

## Understanding and estimating displacement in the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA)

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*Elizabeth Bailey, from the US Embassy, delivering opening remarks for the workshop*

### IDMC WORKSHOP REPORT

*Tuesday 25 and Wednesday 26 September 2018*

*Tegucigalpa, Honduras*

## CRIMINAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT:

Organised criminal violence associated with drug trafficking and gang activity has reached epidemic proportions in the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA) in recent years. In El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, IDMC estimates there were at least 432,000 IDPs as of the end of 2017, many of them driven from, and within, cities suffering the highest homicide rates in the world and levels of violence comparable with a war zone.

With increased attention to the violence, and associated factors such as poverty, inequality and weak governance, has come a growing awareness of the many ways in which gang violence forces people to abandon their homes in search of safety. Most of the existing evidence on this form of internal displacement in the NTCA remains anecdotal, however. Data on IDPs, such as figures, locations, vulnerabilities and needs, is not collected through a harmonised approach which would allow for comparison at regional level. As a result, there is a growing urgency to understand the phenomenon of internal displacement; its drivers, triggers, impacts and patterns, in order to provide the evidence base for operational and policy responses.

## WORKSHOP IN TEGUCIGALPA:

The first year of IDMC's 'Understanding and estimating displacement in the NTCA', a two-year project financed by the United States Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, ended in September 2018. IDMC worked with researchers and partners to develop a common conceptual framework of what constitutes internal displacement in the context of criminal violence in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. We also worked with partners to consolidate existing data on the numbers, profiles, locations and needs of the most vulnerable Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the region.

Drawing on the findings of IDMC's research to date, the workshop aimed to provide a forum for local and regional stakeholders from civil society, government, and the international community to discuss the phenomenon of internal displacement in the NTCA, and to work on its understanding and measurement. (See workshop agenda and list of participants in Annex C and D, respectively).

IDMC launched its findings to date on the morning of Tuesday 25 September during a panel discussion with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Cristosal. In the afternoon, IDMC presented the available data and related challenges, and introduced the systems dynamics approach and the conceptual model developed to understand criminal violence and internal displacement in El Salvador. Finally, Cristosal presented their progress in creating a regional monitoring mechanism. The following day, the participants worked in two groups: one providing feedback on the first iteration system dynamics model of criminal violence and internal displacement in El Salvador, the other identifying data gaps and challenges and opportunities to overcome the latter. Finally, during an additional session on Thursday, 27 September, selected participants provided feedback on IDMC's research on drivers, triggers, patterns, and impacts of internal displacement in Honduras.

This report is divided into four sections: the first provides a brief summary of the presentations; the second presents the work of the two groups on 26 September; the third considers drivers, triggers, patterns, and impacts of internal displacement in Honduras identified during the 27 September morning peer review workshop; the last section, serving as a conclusion, revisits the main outcomes, open questions, and suggest a list of next steps towards improving understanding and estimation of internal displacement in the NTCA.

# PRESENTATIONS

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Elizabeth Bailey, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Honduras, emphasised the commitment of the US government to support the construction of protection networks to monitor the services people being displaced require, through its embassies in the region. The US' southern border experienced a peak of asylum requests by unaccompanied children in the summer of 2014. Beyond providing asylum, the US strategy aims to help build protection capacity under an integral framework and based on precise data, so displaced populations can find and receive the protection they need in order to prosper and feel safe in their homes.

Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs), welcomed IDMC's contribution via written remarks. She said that its studies have helped the ongoing examination of displacement caused by generalised and gang-related violence, with a view to better understanding the phenomenon and providing an evidence base for operational and policy responses in the region. She recounted her predecessors' and her own visits to the region since 2015, stressing that a heightened security response alone would not solve the problem of violence and internal displacement and in some cases may contribute to the problems communities face. Jimenez-Damary recognised that Honduras had taken important steps towards properly addressing internal displacement. She noted the efforts of the government of El Salvador but underlined that it has not taken the important first step of fully acknowledging the challenges of internal displacement (See Annex B for the Special Rapporteur's full remarks).

## HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT IN THE NTCA (NRC)

David García, Communication and Advocacy Officer of the Norwegian Refugee Council for Colombia, opened the panel discussion. He stressed the need to prevent the cycle of displacement from repeating indefinitely, by developing timely procedures to assist people in need of protection and humanitarian aid. He described the work of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in the region by presenting the case of Jose. Jose and his family of four were forced to flee their home on five occasions due to threats, intimidations, extortion, the murder of a child, coercion and physical violence. During his testimony, Jose did not recognise displacement as a protection mechanism. However, he considered that if he had a place to sleep, food and livelihood opportunities at the point of his first displacement and those which followed, his situation could have significantly improved.

Finally, the presentation highlighted the opportunity and necessity of analysing the aspirations of the people affected by violence. It also promoted the participation of the people affected by violence in identifying their needs in order to orient the humanitarian response and successfully connect, from the early stages of displacement, opportunities for change. He shared three success stories: a woman using emergency cash resources from NRC to help her start her shoe business, a man using the same assistance to buy fish and now managing a fish business, and a family which started with two pigs and now own a butcher's shop. Transcript of the presentation is available in Annex A.

## INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN EL SALVADOR (CRISTOSAL)

Noah Bullock, Executive Director of the Cristosal Foundation, highlighted the benefit of characterising and registering the cases of people being displaced to understand the conditions of vulnerability to which they are exposed. He talked about the change in the profile of people displacing; from those who displace due to economic reasons, to people displacing seeking asylum. "The right to not migrate represents now

the right of protection,” he commented. When asylum is denied, he stated, the relationship between deportation and internal displacement is clear. There is a close linkage between internal movements and cross-border flow of people because individuals and families cannot return safely to their places of origin, he explained.

The “expectation to return” could serve as a proxy to locate displaced populations; a low “expectation to return” could serve, for example, as a proxy of the inability of the state to respond efficiently and beneficially. Finally, he resolved, state presence in vulnerable locations is necessary, but should be about providing access to services, rather than military deployment.

## A BASELINE FOR ACTION: PRESENTATION OF IDMC'S FIRST YEAR FINDINGS (IDMC)

Adrian Calvo-Valderrama, IDMC’s Senior Monitoring Coordinator for conflict and violence, presented IDMC - an independent organisation mandated by the UN General Assembly to collect and analyse data on internal displacement worldwide. IDMC has been publishing the Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) since 2016. GRID includes national estimates of displacement stocks and flows and Calvo-Valderrama presented the NTCA figures for violence induced displacement from GRID 2018:

- El Salvador: 296,000 new displacements.
- Guatemala: 1,200 new displacements and a total of 242,000 IDPs from 1997 to 31 December 2017 (the latter data dates back to 1997).
- Honduras: 190,000 IDPs (this data was taken from 2015).

There is no estimate of the number of returns in any of the three countries, nor is there information about IDP numbers in El Salvador at the end of 2017, or about the number of new displacements in Honduras during 2017. Added to that, the existing figures are decaying and/or unreliable.

The limited access to data compounds the lack of understanding surrounding the phenomenon of displacement: clear definitions and empirical evidence about the dynamics and scope of internal displacement in the NTCA are needed, but do not exist. The phenomenon is characterised by invisible movements, because victims fear persecution. These challenges are increased by lack of state recognition of internal displacement.


In order to contribute to the improvement of this situation, IDMC launched a two year project on the phenomenon and the scope of internal displacement in the NTCA. The project has two main objectives:

- To develop a comprehensive and shared understanding of internal displacement associated with organised criminal violence in NTCA, including drivers, triggers, patterns, and impacts.
- To help paint a more complete picture of the scale of the phenomenon, in order to inform the operational and policy responses currently being scaled up in the region. This includes the identification of sources and data on numbers, locations, and needs of IDPs, as well as the main gaps and challenges in this quest.

During the first year of the project, the focus was on the first objective. IDMC worked with senior research consultants who carried out desk and field research in Guatemala and El Salvador for the project. Lucía Avila worked with IDMC to develop a conceptual model based on systems dynamics for El Salvador. Calvo-Valderrama presented the main findings:

- Cause or consequence? Reframing violence and displacement in Guatemala
  - Structural and direct violence both force people to move.
  - Development projects and disasters are significant drivers of displacement.

- Displacement, crime and violence combine to create a downward spiral.
  - Sometimes displacement is the best option, but still unavailable to many.
- [An atomised crisis Reframing displacement caused by crime and violence in El Salvador](#)
    - Displacement patterns are ostensibly random.
    - Targeted threats create a continuum of risk.
    - The nature of a safe place is highly individualised.
    - The precarious nature of displacement leads to repeated transitory moves, “self-containment” and significant cross-border flight.
    - Repressive state responses also contribute to displacement.
    - Displacement has major impacts at all levels of society that are aggravated by the lack of a state response.
    - Data and reporting issues impede understanding and action on displacement.
- Based on the field work, Avila and IDMC developed a conceptual model with 166 variables and 66 causal loops. The model is based on systems dynamics and is meant to help visualise the interactions between different factors related to criminal violence and displacement in El Salvador. Ultimately, the goal is for the model to be used to identify high-leverage entry points for policy-makers and practitioners working to prevent displacement and protect IDPs.




