AFRICA REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

2017
New displacement associated with conflict and disasters in 2016

- **Libya**
  - Conflict: 156,000
- **Niger**
  - Conflict: 166,000
  - Disasters: 46,000
- **Senegal**
  - Disasters: 24,000
- **Chad**
  - Conflict: 36,000
- **Nigeria**
  - Conflict: 501,000
  - Disasters: 78,000
- **Cameroon**
  - Conflict: 83,000
- **CAR**
  - Conflict: 46,000
- **Republic of the Congo**
  - Conflict: 25,000
- **DRC**
  - Conflict: 922,000
  - Disasters: 130,000
- **Sudan**
  - Conflict: 97,000
  - Disasters: 123,000
- **Somalia**
  - Conflict: 113,000
  - Disasters: 70,000
- **Ethiopia**
  - Conflict: 296,000
  - Disasters: 347,000
- **South Sudan**
  - Conflict: 281,000
- **Kenya**
  - Disasters: 40,000
- **Uganda**
  - Conflict: 23,000
- **Madagascar**
  - Disasters: 51,000
- **Tanzania**
  - Disasters: 36,000

**NOTE:** For both types of displacement, the number is shown only when it exceeds 20,000. The size of the pie charts is fixed for estimates of 5,000 or less. In a few cases, the same person may be displaced more than once.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC or NRC.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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NRC partner office: The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)’s pan-African liaison office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, leads the organisation’s coordinated engagement with the African Union (AU) and regional institutions in Africa. It also oversees attainment of the objectives outlined in the memorandum of understanding signed by NRC and the AU in 2013. On the basis of that agreement, NRC has been providing support in documenting displacement and fostering regional dialogue on the phenomenon. It has convened annual consultations and workshops since 2014 to advocate for further ratification and effective implementation of the Kampala Convention across the continent. IDMC published its first Africa Report on Internal Displacement in 2016 in close collaboration with the AU Commission (AUC).

IDMC extends its thanks to the governments that provided up-to-date and detailed displacement information.

Editor: Jeremy Lennard

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Cover photo: Veronique Nzeka is a group leader in the village of Macka II which is on the outskirts of Bangui in the Central African Republic. In the neighbourhoods that are most exposed to community violence, much of the population have had to flee. They find refuge with their families or in IDP sites in the city and the surrounding villages. Photo: NRC/Alexis Huguet, August 2017

WITH THANKS

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Gadi Afliné (far right), 13, attends a skills training programme for adolescents in Mpati’s displaced persons settlement in North Kivu, DRC. She has been living there for three years with her three siblings and her mother. Her father passed away many years ago. Photo: NRC/Christian Jepsen, March 2017
The African Union is at the forefront of global legal and policy development on internal displacement. Commemorating the 5th anniversary of the first regional, legally binding convention in this area, the Kampala Convention, this year African states reconfirm their commitment to addressing the needs of internally displaced people (IDPs). Earlier in 2017, the first Conference of State Parties to the Convention was held in Zimbabwe in July 2017 and a plan of action on addressing the root causes, protecting the well-being of those displaced, and finding durable solutions was agreed upon.

The leadership that Member States of the African Union have shown to date is critically important for the future of the millions of IDPs currently living in the region. Moreover, it is critical for the future prosperity and development of the continent as articulated in its Agenda 2063. The data presented in this report shows that internal displacement really is truly a development concern: at least 37 of 55 Member States of the African Union are affected and face a challenge to meet national and regional development goals unless internal displacement is addressed.

The report highlights that countries producing refugees also have significant IDP populations, both impacting further on cross-border and regional stability and economic development. This shows that internal displacement does not occur in a vacuum and that its dynamics are multi-causal and have multiple impacts. The African Union Commission is supporting Member States to address forced displacement in a holistic manner, targeting refugees, IDPs and host communities whenever these communities live side by side.

Regional trends such as the growing rate of urbanization and economic growth, but also environmental degradation, water scarcity and the impact of climate change, all have an impact on internal displacement risk in Africa. These mega trends present challenges and opportunities. Africa’s urban growth has the potential for extending economic prosperity to millions of IDPs currently living in deprived conditions. Addressing climate change and environmental degradation offers the promise of opportunity in rural and marginal areas, tackling some of the root causes of displacement in slow-onset crises.

To do so, however, we have to build capacity in collecting and analyzing data on internal displacement at the national and regional level. Data collection is a priority area in the Harare Plan of Action. The data challenges presented in this report show that there is some way to go yet when it comes to understanding the scale and nature of internal displacement in Africa. It is in our countries’ own interest to meet these challenges as we progress towards reducing poverty, improving access to basic services and employment, and accelerating economic growth and prosperity for all.

The African Union and its Member States are set on a promising path. Their progress in disaster risk reduction, risk-sensitive agricultural development and urban planning are clear examples of the leadership that will allow us to move forward on internal displacement. Our partnership with NRC, IDMC and other relevant international partners is an important instrument in this and we hope that this report will encourage our members to embrace the opportunity for collaboration on improving the data, analysis and with it our understanding of internal displacement in Africa.

H.E. Minata Samate Cessouma
Commissioner for Political Affairs
African Union Commission
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
IDMC’s second report on internal displacement in Africa highlights the severity of the continent’s continuing displacement crisis. There were at least 12.6 million people living in internal displacement as of the end of 2016, and 3.9 million new displacements were recorded during the same year. At least 37 of Africa’s 55 countries across every region were affected.

Published to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, also known as the Kampala Convention, it calls for a new approach to displacement that addresses its causes and longer-term implications, as well as its more immediate humanitarian consequences.

The report is divided into four parts. Part 1, African Displacement in Context, describes policy developments relating to the Kampala Convention, and conflict and disaster trends in Africa. Part 2, On the Radar, presents figures and patterns of displacement associated with conflict and disasters in 2016, and highlights countries of particular concern. Part 3, Under the Radar, describes the bigger picture of displacement in Africa, including its underlying drivers, the relationship between internal and cross-border displacement and future risks. Part 4, Moving Forward, concludes the report by calling for a shift in how displacement is conceived, recorded and managed on the continent and beyond.

KEY MESSAGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal displacement is a persistent and serious problem in Africa, despite strong commitments on the part of national governments to prevent, address and resolve it. More than 3.9 million new displacements were recorded in 2016 as a result of conflict, violence and disasters, leaving 12.6 million people living in displacement inside their own countries as of the end of the year. Behind the figures are the blighted lives of millions of women, men, girls and boys who have fled their homes to escape atrocities or disasters, and who face the risk of long-term displacement and deprivation.</th>
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<td>Africa’s decades-long displacement crisis demands a different approach if its scale and impact are to be reversed. What is needed, first and foremost, is a renewal of the political will and leadership that was demonstrated by African governments when they agreed to the Kampala Convention in 2009. This requires an acknowledgement of the scale of the issue, and its impact across the continent. National and international partners must work collectively across mandates and institutional barriers to deal more systematically with the root causes, long-term impacts and immediate consequences of internal displacement.</td>
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<td>Conflict caused 70 per cent of Africa’s new displacements in 2016. The continent also accounted for 40 per cent of conflict displacement globally, more than any other, and the scale and relentless nature of the phenomenon are beyond the scope of humanitarian action. Sustained efforts are required of a wide range of organisations and institutions to address its causes and consequences. A better understanding of the triggers of violence and drivers of conflict, and how these change over time, is also required.</td>
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A stronger focus on prevention and reduction of the risk of new displacement requires tackling the drivers of conflict, taking early action on conflict prevention and emerging crises, and reducing the impact on civilians by improving respect for the laws of war. Moreover, national and local development actors from all key sectors need to take the lead from the start and stay fully engaged in protracted crises.

Displacement is reversing current development gains and threatens the achievement of future development objectives in Africa. Dedicated policies to address the phenomenon, targeted support for IDPs and their hosts, and a focus on helping them to achieve durable solutions would contribute to the achievement of development goals. In countries where significant numbers of IDPs live in long-term displacement, progress toward many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will depend to a significant extent on being able to bring their plight to a definitive conclusion.

Effective disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures can prevent and mitigate internal displacement, and reduce its duration and impact. They can also lessen people’s vulnerability to repeated displacement, particularly during slow-onset crises, which are set to become more frequent and intense as a result of climate change. African countries are at the forefront of DRR policy, and national strategies are being put into place, but implementation is lagging behind. This relates to resources and capacity, which points to the need for greater financial and political investment.

There are twice as many IDPs as refugees in Africa, but current international political and policy attention focuses heavily on reducing the flow of migrants and refugees into Europe and high-income regions. This is short-sighted, not only because of the devastating humanitarian and development consequences of internal displacement, but also because it shares the same drivers as cross-border movement. Addressing the former would have positive implications for the latter, but the scale and impact of internal displacement mean it also demands attention in its own right.

The Kampala Convention is only as strong as its implementation. The persistent scale of displacement in Africa highlights the need for it to be applied more systematically to prevent and address the phenomenon, and bring it to a sustainable end. African states, and particularly those with large numbers of IDPs, are urged to go further in adopting and implementing national laws and policies on internal displacement to improve the quality and predictability of financing and action.

African countries need to do more to establish effective systems for collecting and publishing credible data on internal displacement. Despite commitments under AU processes, only a small number of countries are currently able to do so. This severely impedes their capacity to invest in targeted prevention measures and offer IDPs the right protection and support. It also limits our ability to paint a comprehensive continental picture. The figures we publish here are already alarming, but they undoubtedly underestimate the scale of the phenomenon.

