New displacement associated with conflict and disasters in 2015

- Ethiopia: Conflict 56,000
- Democratic Republic of Congo: Conflict 621,000
- Nigeria: Conflict 737,000
- Somalia: Conflict 90,000
- Niger: Conflict 47,000
- Kenya: Disasters 105,000
- Malawi: Disasters 343,000
- Mozambique: Disasters 61,000
- Madagascar: Disasters 87,000
- Sudan: Conflict 144,000
- South Sudan: Conflict 199,000
- Egypt: Conflict 78,000
- Libya: Conflict 100,000
- Chad: Conflict 36,000
- Guinea: Disasters 34,000
- Central African Republic: Conflict 210,000
- Democratic Republic of Congo: Conflict 621,000
- Burundi: Conflict 23,000

NOTE: For both types of displacement, the number is shown only when it exceeds 20,000. The size of the pie charts is fixed for estimates of 5,000 or less. In a few cases, the same person may be displaced more than once.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.
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Cover photo: Families who have been displaced by ongoing fighting in South Sudan arrive in Thanyang, Unity State with what few possessions they have. Photo © UNICEF/UN016646/Holt, March 2016

The Pan-African Liaison Office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, leads the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)'s harmonised and coordinated engagement with the African Union (AU) and regional institutions in Africa. In addition, the Pan-Africa office ensures and oversees the attainment of objectives as outlined in the NRC-AU Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2013.

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Internal displacement has long been a concern of African governments and the African Union (AU) as a source of suffering for millions of people, a driver of food insecurity and a barrier to the sustained development we all seek.

This is the first report from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) to focus exclusively on the African continent. It offers a timely reminder of the scale and complexity of the problem as we mark the anniversary of the entry into force of the Kampala Convention, Africa’s landmark commitment to preventing displacement and protecting the rights of internally displaced people (IDPs).

Conflict, violence and disasters force millions of Africans from their homes, communities and livelihoods each year, and initial figures for 2016 suggest this year will be no different. Data and analysis of the kind IDMC presents here is an important contribution to our own efforts to understand and act on the factors that drive displacement, in order to bring the numbers down and assist and protect those affected.

Monitoring of internal displacement has improved in recent decades, but there are still too many gaps in our knowledge even on the impacts of conflict and disasters. For two of the key drivers of displacement in Africa, drought and development projects, we lack even the most basic information. To deliver on our commitments, under not only the Kampala Convention but a whole range of AU and global policy frameworks from Sendai to the Common African Position on Humanitarian Effectiveness, we need to collect, analyse and share much more data.

A 2013 memorandum of understanding between the AU and the Norwegian Refugee Council offers a way forward. IDMC is a specialised unit within NRC and a global leader in monitoring internal displacement. In the spirit of supporting African priorities in relation to displacement and humanitarian action, it is keen to partner with interested governments and their designated agencies to improve their capacity for national data collection. Alternative sources of information can complement traditional methods when information is hard to come by, and scenario modelling tools are being developed to help inform better planning and prevention.

The resulting data and analysis could be of real value to national governments grappling with the challenges of displacement. It could also support the deliberations of the AU’s Peace and Security Council, coordination on post-conflict reconstruction and development and AU humanitarian needs assessments, as well as guiding the conference of state parties to the Kampala Convention.

As of last December, the number of people living in displacement across the continent was more than the entire population of Kinshasa. If we expand our evidence base and use it as the foundation for coordinated action at the national, regional and continental level, together we can ensure fewer people face the trauma and upheaval of displacement year on year.

Maya Sahli Fadel
AU Special Rapporteur on refugees, asylum seekers, migrants and IDPs
This is IDMC’s first report to focus specifically on internal displacement in Africa. It sets out and analyses the global estimates from 2015 and a selection of the latest estimates from 2016 for people displaced by conflict, violence and rapid-onset disasters across the continent. It also highlights the gaps in the data that policymakers need, and suggests ways forward for improving our collective understanding of the issues.

Part 1 of the report covers displacement that is already “on the radar”. There were 3.5 million new displacements linked to conflict, violence and disasters in 47 African countries in 2015. That is an average of more than 9,500 people a day being uprooted from their homes, communities and livelihoods.

More than 2.4 million people were displaced by conflict and violence, making the continent second only to the Middle East for violence as a cause of flight. Nigeria accounted for more than 30 per cent of the total, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) a quarter.

As of the end of 2015, nearly 12.4 million people were living in displacement across Africa as a result of conflict and violence. That is 30 per cent of the global total, and more than twice the number of refugees on the continent. East Africa accounted for more than half of the total, as it has done for six of the last seven years, chiefly the result of unresolved conflict and insecurity in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

Disasters triggered by rapid-onset natural hazards forced 1.1 million people from their homes in 33 countries. Flooding is by far the most significant cause of flight, accounting for more than 90 per cent of displacement associated with disasters every year since 2009.

These estimates, however, paint only a partial picture. Part 2 of the report explores two important drivers of displacement in Africa that have so far been “off the radar”, namely drought and development projects. We explain why people displaced in such contexts should be recognised as IDPs, and explore some of the challenges inherent in making their protection and assistance needs more visible. We also discuss some of the consequences of failing to do so for those displaced, the governments responsible for them and others working in the humanitarian and development fields.

Part 3 reviews the main data gaps on all the major causes of displacement and the challenges that a lack of sound information presents for Africa’s humanitarian, development, disaster preparedness and climate change adaptation goals. It outlines the support we can offer governments that want a clearer picture of displacement in their countries, including capacity building and decision-making support using computer modeling tools.

Africa faces an internal displacement crisis. If we are to resolve it, we need to improve our collective understanding of its causes and consequences, and of the needs and coping strategies of those it affects. As the world’s leading monitor of internal displacement, we aim to partner with the AU and African governments in expanding the provision of knowledge and analysis to that end.
Introduction

About 3.5 million people were internally displaced by conflict, violence and rapid-onset disasters in Africa during 2015. That is an average of more than 9,500 people a day uprooted from their homes.