For the second year, IDMC plans to finalise a report it has been preparing for internal displacement in Honduras, develop conceptual models for Honduras and Guatemala, identify potential variables and data sources to understand the scope and scale of internal displacement in each country and in the region, contribute to the development of a regional monitoring mechanism, and continue and improve the dialogue and support to state actors.

## DATA IN THE NTCA: FIGURES, SOURCES, CHALLENGES, AND STAKEHOLDERS (IDMC)

IDMC's Andrés Lizcano Rodríguez, spoke further about the second objective of IDMC's NTCA project: data. He began by presenting IDMC's data model, explained IDMC's current estimates for the region, shared common practices from several other countries faced with challenges surrounding data collection, and presented two main results from IDMC's partner mapping: the lack of a systematic data-sharing process and the willingness of organisations to share data.

IDMC's data model consists of population stocks and flows related to internal displacement. Unfortunately, reliable and timely data is generally hard to find. The GRID therefore features data on the IDP numbers, displacement flows and returns during the previous year. Estimates of other variables are available for only a small number of countries.



Lizcano Rodríguez went on to explain the sources, methodologies, and caveats of IDMC's figures.

In [El Salvador](#), IDMC examined information registered by the police and by the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the profiling exercise published by the government with support from JIPS, UNHCR, and the Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences (FLACSO) in March 2018. It based its estimate on two questions about internal displacement in a representative survey conducted in November 2017 by the Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) at the José Simeón Cañas Central American University, the most comprehensive assessment, which provided the best estimate for 2017. IDMC extrapolated the results of the IUDOP survey to the country's total adult population based on a projection of the 2007 census. In doing so, it was able to take into account the number of times a person migrated each year, revealing that there were 296,000 new displacements during 2018.

The main caveat here is that the survey is voluntary, which risks bias related to the characteristics of people who agreed to take it. Equally, the question asked in the survey only considers displacements which have been caused by threats. It therefore excludes those associated with other kinds of violence, such as homicides, theft, extortion and recruitment. It is also important to note that the survey estimate refers to new displacement rather than the total number of IDPs, implying that one person's multiple movements during the year are all taken into account. IUDOP also varies the formulation of the question, making it impossible to compare displacement trends from year to year.

For [Honduras](#), IDMC's estimate of 190,000 IDPs is based on a UNHCR projection of past displacement in 2016. The projection was calculated using the estimated average annual number of people displaced from 2004 to 2014 as reported in a profiling exercise conducted by the Interinstitutional Commission for the Protection of People Displaced by Violence (CIPPDV) in 2015. The exercise is due to be updated in 2018. Although this figure is perhaps closer to the real number of IDPs in Honduras than the 174,000 published in the profiling exercise, the latter is more commonly quoted, even by UNHCR. The figure reflects the cumulative total of projected displacement during an 11 year period. As we have no information to the contrary, we assume that most of these people remain displaced.

In [Guatemala](#), IDMC estimates that 242,000 people remain internally displaced from the civil war. This is based on a 2000 report by the Central American Development Foundation (FUNCEDE), the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, and UN Habitat, which disaggregates 1997 figures from UNFPA. IDMC obtained information about new displacements that occurred in 2007 and 2017, and some cases reported by IOM's displacement tracking matrix (DTM) in 2016, but these caseloads could not be added to the 1997 data, since this could lead to double counting. As a result, IDMC's estimate covers people displaced during the civil war and does not include any who have since fled generalised criminal violence. The 1997 figure is decaying and unlikely to be up to date, but there is insufficient proof to conclude whether and how many IDPs have achieved durable solutions to their displacement.

Given the lack of robust data, IDMC based its estimate of 1,200 new displacements on newspaper articles and a number of resolutions from the Organisation of American States' Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reporting on evictions. Whether all of the 2017 evictions constituted displacement associated with conflict and violence is a matter of some doubt, because there was not always a reliable account of how and why they took place. Additionally, IDMC was not able to estimate the number of new displacements associated with generalised criminal violence in 2017, making the 1,200 figure a significant underestimate.

To illustrate possible solutions for some of the challenges of data collection, Lizcano Rodriguez presented IDMC's work in [Colombia](#) and in the [Central African Republic \(CAR\)](#): in Colombia, the government uses a stock figure that exceeds seven million, putting the country at the top of the list, above Syria, on several occasions. This is a cumulative figure of all people displaced since 1985. The Colombian government includes them all for historical reasons and because it owes them reparations. However, for resource allocation and other purposes, as well as for clarity, it is important to provide a figure for the current number of IDPs. For that purpose, IDMC partnered with the Colombian government's Victims Unit to obtain a stock figure by discounting people who have died, and people who have moved towards a durable solution. The total stock estimate was revised down to 6.5 million, still an overestimate. IDMC continues to work with the Victims Unit to improve the accuracy of these estimates.

To measure new displacement, IDMC bases its estimates on the Victims Registry (RUV), which is operated by the Victims Unit and keeps a record of all victims of the decades-long civil war. However, the RUV's data is not up to date: victims have two years to report displacement and even after they have done so, the RUV may still take time to process their request. Therefore, the UN's Colombia Information Management and Analysis Unit (CIMAUI), makes a projection based on RUV's data covering 2009 to 2016,

to estimate new displacements for a given month based on an analysis of displacements during the same month of the previous year, displacements during the previous month, the average movements of those two months (average new displacement per month in the previous 12 months) and mass displacements during the month in question.

In CAR, the number of reports from different organisations increased as the crisis escalated, but a lack of common definitions and systems of reporting led to indiscriminate reports about expulsions of people, arrivals of people, and sightings of people escaping; no differentiation between stocks and flows, and constant repetition and updating of reports. Therefore, it was hard to identify which caseloads were overlapping. In response, IDMC had to set up a system to assemble and organise the different reports. In order to ensure that no displacement would be counted twice, it set the following rules:

- Only reports of expulsions would be counted unless an arrival was associated with a specific expulsion.
- If there are two or more caseloads about displacements in a region, and there is no clarity about the exact geographical origin/destination of each caseload, nor other ways to set them apart, only the largest of the caseloads will be counted.

This aggregated registry was then used to estimate the total amount of new displacements in 2017. It guarantees that there is no double counting, and provides a more comprehensive figure than the one obtained by adding monthly positive differences of the stock figures the Commission on Population Movements (CMP) provides by prefecture.

Finally, Lizcano Rodriguez presented some of the results of a partner mapping carried out by IDMC to understand who works and how they work on internal displacement in the NTCA. More than 40 organisations were invited to participate, building on previous partner mappings. Twenty organisations from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the UK, and Brazil replied. The two main findings presented during this workshop were that:

1. There is no systematic way of sharing data and information among organisations.
2. Organisations are willing to share their data, if certain conditions can be guaranteed.

## TOWARDS A REGIONAL MONITORING MECHANISM (CRISTOSAL)

Rina Montti of the Cristosal Foundation, presented Cristosal's proposal for a Regional Monitoring System for forced displacement in the NTCA. The mechanism has three objectives:

- To observe and document the nature and dynamics of internal displacement due to violence in the NTCA.
- To analyse the implications, social consequences and violations of human rights associated with internal displacement.
- To contribute to and have an effect on raising social awareness of the phenomenon of internal displacement.

To fulfil these objectives, the regional mechanism consists of strategies and methodological instruments that allow information about the scale and characteristics of the phenomenon to be collected under a framework of four variables:

- The socio demographic characteristics of displaced persons.
- Acts of violence and perpetrators,
- Response of the state and deterioration of living conditions.
- Durable solutions.

Within the methodological instruments, Cristosal's Monitoring System has developed five record instruments to collect data under the framework:

- Records of victims of displacement whose interviews were attended by Cristosal and partner institutions (recorded with confidentiality agreements).
- Records of victims of internal displacement in selected territories.
- An in-depth interview guide for victims of internal forced displacement.
- Interview guide to key references in the field.
- News media tracking sheet.

The first two of these are being placed online through Kobo Toolbox and are being recorded with the help of partners (civil society organisations, government instances and international organisations)<sup>1</sup>.

Monitoring units in each country (Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) feed the regional monitoring mechanism and are responsible for drafting reports, organising national and regional presentations and developing policy proposals.

Cristosal and Quetzalcoatl Foundation recorded 701 cases from January to June 2017. Of those, 375 were already IDPs at the moment of the interview. Almost 50 (46.5) per cent of the cases were unable to displace: 233 due to lack of economic resources; 217 due to lack of shelter and 97 due to lack of shelter and protection. The rest of the cases offered other reasons for being unable to displace. Of the 701 cases most of the women are aged between 0-11 years and 18-25 years. In contrast, men have a more equal distribution of ages 0-11, 18-25 and 36-45 years old. On the Regional Monitoring System website you can find an interactive site with a map of place of origin of the registered cases.