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## Figure 1: Number of people displaced by conflict, violence and disasters in Africa in 2016

<table>
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<th>New displacements Jan – Dec 2016</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs as of the end of 2016</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CONFLICT</strong></td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
<td>12.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISASTERS</strong>†</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
<td>No figures available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Disasters triggered by sudden-onset natural hazards only
Banassan, an internally displaced man in the northern part of Mali, proudly shows his new identity card. “Now that I have an ID card, I am somebody. I can go wherever I want without getting fined, and when I die, people will know who I am and tell my relatives.” Photo: NRC/Ingrid Prestetun, May 2016

2017 marks the fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, known widely as the Kampala Convention. With its adoption in 2009, African states showed global leadership in establishing standards to govern the human rights and protection of internally displaced people (IDPs), and commitment to preventing and managing displacement in their countries. It is the world’s first continental framework that legally binds governments to tackle the causes of the phenomenon; to protect the rights and wellbeing of those forced to flee their homes by conflict, violence, disasters and human rights abuses; and to take steps toward the achievement of durable solutions. Twenty-seven African states are now parties to the convention, including Cameroon and Liberia, which ratified it in 2017. Another 17 have signed but not yet ratified (see figure 2). The first ministerial conference of state parties was held in Harare in April 2017, with the primary objective of establishing the body as a mechanism for fostering cooperation and solidarity in implementing the convention. A bureau for the conference was set up, made up of Gabon, Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Sahrawi Republic, and the first action plan for implementation was agreed as follows:

- establish a framework for solidarity, cooperation and the promotion of durable solutions between the state parties
- establish a policy framework for the prevention, protection and assistance of IDPs at the national level
- promote and strengthen regional and national measures to prevent and eliminate the causes of internal displacement and provide for durable solutions
A snapshot of progress under the Kampala Convention

African states have taken a range of different measures to implement the Kampala Convention and its provisions.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Mali, Somalia and Uganda have developed national laws and policies on IDPs, and many countries, including Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Somalia, have established structures for the coordination and monitoring of responses to displacement. Mali has designated ministerial roles for IDPs at the national, regional and local level, and set out the role of the international community in responses.4

Zambia has established and funded a disaster management and mitigation unit with significant authority on internal displacement, and Rwanda has set up a national platform for disaster risk reduction (DRR). A number of states have also taken steps to ensure IDPs’ assistance and protection. Mali has facilitated displaced children’s enrolment into education, Uganda’s national strategy for IDPs ensures their documentation, and Niger has provisions for the evacuation of elderly and disabled people.5

NRC, along with other institutions including the AU, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have supported AU member states in their efforts to ratify and implement the Kampala Convention. NRC has convened annual consultations and workshops to this end since 2014.

Significant steps have been taken, but relatively little has been achieved on the ground, leaving millions of Africans to lead uprooted and traumatised lives. NRC and others also highlight concerns about delays in ratifying the convention, limited incorporation of its provisions into national laws and poor monitoring.6
DIPLACEMNT AND DEVELOPMENT

For the past two decades, internal displacement has been seen primarily as a humanitarian and protection concern, but it is increasingly perceived as a development issue as well. Displacement, regardless of its context, is ultimately a result of and will impact on a range of social, political and economic processes that determine the well-being of individuals and communities, and the prosperity of nations. Local and national development actors need to lead the planning, implementation and monitoring of assistance to displaced populations, ensuring that emergency response is integrated into long-term support that creates opportunities and helps ensure sustainable solutions. Whether displaced by conflict, violence, disasters or a combination of factors, IDPs face specific and often extreme vulnerabilities that short-term humanitarian measures alone are unable to address.

Conflict and development

The scale of new conflict displacements in 2016 and 2017 highlights the disproportionate impact of violence in driving the phenomenon in Africa. Having declined significantly following the end of the Cold War and particularly between 2000 and 2005, the number of conflicts in Africa now fluctuates more regularly.\(^7\) The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) indicate that incidents in Africa declined between 2010 and 2014, but have inclined again since 2015 (see figure 3).\(^8\)

Conflict continues to affect Africa disproportionately. The continent accounted for only 16 per cent of the global population in 2016, but more than a third of the world’s conflict. This trend of fluctuations in the number of conflicts may continue, but overall it is thought that their intensity in terms of the number of deaths caused is on the decline.\(^9\)

Why then the consistently high rates of conflict displacement seen in our figures? Other forms of violence are on the rise, in some instances involving higher death tolls.\(^11\) ACLED, which monitors armed conflict and political violence, indicates that riots, protests and bombings are increasing in Africa.

Importantly, violence against civilians is on the rise.\(^12\) Forty-two per cent of incidents of political violence targeted civilians in 2014, and 45 per cent in 2016.\(^13\) The box on p.13 highlights the insecurity, chronic poverty and loss of livelihoods and rights that many IDPs suffer.

FIGURE 3: Number of armed conflicts in Africa, 1946 to 2016

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\(^7\) The end of the Cold War

\(^8\) ACLED, which monitors armed conflict and political violence

\(^9\) ACLED, which monitors armed conflict and political violence

\(^11\) ACLED, which monitors armed conflict and political violence

\(^12\) ACLED, which monitors armed conflict and political violence

\(^13\) ACLED, which monitors armed conflict and political violence
Protection and humanitarian risks faced by displaced people

People are often driven from their homes by violence only to face it again in their place of displacement. Nearly half of the IDPs in Central African Republic (CAR) had direct experience of violence, 27 per cent had witnessed a killing, and 20 per cent reported being raped.14

Many places of displacement are insecure. In DRC, Somalia and South Sudan there are concerns that some displacement camps have lost their humanitarian and civilian character, leaving their inhabitants facing serious security risks from armed groups, sometimes because of their perceived alignment with one faction or another. In South Sudan, an armed group attacked a protection of civilians site in Malakal in February 2016, killing at least 29 IDPs and burning more than 1,200 shelters.15 In the wake of such violence, family members often become separated and lose the security and support that comes with living in their communities.

Gender-based violence is a common risk, and women and girls are especially vulnerable to sexual violence and exploitation. In DRC, rape is employed as a weapon of war. Twelve per cent of the female population reported having been raped in a 2007 survey.16 Up to 40 per cent of women report sexual violence in some areas.17 Men and boys also face gender-based violence during conflict, but male rape is a taboo subject and so very rarely reported.18 Displaced men are also often at greater risk of forcible recruitment into armed groups.19

Many IDPs lose their incomes and assets, and live in chronic poverty. In north-eastern Nigeria, people in spontaneous settlements set up by IDPs face severe curtailments on their movement, limiting their ability to access livelihoods. In the Maiduguri displacement camps, 78 per cent of IDPs interviewed in 2015 said they did not have enough food. Many resort to negative coping strategies, including begging, debt and the use of transactional sex to obtain food, money or clothes.20 These strategies heighten vulnerability and often lead to poverty traps and aid dependence, with significant consequences for IDPs and societies as a whole.

Sometimes violence restricts humanitarian access and prevents aid from reaching IDPs.21 Displaced people often have only limited access to essential and services such as healthcare and assistance.

Displacement has a devastating impact on children and their futures. UNICEF estimates that more than half of South Sudan’s children have been taken out of school, the highest proportion in the world, and that 16,000 have been recruited into armed groups.22

Conflict displacement has more than doubled globally over the past 15 years.23 The new displacement outlined in the second part of this report, combined with limited return and few other options for durable solutions, are driving up the number of IDPs in Africa and elsewhere. Some conflicts have taken on a regional dimension, which make them more intractable still, as is the case in the Great Lakes, the Horn of Africa and the Lake Chad Basin (see p.21). There is not currently enough data to estimate the average duration of internal displacement associated with conflict reliably, but some calculations suggest it may last as long as two decades.24 The development implications of this are profound and lasting.

A civil war that kills 2,500 people over the course of five years is estimated to increase the proportion of undernourished people in the population by more than three per cent, reduce life expectancy by around a year, increase infant mortality by about 10 per cent and raise the number of people without access to clean drinking water and adequate sanitary facilities by about two per cent.25 A single year of civil war is estimated to reduce a country’s economic growth by about two per cent, while the doubling of per capita income in lower income countries would reduce the probability of conflict by an average of around 30 per cent.26 A country that suffered major violence over 25 years has an average of 21 per cent more poverty than one that experienced relatively low levels of violence.27 The more intense the fighting, the longer the recovery time. Conflict in one country also has knock-on effects in others. A country experiencing growth, such as Tanzania, loses about 0.7 per cent of its GDP for every neighbouring country in conflict.
Disaster displacement is also both a symptom and cause of development challenges. Developing countries are disproportionately affected, which in turn undermines their potential for growth. For instance, under-development in the Lake Chad Basin has weakened people’s capacity to adapt to climate change impacts in the form of dwindling access to water, which contributes to the displacement of vulnerable people and regional instability.

Disasters are estimated to cause economic losses of between $250 billion to $300 billion a year globally, and they pose a particular challenge to developing nations’ economic resilience. It is thought that “the average historical annual losses from disasters in Madagascar since 2001 are equivalent to around 75 per cent of annual average public investment in the same period”.

Despite the visibility and impact of major disasters, the former UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon has said that small and recurring events are particularly detrimental to growth and development in low and middle-income countries. Such events include flooding caused by annual rainfall patterns, which accounted for significant levels of displacement in Africa in 2016 (see part 2). This extensive disaster risk, characterised by high-frequency, low-severity events, is responsible for only 14 per cent of disaster mortality but 45 per cent of accumulated economic losses. This contributes to “an ongoing erosion of development assets”, which in turn undermines efforts to address poverty and achieve the SDGs.

Better recognition of the complex nature of displacement and its short and long-term implications for individuals and their societies demonstrates the need for greater humanitarian, development and political engagement to prevent and address the phenomenon and bring it to a sustainable end. The scale of needs arising from displacement crises means humanitarian action is essential, but the growing number of people caught in protracted situations in Africa underscores the limits of focusing only on immediate triggers and humanitarian responses. As part 4 outlines, it demands more concerted efforts by political, development and other stakeholders to address the underlying issues that cause and prolong displacement.
NEW DISPLACEMENT IN AFRICA IN 2016

More than 3.9 million new internal displacements in the context of conflict, violence and sudden-onset disasters were recorded in Africa in 2016. This is the equivalent of 10,500 people being forced from their homes every day, and represents an 8.5 per cent increase on the 3.5 million new displacements recorded in 2015. Displacement is a continent-wide phenomenon. At least 37 of Africa’s 55 countries across every region were affected.

More than 70 per cent of new displacements were the result of conflict and violence, a total of 2.8 million across 23 countries. This compares with a global figure of 22 per cent, which clearly highlights the disproportionate impact of conflict on the continent. Africa also accounted for about 40 per cent of this type of displacement globally.

As figure 4 depicts, the high incidence of conflict displacement in 2016 is in keeping with the trend seen in previous years in Africa. New conflict displacements have significantly outnumbered those associated with disasters every year since 2009, except for 2010 and 2012, when major floods caused significant displacement along the Niger river delta.

DRC, Nigeria and South Sudan have featured repeatedly among the five countries worst affected by conflict displacement in Africa. This reflects the enduring nature of their conflicts and the growing number of IDPs living in protracted displacement as a result. Conflict displacement in Ethiopia and Niger is also a major cause for concern.
What are we counting?

This report presents two types of headline figures: new displacements caused by conflict and disasters during the course of the year, and the total number of people displaced by a specific disaster, or by conflict as of the end of the year. We refer to “new displacements”, “incidents” or “cases” because the figures we use may include individuals who have been displaced more than once. Where we refer to the total number of people displaced (stock figures), this is the cumulative number of individuals displaced at a given moment in time.

Despite the high figures, this report underestimates the overall scale of displacement in Africa to a potentially significant degree. Our calculations do not include displacement in the context of slow-onset disasters, such as drought or evictions and other displacement associated with large development projects, including the creation of national parks (see spotlights on p.34). Nor do they include displacement associated with human rights abuses, technological and industrial disasters or epidemics. Displacement is often the result of a number of interconnected factors, but data collection rarely captures more than a single trigger, making it difficult to paint a complete picture of the background to people’s decision to flee their home (see p.36).