The total number of people displaced by conflict and violence as of the end of the year, including those who fled previously, was just under 12.4 million. We are currently unable to make an equivalent cumulative estimate for people displaced by disasters.

Significant though the numbers are, they are certainly an underestimate, because data is simply not available for all instances of displacement. Blind spots in our understanding of the phenomenon hamper efforts to prevent it in the future and to provide effective protection and assistance to those already affected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>New displacement Jan – Dec 2015</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs at end 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT</td>
<td>2.4 million</td>
<td>12.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISASTERS*</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Disasters triggered by rapid-onset natural hazards
NEW DISPLACEMENT
People who fled conflict and violence in 2015 and 2016

Conflict displaced more than 2.4 million people in 14 African countries during 2015, making the continent second only to the Middle East for violence as a cause of flight. Nigeria accounted for more than 30 per cent of the figure, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) a quarter. As figure 1.2 shows, violence forced more than 736,000 people from their homes in Nigeria during the year, more than in any other African country.

It is indicative of the scale of the challenge national governments face that people newly displaced in 2015 represented a significant portion of the total population in some cases: more than four per cent in the Central African Republic (CAR) and almost two per cent in Libya and South Sudan (see figure 1.3).

Figure 1.2: Countries with most new displacement linked to conflict in 2015

![Chart showing countries with most new displacement linked to conflict in 2015.]

Figure 1.3: Countries with most new displacement associated with conflict and violence relative to population size in 2015

![Chart showing countries with most new displacement associated with conflict and violence relative to population size in 2015.]
Sub-regional patterns of displacement over the past seven years reflect the ebb and flow of the continent’s major conflicts (see figure 1.4). A combination of violence and insecurity in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan has kept figures high in east Africa. They dipped as a result of positive developments in 2011 and 2012, but rose again after renewed fighting broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. A sharp fall in new displacement from its 2014 peak, largely in South Sudan, was not accompanied by mass returns, suggesting that many of those most at risk of violence had already fled and were unable to return home. South Sudan, Sudan and DRC were among the ten countries with the highest levels of new internal displacement worldwide in the first half of 2016 (see spotlight). Somalia saw some former refugees return to become IDPs in 2016. More than 24,600 Somalis were repatriated from Kenya between January and October 2016, under an agreement between the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Kenyan and Somali governments. Most people have returned to Baidoa, Kismayo, Luuq and Mogadishu, where they are living as IDPs.

Waves of new displacement in central Africa have followed upsurges in the persistent violence in DRC and the conflict that erupted in CAR in late 2012. The peak in west Africa’s displacement figures coincided with post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 and 2011, and violence linked to Boko Haram’s escalating insurgency in Nigeria from 2013 onwards. Little data is available on new displacement associated with conflict in north Africa, but the highest levels were recorded following the Arab spring uprisings in 2011 and events in Libya in 2014. Estimates for displacement related to conflict and violence in southern Africa were undetermined.
DRC, South Sudan and Sudan represent three of the largest internal displacement crises not just in Africa, but in the world. Together with neighbouring CAR, the four countries were hosting more than 6.8 million people uprooted by conflict and violence as of the end of 2015. That is half of all internally displaced people (IDPs) on the continent, and one in six worldwide. Almost 1.2 million people were newly displaced in the four countries during 2015 alone, and the pattern of violence and upheaval continued in the first half of 2016.

In DRC, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 517,000 people fled insecurity caused primarily by military operations against armed groups in the east of the country in the first nine months of 2016. In Sudan, 13 years after the start of the conflict in Darfur, around 192,000 people were reported as displaced in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile between January and the end of August. Despite the signing of a peace agreement between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition in August 2015, renewed clashes in the South Sudanese capital of Juba and other locations across the country displaced around 96,000 people between January and August.

Each context is complex and unique, but the drivers of displacement in all four countries are interlinked, contributing to an enduring crisis that is as much regional as national. Porous borders, poor infrastructure and a lack of inter-state coordination make it relatively easy for armed groups to move from one country to another, and hamper the protection of civilians. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been active in all four countries over the last five years, displacing hundreds of thousands of people. OCHA estimated in 2015 that more than 180,000 people were living as IDPs and more than 19,000 as refugees in areas affected by the group as of August 2015.

Many of those unable to find safety in their own country also flee across borders. As of September 2016, more than 660,000 refugees from the four countries were living in one of the others (see map). In countries already struggling to meet their IDPs’ needs, an influx of refugees risks triggering a vicious cycle of population movements as resources wane and tensions rise across the region. Violence in host countries has at times forced refugees back inside their own borders. More complex still, a dispute about where the international border lies between Sudan and South Sudan leaves the status of around 82,000 people displaced in the contested region of Abyei undetermined, complicating their efforts to obtain assistance and protection.

Widespread food insecurity in all four countries has also been both a cause and a consequence of violence and displacement. Disasters triggered by natural hazards compound these problems, and have displaced more than 1.5 million people since 2009.

Displacement in any one of the countries cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from its neighbours. A better understanding of its causes and consequences calls for a more regional approach to collecting, sharing and analysing information.
Disasters triggered by rapid-onset natural hazards forced 1.1 million people from their homes in 33 African countries in 2015. Southern Africa was particularly hard hit, with more than 410,000 people uprooted. More than 386,000 people fled their homes in east Africa, and more than 190,000 in west Africa (see figure 1.6).

The scale of displacement triggered by rapid-onset natural hazards is largely determined by the location of homes in areas prone to their impacts, and people’s underlying vulnerability to shocks and stresses that can make their homes uninhabitable, disrupt or destroy their livelihoods and leave them with few safe and voluntary solutions to their predicament.