## MORE RESEARCH RESULTS

Search in the listing

Sex Age Genre Identify vulnerable group Approved academic level Occupation or trade Religion Family state

Have you suffered any violence or are you displaced? What are the main acts of violence that have suffered? If you can not move, what prevents you? Faced with the facts made a complaint?

To which institutions of the State did I denounce the facts?

Sexo	Edad	Identidad de género	Identifique grupo vulnerable	Nivel académico aprobado	Ocupación u oficio	Religión	Estado familiar	¿Ha sufrido algún hecho de violencia o está en desplazamiento?	¿Cuáles son los principales hechos de violencia que han sufrido?	En caso de no poder desplazarse, ¿Qué se lo impide?	¿Ante los hechos interpuso denuncia?	¿Ante cuáles instituciones del Estado denunció los hechos?
Hombre	55	Heterosexual			Empleado privado		Casado/a	Sí			Sí	PNC
Mujer	30	Heterosexual	Mujer	Universitario/a	Otros			Sí		NA	No	
Mujer	21	Heterosexual	Mujer	Universitario/a	Estudiante		Soltero/a	Sí		NA	Sí	FGR
Hombre	30							ND	Sí		No	
Hombre								ND	Sí		Sí	
Mujer	23	Heterosexual	Niñez y adolescencia Mujer				Soltero/a	Sí	VÍCTIMA DE VIOLACIÓN		Sí	ISDEMU
Hombre		Heterosexual	Niñez y adolescencia Mujer				Casado/a	Sí			No	
Mujer	33	Heterosexual	Mujer	1º año de bachillerato	Empleado privado	Evangélico	Acompañado/a	Sí	VÍCTIMA DE VIOLACIÓN	ES UNA PERSONA CON DISCAPACIDAD O TIENE UN FAMILIAR QUE LO ES	No	
Hombre	25	Heterosexual		3º año de bachillerato	Empleado privado	Evangélico	Acompañado/a	No				
Hombre	7	Heterosexual	Niñez y adolescencia	Primero	Estudiante	Evangélico	Soltero/a	No				
Mujer	5	Heterosexual	Niñez y adolescencia	Preparatoria/ kínder	Estudiante	Evangélico	Soltero/a	No				
Hombre	64	Heterosexual		2º año de bachillerato	Pequeña empresa	Evangélico	Casado/a	Sí		OTROS	Sí	PNC
Mujer	62	Heterosexual	Mujer	2º año de bachillerato	Otros	Evangélico	Casado/a	Sí		OTROS	NA	
Mujer	46	Heterosexual	Niñez y adolescencia Mujer				Viudo/a	Sí		NO TIENE A DONDE ALOJARSE	No	

From Cristosal's data visualisation portal: individual entries to the regional monitoring system

<sup>1</sup> Cristosal Foundation is actively seeking partners. For more information please refer to [rina.montti@crisotal.org](mailto:rina.montti@crisotal.org)

Cristosal Foundation recorded 674 cases of children displaced in El Salvador, from 2016 to March 2018. This work highlighted that the most vulnerable group to be displaced by violence are boys aged 0-11 years, followed by female adolescents aged 12-17, and lastly young men. Little more than half of the population (51 per cent) had displaced at the moment of the interview. Boys and girls between 0-11 years old made up 40 per cent of the cases, while in comparison, 39 per cent were young men and women aged 18-25 years. The place of origin of the population was concentrated in the centre of the country (El Salvador).

## INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS DYNAMICS AND THE EL SALVADOR MODEL (IDMC)

Lucía Avila presented an Introduction to System Dynamics Methodology. This methodology is being used to develop a model of internal displacement in the region with the objective of analysing the relations between the drivers and triggers of displacement, their patterns of evolution and how they have compounded to impact the motivation to displace. This presentation offered an introduction to System Dynamics and how to read the El Salvador model. During its first half, Avila reviewed the strengths of the methodology and how it encompasses with data collection. In the second half, she reviewed the basic concepts of a systems dynamics model, including what a feedback process is and the elements of a causal loop diagram. More details are available in Annex E.



# PROGRESS ON THE EL SALVADOR MODEL AND REGIONAL INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT DATA

## THE EL SALVADOR MODEL

The model was developed to untangle the complexities of the overlapping drivers, triggers, impacts and patterns of internal displacement in the NTCA. For El Salvador, it was divided into five sections: criminal violence, well-being, motivation to displace, effectiveness of criminal response and accuracy assessment of displacement due to criminal violence (Fig #).

### | Model's Frameworks

The El Salvador model describes the situations connected to displacement in the state from 1990, after the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords until the present day. It presents violence in a continuum, from intangible to tangible. Intangible violence encompasses perceived criminal acts and threats (of physical injury). Tangible violence refers to any violence where physical injury results. The model accepts that violence of both kinds can lead to re-victimisation (processes). Finally, the model represents how three populations, the security forces and their relatives, gang members and their relatives and the general population, experience violence

### | Sectors

#### *1. Criminal Violence*

At the centre of the criminal violence section of the model, there is a structure detailing the growth of the security forces in response to the growth of the gangs' activities. There is an enmity between the gangs and the security forces that results in casualties on both sides. This enmity has also an effect on gangs' and security forces' families' perception of violence, decreasing the families' perception of wellbeing. When gang activity grows, the crime rate grows. The model divides this crime rate into four sections: extortion, house appropriation, coercion, and gender violence. The four types together constitute the crime rate.

Security forces respond to the crime rate, increasing or decreasing their depending on gangs' presence in a location. Security forces also experience a delay in how they grow based on the time to recruit and train new members. Infiltration is also considered, as it influences the effectiveness of the action of the security forces through corruption.

The crime rate (extortion, gender violence, appropriation of houses, businesses and land, and coercion) is further divided according to the type of violence (threats and direct criminal violence) that impact the general population. Threats and direct criminal violence generate a psychological sense of risk of direct criminal violence and risk of direct criminal violence.




Image. El Salvador Model Sectors

1: Criminal Violence; 2: Well-being; 3: Motivation to Displace; 4: Effectiveness of Criminal Response; 5: Accuracy's Assessment of Displacement due to Criminal Violence

After the failure of the peace accords and the growing presence of gangs, the state persecuted gang members. This persecution had a double effect: rapid losses in gang sizes and fear of harassment. Reduction of gang sizes pressured the gangs to recruit more members. The low level of criminal responsibility of minors encouraged the recruitment of young people and created momentum for forced recruitment. On the other hand, the fear of harassment lowered gang members' and their families' perception of their wellbeing and increased their motivation to displace. Forced recruitment increased the general population's expectation that their own children might be forcibly recruited, which had a negative effect on the potential repercussions of criminal violence.

For all populations, an increased perception of potential criminal violence reduces freedom of movement, which has an effect on access to markets, education and health services. When the potential criminal violence repercussion increases and there is an inequality (or deficiency) of public security, private security emerges, reducing people's willingness to pay taxes. When freedom of movement decreases, the social fabric suffers, increasing the susceptibility of young people to join gangs.

Finally, corruption coming from the gang infiltration of the security forces, together with the state's abuse of power (produced after the peace accords) impacts negatively on trust in the state. When this happens, there is less willingness to report criminal violence and society instead attempts to respond illegally. This mechanism, where legal response declines, has a negative effect on the rule of law and fosters a culture of individual will which has a negative effect on the social fabric. Society declines because of the loss of social interactivity due to reduced freedom of movement and because the quality of the interactions erodes due to the prevalence of the rule of power.

## 2. Well-being

The well-being component focuses on the variables concerning formal economic activity, supply and demand of jobs, productivity, job impact on livelihood, access to services (education, health, and public security) and social equality. It investigates the impacts of extortion, appropriation of houses, businesses and land, robbery and youth marginalisation.

When the perception of criminal violence increases, new businesses decrease (in agriculture-based economies land is not used) so that production capacity declines. This behaviour sets the level of production capacity utilisation at a lower initial level. At the same time, production targets for the next season fall due to lower average sales caused by lack of access to markets, increasing savings, increasing displacement and lowering output due to a lower production capacity utilisation. When sales decline, firms' capital declines, followed by a decrease in wages. In this way, increased perception of criminal violence leads to lower wages, lower labour levels and lower production capacity. Labour can increase when there are more workers available (willing to work for lower wages), but wages also have an effect on a region's average income. The higher the income, the higher the number of sales by businesses, but also, the more ability to pay extortion, which can increase the level and perception of criminal violence. Lower incomes reduce a region's capacity to buy assets, driving sales and therefore wages, down. This in turn can cause people to turn to crime, which once again increases the level and perception of criminal violence. In this situation, people's assets can be lost due to robbery and displacement.