Internally displaced children and their host communities gather in a child-friendly space in Mpati, North Kivu, DRC. Photo: NRC/Christian Jepsen, March 2017
A persistent phenomenon

There were 12.6 million people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence in Africa as of the end of 2016, a third of the global total. This is despite the continent only accounting for 16 per cent of the world’s population.\(^{16}\)

As figure 6 shows, East Africa continues to host the highest number of IDPs, with 6.8 million or 54 per cent of the continent’s total as of the end of 2016. The region has had the highest cumulative figures for seven of the last eight years, driven by protracted and cyclical conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

That said, conflict displacement in Central Africa is escalating at such a rate, with more than 1.3 million new incidents between January and June 2017, that the region may well overtake East Africa as the worst-affected region both in terms of new displacements and long-term IDPs.

Our cumulative figures do not include people who remain displaced as of the end of the year after sudden or slow-onset disasters. Little information about how many people fall into this category is available, but evidence suggests the figures are significant, particularly for those displaced by slow-onset disas-
The number of people fleeing the situation in DRC illustrates this point graphically. There were about 18,000 refugees from the country in France, Germany and the UK combined by the end of 2016, compared with 2.2 million IDPs in DRC itself. Uganda was also hosting more than 205,000 refugees from DRC as of the end of 2016. African IDPs have outnumbered refugees every year since 2001, and in 2016 they did so by two to one. Many refugees began their journeys as IDPs, and part 3 of this report discusses the relationship between internal and cross-border movements in more detail.

IDPs consistently outnumber refugees

Global attention to refugees and migrants increased markedly in 2015 and 2016 as growing numbers arrived in Europe. The focus has more recently centred on people making the journey from Africa because of an increase in those making their way from Libya to Italy. This has shifted attention away from people displaced within Africa, despite the fact that IDPs consistently outnumber refugees.
CAR
An intractable conflict

CAR has experienced decades of instability and stalled development, and following the ousting of President François Bozizé in November 2012 it suffered escalating violence perpetrated by a coalition of armed groups known as Séléka. French and African troops pushed its fighters out of the capital of Bangui in December 2013, but since then the country has been embroiled in a conflict that has developed sectarian undertones and involves high levels of inter-communal violence. Despite a series of measures - including national reconciliation efforts, a government disarmament and reintegration programme and attempts to stop the violence by AU and latterly UN peacekeepers – the killings, destruction of villages and displacement have continued.

About 412,000 people were internally displaced by the end of 2016. There was a period of relative stability in mid-2016 following the election of a new government, but violence escalated dramatically in early 2017 to its highest level since the peak of the conflict in 2013, leading to 206,000 new displacements in the first half of the year.40

IDPs often flee with little forewarning and few possessions. Some flee to the bush, but most end up living in makeshift camps or with host families who are already in a precarious economic situation themselves. Makeshift camps tend to be established during a new wave of displacement when people take refuge in mosques, churches, near bases of the UN’s MINUSCA peacekeeping force or in other empty buildings. Many of the camps have no water or sanitation facilities and IDPs’ movement is usually restricted by the presence of armed groups.41

This leaves people in dire situations, with little or no access to food or water. General insecurity and attacks against healthcare facilities – including an attack on a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Zemio, Haut Mbomou prefecture – limits access and precipitates the departure of aid workers.42 The humanitarian response is largely underfunded, further limiting the response and heightening the vulnerability of IDPs and other populations in need.43 Opportunities for durable solutions are nowhere in sight.

FIGURE 8: Conflict displacement in CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-2017</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REGIONAL AND COUNTRY TRENDS

East Africa had the highest number of new displacements by region in 2016. Approximately 1.5 million people were displaced by conflict and disasters during the year, particularly in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. The region accounted for 30 per cent of Africa’s new conflict displacements, and 63 per cent of those associated with sudden-onset disasters, with 827,000 and 680,000 displaced respectively.

A combination of floods, drought and violence in Ethiopia led to the displacement of close to 644,000 people during 2016. After 18 months of drought which left communities’ coping capacity severely weakened and increased the chance of flooding and mudslides, torrential downpours and flash floods during the rainy season uprooted about 347,000 people.44 More than 90 per cent had returned to their areas of origin by October.45 A further 296,000 people were displaced by conflict and violence in particular in the Oromia and Amhara regions, and a nationwide state of emergency was declared in early October (see spotlight on p.24).46

In South Sudan, there were 281,000 new conflict displacements, combined with an economic crisis and food insecurity. By the end of 2016, a quarter of the country’s population had been forcibly displaced over three years of conflict. Many of them, such as those in Unity state, have been displaced a number of times, and an estimated 50 per cent of the country’s IDPs are children.47

Central Africa accounted for almost 40 per cent of the continent’s new displacements associated with conflict and violence. More than a million cases were reported in the region, of which 922,000 took place in DRC - the highest number in the world for 2016 (see spotlight on p.22).

West Africa accounted for 24 per cent. More than 501,000 new displacements were recorded in Nigeria, mainly the result of Boko Haram attacks on rural communities and counterinsurgency operations by the Nigerian military. Almost 80 per cent of IDPs took refuge with host communities.48 Insecurity, displacement, the destruction of economic infrastructure and restrictions on movement and trade combined to create extreme food insecurity in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The UN warned of famine-like conditions in Borno in August, and as of February 2017 an estimated 64 per cent of households in the state were food insecure.49

Most displacement in Southern Africa was the result of flooding, which forced more than 48,000 people from their homes. Angola accounted for nearly 40 per cent of disaster displacements in the region, and South Africa 25 per cent. Floods and tropical storms have caused further displacement in 2017 (see

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African Union’s regions

The regions referred in this report reflect the AU’s classification as follows:

- North: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the Sahrawi Republic and Tunisia
- Southern: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe
- West: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo
- East: Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda
- Central: Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Principe
The only country in the region to experience conflict displacement was Mozambique, where nearly 15,000 people were displaced by an ongoing campaign by the Mozambican National Resistance.

The majority of new displacements in North Africa in 2016 were recorded in Libya, where more than 156,000 people fled conflict. Nearly 304,000 people were living in internal displacement as of the end of the year. In Algeria, 2,800 new conflict displacements were recorded, though they were the result of the forcible relocation of migrants. Although no new conflict displacement was recorded in Egypt in 2016, 78,000 people remained displaced as of the end of 2016 following forced evictions from the Sinai in previous years. Both countries were also affected by floods in 2016, although the resulting displacement was comparatively low.

Some sub-regions were affected disproportionately by displacement in 2016. More than half of the continent’s disaster displacement took place in the Horn of Africa, while the Great Lakes and Lake Chad Basin regions accounted for 34.5 per cent and 28 per cent of new conflict displacements respectively.

When displacement in Africa is viewed relative to population size, a somewhat different picture emerges (see figure 10). Libya had relatively low levels of new displacement in absolute terms compared with countries such as DRC and Ethiopia, but the highest level per capita on the continent, at nearly 2,500 IDPs per 100,000 inhabitants. This equates to 2.5 per cent of the country’s population, compared with 2.2 per cent for South Sudan. The DRC, however, has high absolute numbers and ranks third in relative terms despite its large population size.

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Fighting between armed groups and inter-communal tensions have ravaged DRC on and off for decades, but on 20 October 2017 the UN declared a level three emergency in the country.\textsuperscript{50} An upsurge of violence during the year was attributed in part to delays in holding presidential elections.\textsuperscript{51} About a million new conflict displacements were recorded in the first half of the year, on top of 922,000 in 2016, when another 130,000 people were also displaced by disasters. In total, more than 2.2 million people were displaced at the end of 2016.

North and South Kivu remain the key conflict hotspots, along with the Kasai region and Tanganyika province. North and South Kivu accounted for more than half of the IDPs in the country with 1.5 million displaced as of September 2017, followed by Tanganyika, which had 584,000.\textsuperscript{52} There has also been a recent surge of people crossing international borders into Angola, Uganda and Zambia, sparking concern on the part of those countries’ governments.

Figures for both new and cumulative displacement have been rising sharply since 2015, but international attention and funding for the humanitarian response has declined, with serious implications for the millions of IDPs in need of assistance. Reduced funding has also led to reduction in the number UN peace-keeping troops in the country and the closure of five displacement camps.\textsuperscript{53} This raises concern about the IDPs’ future location, protection and safety, and many fear that without the presence of MONUSCO forces, attacks on the camps that remain open may increase.

The international community has little to no presence in some of the most vulnerable parts of the country, such as the Kasai region, because access is limited by poor infrastructure, insecurity and restrictive logistical costs.\textsuperscript{54} Local responders are unable to fill the gap, and many have only limited experience of working in emergency situations because the area is new to conflict.

The instability has prevented many families from accessing land and maintaining their livelihoods, and 7.7 million people were food insecure by August 2017, an increase of 30 per cent in a year.\textsuperscript{55} Lack of access to clean water has also led to a cholera outbreak that has killed nearly 600 people.\textsuperscript{56}

The government has taken some positive steps toward protecting and assisting IDPs. It has signed the Kampala Convention and developed national laws on displacement, and in 2016 it established a provincial durable solution strategy for North Kivu. In the absence of a national focal point for internal displacement, however, it struggles to collect and analyse data and establish effective consultation mechanisms. This issue needs addressing as a matter of urgency, along with concerted efforts to reduce the overwhelming impact of violence on civilians, if it is to formulate and implement a coherent response to displacement.
FURTHER DETERIORATION IN 2017

Our figures for 2016 paint an already dismal picture of displacement in Africa, but the situation continued to deteriorate in the first half of 2017. There were just over 2.7 million new displacements in 29 countries and across all regions between January and June, representing 69 per cent of the total for the whole of the previous year. Conflict and violence accounted for 75 per cent of the figure, or 2.2 million cases, making Africa the worst-affected continent in the world by this type of displacement.

Figure 12: The five countries worst affected by conflict displacement, Jan – June 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>997,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>213,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>206,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>163,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>162,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central Africa remains the region most affected by conflict displacement, accounting for up to 60 per cent of the continent’s new conflict displacements, and DRC remains the worst-affected country in the world, ahead of Iraq and Syria. There were 997,000 new conflict displacements in DRC by the end of June, more than for the whole of 2016. There were also 206,000 in CAR, four times the country’s figure for 2016.

The Gambia experienced a major spike in displacement in January for the first time on record, the result of a constitutional crisis and military intervention following a disputed presidential election. More than 162,000 people were displaced internally and 48,000 fled to neighbouring countries, though people apparently returned relatively quickly once the crisis had abated.57

Displacement associated with sudden-onset disasters continued at a similar rate to 2016, with about 552,000 new cases in the first half of the year across 19 different countries. East Africa again accounted for the majority, with 53 per cent, but there was also a significant rise in the figure for Southern Africa. More than 240,000 new disaster displacements were recorded in the region, accounting for 44 per cent of the total for the continent.