There are both economic and political aspects to the vulnerability side of the equation. The poverty that affects around 330 million Africans means communities have few resources to invest in making their homes safe to remain in or recovering quickly from displacement. The fault lines that make some countries prone to crises reduce the authorities’ capacity and sometimes their political will to protect residents against the impact of natural hazards. It is indicative that 18 of the 20 African countries with the most new displacement associated with disasters in 2015 are in the bottom category of the UN Human Development Index. Ninety-seven per cent of people who fled disasters that year did so in countries ranked in the four highest-risk categories of the Fragile States Index compiled by the Fund for Peace: very high alert, high alert, alert and high warning (see figure 1.7).

Floods: the main trigger of displacement linked to rapid-onset disasters in Africa

Floods displaced more than 14 million people in Africa between 2009 and 2015, more than the entire population of Zimbabwe or an average of 5,000 people a day. Disasters triggered by floods were the main cause of displacement each year, always accounting for at least 90 per cent of the people who fled their homes (see figure 1.8).
2015, they displaced more than a million people (see figure 1.9).

The trend continued in the first half of 2016, when floods forced 56,000 people from their homes and land in seven regions of Ethiopia. As of the end of July 2016, more than 50,000 were reported to have returned to their places of origin as the floodwaters receded.15

Extreme variability in rainfall patterns may result in alternating periods of flooding and drought. Malawi suffered the continent’s worst displacement triggered by flooding relative to population size in 2015 and then, like much of southern Africa, was affected by drought in early 2016 (see spotlight). Drought itself contributes significantly to displacement by putting strain on agricultural and pastoral livelihoods and food security, but data on the phenomenon is scarce, as discussed in part 2 of this report.

Climate change, in tandem with drivers of people’s increasing exposure and vulnerability, is expected to heighten the risk of displacement globally in the coming years and decades as extreme weather events become more frequent and intense.16 Projected weather patterns over the 21st century include an increase in drought and heavy rainfall in southern and east Africa, more intense precipitation in west Africa and more frequent heatwaves in north Africa.17
Around 80 per cent of Malawi’s population depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, and they are highly vulnerable to cycles of recurrent flooding and drought. Seasonal floods in January 2015 caused widespread agricultural damage and displaced more than 336,000 people. The floodwaters carried away livestock, destroyed thousands of buildings, homes and assets, and damaged roads, bridges, irrigation systems, schools and health facilities.

It was the world’s tenth-largest displacement of the year associated with a disaster, but only an incomplete picture of what happened to those affected is currently available. The worst affected districts were also among the country’s poorest, and many of those made homeless had no reserves to draw on to rebuild their homes or restore their livelihoods.

Many people, 106,000 in all, took refuge with relatives. The available data does not reveal what happened to them from that point, because monitoring focused on IDPs in formal sites and camps.

Four months after the floods struck, 107,000 people were still living in 131 displacement camps. Eighty-five per cent were from the districts of Nsanje and Chikwawa, and 64 per cent said their homes had been completely destroyed. Ninety-four per cent of those from Nsanje and 56 per cent from Chikwawa said they would be unable to go home, citing the risk of further flooding and other hazards.

By September 2015, an unspecified number of people remained in ten camps in the two districts. They were allocated land elsewhere to settle on, but some of it was reported to be unsuitable.

As of October 2016, more than 18 months after the flooding took place, hundreds of people displaced in Nsanje were still struggling to obtain land for permanent settlement elsewhere. It is not clear from the available data how many of those originally displaced have been able to achieve durable solutions by returning to their home areas or settling elsewhere.

Southern Africa’s worst agricultural drought in 35 years has led to severe food shortages in Malawi and across the region in 2016. The humanitarian impact is expected to be significant and long lasting, further reducing families’ ability to cope and making displacement more likely in the future.
There were nearly 12.4 million people living in internal displacement in Africa as a result of conflict and violence as of the end of 2015. That is more than the entire population of Kinshasa, and 30 per cent of the world’s total number of IDPs (see map). It is also more than twice the number of refugees on the continent (see figure 1.10). A lack of data means we are unable to provide a similar cumulative figure for people living in internal displacement as a result of disasters and other causes, as discussed below.

Protracted conflicts keep figures stubbornly high

Despite fluctuations within sub-regions, the overall number of IDPs in Africa has remained relatively stable over the last decade (see figure 1.11), underlining the intractable nature of displacement on the continent. The numbers of people affected are among the highest in the world. DRC and Sudan have been among the ten countries with the most IDPs worldwide every year since 2003, and South Sudan has been on
the list every year since its independence in 2011. Their persistent inclusion points to a depressing reality of enduring conflict in which many people may have been forced to flee more than once.

East Africa accounted for more than half of the continent’s total headcount in 2015, as it has done for six of the last seven years, chiefly the result of unresolved conflict and insecurity in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. The three countries, along with DRC and Nigeria, accounted for more than three-quarters of all IDPs living in displacement as a result of conflict and violence in Africa as of the end of 2015. New displacement recorded in all five countries in 2015 and 2016 suggests that causes are not being addressed (see figure 1.12).

To do so requires a clear understanding of the phenomenon, particularly the ways in which conflict and other factors such as natural hazards tend to act as interrelated drivers of vulnerability, crisis and displacement (see Nigeria spotlight).

What the figures don’t show: unreported displacement associated with conflict

Governments and their international partners provide monitoring data for Africa’s major displacement crises caused by conflict, but geographical coverage is often incomplete because access is limited by insecurity.

In north-eastern Nigeria, swathes of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states were inaccessible to moni-


tors for the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for much of 2014 and 2015. When access improved in mid-2016, high levels of need were identified among both displaced and host communities. In some countries, monitoring is limited to areas of particular concern to national authorities, such as Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile in Sudan. A lack of data on other areas such as Nile, White Nile and Kassala where violence was reported in 2015 mean further displacement may go unmonitored.

In other cases, no reasonably indicative data at all is available on which to base an up-to-date estimate. The last source we have been able to reference for Algeria dates from 2004. Information published since by international bodies and the Algerian authorities has been contradictory and has not always distinguished between displacement and economic migration, making it unusable for estimating the number of IDPs.