Lower incomes also have an effect on access to health and education services, which in the presence of precarious state provisions of these services, leads to education and health inequality. Lack of jobs translates to low levels of employment and precarious livelihoods, which increase economic inequality. Lack of education opportunities, health, public security, and increased economic inequality produce higher levels of social inequality and a lower level of well-being in the general population. These inequalities then further reduce people's trust in state institutions. When there are high levels of social inequality, social mobility decreases and leads to an increased perception among the population that they will be unable to achieve their life goals. This, in turn, generates high levels of unmotivated youth and low

levels of school attendance. School attendance is also impacted by gang recruitment, which generates lower productivity that in turn reduces production capacity.

### *3. Motivation to Displace*

This component focuses on the variables that contribute to people's decision to displace. It is based on a framework of three expectations of well-being: expected well-being at a person's home, expected well-being elsewhere and expected well-being as an IDP. We review all three, and discovered that perceived well-being opportunities away from people's point of origin changed dependent on social capital in considered destinations for displaced people. We also note that displacement negatively effects savings, decreasing people's ability to displace and move further.

Displacement reduces the potential risks of direct criminal violence: victimisation and re-victimisation. It reduces the proportion of the general population at risk of displacement due to re-victimisation and decreases tolerance to criminal violence, which both reduces the time for displacement and increases the number of people displacing.

### *4. Effectiveness of Criminal Response*

This section contains variables concerning people's willingness to report criminal violence based on the level of potential risk of violence. When there is a higher potential risk of direct criminal violence, there is less willingness to report it, because of the public's level of tolerance to criminal violence and low trust in state institutions. When there is a willingness to report criminal violence, there are higher levels of response and reported criminal violence. The state reports lower rates criminal violence than are actually reported and this, in turn, influences the criminal violence report gap between the actual criminal violence rate and the reported criminal violence. The discrepancy in this measurement has an effect on the assessment of criminal violence prevention and intervention programs. On the other hand, trust in the state institutions has a positive effect on the willingness to pay taxes which increases the state's budget.

### *5. Accuracy Assessment of Displacement due to Criminal Violence*

Displacement reporting is influenced by the potential risk of criminal violence. If an individual perceives a high risk, their willingness to report the displacement is low and the reported IDP numbers are incorrect. This inaccuracy reduces the reliability of assessments and their conclusions regarding the scale of response needed. In the absence of sufficient state responses to displacement, due to for omission or lack of available public resources, other institutions emerge to respond. The burden is carried by civil society and family and friends providing humanitarian (shelter and food) and protection assistance to IDPs.

## WORKSHOP

The modelling workshop was divided into three sections:

1. Learning how to read a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD).
2. Presenting an example of a CLD.
3. Building a CLD.



## Learning how to read a CLD

This stage consisted of a 45 minute introductory presentation on System Dynamics. The presentation was divided into two sections:

### *Definitions and terms*

The first section provided essential definitions and terms to understand how to read the El Salvador CLD (on Kumu).

### *Structure of the modelling workshop*

Section two provided the structure of the modelling workshop where the two last stages: *Presenting an example of a CLD* and *Building a CLD*, were developed.

## Presenting an example of a CLD

This stage consisted of one activity: reviewing the El Salvador Model. Six participants, experts in the situations of the three countries of the NCTA, assisted this stage.

### *Model Review*

In this three-hour exercise, three CLDs were described cause by cause:

- Key Finding 5 (one hour)
- Criminal Violence Sector (one hour, 30 minutes)
- Well-being Sector (30 minutes)

Participants were invited to discuss these causes of displacement and provide references to back up their comments by completing *Template A* (See Appendix C). This activity provided insights on:

- Gang Growth
- Community (its role in preventing violence or displacement)
- Authority (and the tactics it uses)
- Territorial Opportunity

The following are some of the key comments on each:

#### Gang Growth

- The relationship between security forces and gangs is not exactly linear. It is more fluid. Gangs are reactive. They grow just to control a “slice of the pie”.
- There is an increase in the ruralisation of gangs, operating outside of urban areas.
- There is no linear relationship between organised crime and gangs. It is more about: negotiate or clash.
- There are gang expulsions internally. They can lose 400 members in one “deputation”.
- Gangs are starting to recruit professionals, particularly lawyers, who can help them escape punishment for their activities.

#### Community

- El Salvador: Some community leaders in El Salvador take it upon themselves to negotiate directly with gang leaders
- Honduras: Some gang members have increasingly complained to police that they are the victims of violence from community members.
- Honduras: Mayan communities have “Mayan Punishment”<sup>2</sup>.

#### Authority

- Gangs are capable of stopping, and in some cases do stop, homicides or extortion to demonstrate their control over an area. Later, this behaviour becomes more explicitly political, not least because political parties negotiate reduced crime rates in exchange for votes.

#### Territorial Opportunity

- El Salvador: When rivalry declines, gang ruralisation, efforts to dodge security forces and internal migration to strategic zones, result. This is the first wave of displacement. The second wave comes when tough measures are undertaken by security forces to crack down on crime. Truces also create displacement, as territories are left alone and other groups take them.

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<sup>2</sup> Mayan punishment (In Spanish “Castigo Maya”) is a practice by Mayan communities to deliver justice, often involving public physical violence punishments (e.g. lashes, shaving the head of the offender so he or she is recognized by the community, etc.).

## Improvements to the Model

Finally, two comments were provided to improve the legibility of the model.

- Add initial and final relationship signs on the arrows (instead of colours).
- Provide annotations and references for each variable and each causal relationship.

## Building a CLD

This stage was a three hour model building session.

It was divided into three sections: Selecting System's Themes, Developing Factors, Exploring Causes and Effects. The fourth section, Building Feedback Processes and Behaviour Evaluation could not take place, due to lack of time. Five participants, representing expertise from the three countries (El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala), were present. Due to the number of assistants, the session focused on developing a model for the region (NTCA). Notes on the variables selected for each country are shown in the following tables.

## Model Building

Participants were asked to select six themes as answer to the question:

*“You cannot understand internal displacement due to criminal violence in the region unless you understand these six issues”.*

### Selecting System's Themes

There was then a guided discussion to group the themes and agree terms. Finally, the participants were asked to vote for the four most relevant topics. The themes and accepted terms are presented in the tables in [Appendix A](#). The accepted terms are ordered from most relevant to least relevant theme to understand internal displacement in the region.

### Developing Factors

In this section, participants were asked to expand the four most relevant accepted terms into factors that have allowed or countered the growth of the term (or issue).



## Exploring Causes &amp; Effects

Finally, the factors were grouped into causes and effects for each main factor

*Table. Causes and Effects of Main Factors*

CAUSES			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Military dictatorships.</li> <li>▪ Failure of transitional justice.</li> <li>▪ Difficulties building “citizenship”.</li> <li>▪ Power concentration.</li> <li>▪ Racist government.</li> <li>▪ Impunity.</li> <li>▪ Corruption.</li> <li>▪ International relations.</li> <li>▪ US interference.</li> <li>▪ Civil War.</li> <li>▪ Lack of civic education post-armed conflict.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Geographic location.</li> <li>▪ Poverty.</li> <li>▪ Armed conflict.</li> <li>▪ Gang deportation from US.</li> <li>▪ Employment and social insertion.</li> <li>▪ Patterns of violence (past violence).</li> <li>▪ Failure of transitional justice.</li> <li>▪ Lack of rule of law.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Colonialism.</li> <li>▪ Power concentration.</li> <li>▪ Historical processes.</li> <li>▪ Repression.</li> <li>▪ Education</li> <li>▪ Enrolment.</li> <li>▪ Human Rights education.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Failure of transitional justice.</li> <li>▪ Education system.</li> <li>▪ Human Rights Education.</li> <li>▪ Participatory Processes Education.</li> </ul>
FACTORS			
<i>Lack of democratic rule of law</i>	<i>Organised crime (gangs and drug trafficking)</i>	<i>Social exclusion</i>	<i>Violence culture</i>
EFFECTS			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “Mano Durismo”.</li> <li>▪ Criminal prosecution.</li> <li>▪ Use of political violence.</li> <li>▪ Lack of judicial independence.</li> <li>▪ Peace Accords.</li> <li>▪ Social Movements.</li> <li>▪ National Norms Protecting vulnerable groups.</li> <li>▪ CICIG.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Criminal prosecution with due process.</li> <li>▪ Poverty.</li> <li>▪ Lack of judicial independence.</li> <li>▪ CICIG and Public Ministry.</li> <li>▪ Peace building.</li> <li>▪ Community Processes.</li> <li>▪ Social Movements.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Social Movements.</li> <li>▪ Human rights defenders.</li> <li>▪ Lack of democratic rule of law.</li> <li>▪ Social discrimination.</li> <li>▪ Migration.</li> <li>▪ Remittances.</li> <li>▪ Clientelism.</li> <li>▪ Populism and Assistance.</li> <li>▪ Investment in social programs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Repression.</li> <li>▪ Armed conflict.</li> </ul>

## Conclusions

From the modelling workshop, we can conclude that direct and structural violence are the two factors which have driven the motivation to displace. The experts in the field described this factor as “Las Violencias”. Violence that has affected the most vulnerable populations from the three countries through history. Of the four other factors, two point to a governance structure from which violence emerges: lack of democratic rule of law and social exclusion. These factors have prevented individuals from achieving their full potential and, in turn, have damaged the social fabric for decades, eroding at the same time the governance structure and the rule of law.