Figure 13: Countries with more new conflict displacements Jan-June 2017 compared with Jan-Dec 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>997,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>206,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>162,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>922,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>167,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Storms triggered the two largest displacements. Tropical cyclone Dineo made landfall in Mozambique in February, forcing more than 160,000 people from their homes, and damaging or destroying more than 100,000 homes and 65 per cent of crops in the worst-affected province of Inhambane.58 Tropical cyclone Enawo, the most powerful storm to strike Madagascar since 2004, made landfall in the north-east of the country on 7 March. It left nearly 250,000 people, or almost one per cent of the country’s population, temporarily displaced in its wake. It also caused major damage to infrastructure and crops, and destroyed 20,000 homes. The government reported that by 17 March only 5,300 people remained in temporary shelters.59

The speed at which IDPs return to their homes following different hazards and after different events of the same type highlight the need for a more nuanced and rigorous understanding of disaster displacement.
Ethiopia has experienced a steady stream of displacement over the years, but the number of people affected rose sharply in 2016 and the first half of 2017 as a result of both disasters and conflict. The drivers of displacement have historically been a combination of slow and sudden-onset disasters, competition for resources and ethnic tensions, factors which often overlap and mutually reinforce each other.

The Horn of Africa has recently been affected by three consecutive years of drought. This has led to greater competition for resources, particularly between farmers and pastoralists, and aggravated long-standing ethnic tensions within and across borders. The loss of pastoral lands, the death of livestock and low crop yields have undermined both pastoralists’ and farmers’ livelihoods. Food insecurity is Ethiopia’s most serious problem and has led to much of the country’s displacement, particularly in the Somali region. Food and water shortages have also led to malnutrition and disease outbreaks.

The government has developed a response plan that includes humanitarian assistance for those who have returned to their places of origin and programmes to encourage the restoration of livelihoods. The Ethiopian Red Cross also has national disaster response teams that conduct emergency needs assessments and distribute shelters and non-food items. The exact scale of displacement associated with drought is difficult to quantify, because the myriad, overlapping factors make it difficult to identify a specific trigger.

Against this backdrop of heightened vulnerability caused by drought, displacement associated with sudden-onset disasters and conflict has also increased. About 347,000 people were displaced by floods during the short belg and long kiremt rainy seasons in 2016, and kiremt rains also caused significant displacement in September 2017. Conflict, in particular in the Oromia and Somali regions, led to 296,000 new displacements in 2016 and 213,000 in the first half of 2017.

Displacement is relatively localised, with people tending to move within their regions following clashes between militias and the police or attacks on civilians. That said, ethnic Somalis living in Oromia have been displaced back to the Somali region and vice-versa for fear of reprisal attacks following the latest wave of violence over the regions’ disputed border.

Many IDPs seek refuge in neighbouring host communities, but other shelter in makeshift displacement camps scattered throughout the two regions. Reliable figures are hard to come by.
Increased competition for resources. This in turn leads to further displacement associated with conflict. Immediate attention needs to be focused on the effects of drought and other overlapping drivers if the current dire situation is to be prevented from becoming a protracted displacement crisis.

Displacement in Ethiopia is characterised by already vulnerable populations finding themselves unable to cope with disasters that devastate their livelihoods and lead to increased competition for resources. This in turn leads to further displacement associated with conflict. Immediate attention needs to be focused on the effects of drought and other overlapping drivers if the current dire situation is to be prevented from becoming a protracted displacement crisis.

**CONFLICT TRIGGERS**

Fighting between government forces and armed opposition groups led to the widespread displacement of civilians in Africa in 2016. Renewed clashes between South Sudanese security forces and those loyal to the country’s former vice-president, Riek Machar, in the capital of Juba led to the displacement of about 34,000 people in July. A similar outbreak of hostilities in Wau the previous month led to the displacement of around 83,000 people.67

In Somalia, fighting between armed groups from Galmudug and Puntland displaced between 50,000 and 70,000 people in Galalkacyo in October.68 More than 100,000 people fled fighting between DRC’s military and armed groups in Kasai region between August and December.69 In Mozambique, conflict between government forces and the armed wing of the Mozambican National Resistance displaced more 15,000 people during the year.70

The scale of conflict displacement in 2016 suggests that the deliberate targeting of civilians was pervasive. In the South Sudanese city of Yei, 30,000 people fled their homes in September to escape deadly attacks against civilians and the looting of private property.71 In CAR, 13 villages in Kouango were burned in the same month, causing the displacement of about 3,500 people, and 48 civilians were killed and more than 20,000 displaced in two separate attacks on displacement camps in Kaga-Bandoro and Ngakobo in October.72
Inter-communal violence also triggered displacement across the continent. In September, violence between Peuhl and Anti-balaka groups in Ouham Pendé prefecture in CAR displaced 1,300 people, and violence between Batwa and Bantu groups in DRC’s Tanganyika province displaced 2,000.73 These tensions between Batwa and Bantu groups escalated toward the end of the year, swelling Tanganyika’s displaced population from 370,000 in December 2016 to 543,000 as of the end of March 2017 - the steepest rise in the country.74

It is important to note that the triggers of conflict displacement often overlap. Fighting between government and opposition forces can degenerate into attacks against civilians and prompt or aggravate inter-communal violence. Fighting that erupted between DRC’s military and the Kamwina Nsapu militia in Kasai in 2016 has since transformed into inter-communal conflict between the region’s different ethnic groups. New militias have emerged, and civilians have been actively targeted.75

It can be difficult to determine whether displacement is a direct or indirect consequence of violence, and whether it was intentional or not. These issues need to be better understood if conflict displacement is to be prevented or reduced. The Geneva Conventions were designed to limit it and other effects of war on civilians, but armed conflict results in displacement in a number of ways.

The mass displacement of civilians can be a deliberate military strategy, which is a violation of international humanitarian law, or people may flee the indirect effects of war such as general insecurity and the destruction of civilian infrastructure and services. Displacement may also be the result of a combination of factors including insecurity and the loss of livelihoods, income and education opportunities.

We are currently exploring ways of moving beyond the labelling of this type of displacement simply as “associated with conflict and violence”, but we still have work to do. The analysis of its triggers needs to be reviewed.
throughout protracted crises to understand the evolution of proximate causes, and in-depth research is also needed into the underlying drivers of displacement (see p.31).

Conflict persists at the global level, with countries reporting IDP figures over a period of 23 years on average, often involving multiple movements and severe humanitarian and protection consequences.76 This is particularly relevant to displacement in Africa, given that many of the country’s conflicts are fought over years, if not decades (see p.12). There is also a strong correlation between persistent numbers of IDPs and political crises.77 State fragility and weak governance often lead to intermittent conflict, insecurity and repeated displacement.

The significance of political drivers, and the humanitarian consequences and long-term development setbacks of the displacement they cause, highlight the need for greater collective engagement across humanitarian, development and political divides to address the continent’s intractable conflicts and displacement.

DISASTER TRIGGERS

Sudden-onset disasters accounted for 1.1 million new displacements in Africa in 2016. Ninety-seven per cent were associated with weather-related hazards, which is consistent with figures since 2008. Floods triggered more than 90 per cent, causing more than 977,000 people to flee their homes across the continent, and storms seven per cent. Earthquakes and dry mass movements caused displacement in East Africa, as did wildfires in the West and Central regions. A combination of climate change and increasing exposure and vulnerability is expected to exacerbate this trend in the coming decades as extreme weather hazards become more frequent and intense.

Floods were the only trigger of new disaster displacement in North and Southern Africa in 2016. Flooding accounts for the majority of this type of displacement at the global level. Despite regional DRR strategies in Africa, limited capacity for disaster risk management at the national and local level increases the impact of natural hazards on people, assets and livelihoods in many countries.78 Limited early warning systems and risk reduction activities mean that evacuations rarely take place. This reduces the number of people displaced in the short term, but increases the overall impact of disasters.

Sixty per cent of the disasters we recorded in Africa in 2016 were triggered by hazards that can be categorised as extensive risk events.79 These are small-scale recurring disasters that may not receive the same national and international attention as their high-impact intensive counterparts, but which result in losses and impacts that accumulate over time and undermine development progress, such as localised flooding and small landslides that take place in hilly urban settlements (see p.14).80 The scale of this type of displacement is determined largely by vulnerability. This means that much
of it could be prevented by investments in DRR and other measures to make communities more resilient.

More than 676,000 people were displaced by extensive events in 2016, accounting for 63 per cent of all sudden-onset disaster displacement on the continent. These figures are likely to be conservative, given that the impacts of small-scale disasters tend to be under-reported.\(^8^1\)

Extensive disasters account for the majority of displacement, but intensive disaster events do result in more people being displaced by individual events. Countrywide flash floods in Sudan displaced nearly 123,000 people in June, destroyed more than 14,000 houses and led to around 110 deaths.\(^8^2\) This event alone accounted for more 10 per cent of all sudden-onset disaster displacement in Africa in 2016. That said, 90 per cent of the disasters during the year displaced 50,000 or fewer people, and displacement is often cumulative, the result of a number of small-scale hazards. In CAR, 7,500 people were displaced as a result of five different events (see figure 18).

Given that extensive disaster risks are more frequent, the displacement they cause should be easier to prevent by addressing people’s exposure and vulnerability, but they continue to lead to cumulatively high levels of displacement. This undermines development gains, erodes people’s resilience and increases the risk of future displacement.\(^8^3\) More efforts are needed to reduce disaster risk and the displacement that it helps to drive.

**Figure 18: Disaster events and new displacements in CAR in 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Number of Displaced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangui floods</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildfires in Batangafo camp</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boda severe storms</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaga Bandoro floods</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildfires in Batangafo camp</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadzi severe storms</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Marguerite Nguena is a widow who is displaced and shares a house with some of her seven children and her grandchildren. Although she is unemployed, the owner of the house wants to rent the property and is demanding payment from her.

Photo: NRC/Alexis Huguet, August 2017

UNDER THE RADAR
The bigger picture of displacement in Africa

Political, media and public attention is often focused on the immediate triggers of displacement – the violence and sudden-onset disasters that cause millions of people to flee their homes every year. This section of the report paints a fuller picture of the phenomenon in Africa, bringing to light new issues, trends and developments.

The first section discusses displacement risk on the continent, drawing upon our increasingly sophisticated data tools and analysis. The second section looks in more detail at underlying drivers, describing the complex factors that create the conditions in which displacement takes place, or increase people’s vulnerability to it. The third section highlights how increased policy attention to refugees has overshadowed the plight of IDPs and led to mistaken assumptions about the relationship between internal and cross-border displacement.