Even when current figures are available for IDPs, there tends to be no information on the number and situation of those who have returned or settled elsewhere, meaning that the extent to which people have been able to achieve durable solutions is unknown. Nor does “snapshot” data fully capture instances of repeated displacement, whether pendular, secondary or otherwise.

In DRC, many people either have to move back and forth between their homes and displacement sites, or are forced to move on again from their temporary shelters by renewed insecurity. The fact that monthly headcounts do not quantify such movements means that governments and their international partners have an incomplete basis on which
to plan a tailored response to IDPs’ needs. There also tends to be relatively little information on the number and needs of IDPs living in host communities rather than camps in DRC and elsewhere.

**Invisible IDPs: people displaced by disasters**

The estimates for displacement associated with disasters presented in this report are based on aggregated incidents of new displacement that occurred during 2015. There is very little information on the number of people still displaced at the end of the year as a result of earlier disasters, but what evidence does exist suggests the figures are probably significant. At present we are unable to estimate a cumulative total for people displaced by disasters as we do for those displaced by conflict.

Whatever the cause of their displacement, data on the number of IDPs and their needs tends to become more scarce the longer they are displaced. The mistaken assumption that displacement associated with disasters is temporary and short-lived makes such information scarcer still. Depending on the nature and impact of a disaster, a significant proportion of those who flee may be able to return quickly to their homes. When disaster strikes suddenly, however, people tend to scatter and move on repeatedly, making them difficult to identify and track. Even if they do return, they may not be able to recover and achieve a durable solution. If the risks they face are undiminished or have worsened, a chronic cycle of increasing vulnerability and displacement may ensue.

“Residual caseloads” of people unable to return or resettle after a major disaster, and those displaced by locally recurring or smaller disasters, do not attract the same attention as IDPs at the peak of a mass displacement. As a result, their vulnerabilities tend to be overlooked. Better data collection and monitoring of people displaced by disasters over time would help to avoid IDPs being left behind in recovery, disaster risk reduction and development efforts.
The example of Nigeria illustrates the importance of understanding the range of factors that contribute to displacement. Of the nearly 2.1 million people estimated as displaced in the country as of August 2016, almost 90 per cent were recorded as having fled the Boko Haram insurgency. That is only part of the picture, however. Poor understanding of the endemic underlying factors has resulted in a fragmented response and has the potential to undermine current and future efforts to support IDPs in achieving durable solutions.

The source of long-standing instability in northeastern Nigeria has been traced in large part to frustration among young people about a lack of education and livelihood opportunities. The surface area of Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 per cent over the last 45 years, putting livelihoods and access to water and grazing under strain. The disappearance of the vast majority of the lake is the combined result of human impacts – including the damming of tributaries, poor water management and overgrazing – and climate change. Increasing numbers of people have migrated south along the edge of the Lake Chad basin, which over time has led around 70 ethnic groups to converge, sparking competition.
for resources, tensions and conflict. These have increased in scale and geographical scope since the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{36}

Other structural drivers have also contributed to displacement. Historical problems of governance and corruption,\textsuperscript{37} and a lack of investment in transport, agricultural and energy infrastructure have left north-eastern Nigeria dependent on imported food despite having some of the wider region’s most fertile land.\textsuperscript{38} Food insecurity is high and made worse by the absence of welfare programmes and currency fluctuations. Despite the economic growth Nigeria has experienced in the last decade, social indicators in the north-east are desperately poor.\textsuperscript{39}

Figure 1.13 illustrates how these drivers interact and how any response to the country’s displacement crisis cannot afford to overlook the economic, social, political and environmental factors that have accumulated over time, paving the way for conflict and violence that has forced people to flee their homes. The ostensible trigger of displacement, Boko Haram’s attacks, are just the tip of the iceberg in terms of understanding the phenomenon. By August 2016, more than 910,000 IDPs had returned home following military gains by the government.\textsuperscript{40} Efforts to support their achievement of durable solutions will only be effective if they engage with the causes that lie below the surface.
IDMC has to date monitored displacement associated with conflict, violence and disasters brought on by rapid-onset natural hazards. The figures set out above, alarming though they are, do not capture other contexts in which many thousands, if not millions, of Africans are forced to flee their homes and livelihoods.

In recent years, we have been building up evidence on displacement associated with other factors, including two of particular relevance for Africa – development projects and slow-onset crises related to drought and environmental change. In this section we explain why people displaced in such contexts should be recognised as IDPs, and explore some of the challenges inherent in making their protection and assistance needs more visible. We also discuss some of the consequences of failing to do so for those displaced, the governments responsible for them and others working in the humanitarian and development fields.

Ethiopia is experiencing one of the most severe droughts in half a century due to the effects of El Niño. Significant rainfall deficits – up to 50 per cent below average – have had a severe impact on the lives and livelihoods of farmers and herders throughout the country. Photo: NRC, April 2016
People displaced by DISASTERS LINKED TO DROUGHT

The challenges of estimating displacement associated with drought

We do not include internal displacement associated with the impacts of drought on food and livelihood security in our estimates for a number of reasons. Drought means different things in different contexts. It is a relative rather than an absolute state, and can occur in both high and low-rainfall areas. It is difficult to determine its onset and end, and its impacts tend to be more diffuse and cover a wider geographical area than other hazards.

Drought is not only about rainfall, although it can be defined in relation to precipitation levels, as is the case with meteorological drought. Agricultural drought describes a situation where soil moisture is insufficient to sustain crops, forage growth and pasture. Hydrological drought refers to below-average ground and surface water levels that affect activities such as urban water consumption, hydroelectric power production and ecosystem conservation. In the case of both agricultural and hydrological drought, there is no direct relationship with precipitation levels and there may be a considerable time-lag before effects are observed. Environmental drought is a combination of all these factors.

