engagement, reflection and changes in practices over a long period of time</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> A strong legal and policy framework on durable solutions at the national, regional and municipal level&lt;br&gt;2. Effective coordination mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;3. Municipal agreement to allow returnees to resettle on public land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Supporting municipalities (Jordan)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Effective and innovative coordination mechanisms</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Target beneficiaries include wider host community&lt;br&gt;3. Effective profiling exercise</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Disparities between municipality’s and IDPs’ needs</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Hard to measure impact of supporting municipalities on displaced individuals or households&lt;br&gt;3. Further analysis needed on supporting municipalities which use commercial providers for services</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Strong political will&lt;br&gt;2. National ministries coordinate activities with international organisations&lt;br&gt;3. Municipality cooperates with external organisations and is willing to receive resources and training&lt;br&gt;4. Untested in capitals and megacities, where service provision would be at a very different scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong> <strong>Neighbourhood upgrades (Haiti, Kosovo and Colombia)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Tenure security</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Affordability</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Community hesitant to participate fully despite mechanisms for doing so, and legitimate community leaders were difficult to identify&lt;br&gt;2. Absence or inaccuracy of land registries&lt;br&gt;3. Some beneficiaries sold their housing in violation of their tenancy agreement (Kosovo)&lt;br&gt;4. Limited livelihood opportunities for beneficiaries to become self-reliant, which in turn has reduced the habitability of their housing over time.</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> CCMP coordinating mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;2. National coordination mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;3. IDPs find it difficult to buy or rent a house or flat and may be eligible for assistance in acquiring a house or flat in a timely manner&lt;br&gt;4. IDPs want to remain connected to their home and community&lt;br&gt;5. IDPs have the right to the full enjoyment of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the same manner as other members of the wider host community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong> <strong>Transfer of public buildings to IDPs’ private ownership (Georgia)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Lack of follow-up on IDPs fate after expiry of one-year grants</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Extensive field checks of housing stock required to determine suitability for grant</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Disparities between municipality’s and IDPs’ needs</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Hard to measure impact of supporting municipalities on displaced individuals or households&lt;br&gt;3. Further analysis needed on supporting municipalities which use commercial providers for services</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> CCMP coordinating mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;2. National coordination mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;3. IDPs find it difficult to buy or rent a house or flat and may be eligible for assistance in acquiring a house or flat in a timely manner&lt;br&gt;4. IDPs want to remain connected to their home and community&lt;br&gt;5. IDPs have the right to the full enjoyment of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the same manner as other members of the wider host community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.</strong> <strong>Rental support grants (Haiti)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Lack of follow-up on IDPs fate after expiry of one-year grants</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Extensive field checks of housing stock required to determine suitability for grant</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Disparities between municipality’s and IDPs’ needs</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Hard to measure impact of supporting municipalities on displaced individuals or households&lt;br&gt;3. Further analysis needed on supporting municipalities which use commercial providers for services</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> CCMP coordinating mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;2. National coordination mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;3. IDPs find it difficult to buy or rent a house or flat and may be eligible for assistance in acquiring a house or flat in a timely manner&lt;br&gt;4. IDPs want to remain connected to their home and community&lt;br&gt;5. IDPs have the right to the full enjoyment of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the same manner as other members of the wider host community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6.</strong> <strong>Incremental tenure (Somalia)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Tenure security</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Affordability&lt;br&gt;3. Location&lt;br&gt;4. Target beneficiaries include wider host community&lt;br&gt;5. Livelihoods support&lt;br&gt;6. Transfer of knowledge and change in institutional norms</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Disparities between municipality’s and IDPs’ needs</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Hard to measure impact of supporting municipalities on displaced individuals or households&lt;br&gt;3. Further analysis needed on supporting municipalities which use commercial providers for services</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> CCMP coordinating mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;2. National coordination mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;3. IDPs find it difficult to buy or rent a house or flat and may be eligible for assistance in acquiring a house or flat in a timely manner&lt;br&gt;4. IDPs want to remain connected to their home and community&lt;br&gt;5. IDPs have the right to the full enjoyment of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the same manner as other members of the wider host community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7.</strong> <strong>Social housing (Argentina, Georgia, Serbia)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Tenure security</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Affordability</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Community hesitant to participate fully despite mechanisms for doing so, and legitimate community leaders were difficult to identify&lt;br&gt;2. Absence or inaccuracy of land registries&lt;br&gt;3. Some beneficiaries sold their housing in violation of their tenancy agreement (Kosovo)&lt;br&gt;4. Limited livelihood opportunities for beneficiaries to become self-reliant, which in turn has reduced the habitability of their housing over time.</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> CCMP coordinating mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;2. National coordination mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;3. IDPs find it difficult to buy or rent a house or flat and may be eligible for assistance in acquiring a house or flat in a timely manner&lt;br&gt;4. IDPs want to remain connected to their home and community&lt;br&gt;5. IDPs have the right to the full enjoyment of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the same manner as other members of the wider host community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8.</strong> <strong>Transfer of public goods and services (Armenia, Georgia, Serbia)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Lack of available public land for resettlement, so many IDPs were left on waiting lists and some chose to buy their own land in the meantime</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Extensive field checks of housing stock required to determine suitability for grant</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Disparities between municipality’s and IDPs’ needs</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. Hard to measure impact of supporting municipalities on displaced individuals or households&lt;br&gt;3. Further analysis needed on supporting municipalities which use commercial providers for services</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> CCMP coordinating mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;2. National coordination mechanisms between local, national and international organisations and displaced and receiving communities&lt;br&gt;3. IDPs find it difficult to buy or rent a house or flat and may be eligible for assistance in acquiring a house or flat in a timely manner&lt;br&gt;4. IDPs want to remain connected to their home and community&lt;br&gt;5. IDPs have the right to the full enjoyment of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the same manner as other members of the wider host community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Analytical & advocacy tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>focus</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Analytical &amp; advocacy tools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Incremental tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia, Georgia, Serbia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 10. Profiling of urban IDPs (Afghanistan)