DISASTER DISPLACEMENT RISK

IDMC has developed a global disaster displacement risk model that helps policy-makers and responders to understand the risk of future displacement associated with sudden-onset disasters.84 It provides the basis for better risk-informed decision-making, which could help to improve preparedness and ensure more targeted investments to reduce and prevent displacement risk.85

The risk of sudden-onset disasters triggering displacement can be determined as a function of hazard, exposure and vulnerability.86 By combining analyses of historical data and future probability – a probabilistic approach – our model can estimate the average number of people expected to be displaced each year taking into account all events that might occur over an extended timeframe. The figures we derive, known as average annual displacement (AAD), are presented both in absolute terms and relative to population size.87
UNISDR defines key aspects of disaster risk reduction as follows:

**Disaster risk**: The potential loss of life, injury or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a system, society or community over a specific time period, determined probabilistically as a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity.

**Hazard**: A process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation.

**Exposure**: The situation of people, infrastructure, housing, production capacities and other tangible human assets in areas prone to hazards.

**Vulnerability**: The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.

**Coping capacity**: The ability of people, organisations and systems to use available skills and resources to manage adverse conditions, risk or disasters. This requires awareness, resources and good management, both in normal times and during disasters or adverse conditions, and can contribute to the reduction of disaster risk.

In absolute terms, displacement risk is likely to be highest in countries with large populations exposed to disasters. The larger a country’s population, the greater the likelihood that segments of it will be exposed to disasters, and – coupled with significant vulnerability – the higher the risk of displacement. DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tanzania are among the five most populous African countries and the five with the highest absolute AAD (see figure 19). Egypt is also amongst the five most populous countries, but experiences lower levels of absolute AAD due to lower levels of both vulnerability and hazard, while Madagascar – featuring high vulnerability and severe hazards – is amongst the five countries with highest absolute AAD despite a slightly smaller population. The concentration of dense populations in river basins prone to flooding in Ethiopia goes some way to explain the country’s high displacement risk.

An examination of displacement risk relative to population size paints a somewhat different picture. On the global level, south and east Asia have the highest absolute AAD as a result of high exposure to hazards, but sub-Saharan Africa has the highest relative AAD. This shows that vulnerability and capacity to reduce disaster risks, rather than exposure, are the key determinants of displacement risk in the region. Within Africa, Madagascar, Mauritius...
and Mozambique have the highest displacement risk relative to population size.

An analysis of displacement risk in the Greater Horn of Africa reveals the inter-relationship between displacement risk, vulnerability and coping capacity. Countries with higher vulnerability and poor capacity are also likely to be disproportionately affected by displacement relative to their population size. All countries in the region with above-average relative displacement risk have comparatively weak governance structures, high poverty rates and have recently experienced conflict with implications for stability and security. African countries with highest relative AAD also score higher - i.e. worse - on INFORM’s socioeconomic vulnerability and coping capacity classification – a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters (see figure 21 and 26).

However, while vulnerability and low levels of resilience and capacity are currently key drivers of disaster displacement risk in Africa, exposure to hazards is likely to increase in the region in the foreseeable future. This is a result of – among other drivers – population growth and urbanisation, environmental degradation and climate change. In order to mitigate displacement risk, it is imperative to intensify efforts to reduce people’s vulnerability to hazards by addressing factors related to low levels of human development, which are also core drivers of displacement in other contexts. Failure to do so will heighten vulnerability and foster instability, increasing the risk of vicious cycles of displacement.

Descriptions of the factors that give rise to displacement tend to be limited to an immediate trigger, whether it be conflict or a disaster. This oversimplifies the reality of a complex phenomenon that results from a combination of various underlying factors which converge to create the conditions for displacement. It also downplays the human agency involved in any decision to move, even in the most constrained circumstances, and focuses attention on more immediate and proximate events to the detriment of longer-term factors.

We use the terms “trigger” and “driver” to distinguish between the short and long-term pressures that precipitate displacement. Triggers are sudden-onset events that occur over short-time scales and threaten people’s physical or economic security. Used synonymously with “cause”, “hazard”, “shock” and “tipping point”, triggers are visible pressure points that often attract significant public and political attention and catalyse emergency and humanitarian responses. Examples include the armed attacks that have prompted displacement on a vast scale in DRC, and natural hazards such as the floods which forced people to flee their homes in Southern Africa in 2016.
FIGURE 21: Countries with the highest absolute AAD (left) and relative AAD (right) by INFORM’s socioeconomic vulnerability classification

FIGURE 22: Countries with the highest absolute AAD (left) and relative AAD (right) by INFORM’s institutional lack of coping capacity classification
Drivers are the less visible social, political, environmental, economic and demographic conditions that underlie people’s decision to uproot their lives. They combine and overlap to heighten vulnerabilities and contribute to the pressures that trigger displacement. “Driver” and “root cause” are often used interchangeably, describing the underlying factors that create conditions ripe for displacement.96

Political drivers include poor governance or sectarian divisions. Environmental drivers such as degradation and deforestation not only contribute to natural hazards such as flooding, but may also drive conflict, as is thought to be the case in the Darfur region of Sudan.97 Economic drivers including unemployment, poverty and inequality often heighten people’s vulnerability to disasters, contribute to criminality and underpin political tensions that give rise to violence.98

Understanding drivers highlights the common vulnerabilities that contribute to displacement attributed to seemingly distinct triggers, whether a disaster or conflict. It also helps to counter the perception of displacement as a purely humanitarian concern, rather than an issue relevant to the wide range of responders required to deal with both its immediate effects and the factors that give rise to and sustain the phenomenon.

**DISPLACEMENT DRIVERS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES**

Increasing attention has been paid to drivers since the 1990s, because addressing them is thought to be central to preventing displacement and creating conditions conducive to durable solutions.99 The issue has received renewed attention since 2015, when a surge in the arrival of refugees and migrants in Europe pushed migration management up the policy agenda. The establishment of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa is a prominent reflection of this renewed interest. The fund, which accounts for just under 10 per cent of Europe’s overall development engagement in Africa, aims to use development funding to address migration objectives including addressing the causes of “destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration” and “the effective sustainable return, readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants”.100

This was given further prominence in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2016, which stressed the importance of addressing the causes of displacement.101 Those displaced across borders are the primary concern, however, and the specific implications of drivers of internal displacement are barely considered.

A number of relatively new “megatrends” have been identified as significant drivers of forced displacement, including urbanisation, environmental degradation, water scarcity, food insecurity and the adverse effects of climate change.102 Some of these are likely to affect Africa disproportionately. The continent’s urban population is the fastest growing in the world, and is expected to rise from 400 million in 2010 to 1.26 billion in 2050. Urbanisation can bring about economic prosperity, but there are concerns that it is outpacing economic development in Africa, and that the continent’s slum population could triple by 2050 as a result.103 Impoverished, overcrowded and unplanned settlements increase the exposure of the large populations to disasters and displacement, and they can also foment violence.

Climate change is expected to affect people’s lives worldwide through shifting weather patterns, rising sea levels and more extreme weather events, although low-income countries may be most affected. Many displaced people are located in or originate from climate change hotspots, and the effects of the phenomenon are predicted to increase displacement.
Climate change impacts are predominantly water-related. They include sea-level rise, the increased frequency and intensity of rains, storms and flooding, and desertification and drought. Sudden-onset hazards such as floods and storms receive substantial attention in the first half of this report, where we reveal that floods triggered 90 per cent of new displacement associated with disasters in Africa in 2016.

Water scarcity is also a significant driver of displacement on the continent, and is likely to become more so as climate change takes hold. It interlinks with other factors such as poverty, population growth and poor environmental practices to damage livelihoods, aggravate conflict over resources and worsen drought, all of which have significant implications for displacement. As many as 250 million Africans may be affected by water stress by 2050, and yields from rain-fed agriculture may be reduced by as much as 50 per cent in some countries.

Displacement is likely to increase as populations move in search of water and livelihoods, and water scarcity may also become a significant underlying driver of conflict. The former UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon warned ten years ago that "water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict".

With limited water availability and high rates of use, Egypt is thought to be particularly vulnerable to water stress. Egypt is one of the world’s poorest nations in terms of water availability per capita. As long ago as 2000, its water use had already far exceeded its available resources. In a country where agriculture accounts for more than a quarter of employment, it is easy to envision scenarios in which threats to livelihoods result in displacement.

The link between water, climate change and displacement is already apparent in the Lake Chad Basin. The lake has shrunk by more than 90 per cent in the past 50 years as a result of rising temperatures, climate change, population growth and the excessive damming of its tributaries. As many as 20 million people from Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria depend on Lake Chad for their livelihoods, and pastoralists, farmers and fishermen are increasingly forced to migrate in search of water and work.

These conditions have left the population of the Lake Chad Basin increasingly exposed and vulnerable to the Boko Haram insurgency, contributing further to the region’s displacement crisis. Competition for increasingly scarce resources has also aggravated clashes between farmers and pastoralists as each encroach on land traditionally used by the other. Farmers are obliged to expand their crops to achieve large enough yields, and pastoralists have to travel further afield to access water and grazing for their livestock.

In parallel, the loss of livelihoods associated with water scarcity is likely to increase violence and criminality among disenfranchised young people, contributing to banditry and providing ready recruits for future political violence and rebellions.

Flooding may trigger the largest number of displacements associated with disasters in Africa, but water scarcity should not be forgotten as an underlying driver. It forces people deprived of their livelihoods to migrate and contributes to conflict and instability, leading to further displacement. There is a clear need for political and development engagement with water specialists to agree adaptation and mitigation measures to reduce displacement risk.