The delayed impact of drought creates further complications when it comes to trying to estimate associated displacement. Unlike floods and earthquakes, which are direct physical threats that trigger immediate displacement, drought heightens displacement risk gradually and indirectly. Its effects, however, are no less significant. It progressively erodes food and livelihood security among vulnerable populations to the point where leaving their homes becomes a survival strategy, often of last resort. As such, displacement may occur many months after its onset, and rather than fleeing en masse, individuals and households tend to leave gradually over extended periods, making the phenomenon less visible.

The slow onset and diffuse impacts of drought also make it harder to distinguish between forced and voluntary migration. In practice, displacement is neither wholly forced or voluntary. It sits on a continuum ranging from predominantly forced to predominantly voluntary movements, where the former emphasises push factors to leave and the latter pull factors at the intended destination. Displacement might be seen as a tipping point where abnormal movement patterns indicate the breakdown of people’s normal coping strategies under severely stressed conditions.

Despite the difficulties inherent in drawing the distinction, identifying people as IDPs rather than voluntary migrants may highlight their need for help from governments, humanitarians and development organisations. Following low rainfall and failed harvests in Niger in 2010, many poor households anticipated that normal migration strategies to meet seasonal food shortages would not be sufficient, and moved their households to search for work in urban areas. Identifying the causes of their displacement drew attention to their need for emergency food assistance.41

For all of the above reasons, very little data on displacement associated with drought is systematically collected. Even when it is, as in Somalia and Ethiopia, people are generally recorded as displaced by either drought or another single factor, rather than taking a range of causes into account. This failure to capture the complex backdrop to their displacement also limits understanding of their needs and potential solutions to their predicament.

What displacement associated with drought means for Africa

A combination of the factors outlined above mean that displacement linked to drought is poorly reported, limiting the ability of governments and aid agencies to analyse trends and take effective, early action to prevent or mitigate its impacts (see Ethiopia spotlight for an exception). This blind spot is particularly alarming for sub-regions such as the Greater Horn of Africa, where drought is a perennial concern that erodes...
people’s capacity to cope and increases their vulnerability from one year to the next.42

Africa is particularly susceptible to drought and the disasters it can trigger. Rising temperatures, diminishing rainfall and more frequent droughts have become a pattern in recent decades.43 Given that food production is predominantly rain-fed and most farmers are land and resource-poor, large sections of the population are highly exposed and significantly vulnerable to the impact of environmental pressures.44 A third of Africa’s population live in areas prone to drought and are vulnerable to its impacts.45

Displacement linked to drought has an adverse effect on food security. As seen in several African countries in 2015 and 2016, unresolved displacement can make food insecurity worse because planting and harvesting are disrupted while farmers are absent from their land.46 This in turn increases the risk of further displacement.

Drought may increase the risk of other environmental hazards that cause displacement. The high temperatures and arid conditions characteristic of drought may trigger wildfires, which forced more than 18,000 people from their homes between 2013 and 2015. Drought also increases the risk of flooding because desiccated land is less able to absorb heavy rainfall. When recurrent, it may also contribute to longer-term processes of environmental degradation such as increased soil erosion, the deterioration of rangeland, deforestation and biodiversity loss. This in turn may force vulnerable groups to seek alternative livelihoods and places to live. Drought can heighten the risk of conflict. In many countries, drought and other natural hazards help to drive conflict and exacerbate its consequences, including displacement (see Nigeria spotlight).47

Understanding these dynamics and their effect on population movements is important, because the drivers and impacts of drought are closely linked to human action, and as such can be affected by policy choices. Our research in the Horn of Africa highlights a range of human factors, from herd size and composition to remittance flows, that combine with drought to contribute to the displacement of pastoralists from their traditional source of livelihood.48 Given a more comprehensive understanding of the drivers of displacement associated with drought, governments and their partners would be able to identify effective policy options to mitigate risk and respond to the needs of those affected.
Drought linked to the El Niño phenomenon and subsequent flooding displaced hundreds of thousands of people in Ethiopia in 2015 and early 2016. The country suffered one of its worst meteorological droughts for 50 years in 2015, following the failure of two consecutive rainy seasons. It contributed to the lowest soil moisture levels in at least 30 years, crop failure, below-average vegetation cover and severe water shortages in pastoral and arable farming areas.

Devastated livelihoods and high inflation combined to increase food insecurity and malnutrition rates, particularly in central and eastern areas, forcing many people to leave their homes in search of food, water and work. Almost 148,000 people fled severe food insecurity linked to drought between August 2015 and February 2016. Drought also contributed to resource-based competition, which prompted the displacement of about 246,000 people in the predominantly pastoralist Somali region alone between January and May 2016.

From March 2016, heavy rains falling on ground desiccated by almost 18 months of drought resulted in flash flooding. By August at least 56,000 people had been displaced, while failed rains in other areas extended the drought and increased competition for resources. The government forecast that 460,000 people risked being displaced by floods in 2016.

With communities’ capacity to cope diminished by the long drought, the cumulative effect of these recurrent crises left 9.7 million people nationwide in need of emergency food assistance. Food insecurity is verging on chronic, because farming areas that receive sufficient rain have shrunk by 16 per cent over the past 20 years.

Unless effective action is taken to boost resilience, in the long term drought and other climate-related hazards may compound structural sources of vulnerability and exposure such as poverty, demographic trends, weak institutions and environmental degradation.

While there are gaps in the information available for some parts of the country and on the numbers of people displaced by multiple causes, the collection and analysis of data on displacement linked to both slow- and rapid-onset disasters and on the coping strategies, needs and intentions of those affected can still inform Ethiopia’s policy choices to mitigate the impacts now and in the future.
Development schemes can trigger internal displacement

Current global displacement data does not capture the situation of people displaced by development projects and business activities. In Africa, however, as elsewhere around the world, large numbers of people have been forced off their land “in the public interest” as states, often in conjunction with private entities, exercise their power of eminent domain to further development through compulsory acquisition. People forced to leave their homes and land to make way for development projects are considered IDPs even if their rights to compensation and resettlement are fully respected, because they have no choice to remain. How long they remain IDPs depends on when they are able to achieve a durable solution.