## Next Steps

The results from the modelling workshop have directed the research towards analysing the drivers of fragile states. The research obtained from this session and on fragile states, will be used to improve a regional model of the drivers, triggers, impacts and patterns of displacement.

# REGIONAL INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT DATA

The group working on internal displacement data consisted mostly of Hondurans. It began by identifying the reasons they required data and how participants and their organisations like/need to use it:

- Making decisions about policy, programming, and projects.
  - Making strategic decisions about assistance and protection.
  - Designing interventions.
  - Evaluating interventions.
  - Personalising assistance.
- Improving understanding of the phenomenon.
  - Setting up baselines and carrying out needs assessments.
  - Analysing the phenomenon.
  - Visualising the consequences of violence.
  - Building general and specific historical and contextual narratives.
  - Recognising cause-effect relationships.
  - Making projections.
  - Understanding the size of the problem.
- Raising and maintaining awareness about internal displacement.
- Resource allocation.
  - Mobilising funds for attention, protection, and prevention.
  - Making funding decisions.
- Influencing Policy.
  - Proposing programs, policies, projects, and laws for attention and prevention of internal displacement.
  - Achieving government recognition of the phenomenon.
- Holding organisations accountable.
- Denouncing Human Rights abuses.
- Creating support networks.

The group then split into two: a group of people who work in Honduras and a group whose participants work in El Salvador and Guatemala.

## EL SALVADOR & GUATEMALA:

Selected variables and sources	
<i>Variables</i>	<i>Sources</i>
Cause of school desertion	Ministry of education, National survey of child and youth wellbeing
# of IDPs in Guatemala	Police, PDH, Ministerio Público, OSC
Personal documentation	National registry of people (Guatemala)
Income, profession, economic activity	Ministry of labour
Date of displacement	Police, Ministerio público, PDH, Municipalities
Place of origin (nationality, state, municipality, colonia)	National registration centre, supreme electoral tribunal, INE, multiple purpose household surveys
Disaggregation of migration flows by cause	EMIF (south and north), consulates, ministry of health and health promoters

## Other sources

- Cristosal:
  - Interview form upon arrival
    - Interviews carried out by partner organisations
  - other forms:
  - field interviews or local sources
    - in depth interviews
    - media monitoring: list of 37 media sources from three countries monitored daily by students.
- Human rights ombudsman:
  - Monitoring and supervision of state entities - displacement is not addressed, only migration.
  - Reporting form - no reports of displacement
- IOM
  - Information management initiative (DTM done for the Volcan de Fuego and interviews)
  - Baseline reports
  - Interviews
  - Censuses
  - DTM update financed by USAID will be published in 2019 and is being coordinated with INE.
  - Child wellbeing survey (Nov 2018)
  - Support of CONADEH's unit of internal forced displacement
- Ministry of Justice and Security (ES)
- Guatemalan Migration Institute
- DGME (ES)
- Survey on migration at Mexico's north and south border - EMIF
- IUDOP (UCA - ES)
- Fe y Alegría (ES & Guatemala)
- Caritas (ES)

*Other variables*

- Income
- Gender identity
- Sex
- Married/single
- Personal documentation
- Shelter and type of shelter
- Authorities reached out to
- Displacement route
- Handicap
- Kind of victimisation
- Access to information and knowledge
- Abandoned property
- Protection mechanisms
- Rural/urban
- Discrimination and racism
- Citizenship
- Trust in institutions
- Level of trust in CSOs
- International documents to which the country has subscribed
- Attention protocols and services

HONDURAS

Current data collection practices of organisations			
<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Methodology</i>	<i>Attention/ Services?</i>
DINAF	Number of children, rights that were affected, how these rights are affected, economic activity, level of education, cause of displacement, number of people in school-age, time affected by violence, perpetrators, healthcare needs, resources to displace, # of family members,	Meeting registries, psychological interview, forms	Analysis about safe zones for IDPs, financial support provided to IDPs, responses/attention that also include adults

NRC	Resources for displacement, economic activity, report filed, number of family members, cause, perpetrators, socioeconomic level, health, number of displacements, current route, family separation, ethnicity	Kobo and Excel databases, interview forms, profiling forms and needs assessment forms, monthly, when cases are identified, personally and over the phone	Previous route, quality of land ownership, credit status
Spanish Red Cross	General health affectation, loss of property, place of origin, destination, need for psychological attention, age, gender, level of education, number of school-age children, cause of displacement, violence suffered, number of family members, time spent affected by violence	Data only shared with interested organisations when cases are transferred or received, information gathered when cases come in some indicators are gathered monthly, personal interview based on form, in depth personal interview	
Casa Alianza	Types of displacement, economic activity, report filed, health conditions, ethnicity, state response, job or career, types of violence, number of school-age children	Media monitoring, interviews, family visits	Conditions of ownership
PADF	-	Protocols, systemising of data in Excel, references from state organisations and from reports from civil society	-
Cristosal	Demographic, Human Rights, Access to justice, prospects for the future	-	Judicial, related to displacement

Selected sources and variables	
Source	Variables
Ministry of Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Cause of desertion</li> <li>· # of desertions</li> <li>· Teacher relocations and causes</li> </ul>
DINAF (Dirección de infancia, niñez, y adolescencia)	Attention to IDPs and migrants with children
CONADEH (based on cases reported) - contact Roberto Herrera	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Risk</li> <li>● Direct/indirect</li> <li>● Occupation</li> <li>● Level of education</li> <li>● Urban/rural</li> <li>● Municipality</li> <li>● Causes</li> <li>● Perpetrators</li> <li>● # of IDPs</li> </ul>
CENISS (manejan ofert social, hacer solicitud a través del portal de transparencia)	Deportees' <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Reasons to leave</li> <li>● Socioeconomic situation</li> <li>● Information from reception centre interview</li> <li>● Information from municipal deportee attention units</li> </ul>
CONMIGHO	Country exits and entries

COPECO (NDMA)	Disaster and development induced displacement
<i>Other sources</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Association of municipalities of Honduras/Online police statistics system</li><li>▪ IO</li><li>▪ World Vision</li><li>▪ UN</li><li>▪ Plan</li><li>▪ USAID</li></ul>	

# DINAF

- # de niños en riesgo
- Posibles ubicaciones
- Tipo de violencia
- Tipo de Actividad Económica
- Nivel Educativo
- Causas de desplazamiento
- Balance cuentas

- Nivel Educativo
- Tiempo de llegada por la violencia
- Causas
- Actores
- Agentes de Salud
- Requisitos para realizar el desplazamiento
- # de miembros de familia

- Protocolos
- Sistematización de datos (exist)
- Tipología de unidades móviles de E
- Programa de información de este otro otro

# DINAF

- # de zonas más seguras para desplazados
- Apoyo humanitario para desplazados
- Respeto que incluye mapas de salud

# NRC

- Recursos de el desplazamiento
- Activo económico
- Denuncia miembros de familia
- # miembros de familia

- Activo económico
- Nivel educativo
- Salud
- Requisitos de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de familia
- Estabilidad

- Actores
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Actores
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Actores
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

# NRC

- Plan de acción
- Condiciones de acceso
- Condiciones de Estado Crediticio

# CRE

- Afectación salud (Genética)
- Tercera/Séptima generación
- Lugar origen
- Lugar destino
- Necesidad apoyo psicos

- Edad y género
- Nivel Educativo
- Edad escolar
- Causa desplazamiento
- Vida(s) familia
- # miembros familia
- Tiempo afectación vid

- Datos de contacto
- Solo cuando hay
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Al realizar cada caso
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Exposición del
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

# CASA ALIANZA

- Tipos de desplazamiento
- Actividad Económica
- Denuncia
- Condiciones de Salud
- Comunidad

- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Tipos de violencia
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Mechas de Comunicación
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

# C-A

- Condiciones de la Propiedad

# PADEF

- Mechas de Comunicación
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Protocolos
- Sistematización de datos (exist)
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

# CRISTAL

- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

- Justicia
- Tipología de desplazamiento
- Tipología de desplazamiento

## INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN HONDURAS

Finally, a group of volunteer peer reviewers<sup>3</sup> came together in an additional session on Thursday 27 September, to go through the initial research carried out by IDMC on violence induced internal displacement in Honduras. The goal was to review and challenge or validate the existing findings and to identify and crowdsource the main gaps. The group focussed on the following list of drivers, triggers, patterns, and impacts of internal displacement in Honduras.

### DRIVERS

1. Environment: natural and external forces (including climate change)
2. Development and economics (e.g. urbanisation, transnational companies, impact on environment, displacement of entire communities). High taxation, focus on security, worsening poverty, many forms of taxes.
3. Social: lack of income, livelihood. Gang operations. Militarisation.
4. Political: should include a Geopolitical dimension to the analysis, to take into account the geographical position of Honduras (transit of goods and people, including illegal activities, drugs and people smuggling, weapons). Existence of departments/areas hard to reach for government services, where there's a lot of migration.