- Effective and innovative data collection tools and profiling exercise
- Transfer of knowledge and change in institutional norms
- Low level of existing information on target population makes methodology design challenging
- May require labour-intensive and time-consuming comprehensive target mapping
- Lengthy process as a result of consensus building on acquired information
- Not effective for short-term decision making; best suited to informing long-term strategies and policies
- Local authorities and communities cooperate
- Access to baseline data on population and housing
- Broader advocacy and policy to frame the objective of conducting a profiling exercise

### 11. Eviction impact assessment (Kenya)

- Tenure security
- Location
- Freedom from dispossession, damage and destruction (including forced eviction)
- Resettlement, restitution, compensation, non-refoulement and return
- Education and empowerment
- Meaningful participation
- Access to remedies, legal support information
- Difficulty in gaining community cooperation
- Qualitative and quantitative data generated may not always be accepted by state authorities or private entities
- Hard to raise awareness of the significance of impacts and non-material costs of eviction
- Cooperation from community at risk of eviction
- A functioning court system and an active civil society for judicial activism

### 12. Legal aid (Jordan)

- Tenure security
- Resettlement, restitution, compensation, non-refoulement and return
- Education and empowerment
- Access to remedies, legal support and information
- Transfer of knowledge and change in institutional norms
- Dealing with multiple legal systems
- Dealing with multiple tenure arrangements and land claims
- Often requires legal translations of local laws, policies and codes
- Legal aid approach may need to be combined with other, non-legal conflict resolution mechanisms
- Presence of legal experts with knowledge of IDPs' shelter and housing issues
- Functioning judiciary and court system
- Official translations of laws, codes and regulations

---

The progressive realisation of the right to adequate housing in urban areas and the achievement of durable solutions has implications for the nature of humanitarian response. In particular:

1. Humanitarians and their counterparts in the development sector should base their responses on international human rights law, particularly the right to adequate housing, and on frameworks that cover eviction such as the UN basic principles and guidelines on development-induced displacement.
2. National, municipal and international entities involved in development activities should be involved earlier during the humanitarian phase to ensure continuity and coherence between short and longer-term interventions, which should be integrated into broader urban planning and growth strategies.
3. Governments need to recognise displacement as a development issue for both displaced and host populations. International organisations and agencies can help advocate for and shape national housing policies that serve the needs of not only IDPs, but also other vulnerable groups. Humanitarians’ traditional focus on target groups such as IDPs should be complemented with broader development plans that address these structural issues.
4. Responses should be more inclusive and address not only IDPs’ housing rights, but also those of the urban poor and the wider community.
5. Development practitioners should identify the IDPs, particularly those living in protracted displacement, among their beneficiaries in order to address their specific needs.