These megatrends help to focus attention on common issues that affect displacement in Africa and galvanise coordinated efforts across countries and regions, but their varying impacts require context-specific and tailored responses if displacement is to be prevented and reduced. The current crisis in Nigeria has been driven by a range of underlying economic, social, political and environmental factors which predate the outbreak of Boko Haram violence in 2009 that has triggered many of the 1.6 million displacements recorded by the end of 2016. This underlines the importance of addressing long-term drivers in order to reduce displacement.
Land acquisition for conservation and commercial purposes is an important driver of internal displacement, but the issue falls largely under the radar, not least because of the expected benefits in terms of economic development and environmental protection. In Africa, however, where around 60 per cent of the population depends on land as a source of food and livelihoods, its loss can lead to a dramatic increase in vulnerability.118

Land grabs can be understood as “the transfer of use rights or control over land, traditionally used by communities, to foreign investors for commercial purposes”. In Africa, they are often motivated by an interest in biofuels, which accounts for around 40 per cent of large area land deals, while agri-business and infrastructure development are two other important drivers.121

Such deals are often underpinned by a desire to encourage investment and economic development. Given, however, that land used by smallholders and pastoralists is often classified as idle, these populations tend to be disproportionately affected by land grabs, which contribute to “deepening of sociospatial power inequalities” and further marginalise the communities affected.123 Herakles Farms’ acquisition of more than 73,000 hectares of land in Cameroon for palm oil plantations was posited to create more than 7,500 jobs and generate revenue for the government. As the details of the plan became clear, however, the project was abandoned because it threatened to undermine the livelihoods of more than 45,000 people and displace more than 14,000.125

Alongside commercial land grabs, a new concept known as green-grabbing has emerged, described as “the environmentally-justified assertion of control over land and natural resources.” This includes the creation of national parks and efforts to counter climate change by planting large plantations of trees, which already have a history of causing displacement. More than 15,000 people were displaced in Uganda in 2011 by one such carbon-offsetting scheme.128

Be they for conservation or commercial purposes, large-scale land acquisitions reduce the amount of land available for subsistence agriculture and pastoralism, threatening livelihoods and contributing to the underlying drivers of conflict. Agrarian grievances have been identified as contributors to civil war in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where land loss was a major driver of recruitment into rebel forces.130 As such, land acquisitions risk becoming both an immediate trigger of displacement and a driver of future conflict, potentially reversing economic development achievements.

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There have been alarmist claims about the potential for climate change to drive mass international displacement, but research shows that environmental factors do not necessarily lead to cross-border movement, because long-distance migration requires resources that are scarce during times of drought and other environmental stressors. On the contrary, recent evidence from the Horn of Africa suggests that drought has dramatically reduced international migration, and that communities have been forced to displace internally instead.

There are also concerns that the agenda has been driven primarily by political interest in reducing migration, which at best ignores the interests of displaced people and at worst reduces mobility as a survival strategy. There is unease too about the linking of development assistance with migration. This focuses the causes agenda purely on poverty and under-development, to the detriment of other issues such as political and sociocultural factors. It also suggests that development assistance will reduce migration, whereas the opposite is true in poorer countries where economic investments can provide people with the means to migrate.

Understanding the causes as well as the proximate triggers of displacement provides the basis for more coordinated action across a range of responders, timeframes and mandates to tackle the conditions that give rise to the phenomenon. It helps work toward more holistic responses to prevent displacement crises becoming protracted, and to ensure that displaced people are not caught in a cycle of displacement and vulnerability. The primary objective, however, must be to address the causes and effects of displacement, rather than attempting to prevent migration.

MULTI-CAUSALITY: MOVING BEYOND ONE-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF DISPLACEMENT TRIGGERS

Current approaches to data collection on displacement rarely record more than one reason for people’s flight, but focusing on a single cause distorts and oversimplifies the complexity of the phenomenon and may hamper the identification of appropriate solutions. It also means that understanding the scale of displacement resulting from a particular cause is difficult, because people may report being displaced for different reasons. This undermines efforts to monitor different patterns in displacement drivers over place and time.

Agricultural and livestock activities around the Komadougou river, which creates a natural border between Niger and Nigeria, have been dramatically reduced as a result of violence. Cross-border trade between the two countries has also been disrupted, and violence triggered by competition for Lake Chad’s dwindling waters has increased. The estimated 212,000 people displaced in Niger in 2016 may cite loss of livelihood activities, or conflict, as the reason for their flight.

With drought affecting millions of people across Africa during the year, we made efforts to collect quantitative data on the resulting displacement. We obtained figures from Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia and South Sudan, but as the following spotlight illustrates, it was impossible to capture the scale or complexity of the displacement.
Monitoring, categorising and quantifying internal and cross-border displacement in the Horn of Africa is a highly complex process, not least because it has many causes. The Horn of Africa has been affected by severe drought, but many countries in the region also suffer conflict, food insecurity, chronic poverty, sporadic floods and epidemics, all of which worsen the humanitarian situation and trigger displacement.

To make matters even more complex, drivers and triggers overlap within each displacement flow. This makes monitoring the flows difficult, because the traditional division of triggers into conflict or disasters is too simplistic. Nor is there a common approach across different institutions exists to assessing such complexity.

Several organisations monitor internal and cross-border displacement in the Horn of Africa, but each uses a different methodology which makes the consolidation of their figures extremely challenging. UNHCR and NRC collect and analyse data on displacement in Somalia. Their methodology distinguishes between 18 causes, including insecurity, access to humanitarian assistance, drought, lack of livelihoods and floods. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which collects data on internal displacement in Ethiopia, distinguishes between only four - conflict, flooding, drought and “other”.

In other countries in the region, such as South Sudan, only overall numbers of displacements are available, and any information on causes is largely anecdotal. In Kenya and Uganda, no organisation systematically gathers internal displacement data, leaving us to rely on a range of different sources that collect it differently and publish it only irregularly.

Different organisations also have different interpretations of drivers and triggers. Each has a different understanding of what “lack of livelihoods” or “drought” means as a cause of displacement. IDPs in Ethiopia are usually registered as displaced by drought when pastoralists lose most of their livestock and are unable to pursue their traditional livelihoods, but people who flee clashes over resources - in many cases is made scarce by the same drought - are registered as displaced by conflict.

Similar challenges occur in Somalia, where lack of livelihoods or access to humanitarian assistance may be used to categorise internal displacement as being caused by drought. Unlike in Ethiopia, the same categories may also used to describe conflict over resources, meaning that cross-correlation between countries is impossible. These are just some of the many discrepancies we face in compiling displacement data for the Horn of Africa.

Recording a single cause of displacement does not usually reflect the reality on the ground. Nor does it provide sufficient insight into displacement patterns in the region. Drought is a slow-onset phenomenon and we need to understand why people start to move months after its effects have been felt. We need to collect data on all the factors that contribute to displacement, including underlying drivers and the tipping point which ultimately triggers it.

Without doing so, we are unable to paint a comprehensive picture of displacement in the region. The lack of rigorous and comprehensive data limits more in-depth analysis of the relationship between overlapping crises and displacement, which is vital to mitigate its impact. An important first step to obtaining better data is to agree on definitions of multi-causal displacement. Governments and humanitarian organisations should engage with each other to establish metrics, guidelines and systems to monitor the phenomenon.

Clear understanding of the drivers of displacement in the Horn of Africa is indispensable for planning humanitarian responses and mitigating the risk of future displacement. Unless the data provides us with comprehensive explanations of why people feel forced to move, multi-causal displacement will remain poorly understood and poorly addressed.
NO SOLUTIONS IN SIGHT

Some IDPs become refugees or migrants, but how many is unclear

Recent policy efforts to control the flow of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers into Europe and the US have prompted significant interest in the relationship between forced displacement within and across borders. The assumption is that there is a direct correlation between the two, that people who are displaced internally are more likely to eventually flee across borders, or that refugees were once displaced within their own countries. The little evidence that exists, however, reveals a more complex relationship.

Research suggests that the triggers for displacement within and across borders are broadly similar. Security-related risks outweigh all other considerations, but even in the most violent scenarios flight is not inevitable. For many populations affected by conflict it is just one of a number of survival tactics, and those who live in persistently violent environments such as Somalia often know from experience how to manage risk.\(^\text{132}\)

Movement tends to be categorised into the binary categories of forced or voluntary, but in reality, there is more of a continuum between the two. Flight is influenced by a range of political, economic, social and personal factors.\(^\text{133}\) The cost of flight may also prohibit movement, and those with limited means may be over-represented amongst those who remain behind.\(^\text{134}\)

Data on the numbers and trajectories of IDPs who eventually cross international borders is not recorded regularly, making it impossible to quantify the scale of this type of movement. Nor are all IDPs who cross borders recorded as refugees or asylum seekers. Some are not recorded at all, and others are viewed simply as migrants. Refugee figures give a sense of scale, but a fuller picture requires disaggregated migration data. Patterns of internal and international displacement are influenced not only by access to protection and assistance, but also by geography, including proximity to borders and safe areas, resources, family and other kinship ties.\(^\text{135}\)

In extremely insecure environments, people often have to move several times before they find safety. At least 60 per cent of the estimated 50,000 people displaced in Puntland in October 2016 had fled their homes at least once before.\(^\text{136}\) Displacement can also be circular, when people move back and forth between two or more locations. People displaced in north-east Nigeria cross the border repeatedly to escape attacks by Boko Haram and counterinsurgency operations against it.\(^\text{137}\) The relationship between internal and cross-border displacement is neither standardised nor linear.

The fact that IDPs outnumber refugees by more than two to one in Africa makes it clear that most IDPs do not eventually cross borders. Many refugees have been IDPs, but there is little evidence that significant numbers of IDPs become refugees.\(^\text{138}\) Our data does, however, point to a correlation between internal and cross-border movements in Africa. The five countries to produce most refugees in 2016 – South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, DRC and CAR – were also among the ten with most internal displacement associated with conflict as of the end of the year (see figure 23).\(^\text{139}\)

![Figure 23: Numbers of African refugees compared to IDPs in 2016](image-url)
Many African countries that produce high numbers of refugees are also home to large populations of IDPs, but other factors are clearly at play. The number of IDPs in Nigeria and Ethiopia has risen steeply recently, but the two countries produce relatively few refugees. On the other hand, Eritrea produces high numbers of refugees, but its number of IDPs is unknown.

Data on internal to cross-border movement associated with conflict is scarce, but that on cross-border movements associated with disasters is even less reliable. The majority of displacement associated with sudden-onset disasters is known to be internal, and when people do cross borders they tend to flee no further than nearby countries. Much more research is required, however, to better understand when and why IDPs who flee disasters move across borders, as well as the scale and duration of their movements.

Refugees face internal displacement on return

Many refugees return to their countries of origin only to face a life in internal displacement. Their main concerns tend to be security, housing, livelihoods and food, without which their return is unlikely to be sustainable. The principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention is recognised as central to repatriation policy, but return programmes are often politically driven and their voluntary nature is often questionable. Premature returns risk simply shifting vulnerability and displacement from outside a country to within it. This is borne out by evidence of a considerable rise in the number of IDPs following 46 per cent of large-scale return programmes between 2000 and 2016.

There is often a political impetus on the part of the government of refugees’ country of origin for them to return quickly to signify the end of conflict and a return to stability, or so they can participate in political processes. Following signature of the 2005 peace agreement that ended the Sudanese civil war, there
was a significant push for people from the south of the country to return and participate in the 2008 census, which formed the basis for the 2011 referendum on South Sudan’s independence. About 420,000 refugees have fled Burundi since 2015 and people continue to leave the country today, but the government has announced that it is safe to return. UNHCR has launched a voluntary repatriation programme, but few refugees have participated because of concerns about insecurity.145

The forcible return of refugees also gives rise to de facto internal displacement. Many returnees are transferred to displacement camps, where they face insecurity and dire humanitarian conditions.146 In other cases, without the necessary conditions to sustain their return, many face a life of pendular cross-border displacement (see spotlight on p.41).