A range of legal and policy instruments, both African and global, recognise this. At the continental level, the Kampala Convention, which came into force in 2012 and is currently signed by 40 African countries and ratified by 25, explicitly recognises people displaced by development projects as IDPs. It commits states to doing all they can to prevent such displacement, exploring alternatives in consultation with those affected and studying the socio-economic and environmental impacts of development projects before they are implemented. Like the Great Lakes Pact that preceded it, the convention also envisages significant measures to protect people displaced by development schemes. Kenya’s act on IDPs and Mozambique’s resettlement decree indicate national intent to protect the rights of those displaced.

Businesses and banks have also made commitments to safeguard local residents from the adverse consequences of displacement caused by the projects they undertake or finance. Under global principles, the developer is responsible for ensuring that human rights are upheld throughout the project period, and the state...
must protect people against abuses by the public and private sector, including businesses and their contractors. The major development banks and more than 80 private banks and financial institutions in Africa and around the world have signed up to minimum standards covering the displacement risks associated with development projects.

**Why understanding the displacement caused by development matters**

Understanding the phenomenon is essential to ensure the human rights of those affected are upheld and that displacement does not undermine development goals.

People displaced by development projects suffer a range of human rights violations. Their involuntary removal from their homes is a violation of the right to adequate housing. If they also lose access to land and natural resources, other rights may be undermined, including access to food, livelihoods, education, water and healthcare. Their physical security may be at risk if they resist displacement, or if force is used during evictions. Other impacts may include deteriorating health, restricted mobility and the loss of social support networks. Decades of study have shown that displacement caused by development projects leads to impoverishment and disempowerment.

It is often the most vulnerable who lose out. Indigenous people, ethnic minorities, women, children and older people are more exposed and endure the adverse effects of this type of displacement disproportionately. So too do people with insecure tenure, for instance when informal settlements are cleared to make way for urban infrastructure, often with little or no warning. In other cases, dispossession and displacement can be a gradual process. Some people may leave when a project is announced in an effort to limit their losses, but others remain and suffer deteriorating living conditions as investment and service provision in the area decline.

**Undermining development gains**

These are not the outcomes governments, private-sector developers or international finance institutions hope for when planning to develop mining, energy and water, transport and social service infrastructure, agriculture or conservation. Development initiatives may benefit large sections of the population, but if they do not count the cost to those they displace and compensate them for it, the net progress will be overstated and undermined by deepening inequality, poverty and community breakdown.

Large carbon-intensive energy sector projects such as oil extraction and coal mining also generate greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global warming, increasing the risk of disasters and future displacement. Even initiatives intended to improve environmental outcomes can force people from their homes and lands. In Uganda, a private-sector carbon offsetting project evicted at least 8,000 people with traditional land use rights from a national reserve, depriving them of access to the grazing and arable land, watering holes and forest products they depended on for their livelihoods. One source put the number of people displaced as high as 40,000.

When poorly handled, displacement and resettlement to make way for development projects can be costly, and its impacts can extend well beyond those directly affected. The failure to distribute the benefits from such projects equally if at all has in the past contributed to resistance, tensions and conflict. Communal violence may occur between local communities and new arrivals in resettlement areas, and people attempting to assert their human rights may suffer abuses. This in turn can lead to further displacement.

All too often, however, the impact of development projects and business activities on the people they force from their homes and livelihoods is not visible to policymakers because it is not planned for, monitored or reported.

**Better data for better protection and development outcomes**

Whether public authorities, private developers or international finance institutions take the lead, project planning often fails to factor in displacement adequately from the outset. An internal World Bank review in 2016 found that “the large majority of projects with involuntary resettlement that the Panel has investigated underestimated the risks of resettlement.”
Over-optimistic projections of the number of people who will be displaced and what they will need to restore or improve their livelihoods can ratchet up real costs over time, as in the case of the Kandadji dam in Niger. In some cases, projections may be understated to increase the chances of the scheme being approved and funded.

Compensation and resettlement should be budgeted and planned for, but they are often not available to those displaced. Around 9,000 people evicted from a slum area of Lagos, Nigeria, in February 2013 to make way for an urban regeneration scheme had still not received compensation or tenure security more than two years later.

Once a project has been completed or a business starts operating, monitoring the situation of those it has displaced becomes even harder. The number of people displaced is rarely reported, project documents are not routinely published and even if they are, they do not necessarily contain such information. When it is given, the units of analysis are inconsistent – variously households, families, people or cases. The World Bank reported in 2012 that most of its completion reports did not provide substantive information about resettlement outcomes, and the same tends to be true for projects implemented by other multilateral financial institutions, private companies and governments.

Placing the data that does exist on people displaced by development projects and business activities in Africa in the public domain would facilitate an initial assessment of the situation, and as such would constitute a significant step towards improving their protection. Adequate consultation, preparation and costing from the outset should also be the norm for new initiatives that involve unavoidable displacement, in order to preserve positive development outcomes. Governments and investors should insist on credible evidence from developers that they have done so, and ensure that the numbers and situation of people displaced are systematically monitored, reported and addressed.
In order to paint a comprehensive picture of internal displacement globally and for Africa, high-quality data on people already displaced and new displacements is needed for each of the major drivers – including conflict and violence, rapid and slow-onset disasters and development projects – and on the processes responsible for increases or decreases in the number of IDPs.

The data currently available, however, is incomplete in a number of ways (see table 3.1) and as a result we are unable to compile estimates for some of the major drivers in Africa, such as development projects and slow-onset hazards such as drought. Our estimates for displacement associated with conflict and violence draw on a far larger body of data, but gaps still remain as summarised below.