Urban IDPs’ tenure security was widely represented in various types of practices across the matrix, from rental agreements in Jordan and Somalia, to incremental tenure in Somalia and social housing in Georgia, Serbia and Armenia. Several tools that addressed tenure security were represented, such as community enumeration in Haiti and the social tenure domain model in Uganda, which maps multiple forms of tenure. The eviction impact assessment tool was also used to prevent or remedy forced evictions, and legal aid has proven critical in helping IDPs clarify and defend their tenure rights. It can also support shelter activities to achieve the same objective, as in Jordan.

---

6. Various forms of tenure, including informal, should be acknowledged and recognised, because they are key to the progressive realisation of the right to adequate housing.
7. More systematic legal and administrative interventions should be made in land administration systems to ensure that multiple forms of tenure are understood and codified.
8. Adequate protection from forced eviction should be put in place in order to avoid renewed displacement and increased impoverishment.
9. Programmes that aim to improve tenure security and housing conditions should ensure that their eligibility criteria do not exclude IDPs. Those that include the possession of personal documents, permanent residency or a certain number of years spent in a given place may discriminate against IDPs, and flexibility should be envisaged in such cases.
10. Legal aid should be offered to urban IDPs to inform them about issues that affect their tenure security, such as rental lease agreements and protection from eviction, and to advise them on legal and informal routes to conflict resolution and obtaining documentation and building permits.

Access to public goods and services was a key component in a few cases, but it was mainly tied to the element of location, which is vital because proximity to livelihood opportunities, markets and institutions also help to determine IDPs’ overall quality of life and reduce transportation costs.

11. National and international interventions should adopt a multi-sectorial approach in order to facilitate adequate housing and durable solutions. This means addressing elements such as tenure security, affordability, habitability, disaster risk reduction, access to basic and social services and employment.

Affordability was well represented in the case studies, particularly those related to social housing. All cases, however, involved significant subsidies and investment from states, international organisations and municipalities. This investment feeds into housing market mechanisms through purchase (Armenia), transfer of ownership (Georgia), upgrade or the subsidising of rented accommo-
Analytical & advocacy tools

Analytical 

of the right to adequate housing across the practices tend not to have the flexibility to engage in such lengthy

in Haiti, TSI in Colombia and the use of the STDM tool in

IDPs were not satisfied with the accommodation pointed
to frequent outbreaks of fire.

linked to making upgraded settlements less vulnerable

linked to disaster risk reduction, while in Somalia it was

Habitability was also covered by several practices, such as

those in Jordan and Armenia, notably in relation to
cultural adequacy and relative notions of what is consid-
ered adequate housing. In Haiti (Katye), habitability was

linked to disaster risk reduction, while in Somalia it was

linked to making upgraded settlements less vulnerable to

frequent outbreaks of fire.

The fact that in cases such as in Kosovo and Georgia,

IDPs were not satisfied with the accommodation pointed

to the need for their meaningful participation in housing

programmes. Although this report illustrates several ex-

amples of positive participation (Katye and Simon Pélot

in Haiti, TSI in Colombia and the use of the STDM tool

in Uganda) this is one of the least represented elements

of the right to adequate housing across the practices

analysed and highlights the challenge of shifting the

perception of IDPs as being mere beneficiaries to agents

who can pursue their own durable solutions given the

appropriate resources and leverage. Ensuring partici-
pation is time-consuming, however, and humanitarians

tend not to have the flexibility to engage in such lengthy

processes.

Unfortunately, there is shortage of comparative data on

how individual displaced households manage in urban

areas and the best ways of supporting their coping mech-

anisms, whether it is via cash-based assistance, voca-
tional training or housing subsidies. Understanding the

underlying reasons for why IDPs may forego investment

in better housing may help guide programme response

instead of making assumptions that all IDPs are asset-
or cash-poor or would readily invest in housing above

other needs.

Meaningful participation of IDPs in housing pro-

grammes and community ownership of the process

should be an integral component of practices.

A paradigm shift in programming is needed to under-

stand IDPs and displaced households as economic

agents who apply their own calculations when prior-

itising different needs such as housing, food, educa-
tion and health.

IDPs should not be viewed as a homogeneous group,
given that their economic status and resource levels can
vary dramatically.

It is important to understand how IDPs settle in urban

areas, whether it is with families, gathered in particular
_areas, dispersed throughout or in regular or makeshift

camps. Due to their relative invisibility, it is often difficult
to distinguish between poor IDPs and their non-displaced

neighbours. Urban profiling can help determine the ex-
tent of IDPs’ specific needs and vulnerability, as well as

challenges faced by both IDPs and host populations. The

practices presented in this report show both the inter-
est of area-based approaches (Bosaso, Kosovo, Katye/

Haiti, Coordination platform in Jordan) and the necessity
to design targeted assistance for the most vulnerable

individuals or groups (TSI Colombia, practice on social

housing in protected environment in Armenia, Georgia

and Serbia).