Deportation is increasingly used as a way of controlling migration, but the reintegration of migrants is often impeded by crippling debts, limited economic opportunities and social stigma. Many return only to migrate or flee again, either within or beyond their borders.147 Although long resisted by African governments, development aid is increasingly tied to the readmission of migrants and managing migration in countries of origin and transit, which has the potential to increase the numbers of migrants facing internal displacement.148

The concept of refugees and deportees returning “home” is frequently flawed. The destruction of property, illegal occupation, tenure insecurity and other challenges associated with property restitution have been a barrier to return in many countries, including South Africa, Burundi and most recently CAR.149 These and other factors prompt returnees to move to urban centres in search of safety, livelihood opportunities and education.

The population of South Sudan’s capital, Juba, doubled between 2005 and 2011, in part the result of refugees returning from Sudan. Monrovia in Liberia and Luanda in Angola also expanded rapidly in similar circumstances. Returning refugees often join the ranks of the urban poor in slums, where discrimination, lack of documentation, poor employment prospects and disrupted social networks risk heightening their vulnerability further.150 The scale of urban returns and their relationship to internal displacement is not clear, and raises questions about the difference between internal displacement and internal migration, and relationship between internal and cross-border movements.

Monitoring often stops once returnees have crossed the border into their country of origin, and the absence of data on their plight means little is known about where they return to; how many go back to their areas of origin; conditions in return areas; or the vulnerabilities and protection issues they, and their families, face. Identifying returning refugees and deportees as internally displaced would increase their visibility and potentially improve accountability for their protection.

There is an urgent need for African states and their partners to expand and coordinate the collection of interoperable data that covers the entire displacement continuum, from internal displacement and cross-border flight to repatriation and return, so the phenomenon can be better understood and addressed.151 Refugees and migrants who face protracted displacement and vulnerability upon their return cannot be assumed to have achieved durable solutions.152
Somali refugees in Kenya face complex choices. Many feel compelled to leave the country because of the threatened closure of the Dadaab camp, and a worsening humanitarian situation brought about by drastic ration cuts introduced as a result of shortfalls in funding. These pressures have spurred many to return to Somalia under a voluntary repatriation scheme established by a 2014 tripartite agreement between UNHCR and the Kenyan and Somali governments. This is despite surveys showing that between 73 and 86 per cent do not want to return because of fears about insecurity and drought, and lack of access to shelter, livelihoods and basic services.

UNHCR’s own 2016 guidelines state that conditions in south-central Somalia are not conducive to mass refugee returns because of ongoing conflict, insecurity and a lack of basic services. They highlight threats of civilian casualties, widespread sexual violence, the forced recruitment of children and displacement. More than 110,000 people were newly displaced by conflict in Somalia in 2016, and almost 70,000 more fled their homes in the first half of 2017.

The UN warned of a possible famine in early 2017, and UNHCR reported that more than 700,000 people had been displaced by drought between November 2016 and May 2017. It also said that as of August 2017, 6.2 million people were in need of food assistance.

More than 67,000 Somalis opted to return in 2016 despite such adverse conditions, around half of whom received assistance through the repatriation scheme. The vast majority went back to south-central Somalia, despite UNHCR designating the region as unsuitable for returns. Twenty-five per cent of those who returned in 2016 did not go back to their places of origin, and many swelled the ranks of the country’s 1.5 million IDPs. Others have resumed life as refugees. Hundreds have returned to Dadaab, and others have crossed the border into Ethiopia.

With continued conflict in parts of Somalia and food insecurity plaguing the country as whole, the cycle of displacement is set continue and durable solutions are nowhere in sight despite ongoing humanitarian efforts.
Making Progress on internal displacement in Africa

Delivering on the Kampala Convention’s promises

Part 1 of this report outlined the significant policy-level progress in 2017 in relation to the Kampala Convention. The escalating displacement crisis in Africa means that this momentum must not be lost, and African states should demonstrate their commitment by developing and implementing the legal and policy frameworks on internal displacement that the convention envisages.

Full ratification would be a good first step, especially as the rate of ratification has slowed. Among the ten countries worst affected by displacement in 2016, DRC, Ethiopia and South Sudan have not acceded to the convention and Sudan is not even a signatory. 2018 marks the 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and the AU has declared 2019 the Year of the Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Kampala Convention and the 50th anniversary of the OAU Convention on Refugees. An urgent push toward ratification of the Kampala Convention is needed to give full meaning to these anniversaries and catalyse progress toward implementation.

African countries were amongst the first in the world to adopt national laws and policies on IDPs, which are significant in terms of pushing internal displacement up the agenda domestically, designating government responsibilities, defining responders’ roles and creating a structural framework for collaborative responses, all of which help increase the predictability of national and international action. Angola, Kenya and Sudan have enacted national laws to regulate internal displacement, and CAR, DRC, Nigeria and Somalia have taken considerable steps toward their development. Other countries, such as Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia have introduced national policies on internal displacement. Political commitment and technical expertise have been found to be central to national implementation of the Kampala Convention, and the AU
and international organisations such as ICRC, UNHCR and NRC/IDMC have provided significant support. They have also trained public officials on internal displacement issues.161

Alongside the establishment of strong legislative and regulatory frameworks, implementation is required to prevent, address and end internal displacement. The AU has itself recognised the need for a shift “from norm setting to implementation” and the conference of state parties is an important mechanism to support African countries in tackling common challenges, fostering solidarity and exchanges, and monitoring implementation efforts.162

**ENGAGING LOCAL AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS**

The Kampala Convention was ahead of its time in recognising the need for comprehensive responses to internal displacement involving both the humanitarian and development sectors. This is now more widely acknowledged, and protracted crises in particular are increasingly characterised as primarily development and political challenges with some humanitarian dimensions.

The presence of IDPs has both positive and negative impacts on the development prospects of their host communities. Understanding and managing how the costs and benefits are distributed is a development issue vital to mitigating the impacts of forced displacement.163 Development can also trigger displacement. Infrastructure projects, resource extraction and the designation of conservation areas often drive people off their land and from their homes.164

Limited or uneven development can increase the risk of displacement, and impede IDPs’ return to their homes. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognises that IDPs are a vulnerable group that must not be “left behind” and acknowledges that displacement can reverse development gains, but it does not contain specific goals or indicators.

**Sustainable development and displacement in Africa**

Urgent attention is required to address the scale and impact of internal displacement in Africa in order to make progress on sustainable development. The SDGs and the 2063 roadmap on socioeconomic development, which the AU has put forward165, are related to forced displacement in a number of important ways. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development declaration recognises that IDPs are amongst the world’s most vulnerable people.166 To reach the “furthest behind first” and ensure that “no one is left behind”, urgent efforts are required to slow the pace of new displacement, and reduce the persistently high numbers of people living uprooted lives across Africa.167 At the same time, truly sustainable development can only be achieved if forced displacement is addressed in an effective manner.

A number of SGD targets are of immediate relevance to IDPs. For example, ensuring that all men and women “have access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property” is an essential step in IDP protection and reducing “exposure and vulnerability to climate related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters” would contribute to reducing the incidence and impact of disaster displacement (Goal 1 on reducing poverty).168 Goal 11 of making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable, is important to the rising numbers of displaced people in urban settings who are in need of “adequate, safe and affordable housing.”169 It is also a goal that will not be achieved in cities with consistently large numbers of displaced populations. Similarly, Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions lies at the heart of prevention of future displacement.

The SDG declaration acknowledges that internal displacement impedes development, and with it African countries’ ability to meet their SDG targets.170 Explicitly targeting IDPs in the AU’s 2063 roadmap would help to overcome this challenge.
Uganda has been widely commended for its national policy on IDPs, which it adopted in 2004. Under the policy and in line with the Guiding Principles, the government committed to protecting citizens against arbitrary displacement, guaranteeing their rights during displacement and promoting durable solutions by facilitating voluntary return, resettlement, integration and reintegration. Government structures were set up to ensure implementation of the policy and the coordination of humanitarian assistance, and Uganda was the first country to ratify the Kampala Convention in 2010.

Considerable progress has also been made in reducing the scale of displacement over the past decade linked to the ending of conflict in the north. In 2006, 1.7 million people were displaced and living in camps as a result of the 20-year conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government. Around 90 per cent of the population was uprooted in the north of the country at the time. The parties to the conflict signed a truce in August 2006 and the government began depopulating displacement camps almost immediately, moving people to “satellite camps” ahead of full resettlement. Concerns were raised at the time about the timing and voluntary nature of the move, given the ongoing insecurity and limited basic services.

Five years after the peace agreement, the number of people displaced by the conflict had fallen to just under 30,000. Despite the dramatic reduction, however, poverty is prevalent among returnees and access to basic services, including health care and education, remains elusive. The plight of many of former IDPs highlights the challenges inherent in achieving durable solutions, a central pillar of the Kampala Convention. Data gaps mean we continue to report around 30,000 people living in protracted displacement in Uganda, but the figure may well have fallen further. This underlines the importance of accurate and regular reporting. More recently, 23,000 new displacements were recorded in 2016 as a result of election violence.

Uganda has shown commendable leadership in terms of its policies on internal displacement, but the challenges discussed above highlight the fact that continued efforts to apply the policy are required in the aftermath of mass displacement.
Increasing attention to the links between displacement and development, and to the need for collaboration across sectors in addressing the short and long-term implications of crises present considerable opportunities to reverse the escalating displacement across Africa. The World Bank is seen as a possible game changer in terms of increasing the engagement of the development sector, given its financing, data and operational capacity. In December 2016, $75 billion was pledged to the International Development Association (IDA), the bank’s fund for the world’s poorest countries, doubling its resources to address fragility, conflict and violence to more than $14 billion, and increasing financing for refugees and their host communities to $2 billion.

Given that conflict is by far the largest cause of new and protracted displacement in Africa, greater emphasis is required on resolving it and reducing the number and duration of protracted crises. The UN high commissioner for refugees, Filippo Grandi, recently emphasised this point and underlined the need for greater efforts to prevent conflict, address protection concerns and secure peace. Early engagement in emerging crises is increasingly seen as vital to conflict prevention, because it can help to stem the cycles of violence and fragility that underpin displacement. Reducing the impact of conflict on civilians by ensuring more systematic adherence to international humanitarian law must be an important pillar of this agenda. This is not only key to limiting the effects of conflict on civilians and reducing displacement, but is also an important conflict prevention tool because evidence shows that exposure to violence can sometimes lead to perpetrating violence later.