### TRIGGERS

1. Extortion and death threats
2. Relationships with victims
3. Saturation Operations. The location of this police tactic could serve as a proxy to localise cases of mass- and multiple internal displacement. A saturation operation is a police tactic where a large number of officers are concentrated into a small geographic area for hot-spot crime reduction. In Honduras, these operations develop after process of investigation, planning and inter-institutional coordination. They are designed to execute arrest warrants, dismantle criminal gangs, seize weapons, drugs, ammunition, explosives and generally, combat organised crime and associated illicit activities. These tactics, however successful in providing intelligence and criminal captures, have not been able to maintain and reduce violence after the operation has finished (each operation is, on average, 15 days long). Populations from these locations tend to displace in mass due to the fear of retaliation for being considered whistle-blowers by the active criminal group or the incoming group that seizes the territory due to the lack of peace maintenance.
4. Forced recruitment (young men and women)
5. Climate factors (and their relationship with Zone of Employment and Economic Development).

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<sup>3</sup> Sebastian Silva (Norwegian Red Cross); Zelena Rodriguez (PADF); Martia Grazia Pressacco (Spanish Red Cross); Jaime A Flored P (Casa Alianza Honduras); Carlos Siena (Cristosal); Noah Bullock (Cristosal)

## PATTERNS

1. The individual nature of each displacement (while there are individual cases of public displacement to make a statement).
2. Poor, larger, less well-educated households are most affected because those are the areas where the gangs operate. (Landlords occasionally prefer having their houses empty than renting it to someone they can't guarantee are not from maras).
3. Displacement is most often local in its first iteration – with a preference for urban settings. This due to support networks, services, etc. Rural displacement happens less because of gang violence and more for land grabs, or because of gender violence. Criminal activity in rural areas is more closely linked to drug trafficking – most likely to keep the peace along the routes. (Although there is a move back to rural gangs).
4. Displacement is likely to be repeated because movement is towards dangerous areas. Eventually that chain can lead to cross border displacement. Although some people flee the country immediately because the threat is too big. Seven out of ten displaced people leave the country immediately, according to NRC.
5. Lack of willingness to trust the government will protect people. State repression is also linked to police officers committing acts of violence against people who try to report the gangs: police officers are paid off.
6. To be developed: restriction of movement/invisible barriers
7. What are the decisions that make people leave the country: do they feel that the threat is too big? What resources are needed to flee the country? Fleeing the country might not be a sustainable option. Some people might need to flee the continent all together
8. Disparity between men and women
9. Returnees seem to be much more targeted. Is there clear evidence for this? Smugglers sell packages of several attempts to relocate, showing a widely-held assumption that returnees will leave again.
10. IDPs might be less likely to use coyotes because that makes them more visible. They might go on their own or using *guías*.

## IMPACTS

1. Individual impacts:
  - a. There is a requirement to dig deeper on persistent insecurity causing vulnerability, violence against IDPs, repeat displacement; Family disintegration/fragmentation/separation
  - b. Economic impacts, including loss of land (and the need to check with state institutions for housing proxies as displacement might be leading to a significant loss of property) and businesses closing
  - c. Health impacts: Economic impacts of mobility on health. Medicos del Mundo are drafting work on the psychological effects of displacement.
  - d. Impacts on education: School desertion: MSF, Cristosal report on school desertion (November).
2. Community and national impacts:
  - a. Perception of lack of control and insecurity,
  - b. People move out and can't report crimes: erosion of rule of law;
  - c. Desertion leads to school closures;
  - d. Health and hospital closures;
  - e. Loss of productivity and human capital.

## CONCLUSION



### MAIN OUTCOMES

The workshop confirmed that there seems to be a general awareness of the need for reliable, comprehensive, interoperable and systematically collected data on internal displacement. Nevertheless, the lack of a system makes it hard for individual organisations to contribute and there are not enough incentives for one individual organisation to carry the burden of pioneering such a system. Instead, most organisations see the risks of opening up and sharing their data and express concerns about it. They do not, however, discard the option of being part of a regional monitoring system, as long as data protection concerns are addressed and someone else provides the necessary resources.

As most participants have expressed individually before, there is an urgent need for recognition and participation of states in protecting IDPs and preventing internal displacement. Civil Society and the international community can only do as much as states allow them to.

Participants agreed that direct as well as structural violence is the major driver of displacement in El Salvador. The experts in the field described this factor as “Las Violencias” (“The Violences”). This has affected the most vulnerable populations from Honduras and Guatemala, as well as El Salvador, throughout the three countries’ histories. The discussion of the framework also yielded agreement on the lack of democratic rule of law and social exclusion as enablers of structural violence. These factors have prevented individuals from achieving their full potential and, in turn, have damaged the countries’ social fabric for decades, eroding in a circular manner the governance structure and the rule of law.

### NEXT STEPS

For an adequate response to this crisis, the first step is full recognition of the problem. When people are left with no choice but to uproot their lives because of violence, response efforts are unfolding in the

context of displacement, not only voluntary migration. Policy and programming need to reflect that reality.

Secondly, there is no effective response without reliable data on the numbers, needs and locations of those most vulnerable, as well as the root causes of displacement. The national government must work with humanitarian and development partners to tackle both immediate needs and the underlying drivers of the crisis.

IDMC will continue its work, first by completing its report on Honduras and developing conceptual models for Honduras and Guatemala based on the research carried out and the feedback obtained during this workshop and second, by identifying persisting data gaps, making concrete recommendations, promoting the creation of a regional monitoring mechanism, and generally contributing to developing a more comprehensive insight into the scope and scale of internal displacement in the NTCA.

The report on drivers, triggers, patterns, and impacts of internal displacement in Honduras will build on the feedback received during the workshop. It will be complemented by additional research in country. Participants are encouraged to reach out if interested in peer-reviewing the final report. The development of the conceptual models for Honduras and Guatemala has already started in the days following this workshop. The results from the modelling workshop have directed the research towards analysing the causes of fragile states. The research obtained from this session and on fragile State will be used to improve a regional model of the drivers, triggers, impacts and patterns of displacement.

Regarding the measurement of internal displacement, IDMC will work with Cristosal and any other interested parties to improve the regional coordination for monitoring internal displacement as much as possible. Ideally, this will result in national and regional figures that help triangulate information provided by the governments and also lead to recognition of the phenomenon. Any organisation interested in taking part in this process is invited to contact [andres.lizcano@idmc.ch](mailto:andres.lizcano@idmc.ch) and join IDMC's efforts.

For the time being the question about the possibility of a regional monitoring system remains open. A clear way forward would be to build on Cristosal's platform, which is already in place. IDMC encourages organisations to volunteer to pilot this platform. Simultaneously, IDMC will spend the next year reaching out to governments, encouraging them to join efforts to improve understanding of the phenomenon in the region and to open and improve their data on internal displacement. Finally, IDMC will explore individual opportunities that have come to our attention during the workshop and which can help illustrate different aspects of the phenomenon through small samples of data that different organisations could make available.

IDMC will present the results of the project at a closing event in 2019. In the meantime we thank all partners and stakeholders for their active participation at the workshop, and will continue to support these efforts to reduce the risk of displacement in the NTCA.



Gift of the United States Government

## ANNEXES

### ANNEX A: HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT IN THE NTCA (NRC) - INTERVENTION BY DAVID GARCÍA

We thank the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) for this invitation. Greetings to who share this space and the guests in this event.

Before starting with our reading about the humanitarian situation I would like to emphasise that in the last decades there have been important revolutions to assist, prevent, protect and provide solutions for populations affected by violence; however, the humanitarians in the world continue to fail because we often do not understand correctly, who they are, where they are, how people affected by violence can cope with their new environments and how to respond to their situation in a most effective way.

For this reason, we consider fundamental, not only to know and contribute to the information presented today by the IDMC, but also invite you to join decisively this substantial initiative to achieve a better understanding and estimation of the displaced population. The situation in the colony of Mololoa in Tegucigalpa or in the Apopa municipality in El Salvador continues changing rapidly; violence as well. Only a better understanding of the situation will allow governments to make better decisions to continue saving lives and promote a humanitarian response where the population is at the centre of the response.

The Norwegian Refugee Council also takes this opportunity to greet the Government of Honduras for its leadership in recognising the situation of displacement and we highlight the efforts of the governments of Honduras and El Salvador to promote a better response to the situation of violence. However, for the Norwegian Council it is evident that there are people unattended and unprotected. Responding to this situation and to the challenges in the region will continue to require better regional cooperation and the strengthening of a network to find integral solutions to the situation of the lack of protection of hundreds of thousands of people.