The profiling of urban IDPs should be used more sys-
tematically to provide valuable socioeconomic data on

displaced households and the communities they live in,
it which in turn should be used to address IDPs’ specific

needs and inform longer-term public policy.

The focus on displaced individuals and households

should shift to area-based interventions integrated into

broader urban planning and growth strategies.

Such a shift requires cooperation with municipal au-
thorities, and could potentially lead to practices be-

coming institutionalised.

The cost-effectiveness of shifting to more area-based

interventions should be analysed further, but involving

the development sector earlier during the humani-
tarian phase can help share the costs of longer-term

interventions.

Authorities and humanitarian organisations should con-

tinue to identify and meet IDPs’ specific needs, particu-

larly those of vulnerable individuals, if they can-

not be addressed by general approaches. Targeted

support to facilitate durable solutions is a case in point.

As displacement becomes protracted, IDPs’ less

obvious needs, such as psychosocial support to

deal with trauma, tend to be overlooked, making those

affected more vulnerable over time.

Area-based approaches involve humanitarians establish-

ing links with and supporting local authorities and private

sector organisations, many of which are development-orien-
ted. Urban planning must be a core component of any

programme design. In the case of Jordan, where support

for host municipalities was increased, it was clear that it

helped better serve refugees and host communities in

Jordan in the long term, instead of providing only emer-
gency aid and shelter.

Increasing the urban housing supply is a significant de-

velopment resource and economic multiplier, with up-

stream linkages to building materials and land markets

and downstream linkages to construction companies

and employment. The local production and supply of

goods and provision of services for IDPs can make a

significant contribution to a city’s economy. In the case

of Banco Palmas in Brazil, an effective and innovative

finance mechanism allowed residents who were formerly

IDPs to come together and apply the multiplier principle

to generate economic development in the town. By es-

tablishing a community development bank and circulating

their own currency, they were able to ensure that

loans were reinvested in community businesses, which

would later expand the tax base.

The role of the private sector has not been examined in

this report, but it should be remembered that commercial

entities are often the main providers of urban infrastruc-

ture and services. Housing supply is also generally a

product of the housing market, in which governments’

role is limited to that of regulator and sometimes finan-
cier. This report was not able to address questions of

urban scale, for example how supporting municipalities

or working with commercial service providers in second

and third-tier cities might differ from working in large

capitals or megacities.

The links between private infrastructure and service

providers (i.e. water, electricity, solid waste manage-

ment), their regulation by the municipality and the way

the international humanitarian and development

communities can better support them should be stud-

ied further.

The selected practices show how a shift from short-
term to longer-term approaches can take place. Housing

policies should go beyond short-term action to facilitate

durable solutions, either by linking up with development

work or their incorporation into national frameworks on

housing and displacement – as in Haiti cash grant and

Kosovo - or into municipal urban planning, as in TSI Co-

lombia and Jordan Host Community Support Platform.

When practices are integrated into or influence national

policies, the knowledge transfer and change in institu-
tional norms can extend their reach. The institutionalisa-
tion of an approach can take it further than the NGO or

agency that initially implemented the practice.

Authorities can adopt practices into their policies, as in Jordan, or

international organisations can learn from one another, as

in Haiti, cash rental guidelines and adapt their practices to

different contexts. In Somalia, a shift in societal norms

took place, in which IDPs and their landlords gradually

entered into written lease agreements without the inter-

vention of a third party, because they recognised their

usefulness.

It is clear that significant political will is required if prac-
tices are to be relevant and succeed. The role of politics

in urban spaces, however, is not addressed in this report

and needs to be analysed further. Decisions that have a

significant bearing on the lives of marginalised people

in urban areas are determined by political forces, and

adequate solutions often depend on how well they are

handled by those working with such groups and the ben-

eficiaries themselves.

The evaluation of cost-effectiveness was also a chal-

lenge, because the elements taken into account can

vary significantly between practices, and certain aspects,
such as psychological support, cannot be quantified. The

report was also only able to focus on broad replicability

criteria, given the high number of possible variables.

18 March 2015 | Home sweet home

Housing programs and policies that support durable solutions for urban IDPs
19

1918
It is important to note that people in many countries and/or IDPs are marginalised as a consequence of the country (source: IASC, Framework for Durable Solutions, 2014).

A durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement. A durable solution can be achieved through: 1) Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (hereinafter referred to as ‘return’), 2) Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge (local integration) or 3) Sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country) (source: IASC, Framework for Durable Solutions, 2010).

Sustainable Integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country) (source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, ST/ESA/SER.A/352, 2014, p 7).


16. ALNAP, Meeting the Urban Challenge: Adapting Humanitarian Efforts to an Urban World, Overseas Development Institute, July 2012.


25. See section D below and the discussion on the UN evictions guidelines (complete footnote).


29. These elements were identified by CESCR in general comment number four in 1999.


33. ALNAP, Meeting the Urban Challenge: Adapting Humanitarian Efforts to an Urban World, Overseas Development Institute, July 2012, p.4.

34. Jonathan Woetzel, Sangeeth Ram, Jan Mischke, Nicklas Garemo and Shrish Sankhe, A Blueprint for Addressing the Global Affordable Housing Challenge, McKinsey Global Institute, October 2014.

35. UN Habitat, Affordable housing should be ‘at the centre of cities’: Joan Clos. UN Habitat.org. 28 October 2014. Available at http://unhabitat.org/affordable-housing-should-be-at-the-centre-of-cities/joan-clos/.


37. UNGA, Special rapporteur on the right to adequate housing Raquel Rolnik, Guiding principles on the security of tenure of urban poor, A/HRC/25/64.


40. Lilianne Fan, s.78.

42. NRC-IFRC, Security of Tenure in Humanitarian Shelter Operations
43. UNGA, Special rapporteur on the right to adequate housing Raquel Rolnik, Guiding principles on the security of tenure of urban poor, A/HRC/24/45/64
44. For more information see Anne Davies, IDPs in Host Families and Host Communities: Assistance for Hosting Arrangements, UNHCR international protection division, 2015 http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f783j2cz.pdf
46. The Effects of Internal Displacement on Host Communities: A Case Study of Suba and Ciudad Bolivar Localities in Bogotá, Colombia, ICRC in Colombia, Brookings Institution-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, October 2011
47. CESCR, general comment number four, the right to adequate housing (article 11.1 of the covenant); and general comment number seven, the right to adequate housing (article 11.1 of the covenant) on forced evictions; and the expanded list of essential elements contained in UNHRC’s report of the special rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari, A/HRC/2/18, 5 February 2007 (see annex III, questionnaire on women and adequate housing
48. IASC, Framework for durable solutions, op. cit
49. Adequate indicators based on the right to adequate housing help guide and monitor whether states are taking action to progressively realise housing rights. Given that there are many inherent challenges, states have to demonstrate that they are continually progressing towards those rights and are not taking any regressive steps in contradiction to those rights. See annex II, Indicators on adequate housing, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the special rapporteur on adequate housing, Miloon Kothari, A/HRC/2/18, 5 February 2007.
50. Lilianne Fan, p 75
51. When applied to tools, the table reflects the extent to which the tool can address some of these elements. It does not refer to the practice that illustrates the tool.
52. The first 7 essential elements are presented in the UN CESCR, its general comment no. 4 and no. 7 to the right to adequate housing (article 11.1 of the covenant). The expanded list of essential elements 8 to 13 are contained in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the special rapporteur on adequate housing, Miloon Kothari, A/HRC/2/18, 5 February 2007 (see annex III of the report, questionnaire on women and adequate housing)
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is the leading source of information and analysis on internal displacement. For the millions of people worldwide displaced within their own country, IDMC plays a unique role as a global monitor and evidence-based advocate to influence policy and action by governments, UN agencies, donors, international organisations and NGOs.

IDMC was established in 1998 at the request of the Interagency Standing Committee on humanitarian assistance. Since then, IDMC's unique global function has been recognised and reiterated in annual UN General Assembly resolutions.

IDMC is part of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), an independent, non-governmental humanitarian organisation.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
Norwegian Refugee Council
Chemin de Balexert 7–9
CH-1219 Châtelaine (Geneva)
Tel: +41 22 799 0700, Fax: +41 22 799 0701

www.internal-displacement.org
facebook.com/InternalDisplacement
twitter.com/idmc_geneva

About DRAN

The Displacement Research and Action Network (DRAN), an initiative of the Program for Human Rights and Justice at the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It’s the first-ever global academic network on displacement and land rights. It brings together academics, activists, organizations, and policy makers to build new theory and evidence of the increasing incidence of internal displacement around the world due to development, conflict or climate disaster.

For more information, please visit

http://displacement.mit.edu

www.facebook.com/displacementnetwork
twitter.com/displacementnet