Increasing the range of responders involved creates an opportunity to move beyond addressing IDPs’ basic needs, which is a prerequisite for achieving national and global development goals. The development and planning departments and sectoral line ministries of national and local governments must be at the forefront of action that strengthens IDPs’ resilience. By investing in better livelihoods, housing and living conditions for whole communities and areas, they will not only supplement the often-inadequate humanitarian assistance available in many displacement situations. Their leadership and direct engagement also enhances national responsibility and accountability, because support for IDPs becomes an integral part of development planning.

REDUCING DISPLACEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH DISASTERS

DRR is a bridge between the humanitarian and development sectors as it helps minimise the incidence and impact of crises triggered by disasters. The AU perceives it as playing an “irreplaceable role in achieving sustainable development and building resilience.” Substantial efforts have been made across the continent to adopt and implement instruments and frameworks, starting with a 2004 regional DRR strategy and associated programme of action.
that was subsequently extended until 2015 in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action.\(^{188}\) This was followed by a programme of action for the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. African states have also been at the forefront of the 2015 Platform on Disaster Displacement. These efforts are in line with the Kampala Convention, under which state parties are required to put early warning systems in place in areas of potential displacement, establish and implement DRR strategies, emergency and disaster preparedness and management measures, and provide IDPs with immediate protection and assistance.\(^{189}\)

The effective implementation of these instruments has the potential to significantly reduce the number of people disasters affect and displace. When displacement is unavoidable, they are instrumental in determining its duration and impact, and can reduce the risk of future displacement. DRR in Africa is undermined, however, by limited capacity and resources at the national and local level, and many countries continue to experience significant displacement associated with disasters. The repercussions contribute to anchoring the affected populations in cycles of poverty and vulnerability. DRR is vital in preventing new displacement, but it is also increasingly relevant in protracted situations because many IDPs live in areas that are highly exposed to natural hazards, such as crowded, unplanned urban settings in flood-prone areas (see spotlight on Senegal, p.47).\(^{190}\)

African countries will have to report on the progress they have made against one of the seven targets of their Sendai programme of action in 2020, namely the development of national and local DRR policies and strategies. The Sendai framework highlights displacement as a major consequence of disasters, but it has no global target or specific indicator for it. Countries that experience regular new and protracted displacement associated with disaster will, however, have to give due consideration to phenomenon in their national strategies and establish targets and indicators.

There are several action areas and targets under which this can be done, including target B on reducing the number of affected people, and target G on access to risk information and early warning systems. The inclusion of specific indicators for displacement in Africa’s regional DRR programmes of action and national strategies would constitute a first step.\(^{191}\)
Domesticating the Kampala Convention
Senegal’s action on DRR

Senegal’s government has invested significant resources in recent years in improving DRR and disaster management, particularly since 2012 when devastating floods in Dakar displaced more than 5,000 families. It has made disaster risk management a priority for the National Civil Protection Agency, and the issue is also included in its poverty reduction strategy.

Senegal is vulnerable to a number of natural hazards, including floods, drought, land degradation, landslides and fires. Annual floods are a particular concern, especially in the Dakar suburbs. The 2012 floods, which disrupted most basic services in the capital for several days, were a turning point in the government’s flood risk management system. With World Bank funding, it adopted a flood management programme that includes institutional capacity building, urban planning, the construction of drainage infrastructure, waste management and community engagement in flood risk education.

Data shows that the expansion of drainage systems protected 100,000 people and 400 hectares of land from heavy rains in 2014 and 2015. No significant displacement was reported in those years, and the work continues. A shelter project implemented in 2017 by the Senegalese Red Cross will help vulnerable communities build safe and flood-proof homes.

Despite the significant steps taken, however, floods in 2016 triggered 24,000 new displacements for want of effective early warning. The national weather office said it do not have the equipment to predict rainfall quantity and was unable to sound the alarm. This is just one example of Senegal’s continuing vulnerability to natural hazards which, along with poor coping capacity and high exposure, increases the risk of displacement.
IMPROVING THE EVIDENCE BASE ON DISPLACEMENT IN AFRICA

Despite recognition of the importance of data collection in the conference of state parties action plan for the Kampala Convention, most AU member states need to do more to collect and analyse data on displacement. Accurate, high-quality estimates require comprehensive data on incidents of new, secondary and repeated displacement and time series data that illustrates how those situations evolve.

This data is needed for each of the major drivers of displacement and on the processes responsible for increases or decreases in the number of IDPs. This includes the drivers of displacement risk, births and deaths in displacement, and factors related to the achievement of durable solutions. It also includes data about where IDPs fled from and where they have sought protection, including their onward flight across borders.

As elsewhere, countries in Africa currently struggle to capture this data. As a result, the picture of internal displacement presented here is incomplete and displacement associated with slow-onset disasters and development projects, for instance, is not captured. Processes that determine the duration of displacement and the pursuit of durable solutions are almost never captured.

Accounting for secondary and repeated displacement is a particular challenge. The failure to properly capture the dynamics of IDPs’ movement has implications for responders, because people who have been displaced a numbers times are likely to face different and greater needs and risks. More data and research is also needed on cross-border returns to determine whether refugees who go back to their home countries manage to achieve durable solutions or whether they become internally displaced. We have started a dedicated research programme focusing on cross-border returns from Kenya to Somalia to help answer these questions.

Data on internal displacement associated with conflict and violence is collected and produced in a different way to that on displacement associated with sudden-onset disasters. Each method has its own set of challenges and limitations. Data on displacement associated with conflict and violence is not linked to particular events, making it difficult, and in many cases impossible, to determine the onset and duration of phenomenon.

Time series data on the cumulative numbers of IDPs, new displacements and returns are aggregated by geography rather than by caseload, and is collected in ways that makes it difficult to distinguish between new displacement, secondary and repeated movements. Without this information, it is impossible to accurately capture the dynamics of each situation. Time series data on displacement associated with disasters is seldom captured for long, if at all. In these cases, we have to infer how many people have been displaced by using proxy indicators such as the number of homes destroyed. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the duration of displacement or the nature of IDPs’ situations and needs.

Lack of effective coordination and shared data collection standards also create challenges, as the spotlight on data collection in the Horn of Africa illustrates. Without common definitions and collection methods, the data on IDPs, refugees and migrants does not allow us to paint a comprehensive and coherent picture of human mobility. This is particularly problematic when “mixed” caseloads of people are on the move in the same areas.

Ensuring better data on displacement in Africa

Reliable and credible data is necessary for governments to predict, prevent, prepare for and respond to displacement. Displacement situations vary greatly between and within countries and disaggregated data helps to inform tailored responses. IDPs sheltering in urban host communities will have different needs and face different risks to those in camps.

Monitoring IDPs is also essential for measuring progress toward policy goals on reducing internal displacement and the achievement of durable solutions. The data that does exist is often collected for purposes other than monitoring, whether it be needs assessments or response planning. Data on IDPs disaggregated by age, gender, disability, location and shelter type is scarce and mostly available only for people displaced by conflict.
One major factor in the scarcity of data on displacement is the lack of a coherent strategy and framework for its collection and analysis. The AU and its member states have made several commitments in this area, most recently in the Harare action plan of the conference of state parties to the Kampala Convention, which acknowledged the importance of data collection. The AU also held a workshop in Kampala in partnership with NRC/IDMC and UNHCR, the first event of its kind to focus entirely on displacement data and reporting in Africa (see box below). Its outcomes will strengthen the Harare action plan and help to harmonise and coordinate data collection and analysis at the national, regional and international level.

African commitments to improving data on IDPs

The AU and its member states have made a number of commitments on the collection, analysis and use of data on internal displacement. The Kampala Convention commits state parties to a wide range of actions to prevent arbitrary displacement and protect and assist IDPs, including via early warning systems and DRR, preparedness and management strategies. It also commits the AU to sharing information with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights “on the situation of displacement, and the protection and assistance accorded to internally displaced persons in Africa”. The 2017 Harare action plan reaffirms the importance of such data collection.

IDPs’ protection and reintegration is a key component of the AU’s policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development, which calls for the harmonisation, coordination and exchange of information. Pillar eight of the 2015 Common African Position on Humanitarian Effectiveness also acknowledges that credible and reliable data plays an important role in improving states’ capacity to predict, prevent, respond and adapt to humanitarian crises such as displacement. It calls upon states to invest “in knowledge generation, innovation and research” and the “enhancement of national capabilities and the systematic use of existing data and the collection of new data, and the analysis and sharing of information”. This is complemented by the AU’s humanitarian policy framework, which calls on the AU Commission to develop a “network of information sharing and reporting systems with humanitarian actors/experts and national institutions” responsible for responding to displacement.

At the AU’s first workshop on displacement data held in November 2017, it held consultations on the development of a continent-wide roadmap aimed at strengthening data collection, analysis and use. This will feed into existing overarching regional mechanisms on statistics and data. The roadmap is intended to be led and owned by member states, and linked to AU benchmarks on displacement, its Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and targets under global frameworks, such as the Sendai framework. It aims to build on the existing capacities and mechanisms of UN agencies and other specialised bodies.

African members of the UN General Assembly have also recognised the importance of gathering and sharing displacement data, including by collaborating with IDMC, in various resolutions on IDPs’ protection and assistance. The most recent was in 2015.
Africa is in the midst of a deepening displacement crisis. An estimated 12.6 million people were uprooted by conflict, violence and disasters as of the end of 2016. Unresolved conflicts across the continent are driving the highest level of related displacement in the world, with 2.6 million people forced to flee their homes in 2016. The figures for the year are higher than those for 2015, and early figures for 2017 suggest they will be higher still. Behind the numbers are millions of girls, boys, women and men, many of whom have lost their homes, livelihoods and communities, and face years if not decades of upheaval in protracted displacement.

African countries showed leadership in 2009 by adopting the Kampala Convention, and the political will they demonstrated in agreeing the world’s first regional treaty on internal displacement is needed now more than ever. 2019 will mark the 10th anniversary of its adoption, and urgent action is required to make progress turning its commitments into reality for the continent’s IDPs. Full ratification would be a significant first step, but implementation is more important still.

Every displacement is much more than a personal tragedy. Displacement reverses development gains and has profound implications for the future achievement of targets in many African countries and regions. The scale of displacement, and its causes and consequences are beyond the scope of humanitarian action alone. Indeed, such an approach to what is essentially a development problem risks perpetuating the drivers and triggers that result in displacement. The complex underlying drivers and long-term implications of the phenomenon have been ignored for too long. The skills, mandates and capacities of a range of humanitarian, development and political stakeholders are required to address the factors that give rise to and sustain displacement across Africa.

The figures set out in this report are already alarming, but they undoubtedly underestimate the scale of displacement. That caused by slow-onset disasters and development projects is not recorded, and the number of people who remain displaced following sudden-onset disasters is unknown. Better evidence and data can help to inform more appropriate responses, but what is needed most of all is a renewal of political will across Africa to address the continent’s displacement crises comprehensively.
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