My organisation also values the efforts and funding to characterise the population affected by violence; we invite governments, civil society and international cooperation organisations to promote, the voice of women, boys, girls and men continue be heard and recognised. It is vital to guarantee the broad participation of the population affected by the violence in the consultation processes, so that the policies and practices in favour of these populations provide hope to those forced to flee from their homes due to violence. For example, it is essential that the draft of the displacement law in Honduras reflect the recommendations and perspectives of the displaced people. The exercise that is currently being implemented under the leadership of the Commission of Forced Displacement [Honduras] is fundamental for this purpose. It is the work of the governments to transform the needs of the population affected by violence, in opportunities that allow them to enjoy effectively and on time their rights and humanitarian assistance.

Laws that allow us to orient the response to the humanitarian needs of the population affected by violence are vital instruments. Jose (name that we have changed for protect your identity) is a person recently assisted by the Norwegian [Refugee] Council. He and his family of four members were forced to flee their home in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2017 and in this year. Threats, intimidation, extortion, the murder of a child, coercion and physical violence were some of the violations that Jose related to my organisation.

Unfortunately, Jose in his testimony does not recognise displacement as a protection mechanism. However, he considers that having had a place where to sleep, food and opportunities to get out, his situation could have changed since his first displacement in 2010. We could learn from the case of Jose and how a legal framework that meets effectively and on time the humanitarian and protection needs is vital to respond to the needs of people who are forced to flee their homes. As in the case of Jose, the regulatory frameworks and their implementation could prevent the cycle of displacement from repeating indefinitely. For this reason my organisation invites the government of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala to agree and implement regulatory frameworks that meet international standards and ensure a rights-based approach for those who we consider are the most vulnerable people in these three countries.

On the other hand, we are showing that the gap between the magnitude of the humanitarian needs and our response capacity is challenging and growing. In Honduras and El Salvador, my organisation has supported three times more people affected by violence in 2018 than in the whole of 2016.

Unfortunately, many of the people assisted by the organisation do not have sufficient confidence in government institutions. For example, Jose, for eight years did not seek humanitarian assistance in government institutions. Alejandro, another case recently assisted by the organisation was a victim of extortion, intimidation, gender violence and physical aggression for approximately five years in the Medina neighbourhood in San Pedro Sula. For five years, he never denounced the violation of his rights by the members of a criminal gang. Additionally, a report led by the Norwegian [Refugee] Council describes that the gap between the people affected by the violence and governmental institutions is increased by the lack of special and quick procedures to assist people in need of protection and humanitarian assistance. The population affected by the violence interviewed for this report informed us that they lacked the confidence to file a complaint, request help or protection. 47 per cent of the cases interviewed by the organisation in Honduras and El Salvador did not request government assistance. This is one of the main reasons that prevent displaced persons from accessing protection mechanisms and humanitarian assistance.

In our daily work, we have been able to show that the priority sectors of humanitarian assistance for the population are: food, housing and livelihoods. Access to safe education is also a vital service for minors and young people. Most of the people assisted by the organisation considered that safety, humanitarian assistance and dignified treatment provide hope in a situation that is often described as hopeless.

In fact, the humanitarian response in contexts of violence can generate changes to improve the future of the population. For example, the response of the Norwegian Council in Honduras has shown that when emergency assistance is delivered taking into account the needs and aspirations of displaced people, the population will successfully integrate into their new environment. One woman used emergency cash resources that the organisation offered her to start her shoe business, a man to buy fish and now owns a fish business and a family started with two pigs and now has a meat shop. In these real situations, the analysis of the causes of the displacement, the desires of the people affected by the violence and their participation in the identification of their needs in the response was key so that, from the first phase of their displacement, opportunities for change will be linked. A mother in San Pedro Sula told us that she was afraid because she could not feed her children after displacing. At the same time his family separated, one of its members began the journey to the north of the continent. He never came back. We cannot let more time pass to transform fear into humanitarian assistance and family separation into livelihood opportunities to keep families together affected by violence. Today we need to better understand the situation that surrounds us in order to transform an imperfect response into one that dignifies the population affected by the violence in the region.

## ANNEX B: OPENING REMARKS BY CECILIA JIMENEZ-DAMARY, SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Ladies and gentlemen,

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs). First, let me thank the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) for the opportunity to speak at this event aimed at taking stock of the progress and challenges of the first year of their project on understanding and estimating displacement in the Northern Triangle of Central America. I welcome IDMC's contribution, through these studies, to the ongoing reflection about displacement caused by generalised and gang-related violence with a view to understanding better the phenomenon so as to provide evidence base for operational and policy responses in the region.

I have had the opportunity to witness myself that ongoing internal displacement in the Northern Triangle of Central America due to various causes, including displacement triggered by widespread criminal and gang related violence, has a devastating impact on the lives of those affected. The engagement of my mandate on this phenomenon in the region gained momentum with my predecessor's official visit to Honduras in November 2015 and his subsequent working visits to El Salvador and Honduras in August 2016. Upon my assumption of the position, this momentum was maintained with my official visit to El Salvador in August 2017, as well as subsequent academic and working visits to Guatemala, Honduras and, just recently, to neighbouring Mexico.

At the time of Prof. Chaloka Beyani's first visit to Honduras, community members described to him violence, threats and intimidations, killings of family members, extortion, rape and murder of women and girls, and an environment of such fear and insecurity, often as a result of the activities of gangs known as maras, that they felt compelled to leave their homes for other parts of the country or, when their options in Honduras have been exhausted, to seek safety outside the country. He noted that a heightened security response alone would not solve the problem of violence and internal displacement and in some cases may even contribute to the problems faced by communities. Communities did not wish to see greater militarisation of their neighbourhoods as they frequently perceived the military and police as well as newly formed bodies such as the military police as an additional threat to them rather than creating conditions of security. My predecessor emphasised that social policy and development measures, including providing employment and livelihood opportunities and tackling high poverty rates, were also essential both immediately and in the medium and long-term. In 2015, a characterisation study on internal displacement caused by violence in twenty municipalities estimated that some 174,000 persons were internally displaced, while acknowledging that that real numbers could be much higher throughout the country. My predecessor noted that comprehensive data remained challenging, including on IDPs' locations, specific needs and protection concerns. Some important measures have since then been taken by the Government of Honduras to recognise and address the phenomenon, including the establishment of the Inter-Agency Commission on Persons Internally Displaced by Violence, the undertaking of a second characterisation study in 2018, and the development of a draft law for the prevention of internal displacement and protection of IDPs.

I myself undertook an official visit to El Salvador in August 2017. The challenge of high levels of internal displacement, caused by an epidemic of generalised, gang-related violence, with homicide levels above most conflict-affected countries, was a hidden and publicly unacknowledged crisis. Victims of violence and internal displacement commonly had to take their safety and protection measures into their own hands, due to the lack of an effective state protection system for IDPs. Efforts undertaken by the

government of El Salvador, including the recent launch of the profiling study on internal mobility due to violence, which was conducted by the authorities, the Protection cluster and the Joint IDPs Profiling Service (JIPS), are welcomed first steps to prevent and address violence and protect victims. However, a national legal and policy framework to prevent and respond to internal displacement remains urgently needed, along with a clear institutional focal point with an appropriate mandate and budget, so as to effectively extend protection to internally displaced persons. While the difficulties facing the government are significant, fully acknowledging the challenges of internal displacement is an essential yet currently missing step in effectively confronting the crisis and providing the necessary protection and durable solutions for internally displaced persons.

To conclude, I would like to once again welcome IDMC's engagement on these issues and to wish them all the best in the second year of the project.

Thank you.

## ANNEX C: AGENDA

Understanding and estimating internal displacement in the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA)  
*Stakeholder conference and technical workshop*

Tuesday, 25 – Wednesday 26 September 2018

Sala Galería, Hotel Plaza Juan Carlos

Tegucigalpa, Honduras

### *Overall Objectives*

1. Launch full reports and findings on the drivers, triggers, impacts and patterns of internal displacement in El Salvador and Guatemala, accompanied by printed copies of executive summaries in English and Spanish.
2. Launch a Cristosal-IDMC case study on returns to El Salvador.
3. Introduce first iteration of the System Dynamics model for El Salvador and identify steps and key partners to refine and expand to Guatemala y Honduras countries during Year Two.
4. Hold a live peer review session reviewing initial research from Honduras and determine timeline for launch in Geneva in late 2018.
5. Update and complete data partner mapping and lay the groundwork for a regional monitoring mechanism and work plan for Year Two of the project.
6. Expand and confirm partner network and focal points in the region, notably key government agencies from all three countries.