Conservative estimates for displacement associated with conflict

For each of the displacement situations associated with conflict and violence that we reported on in 2015, we were able to estimate the number of IDPs as of the end of year and the incidents of new displacement during it based on direct reporting from the field or by inference from increases in the size of displaced populations.

We have much more difficulty in obtaining data on the processes that may lead to the end of displacement and the number of IDPs who have fled across international borders. There is also little information available about the number of children born and the number of people who die in displacement.

Of the 21 African countries and territories for which we provided estimates in 2015, data on returns was
only available for eight countries – Burundi, CAR, Chad, DRC, Libya, Mali, Niger and Sudan. Data on IDPs who settled elsewhere was available only for Egypt, and none at all was available on those who may have integrated locally. Data on children born to IDPs was only available for South Sudan, and there was no information at all on deaths in displacement or IDPs who may have fled onwards across borders (see table 3.2).

In the absence of credible data on outflows, our estimates are deliberately conservative. When we receive information that IDPs have returned, integrated locally or settled elsewhere, we subtract them from our totals regardless of whether they are known to have achieved a durable solution.

Add to this the differing definitions and monitoring methodologies in use within and between countries, and the widespread shortage of data disaggregated by age and sex, and it becomes clear that the information available is often far from comprehensive. This makes it difficult to provide policymakers and responders with an accurate assessment of IDPs’ needs, the potential vulnerabilities of specific groups and the delivery of assistance. The following example illustrates a notable exception.

Table 3.1: Data gaps for the primary drivers of displacement

| Inconsistent methodologies, definitions and units of measurement |
| Not all phenomena covered by existing data collection exercises |
| Inconsistent distinction between forced and voluntary migration |
| Range of methodologies used |
| Urban and non-camp IDPs not always monitored |
| Data not disaggregated by age and sex |
| Limited data collection on end of displacement |
| Resources not allocated to monitoring displacement over time |

| Access limited by insecurity |
| Belligerents may manipulate data |

| Population movements often complex and hard to track |
| Assumptions about rapid return when this may not be the case |

| Data collection assumes displacement has a single cause |
| Distinctions between forced and voluntary migration hard to draw |

| Displacement figures underestimated or unreported |
| Project documents are not made public |
| No monitoring after project completion |

Table 3.2: Summary of data on 2015 flows that influence the total number of displacements associated with conflict or violence in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flows</th>
<th>Number of countries or territories for which data was received*</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New incidents of displacement</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Returns</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local integration</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement elsewhere</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border flight</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children born to IDPs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in displacement</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Out of 21 countries and territories surveyed
Data gaps for displacement associated with disasters

Given the shortage of data on how the number and needs of people displaced by disasters change over time, our figures are the sum of new displacements reported over the course of a year – known as flows – rather than total numbers of people living in displacement at any given moment – known as stocks. As such, they do not include people still displaced following disasters in previous years, nor do they reveal for how long people have been displaced. They do not count IDPs who have returned to their homes, settled elsewhere, integrated locally or crossed international borders to seek refuge in another country.

We are expanding our data collection in an effort to capture both stocks and outflows from them, and information on displacement associated with slow-onset disasters. The aim is to paint a more comprehensive picture of situations as they evolve and to be able to make comparisons between them. For us to do so, institutions will have to be mandated and adequately resourced to supply the necessary information.

Why Africa’s policymakers need better data

African governments have made a series of commitments on collecting and sharing data as part of efforts to prevent internal displacement and protect and assist IDPs, incorporating the principles of international law into national legislation and regional frameworks such as the Kampala Convention (see box). They have also committed to monitor and report on progress toward disaster risk reduction and development objectives both nationally and internationally, including targets under the 2015 Sendai framework, the Africa regional strategy for disaster risk reduction and the Sustainable Development Goals. None of this is achievable without a more comprehensive picture of displacement across the continent.

Reliable data on population movements is vital to ensure a timely and well targeted operational and policy response. Evidence of the multiple causes of displacement and its impact on development priorities such as food security, education, health and the protection of vulnerable groups is needed to inform effective action.
AFRICAN COMMITMENTS TO IMPROVE DATA ON IDPs

The African Union (AU) and its member states have made a number of commitments related to the collection, analysis and use of data on internal displacement.

The Kampala Convention commits signatory states to a wide range of actions to prevent arbitrary displacement and protect and assist IDPs, including via early warning systems, and disaster risk reduction, preparedness and management strategies. It also commits the AU to sharing information with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights “on the situation of displacement, and the protection and assistance accorded to internally displaced persons in Africa”.

IDPs’ protection and reintegration is a key component of the AU’s Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, which calls for the harmonisation, coordination and exchange of information.

Pillar Eight of the 2015 Common African Position on Humanitarian Effectiveness acknowledges that credible and reliable data plays an important role in improving states’ capacity to predict, prevent, respond and adapt to humanitarian crises such as displacement. It calls upon states to invest “in knowledge generation, innovation and research” and the “enhancement of national capabilities on the systematic use of existing data and the collection of new data, and the analysis and sharing of information”.

This is complemented by the AU Humanitarian Policy Framework, which calls on the AU Commission to develop a “network of information sharing and reporting systems with humanitarian actors/experts and national institutions” responsible for responding to displacement in an AU state.

African members of the UN General Assembly have also recognised the importance of gathering and sharing displacement data, including by collaborating with IDMC, in various resolutions on IDPs’ protection and assistance. The most recent was in 2015.72

Good data is also important for understanding past and future displacement trends and their many underlying drivers, and as the basis for investing effectively in measures to avert disasters, mitigate their effects and support sustainable recovery. Our research in the Horn of Africa found there was insufficient historical and current data on drought impacts to understand such trends fully, but that computer modelling based on what is available can serve as a valuable and innovative tool for policymakers (see Horn of Africa spotlight).
The pastoralist livelihood and displacement simulator is a new interactive tool developed by IDMC and Climate Interactive to explore the displacement of pastoralists associated with drought and human factors.