### *Day 1: Tuesday, 25 September*

9.30 - 10.00	<b>Coffee and registration</b>
10.00 - 10.15	<b>Welcome</b> Elizabeth Rushing (IDMC)
	<b>Introductory remarks</b> Elizabeth Bailey (Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission, Honduras)
10.15 - 12.15	<b>Report launch and panel discussion</b> David Garcia (NRC): Humanitarian context in the NTCA



## ANNEX D: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

<i>Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Email</i>	<i>Country</i>
Marcos Ramírez Domingo	Asociación Pop No'j	popnojoreintadorlegal@gmail.com	Guatemala
Jaime Florez	Casa Alianza Honduras	jaimeflorespineda@gmail.com	Honduras
Juan Carlos Salgado	Casa Alianza Honduras	juancarlossalgadocerrato@gmail.com	Honduras
Meghan Lopez	Comite Internacional de rescate	meghan.lopez@rescue.org	El Salvador
Erlan Fabricio Escoto	CONADEH	analistaudfi@conadeh.hn	Honduras
Rina Montti	Cristosal	rina.monti@cristosal.org	El Salvador
Carlos Sierra	Cristosal Honduras	carlos.sierra@criastosal.org	Honduras
Luis Rivera	Cristosal Honduras	luis.rivera@cristosal.org	Honduras
Maria Grazia Pressacco	Cruz Roja Española	del.mgpre@cruzroja.es	Honduras
Sebastian Silva	Cruz Roja Noruega	sebastian.silva.costa@redcross.no	Honduras
Ninoska sarahy alfaro	Dirección de Niñez, Adolescencia y Familia (DINAF)	-	Honduras
Raquel Chaicoj	El Refugio de la Niñez	coordinacioneproyectos02@refugiodelaninez.org.gt	Guatemala
Ivonne Salgado	IOM	isalgado@iom.int	Honduras
Emy Sierra Lagos	NRC	emy.sierra@nrc.no	Honduras
Guillem Vallbona	NRC	guillem.vallbona@nrc.no	Panama
Isa Pereyra	NRC	jesus.sanchez@nrc.no	Honduras
Ludim Ayala	NRC	ludim.ayala	Honduras
Suzanna Nelson-Pollard	NRC	suzanna.nelson-pollard@nrc.no	Panama
Roberto Canizales	OIM	rcaizales@iom.int	Honduras

Carlos R. Rosales	OXFAM Honduras	carlos.rosales@oxfam.org	Honduras
Zelena Rodriguez Alfaro	PADF	Zrodriguez@padf.org	Honduras
Aurora Midence	PMH - Hnas Scalabrinianas	churrascofara@gmail.com	Honduras
Hna.Ligia Ruiz Gamba	PMH - Hnas. Scalabrinianas	pmhtgs.1991@gmail.com	Honduras
Aura Beatriz Sosa Alvarez	Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos de Guatemala	asosa@pdh.org.gt	Guatemala
Alejandra Hernandez Rojas	PTA Calidad de vida	psicologiapta@gmail.com	Honduras
Brenda Yessenia Amaya	PTA Calidad de vida	pedagogiapta@gmail.com	Honduras
Heydy Paola Rodriguez Ramirez	PTA Calidad de vida	heydypaolaramirez@gmail.com	Honduras
Melisa Elizabeth Murillo	PTA Calidad de vida	melisaelizabeth.ts@gmail.com	Honduras
Olga Vnodchenko	Seattle International Foundation	olga@seaif.org	USA
Roberto Lopez	SEDH	robertoddhh@gmail.com	Honduras
Andres Eduardo Carias	UNHCR	ecariaslive@hotmail.com	Honduras
Jonathan Mendoza	UNHCR	mendozaj@unhcr.org	Honduras
Elizabeth Bailey	US Embassy	-	Honduras
Kate Suplick	US Embassy	SuplickKL@state.gov	Honduras
Anthony Brand	USAID Honduras	abrand@usaid.gov	Honduras
Elizabeth Rushing	Intornal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)	elizabeth.rushing@idmc.ch	Geneva
Adrian Calvo-Valderrama	Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)	adrian.calvo@idmc.ch	Geneva
Andrés Lizcano Rodriguez	Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)	andres.lizcano@idmc.ch	Bogota

## ANNEX E: SYSTEM DYNAMICS CONCEPTS

System Dynamics is a methodology that helps understand how things change over time. It is a mathematical model and a graphical representation of a complex system. This methodology combines the strength of mental models and computational models. Mental models are the combination of the mental database extracted from experience and judgment, and the basis of human activity, along with the written database, comprised of books, newspapers, scientific articles, etc. The major strength of mental models is the tremendous level of information available. Mental models are rich and often sufficiently accurate about the pieces of a system<sup>4</sup>, what information is available, who is connected to whom, what different people are trying to achieve. But mental models are uncertain of the expected behaviour that will result from the interconnection of these pieces through time. Feedback processes theory and computational models help reduce this uncertainty, by offering principles on what pieces to select and how to structure them to build certainty on the expected behaviour.

### Feedback Processes: How to structure a SD model?

Most of the time, we think about every situation in a linear manner. We are presented with information about a situation, then we perform an action, and expect certain results. We fail to visualise that the result provides new information about the situation which in turn control our next actions. This is a closed-loop way of understanding our surroundings. It is a structure that underlies all collection of interconnected elements. A simple example is the action of filling a glass with water: we open the tap of water, let it flow until it fills the glass of water. This is a half-truth. The other half is the information the level of water in the glass provides. We receive the information, compare it with our desired goal and close the tap accordingly.

### Feedback Processes: What elements to select?

In abstraction, a feedback process is a differential equation of first order consisting of three elements: a desired goal, the level of information and the rate of flow (or how this level changes). When building a model of change, we need to take into account the change for each of the elements described in the mental models. We must analyse what levels provide the information that changes the flows of actions. The level of a complexity of a model lays on capturing the correct behaviour of multiple elements, by themselves and interconnected one with each other. Where mental models fail to provide these estimations, computer models excel in solving them.

Next, the presentation provided the guidelines to read and build a graphical representation of a System Dynamics Model. Abstracting the differential equation model, onto a series of variables and arrows, the presenter reviewed four topics: direction, polarity, behaviour and shifting dominance.

#### *Direction*

This topic refers to the direction of the causality between two, and only two, variables. The set of variables is formed by a cause and an effect. The head of the arrow points towards the effect.

#### *Polarity*

For each arrow (or cause and effect relationship) there are two possible types of behaviour. Starting from the cause, if the effect grows when one unit is added to the cause, the effect is considered as having the same behaviour. Contrary to this, if the effect declines when one unit is added to the cause, the effect is considered as having the opposite behaviour.

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<sup>4</sup> Forrester, Jay. "Some Basic Concepts in System Dynamics". 2009. Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

### Behaviour

Behaviour is a characteristic of a feedback loop. Consider the polarities and the number of arrows conforming the loop. If the number of arrows is even, the loop has a reinforcing behaviour: that means the loop is growing. Contrary to this, if the number of arrows is odd, the loop has a balancing or stabilising loop: that means the loop presents a growth towards a goal.

### Shifting dominance

The combination of the two behaviours create oscillations in the final behaviour. The growth trend would be determined by the dominance of each loop.

Finally, the introduction to System Dynamics concluded that the use of System Dynamics is not about developing a precise model, rather a realistic behaviour pattern, a behaviour created by the right causes.

## ANNEX F: FACTORS

Table. Excluding economic system

<i>HND</i>	<i>SLV</i>	<i>GTM</i>	<i>REGION</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Income</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Latifundista</i> and <i>Minifundista</i> System</li> <li>▪ Economic System</li> <li>▪ Megaprojects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Poverty</li> </ul>

Table. Lack of democratic rule of law

<i>HND</i>	<i>SLV</i>	<i>GTM</i>	<i>REGION</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Corruption.</li> <li>▪ State inoperancia.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Impunity and corruption.</li> <li>▪ Lack of protection systems.</li> <li>▪ Lack of reduction of violence.</li> <li>▪ Lack of victim assistance.</li> <li>▪ Criminal structure within State.</li> <li>▪ Repressive security policies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Violence instrumentalisation.</li> <li>▪ Army control of the state.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Corruption</li> </ul>

Table. Violence culture

<i>HND</i>	<i>SLV</i>	<i>GTM</i>	<i>REGION</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The violences (direct, structural, cultural)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Internal Armed Conflict.</li> <li>▪ Patriarchal System.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Violence normalisation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Media show.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Table. Social exclusion

Agriculture industrialisation displaced people; then, (state) armed conflict displaced people, then, armed conflict (organised crime) displaced people.

<i>HND</i>	<i>SLV</i>	<i>GTM</i>	<i>REGION</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Interculturality. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Different worldviews.</li> <li>○ Ethnicity.</li> <li>○ Discrimination to stop being indigenous.</li> <li>○ Direct violence (drug trafficking vs. discrimination).</li> <li>○ Less capacity of discrimination from the state.</li> <li>○ There is no access to education.</li> <li>○ GTM: Indigenous discrimination.</li> <li>○ SLV &amp; HND: poverty.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Social exclusion.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Gender</li> </ul>	

Table. Weakened educational system

<i>HND</i>	<i>SLV</i>	<i>GTM</i>	<i>REGION</i>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Education</li> </ul>

Humanitarian Affectations (SLV) (No other themes).

Table. Organised crime

<i>HND</i>	<i>SLV</i>	<i>GTM</i>	<i>REGION</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Drug Trafficking</li> <li>▪ Gangs</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Drug Trafficking</li> </ul>