Recognising that the scale of displacement depends both on the hazard that triggers it and the many factors that affect people’s vulnerability, the tool models a complex chain of causality that begins with low rainfall levels and culminates in displacement (see figure 3.1). It uses computer simulation to produce estimates of displacement induced by drought that have proved accurate when tested against the available empirical evidence.

The simulator has helped to analyse the displacement of pastoralists in parts of northern Kenya, southern Ethiopia and southern Somalia. The findings suggest similar modelling could be useful for policymakers seeking to understand, prevent and mitigate displacement associated with climate-related hazards in other contexts.

The model incorporates the available historical data related to each variable selected, from precipitation to markets and pastoralist income. It can be used to:

- Simulate the impacts of drought and floods on pasture quality and productivity and livestock health, and to measure knock-on effects on pastoralist livelihoods
- Compare the simulated results of the scale and patterns of internal and cross-border displacement with historical evidence
- Inform humanitarian preparedness ahead of forecast drought or floods
- Explore the potential impacts of climate change or humanitarian and development interventions on pastoralist income, food security, displacement and resilience

Figure 3.1: High-level diagram of pastoralist displacement dynamics
How IDMC can help improve the data available on internal displacement in Africa

The data and evidence presented in this report reflect significant improvements in the way displacement has been monitored over the past three decades. Producing some of the estimates, figures and analyses would not have been possible even ten years ago. As outlined above, however, significant gaps remain that prevent our painting a comprehensive picture of internal displacement in Africa.

We can offer the AU, regional economic communities and national governments support, guidance and analytical tools to help bridge these gaps as the basis for informed policy decisions on preventing and responding to displacement. This is in keeping with a 2013 agreement between the AU Commission and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to collaborate closely on humanitarian issues by improving capacity to reduce disaster risk, respond to humanitarian emergencies, document displacement, strengthen policies to protect IDPs’ rights and foster international dialogue on displacement.

Some of the gaps identified reflect a lack of experience or capacity in data collection at the country level. We will work with governments to address such issues, both in Geneva and in country, by providing guidance and helping to improve their capacity to collect and report the necessary data using consistent and robust methodologies. This should ensure that the information collected is comparable and more complete than at present.

Beyond traditional methodologies, we can support governments in estimating displacement using other data types, sources and means of analysis. Examples include working with satellite images and anonymised mobile phone data. These innovative approaches have the potential to contribute to more accurate and timely displacement estimates.

As described above, we have developed a computer simulation model for the displacement of pastoralists associated with drought. Using similar methods, we have also modelled urban displacement triggered by floods. These models require accurate historical data on a number of variables in order to test their accuracy. Once tested, they can serve as decision-making tools that help to identify the most effective approaches for reducing the risk of displacement and responding to it quickly and effectively when it does occur.

Using historical data collected by national governments and with the support of the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), we have also begun to estimate the risk of displacement associated with disasters in several African countries. Governments will be able to use these analyses to identify how much displacement is likely to be preventable via disaster risk reduction efforts.
CONCLUSION

The data presented in this report confirms that Africa is in the throes of an internal displacement crisis. Unresolved conflicts keep millions of IDPs, double the continent’s large refugee population, trapped in displacement. Millions more people are forced from their homes and livelihoods by conflict and rapid-onset disasters every year – each case a personal tragedy and a cumulative challenge for local, national and international responders.

The picture is complex, and solutions are often elusive. Regional dynamics make it hard for one country alone to protect people from displacement. The interaction of conflict, natural hazards and environmental degradation can frustrate efforts to help IDPs return to their home areas or rebuild their lives elsewhere. These processes must be better understood in order to forge a coherent response.

Our estimates of the scale of the problem are conservative, because the data is incomplete. The monitoring of displacement has undoubtedly improved in recent decades, but it still falls short of what governments and aid agencies require to prevent the phenomenon and provide those displaced with the protection and assistance they need.

Scarcely any information is consistently collected and published on displacement associated with development projects and slow-onset disasters such as drought, two major drivers of population movements in Africa. These blind spots leave many thousands if not millions of IDPs off the radar, and policymakers ill-prepared to address their needs, prevent future displacement or accurately gauge development outcomes.

Even for displacement associated with conflict and rapid-onset disasters, there are serious gaps in the available data. Information on inflows is incomplete and on outflows it is extremely sketchy at best. We know little about how many people have returned, integrated locally, resettled elsewhere or fled across international borders; how many have been newly displaced in remote or insecure areas; and births and deaths among IDPs. What data is available is rarely disaggregated by age, sex, shelter type or location – essential information for planning a humanitarian or development response.

Frequent collections of time-series data are needed to track rapidly evolving situations, those in which IDPs move in and out of displacement relatively quickly and cases of protracted displacement. Monitoring methods also need to be better adapted to the complex, multi-causal nature of displacement in Africa. Most current data collection fails to capture this, but instead identifies only one – or one primary – cause.

Building up a more complete picture of internal displacement is a challenge, but tools and expertise are on hand to help. We are keen to partner with African governments to help improve data collection methods and capacity, making use of alternative sources and modelling the outcomes of policy choices. Working in partnership and with the support of NRC’s AU representational office in Addis Ababa, we can develop a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the number, situation and needs of displaced people on the continent and the factors that cause them to flee.

In so doing, we can provide national governments and the AU’s decision-making bodies with the insights and evidence basis they need not only to prepare for and respond to humanitarian crises and complex emergencies, but also to inform their development, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation planning for the longer term and measure progress against global policy objectives.
## Table of new displacement in Africa in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2015 (conflict and violence)</th>
<th>New displacements in 2015 (conflict and violence)</th>
<th>New displacements in 2015 (disasters)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>New displacements in 2015 (conflict and violence)</td>
<td>New displacements in 2015 (disasters)</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is the leading source of information and analysis on internal displacement worldwide. Since 1998, our role has been recognised and endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolutions. IDMC is part of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), an independent, non-governmental humanitarian organisation.